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SUMMARY  
 
Language establishes through its canonical force categories in which life and world are 
determined and in which translation fulfils the ideology of universal readability. In 
Sotto Voce. Translating the phenomenon … I argue that the politics of universal appeal 
of language is with the question of forming, a formalisation of content that must be 
thought outside of linguistic fixation, on the grounds of a linguistic happening without 
content. This paradoxical happening wrestles with the concepts of belonging, becoming 
and engaging. The perplexity of no referenciality and no translatability is indeed a 
hyperphenomenon that enacts multiple stories of an untold life in an untold world. It is 
about an oblique answer that grazes through the materialisation of the phenomenon by 
referring to a phenomenology of language that boldly unfolds the traces of (its very 
own) indexicality: the powerful structure of the signifié-signifiant operation in which 
the subject and the object can be contracted lays suddenly bare and provokes a 
vulnerable exposition of life and world. On this basis, the phenomenological attempt of 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty teases up reading possibilities in which the metaphorical 
gaze shifts the power play of fixation and denomination and invites us to emphasise on 
the dynamic options of translation and its linguistic usage. By emphasising the 
enactment of language we have to shift the optics from grammar to performance, from 
index to style and from explaining to story telling. Hence, translation in a world full of 
dispositions is a life full of compositions and pleas therefore for biographical writings 
by emphasising: ecco homo … or probably very not!?    
 
 
 II 
PRELIMINARIES  
 
 
“trans late better nie als gar nicht zu spät in den brunnen mon 
enfant die federn und der snowman im sommer tu danses on the  
bright side of life 
 
über setzen und stehen zu besseren stunden trop tard in the  
fountain my child you’re born sans plumes und der scheemann 
schmilzt im tanz der lichtjahre” 
Heike Fiedler1 
 
 
The movens of this thesis is to outline how a phenomenon without content 
operationalises transfer practices and how translation-figurations shape the fashion of 
life and world without having language; it is an attempt to foster daily life practices 
without having necessarily life and practice. A phenomenology of writing is thus the 
description mode that cannot describe within its semantic framework life and world but 
rather writes the immersive power of the phenomenon in its oblique gesture: the 
subsidiary is suddenly in the centre – a fragile centre – without being aware of it. Yes, a 
phenomenological reading of translation exposes life and world in shame, since there is 
no language, no grammar, no canon: this psychopathological credo happens when the 
(linguistic) mimicry of the phenomenon is suspended in its synthetic practice; indeed, 
we have to declare that the exposition of life-world is never the compositum of life and 
world. On the contrary, we should state firmly that the compositum life-world is the 
phenomenological ground reality in which philologia moves out its artillery by 
pronouncing the gestalthafte content of the phenomenon without content: the lexeme is 
the arché of life-world and therefore it is the symptom of translating life-world as the 
regulation of its regulative; the negation no is the very negativity of yes and shame is 
just another expression of the therapeutic healing process – indeed, the radical position 
of having no language is for a tiny moment suspended. This ambiguous situation is the 
phenomenological attempt of being in life-world and it is the very starting point of 
writing a phenomenological project in which the hermeneutical power of language 
colours up the frozen life of the unknown: the categories of life and world (HUA XXIX 
                                                            
1 Cf. Heike Fiedler’s langues de meehr (Fiedler 2010: 72). 
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142) are the healing procedure of the historical spectrum by writing life-world. Hence, 
the Garden of Eden as methodological reference point describes the mirror effect of the 
phenomenon and eases up the spectrum as concretisation of the criterion. Indeed, the 
fixation of history is the explosive operation of the linguistic feature enabling a 
particular Auffassungssinn (HUA XIX/1 430ff) that arises (HUA XIX/1 79f) in its 
particularity the very criterion of life and world. In these contact-zones the 
phenomenological endeavour resembles a playful child in its playpen: there are plenty 
of possibilities to discover the (playpen) world but the regulative force of possibilities is 
given by the construction of the playpen. The construction conditions the entanglement 
of possibilities enhancing regional settings of life-worldly features as momentum of 
translation. Hence, understanding the unknown and the known is not given by top-down 
patterns but as a lateral proposition in which possibilities are inter-mingled; it is where 
life-world is outlined as unity in difference (Waldenfels 2005: 31). These lines enable 
us to write the mimicry of the phenomenon since the adaptability of the phenomenon 
towards life-world is only limited by its degree of incorporation. As consequence, it 
remains a descriptive product of the life-worldly arché. The logoi of the topography are 
the reduction of the grammar in their practice and they are measured by the 
formalisation of episteme through the ego. Hans Blumenberg writes that this kind of 
notification is the basic understanding of human beings and therefore a product of 
formalisation (Blumenberg 1963: 26). In concreto, Husserl turns the formalisation of 
life-world into a phenomenological panoptic of transcendental epoché: life-world is not 
only the phenomenological fundamentum of facticity, the essence of life-world is rather 
underpinned by the transcendental reduction in which the ego is clothed with a 
transcendental coat. Hence, a typology of life-world is incorporated by the very 
responsibility realm and by the devices of transcendental condition features. In other 
words, the transcendental turn within Husserl’s phenomenology is very much due to its 
Macht der Selbstverständlichkeit (HUA VI 183) and due to the synchronised feature of 
having an exit-strategy that is inscribed in the appellation of exit – this kind of 
circularity is indeed the organon of Bewusstsein-analysis. And therefore, the 
transcendental regulation is the recourse of the linguistic arché that clutches generously 
with the means of life and world. In the wake of transcendental epoché the psyche of 
bios serves as formalisation of the life-worldly project. The landscape of Husserl’s 
phenomenology tames the instrument of linguistic practices into the playpen of 
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experiences, in which the economy of out there and in here are ruled by the taxonomy 
of order.  
 
For this kind of phenomenological spectre, the phenomenon without content is 
completely indifferent and just a grotesque vision of an emblematic signification of 
seeing, tasting, smelling and hearing life and world. The dia-legein of the expression 
experience is subsumed under the formula of transcendental singularity in which the 
incomprehension is colonialised by a signifié. The arché of the signifié-singularity will 
be questioned and perverted by Merleau-Ponty’s essentialism: the singular is never 
singular and the arché is never arché. His turn describes indiscreetly the possibility of a 
linguistic arché as savage being. It is a practice in which phenomenology greets the 
Selbstverständlichkeit by holding a scattered mirror towards it; the scattered reflection is 
Merleau-Ponty’s oblique understanding of life-world in which a linguistic arché is 
never given but translated indirectly. Yielding the economy of out there and in here 
conditions a third partner who is actually never a stakeholder; Merleau-Ponty will 
embed the indirectness of the third partner within our very corporal existence as a pre-
subjective and pre-objective settlement that strives for ambiguity as modus vivendi: the 
visible and invisible is also the tactile (VNV 175). The threshold of these zones enables 
us to live with the tactility of seeing as the amplitude of life-worldly practices. The 
ambiguity of life-world is not the re-arrangement of the economic relationship in which 
the phenomenon is negotiated in correspondence to its content but rather a phenomenon 
without content is the enactment of phenomenon without content. This radical line, 
turning the existence of being into its very own interrogation will be enacted by a third 
corporal partner who extends her- / him- / itself into chair du monde2. With reference to 
Merleau-Ponty’s essay Le cinéma et la nouvelle psychologie (SNS 61-75), we have to 
say that the phenomenon without content takes possession of our very own perception 
somewhere else. This somewhere else is the code for the impossibility of perceiving 
phenomenon without content directly – it is a punctum caecum (VNV 295) that begs for 
the indefinite wideness in which the savage corporal being is extended to itself. The 
amplification of phenomenology with Merleau-Ponty reaches a quality that radically 
excludes the dialects of positivities and qualities while wrapping the carnal body as 
                                                            
2 Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s remark on the carnal body: “Or le domaine, on s’en aperçoit vite, est illimité. Si 
nous pouvons montrer que la chair est une notion dernière, qu’elle n’est pas union ou composé de deux 
substances, mais pensable par elle-même, s’il y a un rapport à lui-même du visible qui me traverse et me 
constitue en voyant, ce cercle que je ne fais pas, qui me fait, cet enroulement du visible sur le visible, peut 
traverser, animer d’autres corps aussi bien que le mien, (...)” (VNV 183). 
 V 
savage existence into a theology of becoming the voice. This gestalthhafte 
rapprochement is the non-existent becoming of life-worldly practices and enables us to 
grasp sotto voce as a practice to hear the scent of the voice while hushing through the 
scenery of life and world. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty’s scattered life-worldly 
perceptions are finally fixed by the sprout of life-worldly presence – this presence 
writes on the other hand the coordinates of life and world. A phenomenology of a 
willenlose co-presence is definitely another transfer within the transfer zone. However 
this transfer zone remains, in its phenomenology, as working basis within the psychosis 
of linguistic practices – phenomenology as language fluctuates between foundation and 
becoming presence. Who says phenomenology says paronym but means homonym; this 
reduced totality claims that in lingua esse est percipi. Nothing is willenlos and definitely 
in phenomenological life-worldly presence, the co-presence is translated in situ. The 
very transfer zone and in extension the very translational practice of language remains 
within esse. The hermeneutical practice of life-world remains a descriptive instrument 
of translation insofar as the transfer zone illuminates each corner of a life-worldly 
scenery. However, we have seen with Merleau-Ponty that a particular reading of 
phenomenology enables us to graft the graphein of a transcendental epoché in its 
transfer-practice. In the progress of this thesis we might be able to see how the graphein 
of phenomenology undermines in its linguistic practise the coordinates of translation. 
We will deconstruct the linguistic theology of authority through its very lack. Indeed, it 
will be a cross examination of phenomenological practice by exploring the Ideenhimmel 
of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty but it will also be a cross analysis of German 
transcendental phenomenology and French ontological savagery.  
 
By reading phenomenological features through the lenses of Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty, we can observe how translation practices infiltrate knowledge, power and life. 
And it might be also a clue for how language fosters the colouring act of the scenery 
through its smelly lack. We will approach a translational zone not simply by analysing 
the analogia zone of phenomenon and without content but rather by assuming its 
identity in practice and in life-world. Thereby we do not only have to consider the 
relationship of nature and culture but we have to go much more further by questioning 
the relatum of nature–nature’–culture–culture’ as the practice of utterance. This 
doubling remembers the impossibility of reality in which the filters of episteme 
(language), praxes (practise) and poiesis (performance) overrule Paul de Man’s politics 
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of “(…) [the] necessary phenomenality of any positing (setzen)” (De Man 1997: 113). 
The triple filter of this vacuum marks the translational zone in which the positing of 
semiosis is the corrupted movement from A to B and therefore an inadequacy. The 
inadequacy stumbles the very linguistic practice that writes a phenomenon without 
content. It is not only Freud’s battle call Fort Da! (Freud 1967: 11-15) but it is much 
more about an inadequacy that nevertheless writes the name. The inadequacy of 
graphein is the Einfall of the dialectics of language, in which wording stumbles over 
writing the name – it is the indefinite over the stumbling that writes the material of the 
name. Language is therefore the locus for citation; it is the citation of the name that 
courts the arché of language while violating the fault line of dia-legein in its dia-logoi: 
it is the non-linearity of language that writes the name of incongruency. Or to put it in 
other words, the citation stumbles over the logos of dia in which the punctum of legein 
writes the material consumption of the name. Hence, language is not archaeology nor is 
it the extrapolation of the arché in space and time. The dialectics of language is the 
frozen citation in which materiality flows out the Einfall of inadequacy. The history of 
the material is thus a long citation that cannot simply be captured by the sign of the 
name, in which the generalisation of history is the fall of ars signorum, of semiosis and 
of episteme-praxis-poesis. It is the radical friction with the normative understanding of 
Humboldt’s language eudaimonia: no grammar enables us to travel through life, world 
and history. It is this radical friction in which translation cannot fulfil the role of being a 
mediator, surveyor and a marker of the citation. Through the inter-connection of life-
language-translation-world we have to revise the formula of translation fundamentally; 
translation is neither the linear movement from A to B in which the continuum of 
history is imprinted nor is it Walter Benjamin’s Umschlagplatz. The dramaturgy of 
writing A to B is the fall of the long citation that writes the inadequacy of the name – 
phenomenon without content whilst nameless will be named not by translating the less 
but by marking a name for it; the nameless of the name is the stumbling over the 
citation and it is therefore not an institution of continuity in which process, production, 
network and differentiation write the formatting of the name and in which we pretend to 
know what is transported. The features of rhetoric, the art of allegories, metaphors, 
synecdoche and the realms of metonymies are the forgotten practices in history, while 
the fall episteme-practice-poesis is actually the Einfall of inadequacy. Thus, the act of 
translation is a resentful undoing that is neither dispositum nor compositum but positum: 
XNkhk;, vdJ epiy, Nkw;Nfhs;fisj; jLkhw;Wk;, rpy;yhiynad;W Rtprpy; ngw;nwLj;J, 
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gupRj;j rpYitf; fd;dpau; vd;Dk; goq;FbapdUld; tsu;j;J ghAk; gypahf khw;WU 
nfhLj;J, cyfpw;Ff; ifaspj;jhs;, vd;id, vd; md;id. Indeed, translation is not the 
historised universal acclaim where my name is a citation, the phenomenon without 
content of remo reginold is probably the permanent graphein of a citation-anagram that 
never happened3.  
 
                                                            
3 Tanja Stähler outlines the potential of phenomenological translation practices in her Translator’s preface 
of the German version of Antony Steinbock’s Home and Beyond (1995): “Es wäre ein überaus 
interessantes und fruchtbares Projekt, über die Implikationen der husserlschen Theorie von Heim- und 
Fremdwelt für eine Phänomenologie der Übersetzung nachzudenken” (Steinbock 2003: 20). This thesis 
and especially its compositional rhetoric of the citation that never happened might be an answer to 
Stähler’s attempt.  
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Overview 
 
Chapter I: Husserl’s epoché system in progressum 
 
In this chapter, I will examine how the universality of language fixes a transcendental 
life-world by reflecting Husserl’s unitary prediction of reducing. The epoché formula is 
not the transformation of A to B but rather the intensification of A as A’. It is the 
echoing of Plato’s totality that writes the intensification of founding life and world in 
life-world. But it does not only echo Plato’s universality, it also refers to Aristotle’s 
compulsion of classification scheme that combines and translates the categories A and 
B; it is this organon of universal classification writing the panopticon of 
phenomenological reduction in which the categories of A and B are reduced to the 
ability of intuition by subjecting it to the unitary-predicate. The conversion of Plato and 
Aristotle will be reflected upon the translation formula A as A’ while accepting the 
pregnancy of the dynameion AS. The figuration of the lived space is the topos from 
which the centre and its selection configure the transfer as dépassement. The 
dépassement figura is inscribed in the As-formula of complex synthetic acts (HUA 
XX/II 239) and decision-meaning processes (HUA XX/II 283) in which the reference of 
language will serve as eidetic instrument. The secure soil of referring to references is 
secured by the unity of the predicate and is translated by the copula: the copula is is the 
execution of the reduction in which life-worldly holism is fixed by the categories A and 
B. Therefore, we will see that in Husserl’s life-worldly project the transfer zone will be 
always empiric; indeed, we have to work off the transcendental depiction of the essence 
in life and world by reducing the empiric figura of dépassement to the very existence of 
the copula is. It is this institutionalised consensus of forming the hidden variations of 
possibilities that makes our task visible. The act of translating is therefore a theorised 
empirical facticity of using linguistic features in life and world.    
 
 
Chapter II: Merleau-Ponty’s savagery  
 
The AS-figura of being pregnant will be Merleau-Ponty’s pregnancy test in which the 
preposition as will be overruled by the ontology of the preposition IN. The horizon of 
writing a non-language is the pregnancy-test that will trouble Husserl’s 
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phenomenological life-worldly project insofar as Merleau-Ponty starts much more 
deeper than by testing the values of life and world via linguistic features. The corporal 
body shovels much more deeply than a phenomenology of language could bear and the 
copula could fix life and world. The circumventing of the categorising copula is the 
deepness that does however not mean that une ontologie sauvage will end up in the 
universality of language. The phenomenological translational zone happens somewhere 
else where the fragility of the moment re-addresses the reality by telling the other story, 
to which you will not be willing to listen. It is an approach towards senses which break 
with the ego and its corresponding Bewusstsein. Merleau-Ponty’s corporal rhetoric is 
probably deeply imbedded in the very difference of form and materia that can only be 
translated chiastically as a kind of religious mediation. It is probably the very scholastic 
tradition that reveals the translational zone: with Merleau-Ponty we will discover that 
the Gestalt redeems form and materia of the corporal body in which chiastic 
entanglements of passivity and action, of human beings and God, of living and dying, 
etc. are inscribed into sarx. It is this pathological anathema that keeps the corporal 
language of life-worldly stability instable. We have already expressed with the 
phenomenon without content that the relentless reality of ambiguity will not be resolved 
in magnificat … let us see! 
 
 
Chapter III: Perplex Coenesthesia 
 
This chapter re-depicts Husserl’s transcendental reduction force of the copula and 
Merleau-Ponty’s pathology of sarx by overriding the relation-formula: I will 
fundamentally reject the transcendental dialectics of linguistic relations; there is no 
signifié-signifiant-mastery but there is also no signifiant flottant (Lévi-Strauss 1950: 
XLIX). My phenomenological approach is going outwards, leaving the re-assuring 
transcendental soil and the playful ontological savagery of describing possibilities 
behind me by questioning the phenomenon without content. In fact this undertaking 
strips off the logos of phenomenology – we rather have to say that a phenomenology of 
writing is under these circumstances phenomenographein. It is about a willenloses 
Beiwerk that writes translation by bearing its co-presence – translation is in that sense 
the ultimate disintegration with grammar and knowledge. The figuration of writing a 
phenomenon without content is the spur of non-existence: a catachresis that rather 
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provokes than reconciles. But ultimately, a translation practice of writing the non-
existence of punctum is the paradoxon in which the translation practice fosters the non-
content of linguistic usage by actually using language with content: indeed, translation 
remains our drama!   
 1 
I. HUSSERL’S EPOCHÉ SYSTEM AD PROGRESSUM 
 
The task of transcendental foundation is to outline how knowledge can be possible or 
more precisely how objective knowledge (HUA XVII XXVII) tames life-word realities; 
it is very much about the question of how the realm of this world’s materiality is 
translated into netherworld ideas and how life is the Limesidee (HUA VIII 162 and 309) 
of formulating the very facticity of a secularised world. It is much about the facticity 
calling out the equivocation of life and world as its regulative consumption while the 
premise of limes draws the transcendental line of the signifiant to its mundane signifié. 
By associating dynamis with the premises of signifié-signifiant, we have to consider 
how the realms of thought could engineer the act of declaring the signifié and the 
signifiant in respect of life-worldly practices4. In reference to this life-world panopticon, 
we will be aware that transcendental circumstances explain the conditions of 
dependency between the realms of A and B, eidos and eidolon and the actor and the act 
since the transcendental task tries to capture the liminal dynamis of knowledge-
conditions for producing its respective (life-world) object: objective knowledge is the 
grid for subjectivity, its perception-forms and its practices. The immanent task of 
transcendentality yields the very obvious movement of nourishing the moving grid from 
subject contingency to object facticity; the transcendental line is much more about a 
differentiation in vivo, the difference of subject and object, of A and B and actor and act 
is more about a differentiation as interaction: the grammatical as – not only a 
conjunction but also a function of analogia entis – reflects the ground-reality of 
analogical forces in linguistic productions where we do not simply translate A to B, or A 
as B but A as A’; the apostrophe is the operation engineering the vividness of the fatum 
by stabilising the practices in life. In other words, the apostrophe is the Limesidee that 
bridges life and world while writing the very prolepsis of knowledge. Therefore, the 
differential inflecting apostrophe is far more of a dense and frictional happening writing 
A as A’ to B than A as A’. The intensification and excess of A’ reflects the twist in 
reading transcendental lines: the a priori conditions of possible experiences are 
simultaneously the condition possibilities of any object of experience (KrV A 111). In 
accordance to this catabasis of peregrination, the objective target of translation is not 
                                                            
4 The signifié-signifiant structure enforces the idea of an anthropological constant in which human beings 
are able to perceive themselves from another point of view through the means of language by assuming 
that the last reflective mode of any human being is its cognitional condition.  
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the out-of-my-range-perception but the perception of an object, a translated B that has 
an intrinsic necessity of how the out-of-my-range-perception happens. An objective 
deduction of the A and B relationship is therefore inevitable and has to accept ex 
negativo that subjective foundation is up to a certain point the out-of-this-world-
contingency while dreaming of the prolepsis of in-this-world-facticity. Hence, the 
condition possibilities of experience should be alike the condition possibilities of the 
objects as experience; this is where A to B turns into A as A’ to B.  
 
Hence, these introductory remarks outline that translation is lately based on the firm 
foundation of objectivity (KrV A 111). The objective deduction offers intrinsically (life-
world) categories to signify the transcendental apperception of the utmost principle 
stabilising life-world; pure transcendental apperception, the character of A’ outlines in 
my reading the conditio humana and the condition of classifying knowledge as bedrock 
of life-world while depicting the condition possibilities of being bios, and in extension, 
enacting in its bios ability its linguistic ability. Within this kind of theoretical practise, 
language complies with a special role and links to Husserl’s endeavours for 
phenomenological readings: language and transcendental phenomenology follow 
special movements of mutual illumination – in particular, we have to read 
transcendental phenomenology as a setting that includes and encompasses language as a 
part of phenomenology while fulfilling phenomenological functions5.  
 
In respect thereof, translation is a theoretical theme of reflection and in the same 
moment a reflexive practise by being constantly involved in the dynamic of 
transcendental enactments, in which language finds its own determinacy. This kind of 
conditioning follows its own velocity: it speeds up the understanding of the translation-
process but it slows down the agent of expression and meaning; this retarded 
synchronicity acts in a particular mode of formality and circularity but also in a 
particular mode of vividness. Though, on the one hand this mode serves as a figuration 
of a phenomenological approach, but on the other it suggests a hint that exceeds its 
formal function and formulates its own velocity out of the phenomenological box. At 
this very point language connects with the constitutional and revealing turn of the 
transcendental phenomenological fact: language determines an index of life-world and 
                                                            
5  Language influences not only Husserl’s phenomenological sketches but also the relationship of 
psychology and life-world in general; I refer especially to Karl Bühler (1933) and Roman Ingarden 
(1931). The trias phenomenology–language–psychology is an important constellation of re-thinking life-
world and will be constantly re-negotiated in this thesis.     
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likewise is a practise of life-world – linguistic practices stabilise vividness. Henceforth, 
theory and practise manifest a new relationship and it would be an obviously misleading 
exposition if the said would be exclusively understood in relation to saying in theoria 
and not also in relation to saying in praxis. Consequently, language is an intrinsic part 
of the transcendental ego / actor / translator and it is not solely a coincidental exterior. It 
is part of the transcendental ego itself while living the as well as structure: it is A as A’ 
but it is A as A’ to B as well. In correspondence to this line, the egoistic 
transcendentality offers, deciphered by language, the decisive wherein for any kind of 
theory, the a priori, the trespass and its life-world wrap-around that discloses the figure 
AS while being stabilised by the preposition to. The translation formula A as A’ to B can 
be pinned down to the synchronicity of life-world in which the transcendental (ego) 
should outline its framework as life-worldly reality or expressed in a pointed manner, 
the question reformulates how the transcendental (ego) pre-conditions language in vivo?  
 
In the following, I do not want to approach language solely as agency of 
phenomenological life-worldly reality and as a ready-made solution for the signifiant-
signifié topos but rather attempt to unfold Husserl’s urge for the transcendental cause in 
order to read it as a cipher of linguistic necessity in life-worldly practice. In other 
words, I do not want to outline a Husserlian language theory. My aim, by close-reading 
Husserl’s transcendentality, is to highlight language as outflow of transcendental 
causes; therefore, a theory of language lays out my transcendental phenomenological 
moves. The transcendental cause – understood as the substrate – enables us to reverse 
and to indicate the phenomenon of language and translation. A transcendental 
phenomenological language is the attempt to form language as the pure and transparent 
topos of logos. Accordingly, I want to close-read its influence on language, on 
translation and especially on phenomenological linguistic practices by attempting to 
graft Husserl’s transcendentality-concept: my approach will be a phenomenological 
one6/7. 
 
                                                            
6 This means that my argumentation lines may have circular and zigzag moves, aiming to reveal on 
several rounds discoverable aspects and layers – a certain redundancy will be inevitable (cf. Husserl’s 
remarks on zigzag methodology in phenomenological work practise (HUA XIX/1 22 and HUA XXXV 
94)). 
7 My exegesis of Husserl’s transcendental line and its relationship with language has been written in 
reference to Heinz Hülsmann (1964); principally, I follow his argumentation lines by analysing the 
impact of transcendental lines for translational matters; also, I complement Hülsmann’s reading by close-
reading the transcendental interpretation of phenomenology by Elisabeth Ströker (1987) and Wolfgang 
Röd (2004). 
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1. A first attempt to write phenomenology – language – translation - 
transcendentality 
 
We may consider that the characteristics of language can be stated, analysed and 
translated and the mechanics of stating, analysing and translating in return is making 
use of a linguistic mode whose features have just been stated, analysed and translated. 
This double reading sets up its own phenomenon while taming the double standards 
mediating solely its own insights and references. This circular formula is immune to 
explanation-attempts and at the same time offers a certain practice of focalisation: we 
are in paradise and we definitely have always been living in paradise. Translating 
paradise means to amble within the bounds of paradeisos. The ambling of each step is 
the transferal move from here to there, but this move is still within the same realm of 
opulence. Hence, the opulence of the Garden of Eden is the linguistic act of reflexive 
and conflictive practices. Therefore, we have to admit that grammar occurs as a 
medium, where the distinctions, between form and content but also subjective and 
objective settings are permanently (inter)-penetrated by the one and only paradeisos. 
Reading the double structures of language and living in paradeisos is the necessity of 
life-worldly practices. In other words, language is the phylogenetic paradeisos of 
thinking and expresses itself by constantly outlining the creation of what we label an 
everyday life form8. The creational product of language-creativity is a first attempt and 
a rough characterisation of mingling with the transcendental condition of transferring 
the phenomenon language. It creates lines in which the necessity of language and 
mirror characterises not only daydreams of the Garden of Eden but also daily features 
of life-worldly realities. Therefore, discussing language through language evokes the 
mirror as the intrinsic reflection of mapping dreams of paradise and practices in life-
world. This double reading is the above outlined phenomenon which will occur in a 
phenomenological reading as a permanent stimulans in vivo that cannot be taken as 
grown and fixed evidence by mirroring its necessity. Its knowledge significance is 
evident through what was said while mirroring its effect. By thematising linguistic 
performance and by speaking A, A’ or B through the mirroring language, the 
phenomenon will be itself a carrier of processing the said. The carrier function however 
is a fundamental part of the transcendental ego while the phenomenon is not at all a 
simple contingent appearance, but rather the double standard enclosing the phenomenon 
                                                            
8 In this context paradise does not refer to a utopian constitution. Paradeisos is rather a topos in which a 
sentinel figure enables us to language.   
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which will be revealed by the ego transpono within a life-worldly language setting. The 
transcendentality of the ego transpires linguistics and unveils the vividness of life-world 
by offering for the mirroring said the decisive a priori horizon. Hence, a 
phenomenological language is the attempt to install the linguistic operator as the pure 
and transparent place of the transcendental ego.  
 
Nevertheless, the decisive horizon in paradiso questions what kind of 
phenomenological language is concealed behind the phenomenon and what does it 
mean while the transcendental ego reels in the vividness of purity? We might consider 
that language can be in service and an attribute of phenomenology but it is also an 
everyday language and therefore a technical pre-condition of phenomenology. These 
questionings are solely important if we consider an empirical ego in the aftermath of 
life-world history; in contrast, the transcendental ego does not refer to this kind of 
connection, it rather conditions the possibility for the empirical ego and his / her ability 
to question the practice of language (in a historicised life-world). However, the 
vividness of the transcendental ego can go astray by using language without consulting 
it. At this very point, we will see that we might disclose the thin line of ego cogito and 
language while the concrete intention offers linguistic realms for the possibility to 
apply, to express itself and to translate the expression of thinking for oneself and for the 
vividness of life-world. Thereafter, language will be terminological as well a reflexive 
theme due to its phenomenological requirements and therefore also the agent for A as 
A’. From this stance, the precondition for phenomenological translation may be outlined 
but so far does not consider language as language. Hence, there is still a certain kind of 
dialectic tension between thinking and speaking by considering the difficulty of 
language as an immediate form of mediating A to B. Consequently, we have to consider 
language as a medium and an everyday language9, a precondition for phenomenology 
but we do not consider to which extent language is per se phenomenology. The per se 
clause considers the logos for deploying the different paths of the phenomenon fostering 
its preconditions: it may be the logos of the active uttering in persona who stimulates A 
to B, or a logos wherein thinking and speaking are an appearance of it as well as the 
logos, which is its own being by producing its own thought and linguistic tools. This is 
where the difference between logos, thought and language enables us to outline that 
logos is its logic-correspondence and has to be considered as an epistemic determination 
                                                            
9 Cf. Hülsmann’s characterisation of different linguistic forms (Hülsmann 1964: 50ff.) 
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of phenomenological work-practises. Thus, the logos of differentiation would be the 
logos of the logic. This difference can be reversed through an antecedent identity by 
considering logos as the unity of language and thinking, but it can also be the logos of 
language that will be manifest through its twofold exposition of thinking and uttering. 
Finally, logos can be seen as a mind setting that constitutionally precedes any form of 
language (Hülsmann 1964: 17) – the mind setting can therefore be thought subjectively 
or objectively, as I or as I-ness. Henceforth, the act of thinking outlines the linguistic 
facticity of translating A and B.  
 
A phenomenology of language is in this regard an exegesis of a linguistic template by 
deploying structures of appearance and appeared appearances. In that non / coherent 
phenomenology, facticity already causes translation while its linguistic expression is 
ineluctably a translation of the translation or an interpretation of the interpretation. 
Meaningfully, we should separate being and language and understand each of them 
from their very particular stance. In other words, the template reduces the translation 
formula A to B to a phenomenon outlining being as its vivid bridge in which language is 
simultaneously reduction and description. From that point on we have to consider a 
phenomenological language as a strolling language by making use of an everyday 
language. Basically, this means that language speaks out the evidence of language itself. 
Phenomenology does not promote a language in aesthetic features but rather a language 
that should talk out the essence of language by itself; phenomenological utterance 
should be a form of talking by expressing its evident originality. This kind of linguistic 
line up does not consider the materiality of expression but aims to perform its essence: 
A as A’. The performance of A as A’ in its original evidence refers to objective features 
of a phenomenological language framework. This setting is neither a poetic nor an 
everyday language: a phenomenological language receives from its linguistic setups 
important impulses but not by aiming to form a formalistic system or a meta-language10. 
It is labelled as a language that has emerged from an apodictic power and nevertheless 
is within the evidence of its being. Hence, the dissection of this topos stating vivid being 
while funding the transcendental ego will be a critical reference in Husserl’s reading11. 
                                                            
10 A phenomenological language is always part of an everyday and ordinary language within life-world, 
which is in a mode of epoché and has lost its channelling force (cf. Hülsmann 1964: 18). 
11 We may consider that Husserl tries to develop a coherent theory that takes different directions, but it is 
ultimately marked by continuation. A theory of language can be outlined and paraphrased by assuming 
that Husserl considers language in a correlative-reflexive mode towards the constitutional question by 
problematising its polarity. Finally we may consider his approach towards linguistic models of genesis 
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So far we can sum up that linguistic practices, consciousness forms and being frames 
are in a common and dynamic flow. The origin of language frames almost an 
intellectual, an almost logical and an almost cognitive way of consciousness. Differently 
put, language is the original appearance of logos and therefore is intrinsically an 
element of recognition and finally a genesis of logic itself. The parallelism of logic and 
language while stating paradeisos deploys however an aporia; therefore by proceeding 
within the realm of analogia, language has to be preceded by a transcendental aporia: 
any kind of correlation is continuing within its own framework without having the 
possibility to solve it by exceeding its very realm of action. The question of translation 
and mediation cannot be challenged by methodos: the phenomenon-character is 
deprived of its historical and social situation and is deferred from aiming pure and 
transparent possibilities, language as model features therefore a static-telos oriented 
character of severe assignments. As a signifiant cipher, the expression is related to a 
certain meaning, which is believed and attached to the word in its strict identity. This 
kind of affiliation has to be considered within the act of life-world. The designation 
function, qualified by the act of expression, is a correlation to it. However, the sphere of 
severe identity and the expression as intentional act enforce the questioning of their 
inter-relation and their relatedness; continuity and consistency seems to evoke the 
question of translating ideation and abstraction as well as mediating the act – this 
transcendental aporia will be a recurrent idiosyncrasy while outlining the phenomenon 
language. 
 
In a first attempt, it seems clear that this constellation dissects the relationship of being 
and (linguistic) facticity, but actually the dissection conflates on another layer. From 
this point of view, the constitution of a factual world and the presence of being can be 
declared literally as an impartial expression. Life-world, translated from being, is kat 
exochen a world full of expressions. Thus, there is a reversing effect between being and 
facticity by considering that the factual can be exceeded by its corresponding being – 
this anabasis is however preconditioned and signifies a possibility and not the 
constitution as such. By considering this possibility, the factual event remains in a 
peculiar contingency and cannot be hurdled; language cannot hurdle its being-firmness 
by referring to elements of contingency. We may consider that a phenomenological 
language resembles rather features of a dynamic enactment, the strict isolation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(cf. Lübbe 1957: 225-237). Indeed, it is a transversal setting: from logical, ontological to a transcendental 
setup.   
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object-matter, and consequently any sphere of meaning loses its pertinence. The 
subjective and objective organisational forms are intertwining the effect of dynamising 
while the linguistic act cannot only be described satisfactorily by stressing dynamism; it 
needs the instrument of overviewing its dynamic status by considering the role of 
translation as a tool of enacting language. Gradually we have to consider an alternative 
foundation: the relation of implication and explication, of synthesis and analysis, evokes 
a genetic consideration enforced by the problem of constitution and by different forms 
of intentionality (perception-intentionality, propositional-intentionality, and decisional-
intentionality (Hülsmann 1964 25)). In this respect, language stresses the intentional life 
under the aegis of the logical or expressed, the linguistic act is per se the logical 
perceiving intentionality. The generating act rests on the transcendental ego which 
shapes layers of creational, constitutional and achieving intentionality. Language keeps 
up the tension of a mundane and transcendental world by considering that the event of 
epoché is a constitutional part of the transcendental ego. The constitution of language, 
its historical consciousness, its dynamic and subject oriented figuration, is part of a 
deploying unity. It is not an a-temporal constitution; far more it stresses a dynamic 
constitution of language and it forms a mixture of language, consciousness and being. 
The foundational sense of language is almost the consciousness of logical, cognitive 
and mental issues; indeed, productive and genetic issues will be deployed by 
questioning the logical character – language as such disposes the area of logical 
judgements while depicting the Garden of Eden. The experienced consciousness will 
find its experience while language is the fundamental appearance of logos and 
represents the event of recognition12. This view is so far outlined by Husserl in Logische 
Untersuchungen (HUA XVIII – XX/2), in Phänomenologische Psychologie (HUA IX) 
and in Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie (HUA VI); he evokes the question of history and linguistic cognition, 
of culture and sociality, the relationship of somatic and logical structures and therefore 
the question of translating life-world.  
 
By drafting A as A’ to B, we may consider that Husserl tries to solve the 
phenomenological challenge by stressing an analogical aporia13/14: any formations of 
                                                            
12 Cf. the foundational model of language outlines per se the logical sphere and the area of logical 
judgements. The master pattern of the foundational layer is at the same moment occurrence, generic 
appearance of the logical and constitution of a logical consciousness.  
13 Indeed, this is my alternative reading to the transcendental aporia in linguistic practice. 
14 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno (1990). 
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parallelism and correlation can be solved on its own basis. The constitution problem of 
language and its transcendental consciousness however is actually a practice of 
suspension since the problem of Husserl’s approach is primarily conditioned by the 
phenomenal character of language, which relieves its historical condition and displaces 
it into an area of pure and transparent possibilities. Hence, a linguistic framework would 
consist of enacting mono-logical enforcements and can be characterised by a static 
(precluding) character: the object denominates and the expression opines. The 
expression and the signifié relate towards meaning, which in turn expresses and 
aporetically attaches to the identity of the signifiant: indeed, its denomination function 
is a correlative happening. This element yields the identity of the logic and its severe 
meaning. The sphere of meaning characterised by identity and the expression as 
intentional act evokes the question of the relation and relatedness of A to B, while 
stating A as A’ – in other words, the phylogenetic interconnection of A to B states being 
and acting while transferring A as A’. The relationship of entity and facticity evokes a 
grammatical character due to the fact that a factual world outlines by its own accord the 
constitution while including the presence of the entity as the premises of a life-worldly 
language. The world is from its own status an expression-world per se, but however its 
constitutional grammar is hidden due to the codification of the transcendental ego15. 
Hence, we can evoke a certain mutuality since we may move from an entity to a factum 
and vice versa by using its grammar as securing pretext. This kind of basis should be 
understood in the sense of possibilities and not of constitutions: within the horizon of 
possibilities the factual event remains contingent; however, the contingent element 
within language does not yield its entity-determination. The rigour isolation of the 
factual world and the sphere of meaning will be blurred due to phenomenological 
reflections leading to the constitutional question of linguistic usage by highlighting this 
double relatedness: the relatedness of linguistic acts to each other and the constitution 
of itself. The expression-sphere unifies the expression- and meaning-function of 
denotation and believing insofar as the translational act of linguistic expression cannot 
be satisfied by its correlation and attached descriptions. Therefore the foundation of 
language and translation may find an approach by highlighting the relatio of the genesis 
of implication and explication 16 . A genetic consideration conditioned by the 
constitution-dilemma reflects its relation and stresses its intentional momentum of being 
grammar. The logical event of writing grammar figures as a continuous momentum of 
                                                            
15 Cf. The constitutional problem by Hülsmann (Hülsmann 1964: 24).  
16 Cf. Hülsmann stresses the tension between synthesis and analysis (Hülsmann 1964: 25f.) 
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the intentional act: language signals the unique intentional phase, which achieves by 
itself the emergence of the logical, the logical of the whole intentional life. The 
linguistic achievement is its logical cognitive intentionality per se17. However, the 
original performing stage is still hidden: the logic cognitive intentionality is about the 
generating doing, its means and its principle cause of performance. The principle 
revealed as the transcendental ego is structural as well as generative, constitutional and 
intentional in its aporia. The transcendental event rests in the tension between synthesis 
and analysis, implication and explication and can be understood as an undefined sphere 
of mirroring effects18: language is a decisive part of being in between the reflection of 
mundanity and transcendentality and as well in the reflection zone of the empiric and 
transcendental ego 19 / 20 . We may anticipate and read that the motivation of the 
constitution is in fact a transcendental issue but subliminally it is about the self-giveness 
of the ego as a transcendental fact. Reason is therefore not a contingent effect, but rather 
a universal entity oriented structural form of transcendental subjectivity. It is the 
institution of making things evident and keeping it evident (HUA I 92). Whilst reality 
finds its essence in the mode of reasoning and happens as a self-given fact, the ego has 
necessarily to be seen as the genius locus of truth seeking; reading the ego is a locus 
classicus for the origin and the generative practice of the transcendental question21. 
Hence, as mentioned above, language can be outlined as the structure of a genetic form, 
in which the process occurs by encompassing language, by considering the enforcement 
of the act of utterance via a transcendental speaking person; it is the momentum where 
the mirroring totum occurs as linguistic happening22. In this regard, language is in its 
                                                            
17 We may differentiate between (I) perception-intention, (II) utterance-intention and (III) decision-
intention (Hülsmann 1964: 25). The logical line, which is obviously present in phase III, is already 
present in step I as a special intentional effort and attention. Therewith we consider three grades of 
converse implications. This kind of genetic relationship is definitely a teleological concept. 
18 The spheres appear simultaneously as different steps and phases of the reductive revealing moment of 
the egoistic life. Thereon language is an important stakeholder. 
19 The language issue is in a phenomenological reading simultaneously a transcendental and egoistic 
theme and consequently, this linguistic constellation represents the spatial apodictic evidence of timing.  
20 On this basis we should neutralise ourselves from the world to understand the phenomenon in its 
reduction (HUA III/1 151f); we may describe the problem by highlighting the fact that there is a 
continuity of the empiric and transcendental ego, but this generative case should be given up. At the same 
time we should ask, how could we use a language, if we have to leave the mundane world? Is the act of 
speaking part of the transcendental world? Do we not have to reduce language and the act of speaking? 
And on the other hand, do not we have to find within language the element for a trans-mundane utterance 
(Hülsman 1964: 31)? Having this kind of internal continuity and the corresponding discontinuity, we may 
consider the double relationship. The one medium of language is present as it is friction and correlation. 
Language is in that sense the translation of reflection per se. 
21 Consequently the transcendental question is therefore the reduction of facticity to its essence – it is 
about an unholy alliance between ontic and transcendental genesis writing its grammar.  
22 If you consider the ego-cogito-cogitatum as the a priori characteristic of linguistic practice, we have to 
accept that language as form of its essence has to be written as ego-speaking-spoken. As consequence, 
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genetic constitution never object, but rather a permanent translation in which the 
transcendental life has its own possibility of appearing as grammar insofar as language 
as phenomenological issue is a unity-constitution ad progressum. The language-flow 
proceeding in a phylogenetic mode is always as a constitutional element present and can 
be finally considered as an identic unity (aka grammar). However, the genesis 
happening constitutes in language the unity of the transcendental life and its 
corresponding life-world. The emergence of its history is its linguistic appearance of 
history: language is the transcendental history of facts in its evident authentication and 
therefore it is all about A as A’ to B.    
      
This alignment shows us the continuum possibility of relating language, the 
transcendental ego and the constitutional facticity of the mirror to life-worldly 
practices23. Hence, a transcendental phenomenological language is a matter of how the 
differentiation-sense between valid and merely pretended knowledge can be drawn; the 
opposition does not depend on cognition acts but rather on the objectivation of 
knowledge. In both cases, they intend to be real and existing issues; nevertheless, the 
intention is in the one case accomplished and in the other dismissed. But how does one 
case fulfil the conditions and on the other fail it since the facticity of cognition and 
objectivation has nevertheless to be in a certain relation to its being? Through the 
factual life-world, we may have the possibility to close-read the transcendental sphere 
of a priori conditions which lead to any kind of forming facticity. The validity claim of 
epistemology shimmers in Husserl’s work and has so far invited the reception24 to 
different versions of Husserl’s knowledge aspiration25 . Hence, the transcendental 
attitude of the epoché transforms the subject to a disinterested spectator who does not 
have her / his / its goals in the mundane world. The facticity of life-world does no 
longer encourage the empirical ego to emancipate from the mundane world, since she / 
he / it is always trapped by the flashing mirror. While I am talking about the mundane 
chains of the flashing mirror, Husserl considers that the trap is due to the transcendental 
problem emanating from a general transformation of natural circumstances (HUA IX 
                                                                                                                                                                              
linguistic translation practices are constant expressions of their own entity – again it is about this unholy 
alliance. 
23  In the following we are going to discover if this topic is too overemphasized and how the 
transcendental element conditions and disciplines a phenomenological language.  
24 Especially I refer to the explanation of Dermot Moran (2005), Herman Philipse (1995) and Wolfgang 
Röd (2004). 
25 The dilemma between considering an act and withdrawing us from any (our) natural mind-set (HUA 
III/I 151f) causes contingent conclusions. This aporia by referring to the element of liberty is not simply 
a contingent game, but it is an act of its own entity and its own a priori.   
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331)26. Henceforth, I suggest we have to turn the translational bind by overrunning the 
premise that the mundane world is not the outburst of a transcendental spur but rather 
the other way round, the mundane world provokes the transcendental ego, galvanising 
the transcendental ego from her / his / its slumber. This provocation is the guiding line 
that leads thinking towards reduction in vivo. Negotiating the vivid line within Husserl’s 
transcendental setting gives attention to the fact that transcendentality is in reception 
strategies more than just woolly27. In the following, I want to look closer how the hint 
of life-worldly vividness and transcendental reality crystallises Husserl’s work and how 
a close-reading of Husserl’s phenomenology highlights the transcendental line as its 
undeniable condition of translational matters and as its vehicle of language: it is 
necessary to outline the importance of understanding transcendental phenomenology in 
its revealing progress by turning language itself into a transcendental issue due to the 
fact that language is on a decisional basis an index, a grammar, taxonomy and itself a 
linguistic practise. Nonetheless, Husserl’s phenomenological project is situated on 
different layers in which the transcendental line can be interpreted as the anchor of 
Husserl’s thinking and in which Husserl follows Descartes by understanding the 
transcendental idea in an extensive manner28. By referring to Descartes, the sub-textual 
question is to outline how the relationship or more precisely how the how-relation of 
subject and object drafts Husserl’s programme of transcendental vividness. The bind of 
this antagonistic movement in which nature provokes the transcendental cause, 
reconsiders Husserl’s ethos of truth seeking (HUA XVIII 13). The path of 
understanding successfully the proof of how Bedeutungsintentionen correlates with the 
idea of truth can be seen as Husserl’s movens to rethink and reformulate constantly the 
purity of taxonomy and grammar 29 . This kind of historical comments are not 
accidental30 – we will see that science, phenomenology and cultural thinking are 
eminent for linguistic themes. We might highlight that all kind of problems will be 
systematically part of this amalgamation and will be from there on seen from another 
view. The relation of thinking and speaking, the structure of language as form shows the 
                                                            
26 Undoubtedly, we have to consider that this kind of thinking is already in the line of preconditions.  
27 Cf. Ritter’s Transzendentalität article in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Ritter 1997-2007: 
1358-1436). 
28Cf. In comparison to Kant’s line in Critique of Pure Reason: the condition of possible knowledge is 
enabled via a transcendental subject where the phenomenon can be turned into noumena (KrV A 236ff).  
29 We have to recall that Husserl’s way of working resembles a zigzag methodology and shifts in an on-
going process permanently the perspectives. This entails a certain redundancy within the explanation line.  
30 Phenomenological thoughts stimulate within linguistics and philosophy a critical reflection on what 
language and thinking could be. Prominently within the German linguistic discourse phenomenological 
thinking offered decisive impulse, cf. Karl Bühler (1933), Friedrich Kainz (1946) and Peter Hartmann 
(1958).    
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characteristics of the logical purpose. General, necessary and ideal form units are in it 
and with it visible. There is obviously a certain correlation of form and content; it is 
intrinsically a fact that language and through it insight and cognition are mediated in 
stratum.  
 
 
2. Reading Husserl’s transcendental dream 
 
A The Logischen Untersuchungen: apparently a breakthrough investigation 
 
Die Logischen Untersuchungen (LU) 31  (1900/1901) is Husserl’s first serious 
phenomenological analysis and is declared by himself – in consideration of 
phenomenological methodology – as his breakthrough work (HUA XVIII XIII and 8)32. 
By considering Husserl’s methodological attempt, language and especially the act of 
translating will be an interesting operationalisation factor, insofar as language has to be 
read within the tension of an analogical or equivocal framework of longing and 
simultaneously framing the expression of the phenomenon A and B. The enactment of 
this constellation densifies the task of formulating translation; it is about the 
transmission from an idealistic telos towards its significant other that produces this 
dense fabric of life-world. While considering this speculative framework, we have to be 
aware that the process of mediation and transfer has to be dissected carefully, since the 
genus locus forces us to believe in the regulative act of squeezing. By considering the 
topos regulation of squeezing, we have to be aware that drafting a phenomenological 
reading of translation means resorting to intentional experience(s) (of language), which 
will be read in continuation of being the object of linguistic framing33: Husserl explores 
the intentional phenomenon as the important stakeholder for phenomenology but he will 
nevertheless consider the transcendental element as the foundational twist in 
                                                            
31 The LU are separated into two parts and volumes. Volume one bears the title Prolegomena zur reinen 
Logik (HUA XVIII) and Volume two is entitled Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der 
Erkenntnis (HUA XIX/1). 
32  Husserl’s Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (HUA III-V) 
shows clearly that the LU are not at all the end of his phenomenological thinking, but rather the start of it. 
The systematic foundation within Husserl’s early work can be considered, as it does not find any end of 
his developed method of pure and transcendental phenomenology. However, Husserl highlights in LU 
that a systematic rising from a lower to a higher level has to be achieved, cf. Ströker (1987).  
33 Only the V. Untersuchungen introduces the phenomenological theme; it lays the foundation of 
phenomenology, whereas the VI. Untersuchungen can be understood in relation to a systematic approach 
as the more important one. However, whilst evolving Husserl’s oeuvre, both of them mark the transition 
towards the figure of phenomenological understanding as pure and transcendental task. 
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experiencing A and B. The constitutional issue is thereby a matter of transcendental 
reflection which considers the problem of identity and difference while problematising 
language as language and while finding through the transcendental condition its 
idiosyncratic figure in such a way that analogical and equivocal elements of linguistic 
ability correlate to each other in situ: the correlation of the conjunction as is not only 
given by writing A as B, it is rather stabilised by the preposition to in reference to A as 
A’ to B. This operation is lately embedded within the subject-framework of expressing 
life-world-stabilisation by apostrophising life matters. However, the subject-layer is 
hidden due to the prepositional clause to dealing with the very stratum language. 
Therefore, language considers its identity and difference within the realm of unity 
rhetoric that has to be labelled as the productive part of ego. The livelihood of the 
subject is the ego presenting itself through language and gains therefore its constitution 
in life-world. Language cannot be disassociated from ego and the transcendental realm 
while language presents its own characteristics transcendentally. This is indeed a first 
attempt of reading language in a phenomenological way and therefore the 
transcendental line necessarily composes the stratum of intention-language-ego.  
 
Husserl refers to this kind of knowledge-production by considering logos as its 
corrective, which highlights directly the universal attempt and the seriousness of 
objectivity. This issue can be outlined by pure logic34 and is a revised continuation of 
Husserl’s first monograph Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) 35/36. In contrast to his 
explanations in Philosophy of Arithmetic, where mathematical numbers and their set 
theory are psychologically founded (HUA XII 163), through the act of linking, Husserl 
reconsiders the psychological status in LU negatively37. In Prolegomena he suggests 
                                                            
34 Pure logic does neither stand in opposition to the notion of simple logic nor is it an addition to it. It is 
rather the theoretical foundation of logic. Pure logic outlines a field of analytical truth. It is all about the 
epistemology of laws and theories whose truth is founded exclusively in the meaning of its fundamental 
notions and where its validity is based on its form(ation). Pure logic is therefore not only a discipline 
among others. It is the discipline of the most general and formal condition of knowledge-possibilities 
(HUA XVIII 214 and 238-246).  
35  Husserl does not outline logic in a narrow sense but rather his philosophy of logic includes 
epistemology as well. 
36 Walter Biemel’s comment on Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik: “Die Rückfrage nach diesen 
Grundbegriffen, genauer gesprochen nach dem Grundbegriff der Arithmetik – der Zahl, ist also der 
eigentliche Anstoss für Husserls Philosophieren, hat den Stein ins Rollen gebracht” (Biemel 1959: 190).  
37 Husserl outlines in the preface of the first LU-edition: “Wo es sich um die Frage nach dem Ursprung 
der mathematischen Vorstellungen oder um die in der Tat psychologisch bestimmte Ausgestaltung der 
praktischen Methode handelte, schien mir die Leistung der psychologischen Zusammenhängen des 
Denkens zur logischen Einheit des Denkinhaltes (der Einheit der Theorie) vollzogen wurde, wollte sich 
keine rechte Kontinuität und Klarheit herstellen lassen” (HUA XVIII VII). The effort consists of 
outlining the transformation of the psychic act to the unity of theory, which stresses the logical entity. 
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that psychological perception has to be – from a logical point of view – similar to any 
other empirical evidence and therefore has to be based on inductive generalisation38. 
From this perspective, the psychological approach of ego does not read comfortably 
with any forms of causal laws. The passage from the psychological momentum to the 
unity of logical thinking does not find any kind of satisfying continuation. Indeed, 
Husserl doubts categorically the foundation of the logical by considering psychological 
reasoning (HUA XVIII 6f), mainly due to the inconsistency of transition-readings from 
psychic and contingent acts to objective and sober lines of theory: the subjectivity of 
recognising and the objectivity of knowledge contents has to be questioned. In reference 
to the preface of the second edition of LU Husserl explains that the analysis of logos is 
an emerging study from lower to higher grounds (HUA XVIII 11); meaning that 
internal experiences executed by psychological descriptions are similar to the 
descriptions of the external nature, but this interpretation is in opposition to 
phenomenological descriptions, in which the transfer from the internal to the external 
facticity is not the movens in which the transcendental ego would fulfil to condition the 
(phenomenological) description in life-world (HUA XVIII 12). Hence, Husserl rejects 
empirical psychology due to the fact that the exposition of the objective has to be solved 
within the logic of (pure) consciousness (HUA XII XXVf.)39. Husserl’s pure logic40 
outlines a realm of analytic truth, whose sense of fundamental notion and validity is 
based on its very formation. Logical laws are formal laws and free of psycho-material 
intentions 41  and therefore have to be declared as independent of any kind of 
(psychological) experiences. Hence, pure logic is not a way to explore the condition 
possibilities but it rather is the most general condition of knowledge (HUA XVIII 238 
ff). It can only be recognised by the fact that it is valid – but its validity is independent 
and not conditioned by having been recognised by somebody. Therefore, pure logic 
(HUA XVIII XIII) is literally the operator (HUA XVIII: XII-XXIV), which is able to 
define systems of knowledge and on that point is the most principle evidence writing 
                                                            
38 Cf. Trespassing the setting of a psychological mode towards a logical setting of thinking (unity of 
theory) remains uncanny and does not permit a clear continuation of a theoretical setting. 
39 It is uncertain if Gottlob Frege influenced Husserl. Manfred Sommer draws a unique genesis of 
Husserl’s phenomenological idea, which is only driven by the transcendental telos; Sommer refers to the 
fact, that the transcendental idea has been already the main movens within Husserl’s first work 
Philosophie der Arithmetik (Sommer 1985: 98ff). And in a letter dated the 19th February 1936 Husserl 
explains that Frege seems to have an odd character and does not have added any substantial benefit to 
philosophy and mathematics (Patzig 1981: 252f).    
40 In particular, his conception of pure logic derives from Bolzano and Lotze, and ultimately from 
Leibniz’s theory of methesis universalis (HUA XVIII 222ff). 
41 Husserl declares thirty years latter in Formale und transzendentale Logik that he was not purely against 
psychology; he was only against the version that logic correlates with judgement-experiences. In a logical 
sense judgement has an identical sense within the multitude of acts of judgements (HUA XVII 175ff). 
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trans in life-world; it stands for theory in its very fundamental notion while combing A 
as A’ to B. Hence, the evidence of objective knowledge does no longer pretend the 
relationship of thinking subject and life-world (HUA XVIII 240). The realm of an a 
priori setting allows outlining the scope of reality-experiences by overwriting the mirror 
of the empirical subjects by the facticity of a theoretical subject42. From LU on, Husserl 
disputes the possibility of psychological supremacy. The various psychic acts of empiric 
subjects do not permit the interpretation of a priori facticity; subjective objects are an 
interpretation of the object and therefore already a translation of the a priori fabric. The 
question of intentionality (Brentano 1874: 124) will be reversed, with recourse to 
intentional experiences, in which the materiality of knowledge turns into reality; it is 
this trans from the act of intentionality towards material knowledge where we are able 
to translate before the translation has been written. In other words, logical evidence, 
understood as the universal and the total mode of consciousness, is related to 
intentionality but produce simultaneously universal teleological structures: indeed, the 
grammar is there before Port-Royal has been localised. The tugging of life-world is 
now re-considered on the ground of knowledge-production in life-world. Henceforth, an 
idealistic analysis is based on validity whereas the psychological approach captures just 
a picture or an empty signification, which can only be analysed in a second step through 
grammatical causal-genetic causes: A as A’ is an empty clausal, its validity is only 
enforced by the causality of to B. Hence, on this stage, the relation of the correlated 
subject and object investigation within logic has to be required since the mediation of 
intentionality is something else than the production of linguistic evidence. The subject 
has to be read as the condition possibility if knowledge of logic wants to be the 
mediating part of justifying any given A or B. These conditions are a priori and 
therefore we have to be aware that they are unquestionably not subject-depending. But 
ultimately they cannot be understood as real, empirical conditions without thinking the 
theoretical subject. The Limesidee of conditioning the facticity is rather the a priori 
requirement, commissioned by a theoretical subject (HUA XVIII 119). In this stance, 
the subliminal question of the relationship of an ideal language of logic and the a priori 
                                                            
42 Up to this point, Husserl was persuaded that psychology could deliver the framework of pure science 
and pure logic. Influenced by Brentano, Husserl outlines psychology as the foundation of philosophy and 
knowledge. Brentano on his side understood empirical psychology as an answer to promote philosophy as 
an exact science. Knowledge should be produced and based on a direct line. The introspection as movens 
describes direct experiences and has been later labelled by himself as descriptive psychology whose aim 
is to understand: “(...) fully the basic components out of which everything internally perceived by humans 
is composed, and … [to enumerate] the ways in which these components can be connected” (Brentano 
1995: 4). Further, Leibniz and Bolzano have influenced Husserl; cf. (HUA XII). 
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epistemological conditions of subjectivity open up the Limesidee to a field of duplicity 
by compressing its common concern: from its principle conditions how can we grasp 
the validity of objective linguistic means? On this basis, translation loses its idealistic 
pertinence and has to be considered as an empty shell: it is an air-evacuated cloud-caste 
since its facticity is, so far, nothing else than the permanent reinsurance of its 
epistemological duplicity. Hence, by following Husserl, we have to create a fully new 
foundation: his novelty consists of presenting the nucleus of the problem by blasting the 
exposure of the common idea of knowledge and referring to the idea of an embodied 
knowledge-production43 (HUA IV 158-160).   
 
Thus, we have to consider Husserl’s chapter Ausdruck und Bedeutung in LU in which 
he redefines the correlation of consciousness meaning (Bedeutungsbewusstsein) and its 
logical purposes. Husserl outlines that the embodiment of expression and meaning are 
from this angle the reduction of occasional meanings by offering a straightforward 
answer: the answer is the fulfilment of the reduction line while writing A as A’ to B. The 
clarification of truth has to be fulfilled within the horizon of the Wesens-analysis that 
enables us to the prepositions as and to as its correlation for reduction. This correlation 
seems to be tension filled due to the fact that by discussing the language phenomenon 
the question of logic will turn immanently into a linguistic issue: unambiguity and 
discriminability are the features from where we might be able to develop the purposes 
of language. Hence, language as an applicable sign-system should be the movens, 
formulating translation and therefore logic has to seal not only its own purpose but its 
expression, being taken as the signum of translating A as A’ to B44. This focus refers 
elements of intentionality of noetic-noematic structures while writing the necessity of A 
as A’. The logical system executing the ending of the formula to B underlines linguistic-
free structures that do not need grammar, since the analogical aporia is the reduction of 
the transcendental a priori by its Wesens-analysis. By radicalising the language 
phenomenon, we have to read language as the consciousness embodiment of life-world 
and its translation. The correlation of consciousness and language are in this sense 
phenomenological cohesions in which the transcendental regroups the formation of 
                                                            
43 Husserl stands in a long tradition which somehow incorporates the double feature of body and 
knowledge, cf. Schelling: “Dieses erste Leibliche hat aber in sich selbst eine leibliche und eine geistige 
Seite” (Schelling 1993: 148). 
44 We have to consider that by reading logic and language, I juxtapose the sign realm with features of 
logical evidence. Foucault makes a similar attempt when he co-reads sign and logical evidence within the 
lines of the Logic of Port-Royal. This construction is reference for further questions and critics, which 
cannot be explored in this thesis (cf. Müller 2004: 437-447).  
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eidos. This kind of reducing the Wesen should be described and outlined by expressions 
and meanings as an outburst of phenomenological investigations. This inquiry will 
challenge the linguistic attempt by turning grammar into an index where A, A’ and B 
makes perfect sense. This attitude towards the concept of perfect sense is important 
while questioning linguistic issues. Language as such outlines the pre-requirements to 
secure logic, in a way that thoughts are expressed in an appropriate manner by means of 
well distinct and definite signs (HUA XVIII 22). The system of language ensures – not 
only by its causes – its expression, which is used in this case as signs. Uniqueness and 
discriminability are the points from where the question of language has to be deployed 
in facticity. At this very moment the task of translation supersedes language and 
therefore the foundation of language has to be measured by its capability of transferring: 
the moment of the dynamic act deploys the idealistic embodiment of language. In this 
sense LU handles a universal problem that discusses the (eternal) linguistic relationship 
of logic and expression in a dynamic setting. Language as an applicable sign-system is 
consequently the purpose of the index in life-world. The question of language as the 
question of the linguistic applicability and this, in turn, as a clear and available system 
of signs, confines this debate in a certain way.  
              
Having considered the dynamic token, the LU is hinting – from these circumstances on 
– to find the a priori setting by declaring how the telos of purity could be grafted and 
the phenomenological project launched: phenomenology finds its explications not 
within causal-genetic psychological causes but rather by the task of describing and 
analysing45. The aim is to advance to the source(s) where idealistic laws of pure logic 
are issuing from. The logical judgment is based on that very principal of eidos46, idea or 
origin (HUA XIX/1 8f) in which the description and analysis cause the formation of the 
Wesen in life-world. Phenomenology is in that sense a pure eidetic analysis to discover 
the structures of experiencing consciousness and therefore a method questioning the 
                                                            
45 On that issue, Husserl revises in his second edition of the LU in 1913 the clear and net separation of 
phenomenology and psychology and outlines that transcendentality is not only about epistemology but 
above all act-intentionality. Logical laws should find their foundation in psychic acts (HUA XVIII 189). 
This turn should not be interpreted as a logical or psychological act but rather as a phenomenological 
consequence. To comprehend this disconcerting turn we have to understand on which basis Husserl 
transforms logical truth. By reconsidering the relation of subjectivity of recognising and the objectivity of 
the content of cognition (HUA XVIII 7) the clear and evident outlined boundaries turn into unclear 
settings.  
46 The theory of forms (cf. eidos) stays in relation with the idea of conceptualism. Conceptualism is the 
very idea that universalism is the notion which is produced by subjects. Therefore Husserl’s theory of 
form is far away from what we could call Platonism (cf. also Blumenberg 2001: 12ff).  
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possibility of idea in a translational outfit47. The intrinsic element of logic consists in a 
unity of reasoning and the systemic form appears as pure embodiment of the idea of 
knowledge. Consequently, the nucleus of logical truth is the ambition and the aim for all 
kind of knowledge-production in its fulfilment – only within systematic construction 
knowledge is founded and is foundational. In correspondence to the logical line, 
recognising knowledge means to construct creatively alongside rules and laws. It is 
obviously an emancipation of the consciousness and the logical causality from the 
contingent event of facticity. However, any systematic form needs an element of 
foundation. Within this setting, logic acts as a tool of mediation (HUA XIX/2 537f). 
Consequently, we can say that logical truth is able to formulate objective knowledge via 
the linguistic relationship between Begriff and Gedanke (HUA XIX/2 538): linguistic 
tools and knowledge are therefore correlated in its reduction and deliver the possibility 
of founding literally a grammatical body. Indeed, linguistic signs are compulsory 
conditions to compose pure logic since reflexive, constitutional, and therefore ultimate 
grounding requires language. Hence, linguistic considerations are an essential part of 
the preparation of a pure system of logic, since the translation-process of language is 
only able to graft its proper objectives: language translates logical objects into 
templates; it translates issues and their differences for the sake of reduction. 
Consequently, the logical clarity cannot figure within language but rather by 
linguistically gained objects. The gaining effects of logical objectivity are 
simultaneously the objectivity of language. This is possible due to the analogical aporia 
that finds itself within language48: recognition happens within language and through its 
act it will be self identified – A as A’ to B. This kind of cognitive language processing 
considers language as something that evokes its Wesen in reduction. At this very point 
translation is the permanent process of equation-seeking, which turns A’ (in)to B. 
Henceforth, linguistic considerations are not related to empirical arguments but rather to 
considerations via generic tasks by leading to an objective theory of knowledge and 
pure phenomenological thought-experiences. The vividness of the lexeme has to be 
considered in this line as the enforcement of itself and its appearance. Obviously, this 
kind of approach does ultimately refer to the empirical experiences of empiric subjects. 
                                                            
47 Husserl outlined after 1912 principle reasons for excluding psychology from phenomenology (HUA III 
3f.). Indeed, this remark is related to transcendental phenomenology, while an eidetic approach towards 
phenomenology understands very well an eidetic psychology as the eidetic fundament of empirical 
psychology (HUA IX 52 f). 
48 Language cannot find reflection and self-knowledge through itself – it attains it by the consciousness of 
life. 
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However this does not classify the empiric evidence by schemes and orders, as the 
empiric subjects would suggest it in descriptive psychological approaches. In 
considering the evidence as subjects and objects as clear and net distinctions, we can 
follow Husserl’s transcendental project: this relation is at the core of knowledge 
evidence, since the mode and the manner of their relationship characterise elements. In 
other terms, the intentional meaning is part of the linguistic canon: the concrete psychic 
experience is the copula of grafting meaning and expression and has to consider 
therefore its mode by considering its act-character. The phenomenological analysis 
should reveal the relatedness of expression and meaning and therefore, the objective 
would be given in an incomplete figure (HUA II 5), since the notion seems to be in a 
volatile mode and the evidence looks like its depending on its Wesens-analysis. The 
phenomenological analysis should stress its pure idea by overcoming its simple 
intelligibility of words and its equivocations. By aiming for the setting of meaning and 
expression in logical readings, we may anticipate that the act of translation within 
transcendental settings will have a diffracted significance: transcendental reasoning 
decides the energetic place for any lexeme – there is no longer the translation of A to B, 
since A is always A’ and B is always B’; yes this means that the linguistic act drafts an 
aporetic way of writing equivocations.  
 
This complicated double-relationship of A as A’ and simultaneously A to B or A’ to B 
remembers the speculative aspect of Wesens-analysis in which the psychological and 
theoretical ego are the energetic aporia. Husserl is persuaded that objective knowledge 
recognised as objective and independent is only given via the condition of logical 
constructions. Therefore, knowledge depends on the direction from where it is 
perceived from to establish a certain kind of sense. This kind of linking will be 
Husserl’s phenomenological issue and therefore, the phenomenon of expression and 
meaning refers to consciousness settings of and from language: the relatedness of 
meaning and expression by the event that meaning will be meant by its expression – it is 
about a how-zone of circular reproduction (A = A / A’ = A’). From this point on, we 
have to reconsider the correlation of logical thinking of subjects and objects and state 
that psychological evidence does not stand for logic, but rather signifies the foundation 
of researching the sense of truth in logic. The consequence of reading phenomenology 
in a concrete and psychological way, in which meaning and expression belong 
transcendentally together, is now what edges into the middle of phenomenological 
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thinking: a lexeme can be an expression and relies simultaneously on intentions. 
Therefore the unholy alliance of psychological drive and transcendental composure 
outlines the framework in which the expression documents its meaning. By clarifying 
the doubling of transcendentality and psychology, the correlation of wording, 
knowledge and its transfer zone might be squeezed again into my reading of a vivid life-
world that somehow enables us to the aporetic continuum. This kind of 
phenomenological analysis highlights language as a pure fact insofar as evidence and 
clarity will be an important part of its Wesen. By considering language as meaningful 
expression of its intentionality and by outlining the array of meaning and expression, we 
have to focus on the whole linguistic setting. To define this kind of relationship as 
being-relationship preconditions that the act has an in-between-function and manages 
the trope from-to as the intrinsic part of translating its energetic reduction. The 
phenomenological task is to figure out, how this from-to constellation could succeed in 
the analysis of life-worldly Wesens-analysis. It seems to be obvious that language can 
be taken as an appearance of its meaning. But however, how does the objective meaning 
transform itself to a subjective expression? The translation of itself and for me is 
therefore the prevalent question in which the aporetic continuum upholds the embodied 
vividness of life-world. Language as feature of transporting and as permanent 
transgression phenomenon thus should offer in its phenomenological analysis the 
possibility to bring logic and psychology into contact49: the language-task considers the 
transition of the act (for me), which is at the same time a function (itself) and vice versa. 
The psychic experiences as function should enable us to the being-relation of expression 
and meaning within intentional life and likewise the Wesen of phenomenological 
description as an act that will declare its being-clearness. Husserl’s generic twist is to 
stress that the empirical and individual experience is only possible due to a priori 
structures of consciousness. Hence, the empirical evidence is important on the path 
towards pure knowledge and at the same moment truth is an epiphenomenon of eidetic 
evidence. This complex linkage of the phenomenon and the epiphenomenon streaks the 
orientation of phenomenology while writing consciousness of and language from. The 
analysis of LU attains by this step not only a universal problem but also the issue evokes 
the correlation of legein and aporein (Hülsmann 1964: 46).  
 
                                                            
49 By considering this line, we may underline that language should be the medium that tries to solve the 
question of phenomenological reflections. 
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B Interlude: A as A’ to B 
 
As a preliminary conclusion, we can admit that Husserl starts his phenomenological 
project by attempting to highlight the transcendental issue as the main operator towards 
pure knowledge and on the other side he emphasises the downsizing of the 
psychological momentum as the barrier to squeeze the act of transformation. He fulfils 
this shift by introducing the theoretical subject and, in an even more powerful manner, 
the vision of experiencing consciousness. This clear liminal evidence is elusive due to 
the fact that Husserl and the ethos of phenomenology is driven by moments of 
enhancing and extrapolating the phenomenon to re-find and re-shape – on an 
archaeological basis – what was initially intended. A linguistic code within the horizon 
of consciousness has to find necessarily a character of a foundational-sense: 
consciousness cannot be speechless. On a profound basis, consciousness and language 
belong to each other and this matter of fact is an evidential fact of Husserl’s thinking. 
He outlines it as a descriptive phenomenology and refers to a dismissive sense of non-
constructional linguistic evidence. Far from explaining theories and speculative 
interpretations, it is about outlining the evident understanding of what thinking and 
recognition could be (HUA XIX/1 25)50. Husserl’s methodological claim is a clear 
rejection of theoretical approaches of constructivism and deconstruction avant la lettre. 
By contrast, Husserl stresses the momentum of gazing that gets disciplined by the 
revealed, the displayed, the exposed, etc. and is per se the enactment of translation kat 
exochen. Hence, this re-setting is not simply gazing and not simply disciplined by 
translational processes, it rather correlates with a procedure of reflection: the 
phenomenological task refers to the intentional relation of the recognition to the 
recognised51. In other words, this conisation outlines the above-mentioned correlation 
of acting and its function of translation. The generic element of this challenge is an 
effect of the contradiction of perception and thought (HUA XIX/1 9) while squeezing 
life-world into paradeisos.  
 
We can say now that phenomenology knows / gazes from real, ideal, existent, fictive, 
etc. entities nothing less than that they are imagined, intended or supposed in 
                                                            
50 Cf. Husserl postulates the principle of presuppositionlessness (HUA XIX/1 24ff). 
51 By excluding heritage and tradition, Husserl neglects the status of language within tradition. Language 
cannot be alien to any kind of heritage, if it does not want to be ineffectual as a medium of 
phenomenological description. So far, Husserl has not problematised the aporia of pure description and 
linguistic interpretation.  
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consciousness. But if this kind of imagination has any descriptive characteristics of 
intentional experiences, the sense of imagination has to be found exclusively by vivid 
(and embodied) experiences – any other perspective description will not be possible 
(HUA XIX/1 25f). This seems to be accurate, however, does this specific act-moment, 
of intended intensions represent Husserl’s sense of objectivity? This question – again 
relying on this noteworthy aporetic evidence – will be the movens for Husserl’s shift 
towards a remodelled transcendental phenomenology pure et dure. It is obvious that the 
feature of phenomenological working is addressed by the self-liberating momentum of 
our own activitas. The consequence of this methodical shifting is referred to as the 
instrument of reduction dissolving the correlation of legein and aporein in which the 
psychological feature of transcendentality enables us to read from-to.     
 
 
C Back to entities! 
 
The elaboration of the transcendental grafts Husserl’s dictum back to entities and 
therefore he enhances the method of reduction or the so-called epoché. By reducing the 
object to its pure essence, a phenomenon should expose its Wesen. Pure phenomenology 
stands for this kind of reasoning; it is present für mich through its reflexive and eidetic 
manner of noetic-nomatic structures of an sich while purifying A, A’ and B. To 
understand this task we have to consider that Husserl makes a difference between pure 
eidetic phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology and therefore introduces 
ontological considerations into transcendental arguments. This issue is one of the main 
contents of LU: the second tome Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der 
Erkenntnis tries to condense this exposition by exploring once more the idea of 
transcendental phenomenology52. 
 
In Untersuchung V Husserl refers systematically back to descriptive psychology and 
tries – in reference to the above mentioned – to rehabilitate its stance. This re-setting 
however could provoke misunderstandings, but Husserl’s intention of depreciating the 
psychological issue has to be understood in relation to a special way of psychological 
understanding: psychology henceforward should be separated from phenomenology by 
the fact that its task should only consist of describing and analysing for the purpose of 
                                                            
52 Especially V. and VI. Untersuchungen of LU II (HUA XIX).  
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advancing to the sources of knowledge and only from there on the law of pure logic 
could arise: it is about an ideal or pure eidetic analysis. In turn, the eidetic turn can be 
interpreted on the basis that it does not sit comfortably with the psychological realm, 
since the principal reason for exclusion is based on the relation with transcendental 
phenomenological features. However, eidetic phenomenology allows very well to 
consider psychological realities. Eidos is not only the forecourt of transcendental 
considerations; it can also stand for the foundation of empirical psychology (HUA IX 
52 ff).  
 
The point of eidetic phenomenology is a plea to reconsider the phenomenon of gazing 
and translating, as mentioned above. Husserl’s principle of presuppositionslessness 
indicates this kind of direction by attempting to exclude all kind of theoretical pre-
opinions and historical burdens. This does not mean that there is no tradition and no 
history, but rather history and theory are part of the phenomenological issue. Husserl 
wants to go back to the things (XIX/1 10) by cultivating the event of seeing in history 
and in theory. This cultivation is based on the act of intuition as it has, in its relation 
with things, its unique expression of characteristics. From this point on, we can see that 
phenomenological analysis has the expression of the unique, which wants to express the 
thing itself. The revolutionary issue is to relate intentionality on objectivity and from 
that stance to present it systematically (HUA XIX/1 21 and 33). There is a correlative 
character of intentionality and objectivity by outlining the attribution of the psychic and 
logic sphere on a common basis: paradeisos. The relatum does not pretend to 
understand language as a correlative and translatable issue but rather language is itself a 
sphere of translation, in which the logical and the psychic are mutually interpenetrating 
and thereby forming the act of language in its eidetic purity. The reflection on 
translatability is at the same moment the constitution of phenomenological talking and 
seemingly the acting premise of linguistic foundation: phenomenological utterance is to 
speak out the linguistic knowledge since the phenomenological language is actually the 
entity, which maintains the relation of expression and meaning. Therefore the 
phenomenological approach is based on claims. But referring it to analytical and 
descriptive drafting (which is based on intuition) we certainly have to accept that 
experience offers the explication (HUA XIX/1 25) for lining up expression and 
meaning. At the end of Untersuchungen VI Husserl clarifies what analytic a priori 
reality should mean and how the evidence of the signifié could be outlined. Therefore 
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Untersuchungen V starts with drafting the complex theme by attempting to grasp the 
nomination of logical truth and evidence by examining it without relying directly on 
these features: Untersuchungen V grafts the incipient stages of act-intentionality. We 
can read that intentionality is for Husserl one of the most interesting and obscure 
features (HUA III 180), especially when he replaces the abstract act-intentionality by 
the concrete intentional life in consciousness (HUA XIX/1 388ff). By considering this 
epistemological framework, phenomenological language is no longer naïve insofar as its 
intentionality will be fulfilled consciously and characterised as pure meaning. In this 
line the act has to be understood exclusively as an intentional experience or as a mode 
of consciousness, where intentional issues are defined not in their enactments but rather 
in their ideal relationship of a common ground of validity: the transfer from A to B via 
A’ is validated through evidence of the prepositions as and to. As identical act of 
intentions we may recognise them in their particular evidential act of reflection (HUA 
XVI 44). This seems to be the character of evidence that is experienced in the identic 
realm of transcendentality. Nevertheless, the V. Untersuchungen has not been focused 
on the intended Gegenständlichkeit; its focal point is directed towards the enactment 
and therefore Husserl’s phenomenological expectations have to be re-read in the line of 
an ambivalent correlation between the phenomenon of knowledge (cf. the knowledge of 
Erscheinen and Erscheinendem) 53  (HUA II 14). Nevertheless, the bias of act-
phenomenology reveals the idea of questioning the translation-mode by given 
conditions of any intended entities. This enables us to differentiate real from intentional 
contents (HUA XIX/1 411ff) and provokes at the same time a paradoxical turn: if the 
real content constituted by the effect that the imprecise and depending part in their 
relatedness ensures the function of any act, than the act has to be considered as a 
qualified act, since we have the stabilising feature of material knowledge that secures 
facticity. The coordinates of the securing facticity will be found within the 
transcendental approach by grasping the a priori correlation of noesis and noema. From 
this point of view, we have to accept that consciousness is the summa of all kind of acts 
(understood as an act of relational and intentional moments)54.  
 
                                                            
53  The double meaning of the notion of phenomenon is a result of a correlation of appearing 
Gegenständlichkeit and its associated acts, which appear for their part in act-reflection.  
54 At this point it is unclear on which basis Husserl establishes his phenomenon of act intentionality; is 
consciousness related to an egoity and on which basis can we talk about time due to the fact that the unity 
of consciousness is part of a process of change while writing ego (HUA XIX/1 369)?  
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Along the bulge of consciousness-summa, the present-sense of the intentional content 
draws questions. We have remarked that the intentional scenery of life and world could 
be perceived. Declaring it as intentional content, within the context of consciousness 
and as the element of translation, is not justified due to the fact that things in 
consciousness are even in that case not real moments of acts as they do not concern real, 
but rather fictive realms in an environment where life and world form life-world. Hence, 
the difference of the real and extra-real does not at all affect the intentional structures of 
translatability and therefore, subliminally, the question is how Husserl could throw light 
upon the difference of intentional and true Gegenständlichkeit without sacrificing the 
transcendence of consciousness of a real A or B, that is taken for a real intended thing in 
the consciousness-immanence-setting.  The instruments of Untersuchungen V do not 
permit us to solve the difference of transcendence and immanence, but it shows that any 
real composition of act and the intentional Gegenständlichkeit has to be expanded. 
Nevertheless, the thematic of the mode of given conditions leads to interesting insights 
and focuses on a unique issue in Husserl’s phenomenology: critical clarification of 
knowledge does not only rely on intentional relations of consciousness-acts and their 
entities, but rather on multiple ways of gegenständliche conditions55. Based on the 
penetration of the perceiving consciousness, the sense of translation will be significant 
for Husserl: not the identification of A as A’ is important but rather As matters. Hence, 
the categorisation of acts does no longer bother, due to the fact that the separation of 
entities, which is intended and the way in which it is intended will be prevalent. The 
belonging of an act to a common composition of sense(s) (irrespective of its qualitative 
differences) evokes the bonding formula: neither A nor A’ counts but rather the line is 
about the compositum As. Hence, Husserl stresses in the V. Untersuchungen that the 
essential of any act is not its quality but rather the intentional being of an act that 
reflects the unity of quality (HUA XIX/1 431) and therefore we can say that the idea of 
translating will be valorised as process. Language is neither a momentum of exterior 
perception nor a product of human relationships but rather it is an agile happening and 
expresses meaning. A, A’ and B will be captured as simply perceived, but the perceived 
is rather an identic fact that is already expressed via the meaningful act: AS.  
 
Hence, the VI. Untersuchungen outlines the mode of consciousness from where on the 
question of the Limesidee can be fixed as conditional reality of AS. It does not mean that 
                                                            
55  The idea of multiple modes stands for a given Gegenstand that refers to different modes of 
consciousness by appearing differently to its relative Gegebenheit. 
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fixation of the Limesidee and Gegenständlichkeit are equal, as we could imagine. But 
the question of a truth-seeking theory is based on the mode of given conditions that – in 
a phenomenological way – seeks to discover its correlative mode of consciousness; the 
mode of consciousness on its part has the specificity to be not only act-nor-thing-
specific but rather the mode can be found in any act or Gegenstandsbereich of its own 
realm; therefore the idea of the experience of self-giveness of any given issue defines it 
as its evidence. It refers to act-phenomenological characteristics, from where the 
evidence is taken apart of any other intention as a radical synthesis56. This act meaning 
is substantial and as such is constantly a dynamic medium of linguistic performances; in 
addition it is comprehensible in that sense that it denominates its meaning. In another 
sense it means that however the idea of truth is given – by the fact that even evidence 
could be declared as the experience of truth – it will be understood as forming act-
identity in a self-given-mode. This needs methodological clearance insofar as the self-
giveness of evidence infiltrates the act of objectivation; Husserl differentiates in this 
respect the notions Bedeutungsintention and Bedeutungserfüllung (HUA XIX/2 572ff 
and 582ff). A given fact is per se never an evident fact but it rather depends on the work 
of a regulative AS. Husserl’s translational work refers therefore to procedures of self-
giveness57 in which the transfer is its regulative momentum in which the intention of the 
fulfilment is the approximation of life-world. Hence, to intend an act of evidence means 
however not to be able to recognise it, since the correlative life misses in the world. The 
given has to be given in a specific way: A is per se not an object but it is given by its 
way of its givenness. This is the phenomenon translated by its givenness and in such a 
specific valence that it cannot a priori be declared A, A’ or B. Meaning conditions 
therefore the work of translation as something – something is the cipher in which 
intentional-meaning meets meaning-fulfilment. Hence, this comes into focus of vivid 
fulfilling and displaces the limes-formula into an unknown centre; the event of simple 
meaning is from this point on the intention in the fully pregnant sense (HUA XIX/2 
572ff). The notion of intuition corresponds with the notion of objects, but it is 
understandable by taking into account what the intuition uses for vivid fulfilling. The 
result of such fulfilling meaning-procedures of self-giveness of things, is at the same 
time that which is important for the evidence and therefore it is not just a random effect 
                                                            
56 The experience expression could mislead; note: the experiences of evidences are often the synthesis of 
categorical orders. 
57 The idea of self-giveness can irritate but will however show that it is not a unilateral act; there is a 
danger that the concept of self-giveness may postpone to the other extreme by reading realism or Ding an 
sich. 
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of acting, it rather is a multiple complexion of action: the force of phenomenological 
translation is to show us that we are not capable of controlling our environment but 
directs us to a better perception of our environment. Literally, we are not able to observe 
a scenery and say that we have an arsenal of elaborated language features to describe 
the setting, rather the setting of the topography surprises us; the abstention allows us to 
understand and to perceive in a deeper and denser way.  
 
Ergo, the evidence of a deeper and denser life-world self has for Husserl normative 
signification due to the fact that he formulates the concept of evidence as one of the first 
methodological principles (HUA XVII 209ff). It is all about phenomenological 
clarification and securing subsistence of the self, which is not based on a verdict, but 
rather is valid through itself in reductio. His phenomenological clarification of grasping 
A as A’ to B falls behind the classic theory of levelling A as A’ to B as the adequation 
for life and world. Husserl’s analytical clarification of the relationship of evidence, self-
giveness and truth does not even serve as a special explication for an exclusive 
definition of life-world, but serves as a clarification of the fundamental condition for 
such kind of definitions. Therefore evidence is not a criterion for truth and reality (HUA 
XVII 163f). Evidence does neither stand in opposition to any linguistic canon nor does 
it serve as its correction. Husserl’s aim is totally different: it is about the agreement of 
how the sense of utterance could be formulated. The explanations in LU are a first 
approach towards the transcendental project; a lot of traces are outlined but they evoke 
clarification and densification: we have undertaken some clarifying investigation to the 
realms of intention, evidence and vivid fullfilness in which the battle cry back to entities 
is the hidden cantus firmus.    
 
 
D Declaring transcendental phenomenology58 
 
After having published LU, Husserl develops in Ideen I (1913) (HUA II) the very 
systematic foundation of the transcendental task. The above outlined phenomenological 
analysis does not only continue but rather has to systematically be ordered: it is about 
how evidence, vivid fullfilness and intentionality constitute systematically the path of 
founding the AS of the subject, the objects of language, of the reason being etc. in order 
                                                            
58 In critical reference to Elisabeth Ströker’s notes (especially Ströker 1987: 34-115). 
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to justify a linguistic set up in life-world. Henceforth, we might say that language is per 
se a transcendental theory. In other words: a linguistic framework and the usage of 
language itself cannot be understood in analogia entis by declaring its conditions within 
this framework. At a first glance, language has in correlation with consciousness-
intentions a descriptive function or more precisely in our case the function of analogical 
aporia. Everything is given as consciousness-content and as an act happening out of 
consciousness. Recognised by its reduction, phenomenology has so far been the 
momentum of a consciousness-giveness. The phenomenon is the given-condition of 
consciousness, it is the donation of a certain specific consciousness, which exists by its 
invading language; the process of language invades by re-referring to the sphere of 
consciousness – this kind of invasion is the outlined process of epoché. In this sense 
reduction does not simply mean an acceptance, on the contrary, it is a movement of 
thought in which the phenomenon finds its vivid fulfilness of intentionality and 
fulfilment. Reduction means therefore to bring the element of what as a how 
phenomenon to the sphere of consciousness and to produce it in a pure manner, i.e. to 
set up its generic and evident constitution in epoché. From its evidential point the act of 
reduction restrains its evident entity of the phenomenon whereby its evidential fact is 
clarified (ideation means that the entity of possibility finds its own condition). However, 
no operations, which refer to the transcendental line can be part of the undertaken 
investigation59, rather phenomenological knowledge tries to outline the clarification 
lines of what the difference of Sein und Seiend could reasonably mean. Therefore, we 
have to relate the acts of ontological perceiving to each other, since ontological 
knowledge production cannot be separated from the Sein and the Seiende. Its perceiving 
feature will be the reason to define what being could actually mean in life-world (HUA 
VI 9f). Husserl is persuaded that only epistemological production delivers clarification 
of ontological and apophantic pretensions (HUA II 22ff). The hint arguing with a 
knowledge setting is to start with the idea of reduction by arguing that 
phenomenological methodology does not have any link to knowledge within tradition, 
science and philosophy. Reduction, understood as a step-by-step movement, demands 
an abstention of scientific, philosophical and linguistic positions and on the other hand 
it shifts its significance towards a transcendental existence of writing philosophical, 
scientific and linguistic possibilities. Insofar, this kind of reduction is not yet 
specifically of phenomenological provenience. This has to be mentioned as Husserl has 
                                                            
59 This mistake is often made in argumentation lines of everyday life, of positivism and especially of 
ontological discourses. 
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not a clear distinct denomination and separation of forming reduction. Hence, the notion 
reduction can be used as the ontological engine that enables us to the vividness of 
aporia. This operator however opens the transcendental-phenomenological field 
towards the transcendental consciousness of reality. By considering this iteration, we 
have to assume that the constitution of the intentional is fulfilled by phenomenological 
reflections of reduction and ideation. Whilst givenness and constitution are unified 
present, their evidence happens in their self-givenness. We may assume that the 
evidence is the constitutive givenness of any A, A’ or B that will be squeezed in life-
world; constitution is act-constitution and exactly this given constitution is the essence, 
wherein phenomenology may be fulfilled as vivid fullfilness of intentional self-giveness. 
This refers to the theoretical-subject as act-performer, in which all phenomena are 
constituted and performed while the empirical ego stumbles with A as A’ to B. Thus, the 
existence of the subject effects the action of consciousness 60 . Accordingly, 
phenomenology has to seek its way down by considering its regressive path and 
delivers therefore traces for translation. From this point on, we can no longer consider 
phenomenology as it has been practised so far: there is no simple experience of 
consciousness. The origins are only on a reflexive level present, but they are 
nevertheless given without mediation – we have to declare the foundation of linguistic 
codification as a direct Erschaubarkeit. Up to now, we investigated that A, A’ and B act 
analytically, but from now on we can no longer handle them only on reflexive purposes. 
It turns out that they signalise a fundamental problem in so far as they grasp deep-rooted 
epistemological self-evidence. Hitherto, the self-evidence of words, grammar, syntax, 
etc. are so far ontologically given and are not simply the verdict of a self. But 
everything gets changed if we no longer accept the fact that in translational practice this 
kind of natural knowledge is no longer obvious, but rather linguistically reflected. In 
that sense, the translational knowledge astray is a riddle: how is it possible to reach 
knowledge, considering that the subjective entity is irreconcilably separated? 
Knowledge is therefore mystified with the riddle of transcendence. Within his sceptical 
argumentation, Husserl does not care if knowledge is in an appropriate relationship to 
the objective issue (HUA II 24), his main concern is to know how it is possible to 
capture what is important and what the idea of knowledge, its validity, could signify. 
This is his fundamental way to query language and translatability and is the 
                                                            
60 Husserl’s phenomenology of language cannot be taken as an existential hermeneutics; however, the 
thematisation of an existential hermeneutics is instantly raised – the question, remains if an existential 
hermeneutics is the purpose of phenomenology. In reverse we may consider that a hermeneutical writing 
may overcome language within a simple analogical setting. 
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methodological basis for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and gives us 
nevertheless an interesting view of how language and translation could be formulated. 
 
Therefore, the question of how we understand the Gegenstände – or to be more precise, 
how we understand the lexeme – of transcendental consciousness and in relation to this 
Gegenständlichkeit, we need to analyse the enigmatic fact of how the intentional act and 
language are related to each other in terms of translational activities. This relationship is 
able to draft the intentionality of knowable acts. Hence, it is not only a relationship as 
something but it has also the line of to(wards) something. This directed intentionality – 
different to the sheer intentionality – foster the intended entity: it is all about the 
authentic entity. But it is as well uncontested that the intended entity can only been 
mediated by intentional entities (cf. the noesis and noema relationship). Therefore we 
have to see that the problem of knowledge is not simply a problem of the act and its 
corresponding entities but rather a problem of the relation from two forms of 
Gegenständlichkeit and their translatability. As outlined above, a fulfilled act of 
knowledge would be presented as a correspondence or as an equation. It is 
representation insofar as an intentional entity has to be understood as an imagination of 
the real and as an intended entity within the realm of evidence. There are some sorts of 
theoretical burdens by creating such an image from these real entities: according to the 
image, we should show and review the entity as a separate issue – we write A, A’ and B 
and not AA’B. Therefore we need a position apart from them but actually the relation 
can just be possible through other intentional relations in life-world. The 
Gegenständlichkeit of consciousness is an immanent intentional correlation, whereas a 
real entity has always a transcendental appeal of consciousness. This separation from 
immanence and transcendence conceals a translational ambiguity: the real entity is on 
the one hand transcendent in terms of its corresponding immanent entities, but not at all 
exterior to its intended acts, and on the other hand it would be simply unrecognisable. 
As a matter of principle, the relation between intentional and real entity is just the 
negative expression of the fact that not only the intentional and immanent Gegenstand, 
but rather the difference of immanent and transcendental Gegenständlichkeit, is itself 
part of the recognising consciousness; it is very much again about the fulfilment of the 
intention in its squeezing momentum. 
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As a result, another notion of intentional immanence emerges. It does not belong per se 
to the problems of natural knowledge and language, but rather it is about its reflection. 
Therefore it does not solve the previous evoked ontological difference of meaning-
intention and meaning-fulfilment while writing the evidence in transcendental real 
language. On the contrary, the realm of A, A’ and B will be Gegenstand and part of the 
epistemological reflection, in which the immanence of consciousness is understood as 
transcendental immanence; hence it will be part of Husserl’s phenomenology and does 
not signify a contradiction to the transcendence of the meaning fulfilling of a real 
Gegenstand. Husserl’s transcendental approach refers now in its difference to the mere 
intended; the enlightening of consciousness can only be understood by its redundant 
consciousness act: on the one side, it is a fact that language has to be intended to 
transcendental objects to get them determined and on the other, language is oriented to 
the transcendence of Gegenstände to define them. In the first case, knowledge is related 
to Gegenstände whose real existence is an unreflected premise. In the other case, it is 
based on the existence of Gegenstände, which has not its real predicate and therefore 
requires an epistemological proof61. As a result, translating figures are a permanent 
circular topos of knowledge-production (A = A’). The analysis of how Sinnaufklärung 
of knowledge can be developed by a constitutional theory will reflect the A = A’ 
scheme. This drafting will be weighty for Husserl’s approach, since phenomenology, as 
a descriptive method, occurs as transcendental perspective while incorporating the 
intentional consciousness in its transcendental consciousness. The effort will be to make 
this stance analytically accessible for reading A as A’ to B. 
 
 
3. The other breakthrough: transcendental reality 
 
So far we have seen that static-receptive considerations do not sit comfortably with 
phenomenological lining, i. e. we have considered that Husserl thematises the 
relationship of essential different acts of meaning and therefore undermined the 
momentum of rigidity. Instead, we have to consider that Husserl highlights the event of 
                                                            
61 In relation to Kant: objective reality of entities needs epistemological proof; hence, having no real 
predicates means there is no epistemological proof. The relation to Kant’s transcendental questioning is 
not accidental. Husserl tries to shape the conditional questions for possible gnoseological effects as the 
foundational condition for phenomenology, which reviews the critics of reason. However, the difference 
between Kant and Husserl is obvious: the conditions of possibilities are in phenomenological discourse 
not only related to knowledge but as well to the Gegenstände of knowledge. Kant, for his part, fixes a 
transcendental-subjective a priori. 
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translation, mediation, the process-character of consciousness and the teleological 
dynamics in order to obtain the transcendental reality in life-world. Hence, in 
Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit 
der Natur (Husserl 1968: 307-325), Husserl intensifies this line by highlighting his aim 
for a transcendental language. The possibility-conditions of valid predications are the 
condition possibilities for any lexeme in such a way that the latter is constituted by the 
first and its unity outlines the identity of the therein-prevailing-possibility-conditions. 
This implies that the condition-possibilities are considered as the capabilities to 
encompass the predications and the continued conditional-ground. Therefore we may 
assume that the predications are the given possibilities of any object formulating A, A’ 
or B. At present, we consider that predictions cover the expression realm of objects and 
conversely, any categorical objects can be taken by the prediction. Language as 
prediction accomplishes the synthesis a priori that founds the categorical object as such. 
Consequently, they are the subjective accomplishment, in which the formal objects are 
predetermined for any kind of thoughts. Language as phenomenon offers the area of 
constitution for other and further formalisation activities. Therefore, language signifies 
in such a framework a content-producing sphere of different layers. It is a material- and 
formal-sphere, which gradually turns from its own form-constitution into the material 
content of logical spheres. In this respect, language signifies a producing and material 
sphere that relies on its form-constitution as a second-level material. Herein this marks a 
certain structural relation: whilst form will be on a next level content, it will be at this 
point its material content. In that sense, meaning as form is at once the matter of 
categorical certainty. In other words, the entity of the form is its possibility to be 
content. This kind of form-substance-relationship is as a consequence a phenomenon in 
actua; it outlines the continuation-principle that conditions the overall structure of acts 
among themselves and the consciousness in toto. Henceforth, the ground operations of 
the act-structure are the utterance of the imperatives give and take62.  
 
By considering give and take, we consider simultaneously the relationship that 
corresponds to the revised framework of language: language refers therefore on the one 
side to the predicativum of the perception-act and on the other to the category of 
perception. Perceptions interpenetrate in such a way that the realms A, A’ and B grasp 
the content of the perception sphere, namely by giving them as (formal) idea. Therewith 
                                                            
62 Cf. also Hülsmann (Hülsmann 1964: 147). 
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the problem of identity and difference occurs insofar as the taken and the given 
correspond to each other and that the given feature signifies the a priori of an act, and in 
contrast, the taken realm gathers from a given fact, which occurs as a categorical form 
of evidence. The identity of form and difference, in its different act-spheres, is therefore 
questioned in its procedure. The densification of life-worldly linguistics is the result of 
being double taken by its identic reading – the identity of the syntax of A, A’ and B 
produces therefore the dynamic act of translation: identity is the presence as it is the 
other in ones own63. The possibility of this identity is the being of an object that is 
present in both imagination and perception and will be performed in the acts of the 
imaginative A as A’ while perceiving to B. The possible unity formation of imagination 
and perception is the intrinsic idea of identity and therefore we have to consider that 
language represents indeed the sphere of happening, whilst outlining identity. To put it 
differently, the possibility of the acts and the possibility of contents indicate the 
linguistic condition-possibilities that can only be found in its identity of grammar and 
syntax while writing life-world. It is the way in which the linguistic act provides 
identity in its peculiar way of essence, by referring to its transcendental function of give 
and take: the dynamic act of giving linguistic terms is taken by the phenomenon of 
analogical aporia as its transcendental issue. At this very point the transcendental 
phenomenology of translation takes its corresponding partner for producing life-world. 
The correspondence of form and category, of formation and meaning, and the exchange 
of an index to its indicated grammar however, induces the translational act of give and 
take. The analogia is the forgottenness of the subject as the foundational actor of 
analogical aporia: analogia as such, as recurrence and correspondence, forgets how it 
is squeezed in and analogia further on forgets to recognise itself. This is the reason why 
the translational task is often not considered and will be taken for granted64.  
 
We have seen that language means to approach its being by enacting it. I tried to outline 
this line up by re-considering action and knowledge: transcendentality of language is 
                                                            
63 The perceived is within the envisaged in imagination. But the perception is far from being the 
perceived, it rather offers the identity of the perceived as the perceived in imagination; i.e. if I perceive a 
chair and after that imagine it (without having the possibility to re-see it), I have to resume that the 
imagination of the chair is in correspondence and simultaneously the unity within the perception of the 
chair. The identity of imagination and perception is therefore the identity of the chair. Neither the 
imagined nor the perceived chair corresponds to the identity; only the chair as chair is as such its identity. 
64 From this point we may assume to create a new analogy-thesis, which corresponds to an analogia 
transcendentalis. However, there are no such signals in Husserl’s oeuvre. He emphasises that language is 
given by language and we make ourselves out of it as well as we are often used by it. But can we assume 
that we possess language? 
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subjectivity and its happening-character is the content of its linguistic being. We can 
also say that subjectivity as agent considers language as possibility and on the other side 
it is definitely the possibility of language. By considering language as possibility we 
have to read it, it does not analyse the conditions of language, but rather presents itself 
intentionally as possibility. In this perspective language offers the possibility to express 
something – this resembles the phenomenological qualities which Husserl is so keen of: 
the neutrality of place, where the manifest will be manifest, where the meant can be the 
meant, where the totum can enact its presence, etc. Henceforth, from a 
phenomenological stance, language offers the possibility to say nothing and to say the 
truth; any utterance can occur in language as a multitude of possibilities. Language has 
therefore no distinct setting. The linguistic indifference concerns language as form, 
which offers in its formality of emptiness the possibility to imagine and to express its 
content and at the same moment to be content in its form. Pure formal language or 
language as pure language is alienated from any content as we have seen it above. This 
tension of fullness and emptiness, this kind of excess and lack conditions language as 
the intrinsic feature of translation. In other words, the richness of language-neutrality 
signifies the hyperbolic event of reality and outlines the striking moment writing the 
possibility of language: language is not a copy of a pretended world, language is not 
bound to an actuality and a necessity but it is far more the possibility that trespasses the 
instant actuality. In concreto, it is the possibility in which every kind of modality can be 
expressed. The neutrality of language invites us to use language as a possibility. It 
offers in its neutrality and indifference against psychic and individual moments, the 
possibility to leave their conditions behind it. Hence, language as phenomenon outlines 
a certain distance, an overcoming of the affective, a suppression of emotions, imitations, 
psychic elements etc. that leads toward knowledge. In this relationship, language can be 
considered as the logical, as the deliberation of logos and as a step towards the realms of 
knowledge and reasoning. Language as possibility means therefore the logic of 
language, since the logos of language defines its intrinsic possibility of linguistic 
happenings; possibility of language is therefore its own being as unity of senses and as 
the meaning of the permanently opening process of relation- and order-structures. The 
sensual sphere of perception is not the possibility of meaning, senses and not at all the 
possibility of contents but rather the sensual world of perception, which found a 
linguistic world within the setting of a world per se that is in the same moment the 
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object of transcendental condition-possibilities65. The possibility-analysis as linguistic a 
priori cannot be understood as an autonomous process; it can only be captured as a 
transcendental process. However, this does not mean that language as possibility and 
the possibility of language are deployed as a unity of an analytic-synthetic a priori and 
a posteriori setting in order that this process of phenomenological act highlights 
transcendental hermeneutics. It is the transcendental ego that delivers the performance 
of hermeneutics. However, the possibility of language and language as possibility are 
not sufficient to capture its being. The being of the act is insufficient and 
phenomenologically hardly developed. The act, in which the possibility of language has 
its own being, outlines the transcendental issue by being its own possibility – this 
possibility is provided by the subject as its intrinsic relatum.  
 
 
A The equivocation that never lasts  
 
The problem of this translational setting faces the problem that a signifié is the outburst 
of varied meanings; this aporetic momentum is caused due to the acting difference of 
meaning-fufilling and meaning-providing. The analysis shows us that language is 
literally the translation of the conferred meaning in its apprehended form that is for the 
moment the empty formula of squeezing (cf. aporetic analogia). Providing and 
fulfilling happens linguistically between the signifié and the signifiant as a cipher of 
translation: as and to. The element of equivocation plays therefore an important role and 
leads to the above outlined act-momentum. This means that on the one side the 
relatedness of its being and on the other the engagement of the respective relationship of 
perception and notion as well as the connexion of content and form – literally both 
elements are interconnected and therefore deliberately an act of transfer: the expression 
as intentional act is not a simple fact, but rather a permanent event of translation66. 
Hence, it is not accidental that a translational framework replies to the phenomenon of 
equivocation; the equivocation is the dilemma of language, since it withdraws quasi 
itself. But this withdrawal is practically the consideration of the linguistic act as its 
                                                            
65 In reference to Manfred Sommer (Sommer 1985: 91ff). 
66  The simple description of intentionality and erfüllende Anschauung shows the complexity and 
entanglement of their enactment. The act of knowledge and the cognitive-function of expressions play 
therefore a major role (HUA XIX 56f and 61f). Emptiness and fullness refer primarily to read that 
expressions and intentions can be both and therefore in their fullness separable. 
 37 
forced meaning-fulfilling and meaning-providing67. As its equation language brings 
itself into reflection insofar as the equation is nothing else than the self-disclosure of 
language in its transcendental setting. Indeed, this self-disclosure manifests on its own 
ground its equivocation68. This kind of reflection is shown within the reflection of 
equivocation as such, since it means the material of an equivocation; an objective that 
means itself as the objected issue. By considering language, as a proto-type of the 
equivocal framework, we can consider that we have to understand it simultaneously as a 
theoretical and practical phenomenon. Henceforth, any expressi verbis is a possible 
equivocation: the equivocation faces the tension of being in a translational mode of 
from-to that could be understood or not and will, if it turns out to be, a system of a 
permanent transcendental need. We may suggest evoking an analogical sphere of 
mutual translation. To understand this correspondence and as an addition to the previous 
chapters, we have to consider that a linguistic expression is significant and stresses 
therefore once more the facticity of significance: any linguistic act signifies something. 
This something can be considered in its most extensive way as the content that will be 
expressed in its very style. As we have already outlined above, the process of translation 
is highlighted by its style, by its manner, how something is expressed69. Only within or 
as its relationship, language articulates the content and the form by referring to the act 
of translating. The equivocation considers therefore the extensive life-world-arena, 
which is language: translation is the intrinsic articulated sense-unity70. This is where the 
internal structure and translation occur as meaning and as expression. Language is 
therefore common as well as solitary, in its proper name as in its generic term: the 
tension between this two positions is the ground-reality of translation in its pathic 
expression and the simultaneous emptiness and abstractness. By considering this matter 
of fact, translation in its pure sense is possible and enables us to its possibility of 
language. Hence, translation reconsiders to enact the phenomenon of language as 
language insofar it is revealed by itself. The equivocation is the constant release of 
language; its practise is however always clearance and as well differentiation. 
                                                            
67 By performing it, it emerges – as long as it is reflective – as its own being. 
68 As we have seen, language as language is the universal and extensive equivocation. With other words, 
language is necessarily an equivocal field, in which the dynamics and statics of the equivocal occurs to 
itself. 
69 The intentional expression-meaning does only mean that intentional acts are meaningful, but it does not 
express anything about the internal structure and the disposition of its presentation. Language as 
equivocation means that anything could be meaningful and therefore linguistic. Finally, it signifies the 
primordial relationship of content and expression and as well of speaking and being in its furthest sense. 
70 This sense unity is highlighted by Husserl mentioning the totum of language, the name for the no-
named and the universal name as well as the situatedness of an expression in its subject(ivity), 
contingency, situation, etc.  
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Translation faces a dialectic movens by suspending stabilised moments and creating 
simultaneously new fixations. It seems to be pertinent to evoke that the structure of 
equivocation offers at the same moment the possibility of linguistic revealing and 
developing. The translational structure is permanently peaked by constantly offering the 
possibility of unfolding and developing 71 . This evidence outlines the fact that 
unambiguity and ambiguity are related to each other in a suspense-packed condition and 
finally signifies nothing less than the appearance of a dynamic and contingent 
translational activity72. The emptying offers in the same line fullness by realising new 
categorical contents in such a way that there will not be an emptiness of content. The 
performed abstraction however entails in the sense of universality a new form of 
translation: each kind of abstraction contains in its conditions a fullness that can be 
taken as a special and individual content.    
 
Most commonly, the outlined task is in its everyday language considered as the 
conversion of the realm of objects, meanings and expressions. These three realms are 
often thought mutually and are mediated by the linguistic sphere, albeit language is not 
able to offer such kind of translational power. The more appropriate téchne, facing the 
analogical aporia of thinking about the different realms by their own means and 
negotiate them thereafter via language, will be discussed by the figure of knowledge (-
production) insofar as distinct knowledge can be sorted out, well-defined notions 
presented and attributions proposed73. Nevertheless, we cannot pretend that language is 
the coordination-authority and the realm of objects, in which meanings are reflected. It 
is not possible to relativise the sphere of perception, objects, notions, etc. to the sphere 
of language and to declare language as the genetic code. As outlined above, the aporia 
can be resolved by discussing the difference as an equivalent fact; we may consider that 
language is always a dense enactment of expressions, feelings, intentions, contents, etc. 
The enforcement of translation offers therefore the possibility to write the equivocation 
as its locus amoenus. The process of translation in its equation-framework highlights 
                                                            
71 So far we have not considered the notion of univocation. The univocal expression can be outlined as 
the ultimate destiny of language – as mentioned this consideration is weak, since de facto univocation can 
be debated as a border case of equivocation. It is literally in suspension the negation of it. Or in other 
words: the univocation shifts permanently its being into the sphere of equivocation, in particular by 
remodelling itself as the negative part of equivocation. Henceforth, that means that any expression 
contains the negativity by convening the univocation and the equivocation. 
72 The relationship of perception and notion and as well of emptiness and fullness condition language. 
73 If there is a possibility to discuss the issue in such a way, we would crystallise two different and 
language-free spheres: objects and meanings. The linguistic realm however is primarily the 
representation, assignment and coordination of the expression.    
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the relationship of constitution and genesis and therefore the achievement of the 
transcendental ego by logical purposes. Language happens by considering it as the 
context wherein the relationship and the foundation of possibilities find its 
manifestation: the enacted translation-production reveals the constellation of categorical 
and objective realms, by considering the phenomenon of equivocation in potentialis.       
 
 
B Metabolê: a subversion of translation? 
 
In broad lines, we find that the entanglement of objects, meaning and expression 
outlines the possibilities of translation. Hence, there is a mixture of similarity, identity 
and difference in which language has to be seen as transcendental figuration of 
primarily a priori unity while facing its translation as its first act. This means that there 
is a certain semantic setting of equivocation and synonyms, which are systematically 
pre-existing and conditioning our relationship of the self, the similar and the different. 
The semantic precondition – led by a language of similarities, identities and differences 
– outlines denomination formulae for pre-existing logical categories. It is a special 
framework in which equivocations and synonyms are the hidden but guiding element for 
expressions by conditioning identity and difference, especially then, when we may 
assume that in language we do not only have a pre-existing setting but an activity that is 
its own identification and differentiation. Equivocations and synonyms are therefore 
linguistic pre-determinations and they have to be analysed more carefully, especially in 
correspondence to their character. Husserl outlines the expression-character of names: 
the phenomenon of expression is primarily a relationship of meaning and objects that 
are shown above all by the acts of expressions. The expression has to be understood as 
the translational act of two different spheres of intuitive and significative acts. It is 
translation in the sense that it mediates between perception and meaning. Hence, the 
duality is the content of the expression, but the identic, the idealistic unity of meaning 
and the objectivity are dispersing (HUA XVI 30ff). However, there is a certain striking 
necessity to keep a certain correlation between the different acts, as the expressed is 
related to partial identification (HUA XVI 33ff). Equivocation and synonymy evince 
the independence of meanings, which could be therefore empty and without any 
corresponding objects. Equivocation and synonyms are meaning-awarding, meaning-
complying and therefore the intrinsic happening of language. We have to argue that 
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translation evinces the mediation of ideal and real realms as the result of identity and 
difference. Therefore the expression can be considered as a dynamic fulfilling- and 
identity-happening: the intentional being of the act of perception assimilates with the 
meaning of the expressing act of A and B (HUA XVI 32). The sphere of expression is 
therefore a sphere of adequation of translational identities – language is a consequence 
of translating identities but not by considering it exclusively as a linguistic 
consciousness and it should not only be discussed by consciousness-aspects either. 
From this standpoint, we may consider that language and its intrinsic consciousness can 
be considered as the very transcendental condition. As we have outlined, language is not 
its own content but rather a part of its being that expresses issues that are not owned by 
language itself74. The predicative element is therefore necessarily the horizon from 
where the category of language is enacted. The world is the believed universal feature, 
it is the perceiving of the whole and as well of the singular. This kind of believing is the 
articulation of the believed intuitive, originated perception of life-world as the very 
formulation of the ur-doxa75, represented as the dialectic pair of perception and 
imagination. This dialectic entanglement is neither a psychological nor a physiological 
explanation, but rather – as the phenomenon of consciousness-process might presume – 
the transcendental life as such76.  If ur-doxa outlines a pre-predicative moment, we may 
assume that believing finds its explication in its categories; in other words, language is 
per se a synthetic event of squeezing life and world into a realm of pure seeing. By 
analysing language through the perceived life-worldly language, we are able to create a 
new order and new rules for a new linguistic transcendental synthetic a priori. This 
implies as well that the dynamic enactment of language is actually a transcendental 
enactment, insofar as its logic is fostered by its linguistic facticity. As consequence, the 
phenomenological understanding of language can never grasp its own standpoint and 
hence, the act of translation remains in its very stop (A = A’). The horizon of the ur-
doxa is not at all an immanent sphere that excludes transcendentality. The pre-
consciousness is not at all the topos, where we are able to understand but rather the spot 
where evidence should arise. It evokes further steps – this step is finally the epochal 
step leading towards a front or, euphemistically pronounced, it leads to paradeisos. The 
                                                            
74 If language faces its own content, it will be the content of language – it can no longer be act and 
happening. That would mean that we would have left language. 
75 The ur-doxa is exactly the absolute coincidence of existence of the human being and the consciousness 
of itself, which is subsequently revealed as the transcendental ego. 
76 In that sense, we do not consider psychological effects but rather discuss the psychic phenomenon as 
such and examine the evident self-giveness of a being as a being. The appearance in its doxic 
consciousness poses the transcendental question. 
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act of translating as an enactment of consciousness evinces epoché that yields any 
standpoint and invokes the fatum of any given phenomenon.   
 
 
C Life-world: the anthropological figuration of translation 
 
We have seen that transcendental reduction undertakes the formation and setting of pure 
consciousness. This kind of consciousness architecture has been established as pure life 
and as Erkenne Dich selbst formula (HUA VIII 121) against any forms of natural or 
psychological reasoning. Husserl has analysed so far (cf. LU) this setting by considering 
the experience-phenomenon (of language) and the experimentum of aporetic analogia. 
This condition was the initial purpose for pure phenomenology and consequently as 
well the relationship towards a life-world full of experiences. In correspondence to this 
lining, the ego as its theoretical agent has been tacitly accepted (HUA II 44). The very 
fact of hidden acceptance questions if consciousness-intentionality is really given while 
consciousness is related to language or is it rather the question of the relation to its ego, 
which could have given insights to Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological 
preliminaries. By naming the cogitations, Husserl has so far and especially in Ideen I 
not considered the ego as a possessing subject of consciousness; the ego is rather an 
epiphenomenon. But if we add to the ego a specific unity-form of intentional 
consciousness, we have to consider that the unity of consciousness is given from its 
very beginning by my perspective: the ego will be a constitutive part or in other words, 
it is its origin of all operations – the ego, is dictator, scholar and translator. This kind of 
self-certainty is at least nothing else than a reflective certainty, but understood as a 
doubling of being a subject and an object and therefore the formation of forming unity: 
the translator will become translation. By grasping this condition, the identity of any 
ego cannot be comprehensible: the subject turning to an object by self-devotion is 
always and in any case of self-reference already ahead of its own conditions. Not much 
different is the case for the transcendental ego. Hence, the identity of the ego does not 
correspond to how we perceive words – indeed an identity-entity is conditioned through 
its multitude: a word is not at all identical due to the fact that it simply exists. Identity is 
the result, a process of identification; from a phenomenological stance, it is a special 
translational synthesis from where on different giving meanings of a word will be 
canalised as word and in extension as language. In reference to the subject, the object-
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identification has already a certain kind of a non-actual identity-consciousness of the 
identified subject as conditioning feature translating life and world. The basic question 
will be in relation to condition possibilities by outlining its linguistic identity-
consciousness, how is it constituted or do we have to accept a complete different 
identification-concept to define the self-identification of language and the ego in which 
A as A’ to B means A as A’ to B?  
 
The pure ego has so far been presented as a peculiar form of transcendental reflection in 
immanence and the phenomenological standpoint presents therefore the given stands in 
correspondence with its pure consciousness. We have to note that Husserl does only 
consider the given issue as an empty pool of experiences; it is inexplicable in the form 
of a pure ego and nothing else. Therefore the phenomenological view sheers off from 
the experiences having ego towards the abstinent I perspective. In LU and in Ideen I 
Husserl describes the ego as thinking from nobody (HUA XVI 41). His theory of 
essence and its intended function manifests therefore further information: the essence of 
consciousness and the extraction of its invariant structures is – through the ideation of 
the experience-reflection of the one’s own ego intentionality – given structurally and in 
this manner my consciousness, how I find it as my essence-setting, is just an exemplary 
isolation of an entity-generality that is completely indifferent, compared to any 
empirical consciousness. 
 
The ego is no longer an empiric ego, but rather the ego has to be understood as pure ego 
or as theoretical subject as we have outlined above, which contains a multiplicity of 
experiences within ideal possibilities (HUA V 71) and on its part has to be thought from 
a contingent existing ego. But the pure ego in the sense of a pure, idealistic essence-
constituent of consciousness-structures does not deliver the possibility to be my very 
own bios. My ego translates and requires another ego and henceforth, the other stresses 
in a phenomenological sense the very mutual sense-implication (HUA III 8f and 70f). In 
reference to Husserl, the eidetic spur does not signify the telos; rather the transcendental 
reduction, which leads to origins of sense and hence, the transcendental ego has to be 
considered as the filter of life-world: any pre-phenomenological sense of the ego 
understood as the mundane ego has to be excluded while the ego has to be understood 
as a pure transcendental ego. However, the analysis has already exceeded the status of 
an ego, which does not describe it as ineffable and nothing more than just the 
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benchmark of its acts. The transcendental ego of Kant, understood as transcendental 
apperception, is disenchanted by my view of Husserl’s transcendental ego77: The ego, 
understood as transcendental ego, could only be declared as my own by having another 
transcendental ego, which is different and somehow similar to my ego. The otherness as 
well as its sameness causes nevertheless problems due to questions of how the otherness 
has to be linguistically founded: if another subject should be within my own 
consciousness-field, I will not be able to understand it as my own kind – this serious 
break with any semantic or hermeneutical precondition will overcome Husserl by 
rethinking the dependence of the alien-empirical-ego within my ego and the status of 
the alien transcendental ego in its being-sense by blasting the own sphere of 
transcendentality, if the other ego has to be understood in its fundamental meaning as 
the other. Therefore the formation of translation is the formation ex negativo78.  
 
Husserl’s ego cogito has its source within the invulnerable basic position, which seems 
to be an aporia within its un-evolved structure: whatever is given to me is a giveness of 
language for me, whatever is presented to me in its being, has to be understood as a 
being for me. Therefore, any other I is hence, another I to me. But this aporia has, as we 
have outlined, been given up due to the fact that any being is every being as such, but 
rather it is only a possible sketch of what Sein and Seiendes truly are. This turn is the 
fundamental phenomenological approach: its emphasis on accepting only my ego cogito 
as the foundational embodiment of any judgement (HUA I 7) has only started by the 
method of transcendental reduction. My Ebenbild is the ego writing A as A’ and never A 
as B. The idea of an immanent perception, which does only exist in me, is a comfortable 
starting position for any ego (HUA III 85f and Ströker 1987: 139). However its 
qualification can only be understood, if it does not exist for me and for others, but just 
only for its own purpose. The transcendental effect highlights this theoretical effect of 
solitude: by accepting that the inhibition of world-believing allows the principle 
possibility of thinking that another ego does not exist, the effect will be that this 
reduction conditions a transcendental singularity of my own ego (and this effect can not 
even be mediatised through its being-demand). In our analysis, the theoretical solipsism 
                                                            
77 In the following I attempt to draft the transcendental ego by attempting to shift a phenomenology of 
consciousness towards a phenomenology of subjectivity.  
78 Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology can be declared as the first transcendental path, which has 
rethought the status of inter-subjectivity: the abstract multitude of empty egos will be transformed 
towards a transcendental inter-subjectivity of any concrete egos as the first sense-foundation and being-
validity. Husserl presents in the V. Cartesian Meditation and in Ideen I a very narrow presentation of the 
idea of inter-subjectivity, but only to transform it in Krisis  (HUA VI 136ff and 187-193). 
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is stabilised by the preposition to. This result leads to a transcendental solipsism (HUA 
VIII 238 ff), which has to be read in the line of to B. As a sequel to this methodological 
solipsism, the constitution-analysis forms the framework of the ego-multitude, which is 
given in my field of experience as a transcendental phenomenon. Additionally, we can 
say that transcendentality is per definitionem translation due to the mediating 
requirements of the subject to subject relationship.   
 
A sideline to this stance considers how Husserl separates the own and alien subjectivity. 
He focuses it on the description of the difference of Unmittelbarkeit and Mittelbarkeit 
by introducing therefore the notion of empathy (HUA VIII 134 and HUA I). The notion 
could be misleading, but does at least signify the oppositional sense of the original 
meaning of my own: the other is present as unified with his / her / its body too, but 
nevertheless she / he / it is another ego with it / her / his inner life and this inner life is 
not given as like his / her / its body is given as original to me (HUA III 8). Empathy is 
phenomenologically speaking a perception act, even if it is no longer an original act of 
perception; but as an act of perception it is a constitutional act of translation (Ströker 
1987: 140). Hence, language is from the perception of its intention in a certain way an 
ephemera but however an ephemera that finds a constitutional basis – the consequence 
is that the ephemerid other is simultaneously A, A’ and B while writing give and take in 
life-worldly empathy. Therefore, as we can outline in theoretical and practical terms 
now, language happens as a result of translation within / without a life-worldly reality. 
As a consequence, the human consciousness and its objective status are outlined by a 
linguistic consciousness in style-formation. Thus, language is the outlined language as 
language and in language by trans-lating and re-enacting it. The re-enacted language 
questions the field of my own linguistic use that can no longer be seen in its pure 
imitative sense. The equation A = A’ is sensu stricto more than a perfect imitation; it is 
the paradoxon of a linguistic interaction with life-world79. Language as life-worldly 
phenomenon leads to the constitutional question of the foundational setting of being-
with-one-another. The figure of translation can take over this task as a Wesens a priori 
and outlines the importance of stressing that any question of a social phenomenon leads 
to neither sociological nor psychological insights but to a paradoxon that will be 
revealed in transcendentality while writing the above outlined from-to. To understand 
                                                            
79 Considering the imitation as an act, it would signify that the re-enactment has to be enforced by an 
appropriation: the connections will be thematic such in a way that the social relations have to be 
considered as a human constitution. Considering its a priori setting can enact a performed language 
between human beings. 
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this kind of relation-possibility it does not demand a deconstructive or genetic 
aspiration: neither historical, biographical nor psychic-psychological aspects prevail, 
but the essence as possibility for it has been taken into account to foster what Husserl 
will call life-world. Henceforth, the foundation of translation is not at all a historical or 
psychic moment of the ego but rather it is as such present and operated in any linguistic 
efforts. In this reading translation is a monadic operation and as we can now anticipate 
transcendental meaning, it can be characterised as a sui generis operation. The sense of 
translation is therefore a process of movement from A as A’, whose dynamis is not 
bound directly to A’ but rather it is from its possibility bound to it; the 
Wesensallgemeinheit of this it is the grammatical code of its universality to B80. Hence, 
meaning is consequently the capture of having in actua the content per se. Only the 
performance of meaning meanings can be considered as actual – this is true only if the 
per se is the codification of life-world. The content of life-world understood in 
correlation to the act as the what-question has its a priori foundation within a setting in 
which the content is just the content of the act and cannot be taken from it as a 
transcendental moment in life-world – that means that the content of any act is the 
foundational layer of explication. Content of acts are therefore act-ish, since they are the 
material moment of their own. Thus, content is the what of the translational act: the 
translational act of phenomenological analysis is not simply the performance of 
meaning, but it rather signifies the essence of signifié and signifiant. By defining its 
meaning contentwise, the act of translation is able to constitute it as content – however, 
the translation is not part of the content: we can never see literally the translation A as 
A’ to B. As the act constitutes meaning contentwise, it is able to create the content in the 
manner as it defines it as a priori setting, such in a way that the translational act is a 
new style of the content81. Translation that is intended to signifié and to be a signifiant 
is the a priori act of its being. The act of its essence can be kept retrospective as the 
current being. In other words, the signifiant is the enactment of the signifé as an a priori 
sphere of language. The transcendental translation can henceforth be seen as the 
synthesis of signifé and signifiant that drafts at the same time the translated figuration in 
its reduction. The transcendental logos of this translational task is the act from which 
                                                            
80 In a phenomenological analysis we may consider the constitutional question of founding the meaning 
of language. The meaning act evokes and intends a general a priori giveness. This given fact of linguistic 
meaning can be seen as an intentional sphere. In this constellation it is not important if the act can be 
taken simultaneously as meaning-providing or meaning-fulfilling.   
81 Translation seems to be a reactionary and tautological act: content will be content, but indeed in such a 
manner that the meaning has always been meant; its enactment is however that which emerges whilst it is 
thought as meaning.  
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the phenomenon emerges from itself and find its own way. Therefore, the 
transcendental element sets itself free as the essence of translation by performing the act 
of reduction. A transcendental approach that reduces, is likewise the act, which 
produces: it is the unity of the historic and the present future or in other words, the 
translational productive force is highlighted by its enforcement and its re-enactment – 
translation can be outlined as being-as-translation82 / 83.  
       
 
4. Transcendental phenomenology of translation 
 
My reading of phenomenological transcendentality and its relationship to language and 
translation stays primarily in addition and likewise in opposition to Jacques Derrida’s 
approach84. The transcendental ego is not, as Derrida claims, a function of language85: 
words are not emerging apart from the ego; language and words are generated through 
their actors and by enacting them – we may consider and direct towards them in action 
(HUA XVII 366f). Hence, this thus not disseminates the translational cause. Derrida 
implies that Husserl’s idea of purity is an expression of a groundless will and of a pure 
essence that is still present through his reading of transcendental considerations. In 
reference to this reading, Derrida is highlighting Husserl’s privilege of monologues as a 
wish for purity in life-world. Claude Evans stresses in contrary that in Husserl’s 
communicative interaction meaning is always related (Evans 1995: 43ff). In other 
words, Husserl stresses not the privilege of monologue; it is rather the derivation, the 
essence of meaning-expression in its ideality. Rudolf Bernet (1995) and Derrida (1973) 
are signalising in their readings that Husserl’s expressions rely on the expressed signs 
and are therefore based on empirical substance. This means that Husserl’s ideal 
language cannot be pure transcendental nature. This highlights the correspondence of 
                                                            
82 Language as a medium is in a permanent process of correction. This means, it is in a permanent process 
of constitution thus a result of intervening and transforming tendencies (cf. chapter II Merleau-Ponty’s 
savagery of this thesis). 
83 The enactment can be seen as an inner-translational process. The translation of the object (A) and the 
objected (A’) demands the disclosure of the subject. This kind of disclosure is an interpretative happening 
through its circumstances. The other / the circumstances include dia-logical in the monads setting, but 
however in a monad-logical analogon (A’). This highlights as well the fact that the dynamic element of 
translatability is actually the transcendental life that is brought to itself in such a way that the idea of 
logos is connected with facticity. Henceforth, the transcendental encompasses all sorts of transcendental 
features and connects by the language of the ego all kind of transcendental labels.    
84 Cf. L’introduction and Notes critiques of Derrida’s translation of Husserl’s L’origine de la géometrie 
(Derrida 2010). 
85 Cf. Derrida’s reading of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena (1973). 
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the empiric and the transcendental. Hence, a transcendental world is in Derrida’s view a 
non-founded project.          
 
In contrast, my reading outlines a transcendental phenomenological approach towards a 
theory of translation that enforces an epoché that brackets the mundane world and 
whereas the cipher of an empiric world is content of a transcendental procedure – 
transcendentality is therefore not the antipode of life and world, rather the hyphen 
between life-world is the enacted transcendental vividness of translating. The epoché is 
a requirement of content and is likewise a transcendental life itself. Henceforth, it is the 
transcendental foundation that yields the contingent world towards an intrinsic-necessity 
that releases itself the universal possibilities of life-world. It is this very moment where 
Kant’s paradoxical Weltanschauung86 (KUK B 92, 93) is superseded by the vividness of 
life-world in its facticity. Language as such is therefore the mediating partner insofar as 
it remains in itself and likewise outlines the translation from the mundane to the 
transcendental sphere – nevertheless: it remains the universal possibility of 
transcendence in which language is the aesthetica comprehension (KUK A 86) of life-
world. Language and in its extension translation have the ideal requirement for outlining 
at the end the idea of the transcendental in Husserl’s phenomenology. Henceforth, the 
achievement of a linguistic phenomenological setup is an examined transcendental life 
out of a mundane world and vice versa, by referring to the fact that the epoché 
precondition is finally also a linguistic issue. The epoché is the mind setting, the 
finding-to-oneself of the ego within the I-ness that happens by the enactment of 
language; this kind of qualification is the possibility-framework that deliberates the 
transcendental movement of thinking. In other words language is in its translation-
performance a trespassing moment, where the contingent phenomenon overcomes its 
facticity and from where the difference of facticity and essence will be revealed: the 
reduction is its methodology. In other words, language is the permanent translation of 
continuity wherein the transcendental enforcement leaves the world in its source and 
simultaneously enacts it within its mundane realm: this is the translation task of 
                                                            
86 Cf. Kant in Critique of Pure Reason, § 26 Von der Grössenschätzung der Naturdinge, die zur Idee des 
erhabenen erforderlich ist: “Das gegebene Unendliche aber dennoch ohne Widerspruch auch nur denken 
zu können, dazu wird ein Vermögen, das selbst übersinnlich ist, im menschlichen Gemüte erfordert. Denn 
nur durch dieses und dessen Idee eines Noumenons, welches selbst keine Anschauung verstattet, aber 
doch der Weltanschauung, als blosser Erscheinung, zum Substrat untergelegt wird, wird das Unendliche 
der Sinnenwelt, in der reinen intellektuellen Grössenschätzung, unter einem Begriffe ganz 
zusammengefasst, obzwar es in der mathematischen durch Zahlenbegriffe nie ganz gedacht werden kann” 
(KrV 92, 93).  
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transcendentality where the leap of leaving and arriving is trained constantly; the 
contingency of facticity is simultaneously the appearance of the essence that in its 
random effect is necessarily present87 . This kind of translation and its likewise 
simultaneous-coincidence-effect and necessity is the comprehensive possibility that 
defines the appearance of facticity. Language and its enactment through translation are 
able to do so, while transcendence happens in it and while it is the occurrence of the 
transcendence. In other words, the questioned relationship of subject-object cannot 
longer be taken for granted and not at all been taken as an objective issue. Any kind of 
objectiviation of language is likewise a subjective practise and vice versa. In this 
redundancy language and epoché condition them mutually in an apodictic essence: 
language is the idiosyncratic possibility to outline the whole world wherein the 
transcendental life can express itself. Or to put it in other words, the transfer A as A’ to 
B is not the history of notions rather it is the fate of notions. This kind of intrinsic 
necessity – not allowing to work off its historical layers – is the qualification of the 
translational task in vividness; the universal possibility of anonymity, homonymity and 
equivocation are the vivid requirement of translating the lexeme into life-world. 
However, the translational task is not the converse of implication and language not the 
loom of identity. Thus, the idea could be easily brought up that a phenomenological 
methodology is settled in a self-referential formal scheme, as the dynamic in translation 
and linguistic work would be a pendular movement around a static point of identity. 
Even if we assume that the transcendental idea has a certain teleological aspect, the 
consequences are specific: linguistically, in which the logos reveals as the identic 
principle of language, cannot be taken as a formal phenomenon. As Husserl discusses 
the relationship of phenomenon and logos as its fundamental question, we have to 
understand its phenomenal sphere, in which the showing of the logos is a happening – 
directed towards the ultimate experience of life-world (HUA IX 55ff) or in our case 
directed towards the ultimate possibility of writing to B. Indeed, it is the result of the 
self-given logos: the content is not revealed as such, translation sets it free, generates it, 
and produces its genesis, which is evoked within the principle of transcendental-
identity. By considering translation, language performs in its original identity all kind of 
content in penetrated aporetic vividness. The relation of the phenomenon and logos 
leads to the relation of eidos and logos insofar as the eidos outlines the presence of the 
logos in the very phenomenon of life-world. This kind of presence is what we have 
                                                            
87 This is the very realm where translation happens. 
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evoked as identity of A as A’ to B. The identity is the unity of eidos and logos as it 
happens in the phenomenon of reduction: originally and generatively by giving fullness 
to the content. Hence, from a phenomenological standpoint the identity as principle of 
identity preserving content in the phenomenological reduction, offers in its description 
and analysis not a formal and abstract world but a anamnesis that is rather the ekphrasis 
of life-worldly utterance: everything has to be content, everything is given to the 
element of thinking and is therefore within the sphere of life-world. In this respect, we 
may approach phenomenological translation more like a drawing; as one pencils, one 
may approach what one has in mind without ever having reached a point where 
precision naturally coincides with completion (Mattens 2008: X). That the whole should 
be content of thinking evokes in a linguistic approach that translational performance can 
reveal everything as a linguistic immanent fact and therefore we have to say that the 
very unconditional condition of life-world is the very transcendental nucleus in which 
the process of translation is the indestructibility of the vivid facticity (HUA IX 63). It is 
all about this vividness of density that has been examined by the reduction of the 
transcendental reduction or to keep it short: translating the transcendental life-world = 
the enthymeme of an examined life. 
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II.  MERLEAU-PONTY’S SAVAGERY  
 
By considering chapter I, transcendentality can be read as an operation of dynamism, 
creativity, acceleration and as a coniunctivum of linguistic framing; the transcendental 
effect enables us to create a momentum of knowledge-creation within the realm of 
positivity: linguistic practice finds a corresponding setting by enhancing the figure of 
creativity. Nevertheless this creational element is attached to a given life-world and 
remains finally circular within the horizon of A as A’ to B. It is a deliberation shaped by 
a given transcendental framework and attributes therefore a distorted dynamism in 
linguistic practice. In other words, the linguistic element of process will be retained by 
its transcendental order: A will be always A’ and B will be always B’88. Within this 
context, the connection of A and B is for Husserl not the operational feature to 
understand linguistic productions. It should be more likely that language talks out the 
essence of language by itself without referring to an aesthetic immanentism. Husserl 
heavily supports that language should offer linguistic intelligibility since the enactment 
of reduction creates a realm of pure knowledge and pure language – subliminally we 
could label Husserl’s phenomenological achievements as a Critique of 
Phenomenological Reason highlighting linguistic considerations as stylisation of the art 
of possibilities89. Husserl operates – even though unconsciously – in the very tradition 
of scholastic principles: ad impossibilia nemo tenetur. He reformulates this principle to 
shape theory and language by considering the epoché as a shift from a natural setting 
towards a transcendental consciousness, in which language, its translation from A as A’ 
to B and its corresponding life-world will be given transparently and not as an 
impossibility – it is a speculative corpus, in which its realm will be mediated in a 
harmonic manner. Merleau-Ponty criticises this position by outlining that B will be an 
empty formula, as soon as you are reducing my existence to consciousness categories 
(PhP VII). The reduction of monadic consciousness leads towards a simplification of 
life-world, in which the so-called I regains its status in its actual life-worldly 
embodiment. Nevertheless the embodiment of the world cannot be thought from the 
                                                            
88 By using idioms, we tend to view our mode of expression as a corresponding feature to its semantic 
framework. Therefore, we look for the equivalent meaning in foreign languages insofar as we are 
satisfied by their semantic (mirroring) expression. However, Husserl has forgotten to outline that it is not 
sufficient to establish a universal grammar, which is the carrier of the language that he actually speaks 
(Prosa 43f). 
89 This kind of reasoning can only be promoted by its historic possibility since pure knowledge is in this 
context recognised as project. It is a central category of scientific reasoning, since an idealistic canon 
formulates categories for a future theory of knowledge and society (Hinkelammert 1994: 17).   
 51 
outside, we are drawn on it since being in a linguistic mode and simultaneously in life-
world. Hence, by accepting this stance reduction does not lead to linguistic and 
transcendental purity, but rather the linguistic label offers an almost broken fact in an 
almost broken reality: reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction (PhP VIII). 
My reading of Husserl’s transcendentality, mediated by language-objects and language-
subjects90, redeems the possibility of a non-elaborated reduction, but however the non-
elaborated reduction, and this is the important twist in Husserl’s reading, remains 
meaningful for linguistic categories à la Husserl. The category of meaningfulness is the 
crucial point to understand Husserl’s language concept and the translation of A as A’ to 
B. Merleau-Ponty, influenced by the later works of Husserl91, develops – in opposition – 
his theoretical reflections on dynamis by deconstructing the topos language as an 
operator of diffraction and neglects therefore the continuation of categorical 
imperatives. He tries to shift Husserl’s overwhelming category of transcendental 
consciousness-phenomenology towards a deep description of ontological life-world as 
locus amoenus of experience and expression in which the index (of meaning) is not a 
settlement of causal links but rather the multiplication of meaning by its physical 
embodiment. The line up of a non-meaningful language setting will be important for 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological framework; it is about an experienced language that 
is at work, that overwhelms us and ekes out its presence – it is about language that is on 
the threshold of passivity and activity. This very idea of hesitation at the border of 
continuation92 ties up with Husserl’s phenomenological setting but in the same time 
ruptures also with Husserl’s linguistic index. Merleau-Ponty disposes neither 
intellectual nor empirical considerations but refers to the body93 and in addition to the 
ontological set-up of the carnal body94 as the new nucleus of knowledge. In contrast to 
Husserl, we are tempted to denominate Merleau-Ponty’s approach as a Critique of 
Embodied Reasoning and outline therefore an idea of an embodied language in fragility 
by involving its processes of translating: the acts of expressis verbis rearrange through 
                                                            
90 In Krisis Husserl strives for the recovery of life-world, by referring to the concrete capability of 
experience and subjectivity (HUA VI). 
91 Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s lecture on Husserl at the Collège de France (RC 159-170). 
92 Husserl outlines in a similar way and in the wake of Bergsons’ experienced space and experienced 
time, the idea of an experiencing I and the concept of serving bodies (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 7).  
93 Merleau-Ponty is not the only thinker who stresses the body as a philosophical theme at the dawn of the 
20th century. In Merleau-Ponty’s immediate intellectual neighbourhood we might highlight Henry 
Bergson (cf. Bergson 2012), Edmund Husserl (Theunissen 1965: 57-70), Gabriel Marcel or Jean Paul 
Sartre (Maier 1964: 1-20) who also refer to the category of body. However, in comparison to these 
thinkers Merleau-Ponty may have outlined the body in the most rigorous manner and as a category of 
flesh (cf. Good 1998: 14 and Danzer 2003: 84-112). 
94 Merleau-Ponty stresses notably in Le visible et l’invisible (VNV) the richness of the fleshy body. 
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the streams of perception and offer an alternative to intellectual or empiric reading, 
thinking and speaking. The empowering of the language phenomenon does not only 
reveal the visible realm, it writes at the same time the appearance of the invisible and 
unsaid. This kind of translational morphine will no longer be able to re-shape the 
predominant western theorem of eidos and eidolon. In contrast, by supporting the 
conventional transcendentality, Husserl lingers in this circular mind setting. The 
reflection of the grammatical As in A as A’ to B within Husserl’s dispositive of 
translational practice does not solemnly reflect its twist in reference to the 
transcendental issue: the a priori condition of possible experiences are likewise the 
condition possibilities of any objects of experience and its corresponding intrinsic 
necessity by highlighting how something takes place and how something is happening. 
Nonetheless these conditions reflect within Merleau-Ponty’s framework nothing else 
than a second reality. However the conception of an intrinsic validity of a second reality 
has to be understood with caution: language occupies a semantic space as the dotted 
note prolongs rhythm to an unexpected dilatation; language offers the possibility to rely 
on the echo of its already said, its extra-linguistic support and will be nourished by the 
unsaid (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 8). Hence, in the vein of Merleau-Ponty we can say that 
the principles of mediation, representation and reflection, which has been so far 
fundamental to understand the very idea of language, has to be yielded by considering 
the fact that the idea of a new concept of mimesis and translational act does not nourish 
its overwhelming life-world. However, the translation of A has to be read as a condition 
of possibilities; it could be the offspring to B, B’, B’’, C, D, E, Z or even ∞. The 
possible figures of B, B’, B’’, C, D, E, Z or even ∞ are anchored in the uneven 
topography of life-world and present a nature beyond nature. In the wake of Proust, 
Merleau-Ponty describes that speaking and writing means to translate an experience that 
still has to be become a text (RC 41). The texture of the lexeme will evoke its very text 
though. By yielding the idea of nature, Merleau-Ponty tries to outline a reality that 
neglects the binary code of subject and object as well as the original and its copy95. The 
strange relationship of perceiving and expressing is the effect of articulating a lateral 
style, by featuring hesitation on the threshold where the sign will be history96. Merleau-
Ponty reminds us that we have to understand that language is not an obstacle for 
                                                            
95 However, in Le visible et l’invisible (VNV) Merleau-Ponty complains that he as so far accepted a kind 
of dualism, which has to be yielded. By accepting it, one remains subliminally within this circularity, 
since the rejection is constructed against it.  
96 Merleau-Ponty tries to draft a theory of expression in his essay La science et l’expérience de 
l’expression (Prosa 15-65). 
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consciousness and consciousness is not the difference of s’atteindre and s’exprimer 
(Prosa 26). Hence, it is all about how are we able to understand and perceive the signifié 
and signifiant and consequently it is about how are we able to shape the very act of 
translating. And therefore, is it not simply an a-rational game of coincidences and 
arbitrariness? The transcendental stake does not at any point enable us to change this 
feature but somehow the momentum of genesis and historicity of language might 
overcome the binary code of language by stressing the crystallisation of its being; the 
sublimation of language refers in Merleau-Ponty’s reading to the carnal body without 
being its condition of possibilities but sketches rather the articulating possibilities of 
expressions. This difference will be important if we want to rethink the task of 
language, since the grammar of condition possibilities refers to the static momentum in 
language and in opposition, the articulating possibilities will be the vivid and perverted 
momentum of language. We will observe that Merleau-Ponty dwells within the tension 
of fixation and motion, while considering linguistic practices – indeed, an aporia of 
possibilities97. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty can be labelled as a phenomenologist: he 
considers perception as the embodied modus operandi and the sine qua non of 
gnoseology; gazing as the horizon of the phenomenon and of meaning neglects in 
Merleau-Ponty’s configuration the immediate sense of lexemes (Merleau-Ponty 1966: 
VII). In other words, there is never a complete idea and never a whole setting of 
grammar that is given immediately. Merleau-Ponty rejects positivities by considering 
the body transformation of perception as principle that is ahead of life-worldly 
reflections while bearing its inalienable presence and while being here within its very 
own corporal transformative practice of life-world. The phenomenological perception of 
worldly features is so to speak the momentum of realising perception. Seeing is not at 
all seeing from something, in the sense that seeing owns the viewed; seeing is rather 
acting simultaneously: it is an act of getting hold of something and simultaneously 
being different – phenomenological seeing is neither at all a certain mode of thinking 
nor a self-presence; it is my own medium to be absent from my own being by 
participating within the separation of being from a inner-perspective and therefore 
having the possibility to become me myself (cf. le charnel in OE 81). The event of 
seeing shows us how outer and strange beings are quite related and it shows that seeing 
is not related to entities but rather overtakes an event of gazing, by helping to express its 
mute status. Phenomenology as a non-central-perspective offers the transcendental 
                                                            
97 The aporia of possibilities is similar to Husserl’s aporetic analogia and yet it is something completely 
else. This difference will be a recurring momentum, while reading phenomenology. 
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intersection of being, life-world, truth and the unspoken expression, in which being will 
be transcendental in its shattering. In accordance to language, silent words double the 
expressed language by evoking the absent present (OE 85)98. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty 
outlines that fixation of attention cannot be formulated as a pure consciousness category 
but the uncertainty might give us strands to understand the fragility of the phenomenon: 
the translation from A to B is a transgression of expressivity and not a chain of logical 
meaning. In other words, the appearance of language happening is the simultaneity of 
the visible and in-visible and of the meaningful and meaningless inflection – we should 
think consciousness in contingency of language and not simply as its opposition. It 
offers the chiastic experience of phenomenological perception that refers to a 
paradoxical double layer of seeing: the appearance of the invisible. Nevertheless 
simultaneity is not within the Hegelian synthesis-telos, it is a radical form of perception 
insofar as it follows to carnally any hollows and considers any traces in absentia 
(Signes 217). The perception of life-world and its translation into linguistic expressions 
are the entanglement and involvement resulting from lively engagements. In accordance 
with Cezanne, Merleau-Ponty claims to develop a sense of seeing that is beyond linear 
perspectives (SNS 8 and 19f). Perception is a primordial event of sense brut as an 
indirect consequence of language and can be formulated as grammar of constructio ad 
sensum. Nevertheless in Merleau-Ponty’s sense the feature of perception enhances the 
element of structural enforcement. He introduces therefore the concept of a world-ray, 
which tackles the Greek optics and enables us to trespass the perception of elements, 
dimensions and rays (VNV 253 and 267); rays are figuration of trespassing literally the 
line up of lexeme-body-world by outlining the crystallisation of non-coherent 
associations of the immer wilder (VNV 254). These dense discretions are hyperboles, 
which cannot be grasped by causal noema-noesis structures or by symbolic 
representations. Inflection is in this sense the arrangement and entanglement of settings 
that enhance hyper-amnesias of associations. Consciousness is the revision of worldly 
                                                            
98 Cultural practice attempting to think simultaneity enters new paths (since the eidos eidolon topos will 
be within the space-time matrix heavily contested) but, on the other side, this new path has to be aware of 
not destroying the harmony of simultaneity by stressing the identity of simultaneity. As we can follow 
Merleau-Ponty’s reading, he questions the perception believing while having a deferred answer, since no 
idea of an invariable can answer it adequately and therefore, the existent world exists only by questioning 
its forms. Phenomenology is in this sense perception believing that questions itself and thus, it is literally 
neither a pre-scientific nor a primitivism in the sense of a postulated naturalism. The receiving answers 
within natural settings from questioned entities and life-world are above of all kind of facts and 
underneath of any substance within rough and wild realms of a meaningful life-world. Meanings and 
substances of revealing phenomenological working are not enough in themselves, they are gained from its 
raw being, while the simultaneity of substances and meanings are somehow refundable in its wild 
constitution. 
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relationships: meaning elements are the enactment of the immediate and pre-positional 
occurrence of lateral collaborations; words and their corresponding grammar are 
therefore the dense description of the bodily Überstieg (VNV 307). Language is the 
enactment of an indirect language: it is not grammar accuracy that explains the 
linguistic framework but it is about the differentiation and lateral morphemes between 
signs and phenomena which reveals its connotation (Signes 53f) – the characteristics of 
language are its possibility to remain unnoticed (Prosa 16ff). Nevertheless, the spur of 
the chiastic experience of perception and of linguistic expressions will be re-discussed, 
insofar as Merleau-Ponty offers the lining of speaking otherwise.                                 
 
Hence, pluri-potentiality of expression is translation, a migration of scattered senses into 
a new body, in which it may find its new expression99. The act of expression is a 
translation without pre-text – the expressed finds its expression in the act of 
expressing100. Hence, perception might be already an expression (RC 14) by considering 
a thin line between natural and cultural realms. Therefore the linguistic act of 
expression does never start as tabula rasa – the expression A is a distortion of social 
codified and existing expression-systems or une déformation cohérente of B, B’, B’’, C, 
D, E, Z or even ∞ possibilities. These lexemes create a new arrangement of equivalent 
systems, which are never equivalent systems kat exochen but evoke a deepness which 
encompasses me by having fleshy words as its totum simul (VNV 268f). This provokes 
a new kind of style that makes an indelible mark on the life-worldly project; to express 
my intentions in words and in its semantic-guise, my fleshy body uses a linguistic style 
– an innere Stimme (Humboldt) – that arranges and precedes its expressivity without 
having the duty to realise it101 (Signes 110f). Hence, we have to stress the capability to 
see how un moyen de style (Prosa 83) emerges within points of contact between the 
writer / speaker and her / her life-world and likewise it is about how this requirement 
can be enacted that swamps its writers / speakers (Prosa 84f).  It is not about intellectual 
transparency but about its gesture and the possibility to be surprised by its enactment. 
                                                            
99 However the obsession of newness and creativity is enrolled within the conception of universality-
perceptions. It features the explication and guideline of Kant’s transcendental deduction but at the very 
same moment Kant does not outline its origin. By stating if there is a world we have the feeling that Kant 
has a pre-knowledge of life-world, of its development and likewise of fixing its condition a priori (PhP: 
74f).  
100 This re-considers Husserl’s understanding of the intrinsic structure of language. 
101 Merleau-Ponty shows in his psychological analysis that a child’s ability to speak is not the sum of 
morphological, syntactical and lexical meanings; these skills are neither used nor are they adequate for 
acquiring language. The act of language does not evoke comparisons between my expressions and the 
denomination-arrangement of my used means of expression (Signes 110).  
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In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis is a trial to leave the transcendentality-
rhetoric of linguistic setting and its powerful methodological articulation of 
representation and structure behind its condition possibility. Hence, this kind of in-
captiousness is only possible due to Merleau-Ponty’s pathic openness by considering 
the movement of existence itself (PhP 105). The openness is caused by the possibility of 
perception; we might have phatic worldly experiences due to our force of perception. 
The idea of être-au-monde does not only signify that language is anchored in its world, 
it is likewise essential to its existence to surpass the environment, to rewrite possible 
worlds, which pervert the immediate environment. As consequence, the twilight effect 
of shifting between real and imaginative worlds is not able to find a unifying operator, 
the articulation mode of texture and style, will be rather experienced; Merleau-Ponty 
compares this unity-perception with human beings due to the fact that I recognise any 
evidential happening, before I am able to outline its characteristics, since this situation 
keeps in all its expressions and behaviour its genuine style, even if the milieu or its idea 
should change (PhP 377f). The unity of the environment is not at all enhanced through 
reasoning but it is experienced as materialised style of a given text / texture. The force 
of synthesis is only given by the materialised historicity as an involvement of disclosed 
meanings (Prosa 154). Husserl’s polyphony and dynamic linguistic footage remains 
within predicative knowledge settings. Merleau-Ponty tries to yield this linguistic 
noema-noemsis linkage by attempting to capture its phatic responsiveness102 as an 
outburst of linguistic silence – it is about language as a mode of existence that attempts 
to describe its genesis by its ambivalent responsiveness. Translation is not the reduction 
of the sum of linguistic transfers. 
 
We will see that language is in Merleau-Ponty’s consideration the enactment of 
diversity and lateral coincidences; it does not offer a grammar, rather language reveals, 
re-opens, transforms and re-arranges A and B; language follows the principle of in statu 
nascendi within the embodied life-word prospectus. Language and its transformations 
are not process oriented and do not have an immanent structure; Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of language is a happening that works and reveals in its daily practice 
every other day another layer of distortion and erection. The translation of the very 
morphological cosmos has no location within the landscape of grammatical inflection: 
language is neither simply the representation of facticity and certainty nor is it the 
                                                            
102  Bernhard Waldenfels’ phenomenological reading outlines a responsive phenomenology  (cf. 
Waldenfels 2007). 
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generative dynamis of a linguistic matrix – language is the translation of the chiastic 
experience of lack and excess in the sense that it relies on non-linguistic realms and 
likewise refers to the already expressed and said.  
   
In the following I will re-consider Merleau-Ponty’s framework and use it for the benefit 
of understanding linguistic and translational practices103. As I have outlined, translation 
can be read as a constitutive part of Merleau-Ponty’s writing but his architecture and 
understanding challenges are notably challenged by the fact that he confounds 
permanently the very idea of intelligible conditions and keeps it as a western ideology 
out of order. In addition, most of his final manuscripts are fragmentary104 and invites us 
to a multitude of speculative moments. However, reconsidering the ambivalent 
relationship of Merleau-Ponty with Husserl and the consequences of rearticulating 
phenomenological approaches, will be a hidden guiding line for this chapter: by 
continuing phenomenological lines within the weakness of Husserl and at the same time 
contrasting it with Merleau-Ponty’s understanding, I hope to create a close-meshed net 
of a theoretical framework to capture the vivid perception of phenomenology and its 
understanding of linguistic grammars and language possibilities; I attempt to show that 
Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre can be read in relationship with Husserl’s thoughts and that this 
link yields likewise Husserl’s transcendental ego by highlighting that Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiastic ontological stance relies on the very idea of transcendentality. The eagerness of 
this reading might offer a setting to bear the paradox of grammar and expression. Along 
Merleau-Ponty’s study and work we might have sceneries, in which reflection on 
language and translation can be re-drawn. This topography gives us the coordinates and 
strands to develop Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of morphology and linguistic 
enactments. I have separated my analysis into two parts: In Prima Vista I attempt to 
outline Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical thoughts and refer them to a possible theory of 
language. Secondly, in Coda I shift the focus more specifically to the practice of 
language by analysing its linguistic and translational features. We will again experience 
a certain redundancy; these kinds of repetitions are inevitable and offer the possibility to 
mediate the analysis from different angles by stressing that within the realm of 
                                                            
103 I refer and follow Paul Good (1998) and Remigius Kwant’s (1963) interpretation lines of Merleau-
Ponty and, in particular, I am debating Good’s reception of Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology in relation 
to linguistic and translational matters. 
104 Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre is unfortunately not complete. Le visible et l’invisible (VNV) and La prose du 
monde (Prose) are fragmentary works and have lead to various interpreting strands. Hence, the debate 
about Merleau-Ponty’s late work lasts therefore a fragmentary issue and evokes different reception 
strategies. 
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repetition the unformed reality and multiple possibilities might be able to seep in105. 
Hence, in the section The transgression from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty or the dilemma 
of transcendentality I attempt to outline their intellectual relationships by stressing that 
Merleau-Ponty will re-interpret Husserl’s theoretical nucleus and on that basis he will 
re-articulate the relationship of life-world and translation. Re-framing these 
relationships offers in the section of The Cartesian Idea new ties between Descartes’ 
res cogito and res extensa and might launch a subtle transcendental line in Merleau-
Ponty’s framework, as in the content of Merleau-Ponty’s Post-Cartesianism, Body 
language and The idea of savage being. In Coda I will reveal, in Language and 
translation: a lateral affair, the question of a phenomenology of language and 
translation by considering the paradoxon of language and the correlative problem of 
evidence and expressions. As consequence, I radicalise the lateral project by attempting 
to follow literally the lateral trickle in linguistic translation in The hyberpolic difference 
of lateral encounter. Hence, the aporia or hyperbole of lack and excess will be my 
opening question and critical operator to engineer Merleau-Ponty’s theory of language. 
Therefore, close readings of La Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945), his 
posthumously published Le visible et l’invisible (1964) and La prose du monde (1969) 
are the foremost sources of revelation.  
 
 
1. Prima Vista 
 
A The transgression from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty or the dilemma of 
transcendentality 
 
In the following I am going to sketch the problematic relationship between Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty by reconsidering that Merleau-Ponty can be read in the continuation of 
Husserl’s phenomenology but at the same time we can also read in Merleau-Ponty’s 
setting a rupture with Husserl’s transcendentality 106 . Hence, sensitised by this 
problematic relationship we should neglect the labelling concepts of Husserl’s 
                                                            
105 This kind of work-practice resembles Husserl’s zigzag methodology (cf. chapter II of this thesis).  
106 I resist to read into the relationship of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty any form of continuity: yes, there is 
a relationship and at the same time there is no stringent correlation between these thinkers. Merleau-Ponty 
suggests in Le philosophe et son ombre (Signes 201-228) that his thinking has an inner relationship with 
Husserl’s system. In other words, combing Husserl with Merleau-Ponty offers layers, which are beyond 
the merely positive aspect of relatedness. It is not only that Merleau-Ponty wants to radicalise Husserl’s 
trajectory, by making the anti-Cartesian concept of phenomenology explicit (Romdenh-Romluc 2011: 
16). 
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phenomenology here and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology there: yes, Merleau-Ponty 
hesitates to accept transcendental readings within phenomenological approaches but 
nevertheless, his counter-project savage ontology enables us to some extent a reading 
which could offer transcendental lines that uplift Husserl’s original notion of style 
(Prosa 79). However, this undertaking offers the possibility to approach Merleau-
Ponty’s reading by attempting to create a virtual and highly speculative diffracted 
relationship between Husserl’s and his thoughts107.  
 
The articulation of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can be revealed and 
reframed by referring to the difference between translation and mediation. So far, we 
have used translation and mediation almost as synonymous and as evidence of linguistic 
practices. By outlining Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s language framework we will re-
articulate the setting of these two notions by referring to slightly different meanings 
created by ortho-practical distinctions. The theoretical framework of mediation is 
shaped by the force of a third party that observes the transaction of A as A’ to B and 
finally offers from that position the amalgamation of horizons. This is indeed the task of 
Husserl’s transcendentality: it outlines the condition possibilities to grasp the motion 
within the setting of A as A’ to B and suppresses any forms of excess, trans-passing or 
hyper-motions. It is not only about having a grammatical corpus (without relying on its 
facticity) but locating the intrinsic logos of the lexeme (Prosa 7 ff). It is this kind of 
universal grammar or grammaire générale et raisonnée108 that incorporates everything 
within the possibility feature of determining life-worldly bodies (VL 172). Husserl’s 
life-world is an accelerated enactment of language within the very horizon of life and 
world. In references to linguistic realms the intention of the signifié is not beyond 
words, but it is within the embodied reality of word(ing) (HUA XVII 26f)109. This 
might be the reason why Husserl refers in Ursprung der Geometrie (Husserl 1939) to 
linguistic features as a fundamental search for clarity in ideas and truth (VL 176). In 
contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding could be affiliated with the notion of 
                                                            
107 Especially by re-considering Husserl’s point of subjectivity in Krisis (HUA XXIX): “the subject-
matter of phenomenology is not the content of one’s own experiences, conceived as independent of an 
externally existing world and capable of being known with absolute certainty. Instead, phenomenology 
studies an inter-subjective world about which an individual phenomenologist may be mistaken” 
(Romdenh-Romluc 2011: 13). 
108 In reference to Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot’s seminal Grammaire générale et raisonnée 
(Arnauld 1810). 
109 This very section influences Merleau-Ponty’s envisioning of the inner-ontological reality of language 
(cf. Prosa 7 ff).  
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translatio 110 : language is the permanent enactment of its ontological anchoring; 
nevertheless anchoring and enactment trespass the horizon of life and world, since 
linguistic actions disappear at the very moment of transporting vernaculars in totality 
(VL 173). Hence, the mediator as director and actor will always be apart while 
mediation and conversion of A as A’ to B evokes B, B’, B’’, C, D, E, Z or even ∞111 
cannot be grasped by the mediator. The slippery moment evinces the circular reality of 
mediating linguistic signs. Merleau-Ponty denominates this very event of C as a chiastic 
experience or as an event of reversibility. The intentional motion from A to B engineers 
the realm C. If we believe that translation is a repetition of linguistic realms, we are 
simultaneously implying that language is a purely positive and legitimised – inventory 
that defines its – content of belonging112. Therefore, we may understand translation in a 
Merleau-Pontyian sense as a radical translation: a realm A will be trans located beyond 
latio – the trans-gression goes beyond the understandable B. The figure C is the factor 
of the chiastic event in translational practice as latio brings something in, beyond 
realms. Translatio is an event that refers to somewhere else which is not intended in its 
practice; the multiplicity and linguistic variability of connections do not evoke the 
dilemma of objective and contingent translation, since the enactment of translatio is not 
within the setting of fixed objects (of thoughts); analytical investigations and rational 
thinking de iure would destroy the richness of translation and the use of evocative 
languages. Hence, the representational definition of thought and language mistakes a 
second-order possibility for the primary process of expressive transformations. 
Translatio as such deals with the invisibility of the visible within the realm of linguistic 
motion and its very expression. In other words, mediation presumes an a priori of 
language whilst translation offers an a posteriori setting. This might give us the idea of 
the tiny but powerful distinction and twist between mediation and translation. However, 
we should be aware that this thorough distinction is a weak distinction, as it is sensu 
stricto not definable a posteriori and can be re-shaped and differently articulated within 
other connotations and figurations a priori113.           
                                                            
110 Cf. Latin, latio, lationis: the bringing but also the approval (cf. legum latio: legislation) (Baier 2013: 
2827). 
111 To facilitate reading fluency, I am going to use in the following C as representative for B, B’, B’’, C, 
D, E, Z or even ∞. 
112 In contrast, Heidegger explains (in reference to Leibniz and Kant) that in any thoughts there are layers 
of Noch-nicht-Gedachte (Heidegger 1957: 123f). Thinking does not mean to possess the realm of 
thoughts but to paraphrase the realm of thoughts.  
113 In reference to chapter III Perplex Coenesthesia of this thesis.   
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With respect to translatio, we can discover in Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre the shifting from 
transcendental to ontological realms114. In extension, phenomenology outlines in its 
framework the capability to transgress the objectivation of natural settings without 
ending in naïve empiric world-references. Phenomenology is enforceable and 
discernible as manner and style by referring to a movement, which is not enclosed by a 
panopticon. The realm of language has rather to be understood as an amalgam of 
different layers and not the possibility of enactment(s). Along these lines, we have to 
read the continuation and the difference of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl115. Merleau-
Ponty outlines that causal explanations and reflexive analysis combined with linguistic 
signs are insufficient and carry implicitly a contradiction. Therefore, transcendental 
reduction highlights two distinct and oppositional moments at the same time: nature will 
be transformed into entities of thoughts and intentional objects, likewise it will be 
transformed by intellectualising nature, since the features of natural setting will be still 
preserved. As we have seen, the immanence of nature contains its very own clarity and 
evidence (Signes 224ff). Hence, linguistic explanations of the world referring to 
consciousness offer an ur-doxa where a fortiori cancels the common understanding of 
the Cartesian dualism of a relative nature and its mediated pure consciousness. 
Therefore, transcendental categories do not function as operator for phenomenological 
considerations. As we have seen, Husserl outlines transcendentality as an instrument to 
reproduce a setting of certainty in which language and knowledge are capable of 
representing the very idea of the contingent nature, the corresponding life-world and 
consequently, yield the contingent world towards an intrinsic-necessity that releases its 
universality. In short, transcendental foundation is the instrument to denominate 
Wesensallgemeinheit (HUA XVII 8) or ursprüngliche Sinnauslegung (HUA XVII 13), 
in which language is an intrinsic part and an act of transcendental egoity by highlighting 
language as being itself a sphere of translation, in which the logic and the psychic 
oscillate and form kat exochen the act of language. Husserl evokes a reading that 
promotes invariant entities by relying them on a transcendental consciousness line and 
therefore stressing subliminally the position of idealism since structures and its being 
are thought independently of its sources – this is what we might call the logion of 
phenomenon. The logion can be however understood as the expression of the 
                                                            
114 However this shifting and labelling might be too tendentious, since it offers a purely positive and 
determined historic label: transcendentality versus ontology.  
115  There is an ongoing debate on the intensity of Merleau-Ponty’s reception of Husserl’s 
phenomenology; cf. Toadvine and Embree’s Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl (Toadvine and Embree 
2002).  
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phenomenon, which tries to interfere with the so-called objects by going back to itself 
without hoping to reconstruct and analysing its content. In this sense, experience does 
not start within entities and subjects. On this principle, Merleau-Ponty can be 
distinguished from Husserl by re-evaluating Husserl’s a-temporal and transcendental 
ego116. Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to describe the operation of perception as the generative 
body that is related to the world and is not the offspring of an a-historical plan, drafted 
by a transcendental ego. Hence, the linguistic perception is not a defined description; it 
is rather the fundament from which the enactment of language and daily practice can be 
carried out (PhP V). Insofar, the description is in front and before any canonising 
taxonomy. In this radical sense, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology evokes a certain 
impossibility in its enactment, while the relationship and entanglement of language and 
world cannot be grasped by a reduced I perspective. The transcendental reduction of the 
ego, within the lines of an absolute consciousness, misleads and is finally not able to 
capture the overwhelming richness of the enacted life-world and its situated ego. Hence, 
phenomenological reduction is for Merleau-Ponty not an effect of transcendental 
idealisms but rather the impossibility of a complete reduction (PhP VIII). Within the 
linguistic framework, language, syntax and grammar are never language, syntax and 
grammar – they slip away as soon as we want to capture them. The enacted style tells us 
a lot more about language, syntax and grammar. In extension, Merleau-Ponty yields the 
entity foundation to perceive and understand our world-relationship without entering 
into the realm of facticity. The apeiron of grasping the un-reflected grammar in 
reflection will be the main guiding line for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
understanding (PhP Xf). In this sense, a phenomenological approach à la Merleau-Ponty 
is the art of creating truth (PhP XV), the pre-existing logos offers the possibility to 
understand and mediate life-world-reality. The linguistic expression however resembles 
the myth of Sisyphus by strongly attempting to offer a platform of understanding and 
meaning. However, if the phenomenological stream wants to be loyal to its expressive 
features, its motion has to always be unknown (PhP XVI). In this sense, translation as 
the historic trial to transform res extensa into res cogitans remains in a circular 
movement of idealistic and speculative setting in which the eidos and the eidolon enter 
a pre-configured setting of mimesis. Entering life-world will be acted in Merleau-
Ponty’s eyes by the perception of the un-reflected existence in life.   
                                                            
116 Husserl’s Cartesianischen Mediationen refers to Augustine’s Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore 
homininis habitat veritas (HUA I 183). 
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A closer look at Descartes’ subject / object theorem might give us a more 
comprehensible understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s ambiguous relationship to 
translation, its possible transcendental stances and its correlation to language. 
Furthermore, the analysis of Descartes re-articulates Husserl’s interpretation of 
transcendentality (HUA I) and offers the possibility to draft a bridge between Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty on behalf of understanding the translational work-practise of A’ to 
B. As we can imagine, within Husserl’s setting, the Cartesian mode was the generic 
point of modernity, insofar as Descartes designed perception and representation 
strategies as a concept of pure egology. Husserl’s Erste Philosophie (HUA VII and 
VIII) stresses subliminally throughout the two monographs that within Mediationes 
(Descartes 1904) Descartes reveals an important discovery to understand transcendental 
philosophy: it is about establishing and re-editing a pure and absolute transcendental 
understanding of subjectivity within an absolute doubtlessness constitution (HUA VII 
61ff). In Husserl’s Cartesian reading, Descartes might deliver the possibility to 
understand our (life)-world, although the position which Husserl ultimately reaches has 
more in common with Kant’s transcendentality: Descartes’ aim of grammar includes to 
establish the human being as the master of nature (HUA VI 62) by separating an inner 
subject from an outer subject. His theory drafts an epistemology of translation and 
mediation, which highlights the par l’intermédiare de117 as the main operator to 
approach life-world – understood as an a priori relationship – wherein an external realm 
will be significant through something that has internal components118. Hence, the 
internal status mediates its means to recognise the external world. This 
conceptualisation offers the setting for objective thoughts119. The almighty figure of 
metaphysics, underpinned by the approval of a thought-independent material outer-
world, delivers the condition possibilities of knowledge production for objective 
thoughts – in summa: the order of any being-entity as well as the order of reasonable 
thoughts depend on a common ground or on generosity of the scholastic God, wherein 
                                                            
117 Descartes writes to Gibieuf: “(...) assuré que je ne puis avoir aucune connaissance de ce qui est hors de 
moi, que par l’entremise des idées que j’en ai eues en moi” (DES III: 474).  
118 Descartes denies any organic perception of the outer world and rejects therefore the Aristotelian 
holism by arguing that the physis of the rex extensa will be produced by force and pressure. The 
replacement of organic approaches by causal means is due to Descartes’ influence on mechanic theories. 
In other words, the dualistic conception is driven by the technique of a mechanic apparatus that executes 
its order literally by the digital-code 0 / 1: “Knowledge of things outside the mind / agent / organism only 
comes about through certain surface conditions, mental images, or conceptual schemes within the mind / 
agent / organism. The input is combined, computed over, or structured by the mind to construct a view of 
what lies outside” (Taylor 2005: 27).      
119 Descartes’ Metaphysics is primarily a theory of experiencing I, God, nature, etc. and delivers therefore 
the basis to justify objective validity (Descartes 1904). 
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the order of A and B are able to co-exist. To understand this line, we might have a closer 
look at Descartes’ representation theory and how his system might offer implosion-
strategies for Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical considerations. As we can retrace now, 
Descartes is an important stakeholder for phenomenological reasoning: his cogito / sum 
figuration offers the framework to re-shape and re-draft the appearance of the 
phenomenon by being confused, since it is so far considered as the realisation of being-
evidence. It is about showing that the transcendental setting within Descartes’ system 
supersedes intellectual (subject) and empiric (object) positioning and offers therefore 
the condition-possibilities to enter life and life-world as an expression of its very (own) 
style. Thus, the simple opposition of subject and object misses out Descartes’ 
ontological-systemic resonance of transcendental entanglement of subjects and objects 
and in addition, it anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s blurring effect of subjects and objects. In 
the following, my intentions are to re-articulate the abyss between Descartes and 
Merleau-Ponty by showing that the transcendental figuration offers a hidden fil rouge 
and considers likewise the very condition of translating the inflection of the lexeme in 
life-world120 – it is about showing that Descartes can be read in a broken manner. The 
synoptic reading of Descartes and Merleau-Ponty discloses the possibility to highlight 
the paradox of perception and expression not as a simple possibility, but as vivid 
paradox: ergo, the act of translating is a paradox in life-world.         
 
 
B The Cartesian Phalanx  
 
Descartes is driven by the commitment to differentiate random opinions from the 
undeniable veritas and to install the human being as lord and master of nature by 
destroying theories and concepts121 (Descartes 1984: 349).  His systemic forming is 
based on the principium cogito that outlines the midpoint from where his setting can be 
drawn. He promoted firmly that epistemology supersedes ontology by considering self-
existence and self-knowledge as fundamentum of certainty. Nevertheless, I am 
persuaded we should not use epistemology against ontology, since it offers aspects of 
Descartes’ setting by recognising that epistemology is foremost another quality to speak 
about ontology (e.g. intellectual ontology). Hence, the existence of a thinkable 
consciousness is the expression of reality and Descartes’ very first principle: ego cogito, 
                                                            
120 My reading of Descartes’ transcendental line is inspired by the work of Franz Bader (1979 and 1983).  
121 Especially he tries to break with scholastic traditions and its reception of Aristotle.  
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ergo sum. As consequence, Descartes tries to avoid any forms of obscurity and 
contingency by introducing a methodology of doubt: the operation of disbelief is 
henceforth the groundwork of his metaphysical understanding and the feature to re-
articulate objective validity of judgements within independent thinking. Engineering 
disbelief is the examination of the correct transfer of the idea to its objects by so-called 
cogito operations; the ego is not a pure body but a thinking entity (cf. ego cogito, ergo 
sum) in the sense that I am able to assess it within the realm of metaphysics. In a certain 
way, it is a form of doubting the appearance in my very own anabases of egoity and 
pointing to distances between the object and its ontological realm by considering its 
epistemological condition and by outlining therefore its transcendental reflection. We 
might consider that doubting the relationship of knowledge and being has to be re-
considered by translating the expression of knowledge; idealisation of its doubt is 
henceforth articulating the possibility of being. Within this tension Descartes’ 
understanding of metaphysics is in general the treatment of first things, which can be 
discerned by its order122. It is prima philosophia insofar as it is conceived by its 
methodem universalis: scientia generalis sive universalis (DES IX–2, 16.14–16). The 
ontological stance is therefore no longer an abstract configuration but rather the 
continuation of knowledge and evidence by transferring the subject / object dualism to a 
transcendental unity of being. Ipso facto, language can be understood in actua by its 
content, by its cogito / sum architecture and therefore in its relative and absolute 
correspondence of mind characters. Linguistic signs are directly known as a product of 
an active cogito, in which the realms of res extensa and res cogitans are fluid123. In 
Descartes’ eyes, the non-negotiable mediation and directness of evidence do not permit 
us to outline a more vivid understanding of language. Prima philosophia and therefore 
prima lingua is prima cognition and vice versa. As consequence we may assume that 
ideas are non-visible notions and that the existence of objects, as a consequence of 
ideas, has to be negotiated by its cogito in a priori et non ab effectu. The cognition is 
the principium of knowledge and does not refer to any other pre-predicative entities – 
                                                            
122 Descartes explains clearly that his understanding of metaphysics has not primarily and exclusively to 
be understood as a fundamental involvement of God and soul (DES III, 235. 10-18). In this sense, 
metaphysics does not deal with ontological and objective articulations without referring to the conditions 
of knowledge. Objects have to be known from just another entity and not by the ontological classification 
of genus, ordinis, species, etc. It is a clear rejection of Aristotle and Aquinas’ vertical structure of society 
and knowledge and their inherent teleological causality.     
123 The corresponding parts of subjects and objects are the twisting features, which Merleau-Ponty 
radicalises by introducing the carnal experience as the incursion into Descartes’ transcendental 
framework. 
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any ontological order can from that point on exclusively understood as gnoseological 
momentum.  
 
It is worth while to decipher Descartes’ particular methodological line up to understand 
Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the Cartesian holism which puts world and the body in the 
seer as in a box (Haas 2008: 12) – however, it is not important if Descartes follows 
holism but it will matter how he follows it. Descartes’ scepticism insists, similar to 
Husserl, that beliefs are random ideas and appear in front of my mind while it might be 
possible that an evil demon deludes my very fundamental thoughts (Descartes 1984: 
13). The – in intellectual history – powerful notion of cogito introduced in the II. 
Meditation, (Descartes 1904) outlines the necessity of an ego, since the ego is able to 
doubt and to accept the possibility of an evil demon (Descartes 1984: 15). At this very 
point, Descartes conditions the importance of the internal mental representation for an 
external world. This configuration allows him to emphasise the concept of mind as a 
thinkable issue and likewise to outline the difference between body and mind124. Hence, 
mind is the main operator of representation125 and the formula to effectuate synthesis. In 
opposition to the very scholastic tradition126, perception will be a cognitive translation 
of unified and shaped homogenous pattern and defines external objects as being 
conceived with her / his cogito. This line (re-) introduces the element of idea and is 
primarily shaped by the perception of thinking and by the judgement made by the 
mind’s faculty of understanding: seeing is solely the capability of executing judgments, 
which are in my mind (Descartes 1984: II 21). But however, there is also an idealistic 
founded doubt that criticises the relativity of knowledge through its appearance and 
linguistic expression. The dissolution of the outer world / life-world evokes the question 
if cogito, in its oppositional force, has not also to be questioned in its translation 
                                                            
124 However the difference of subject and object or body and mind cannot be drawn definitely, since 
Descartes argues “(...) We say that we see the wax itself, it is there before us, not that we judge it to be 
there from its colour or shape; and this might lead me to conclude (...) that knowledge of the wax comes 
from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone” (Descartes 1984: 21).  
125 Cf. Descartes: “(...) it is the soul which sees, and not the eyes” (Descartes 1985: 172). This very inner-
related approach underpins Merleau-Ponty’s turn: any corporal existence can be doubted and likewise we 
have the very profane perception of our own body and hence, this perception has to be thought. Hereto 
Descartes: “I know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses (...) but by the intellect alone, 
and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood, 
(...)” (Descartes 1984: 22f).  
126 The theory of Galen and Plato follows the idea that the act of perception is primarily an optic 
operation, from the eye to the object. Insofar we may subsume that Descartes’ approach is a breakthrough 
as it contrasts with the scholastic tradition. Nevertheless he approaches Thomas of Aquinas by 
considering his deus as an object per se (quoad se) and likewise as per nos (quoad nos) (cf. Summa 2, art. 
1).  
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capability, since knowledge is part of res extensa. The gnosiological force within 
Descartes’ setting is to understand life-world as knowledge from something and as an 
emanation of being. The idealistic doubt questions the imminent force of knowledge in 
its immediacy, by evoking a second form of mediated revelation; the mediation in 
knowledge is the indirect medium of being simply doxa and random lexeme 
constructions. The dissolution of reality through knowledge, by considering the 
translational operator as as momentum of contingency, offers Descartes the insight that 
unconditional knowledge is per se universal and it is therefore even the idealistic doubt 
of the universal doubt (even of knowledge itself). In other words, the doxa and its 
attached doubt are within eternal regress. The un-doubtable cogito is only possible if a 
gnosiological framework sets its very own being. Hence, the unity of cogito and sum is 
not simply a state of mind, which highlights something that is not at all intended by its 
cogito. Indeed, this is what Descartes drafts as the distinction between primary (belongs 
to matter) and secondary (added by the mind) qualities. The transcendental condition is 
therefore the remedy for Descartes and the unde autem scio (DES Med. I., AT VII, 
21.3), wherein the unity of knowledge and objects are translated in knowledge. In 
opposition to Kant and in addition to Husserl, we can read that Descartes does not only 
apply the transcendental condition to the grid of the external world but he also refers to 
knowledge as if it is in its unity translatable and consequently knowledgeable.      
      
Res extensa is the materiality of res cogitans and will be mediated through an internal 
linguistic corpus. Therefore, language is in Descartes’ setting an auxilium or a sine qua 
non for knowledge-production. Hence, within this idealistic setting the transcendental 
element prefigures tacitly its stake: it offers the conditions for reasoning by stressing 
that perceiving stands for conceiving with his / her very own mind (Descartes 1984: 18). 
Having established the ego, Descartes uses perceptions as an internal translational 
instrument to outline the undoubted idea. Hence, the translational task is not within a 
translational setting, rather mediation will be trapped in endless repetitions: A (res 
cogitans) to B (res extensa), A (res cogitans) to A’ (re-assurance of res cogitans) and so 
forth. Hence, transcendental condition depends on the circularity of re-assuring res 
cogitans and thus, ideas offer a transcendental setting, which incorporates a double-
layered flaw. To understand this flaw we might resume Descartes’ chain of reasoning 
by highlighting (a) that we may doubt the possibility of a body by having as counter-
argument the evil demon, (b) as a thinking being we know that we have the perceptions 
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of worldly things and hence (c) perceptions must be sensu stricto thoughts (Haas 2008: 
16). By summing up we may remark the double feature of the mundane world – (a) one 
can doubt the body and its materiality and (b) the synthesis of having those elements is 
kept in one’s mind – fosters an ambivalent position127, since I am not aware if I have a 
body and in addition to that if the translation of B (rex extensa) from A (rex cogitans) 
can be defined de jure that A is not B. The certainty to translate A to B remains in a flaw 
condition, since Descartes requires that perception remains doubtful and likewise, 
within a contingent world, the ego as a counterpart should establish the un-failed basis 
for truth. This aporia is only possible if he accepts a certain metaphysical stance, if not 
it will end up in petition principia. Within this kind of flaw, Merleau-Ponty rejects 
idealistic theories, while ideas supersede living exposures; indeed, the representation of 
mere ideas is a mechanic operation and does not consider the brokenness of perception 
possibilities.   
 
However, Descartes’ subject-object separation should be, in my reading, understood as 
a united disjunction of subject and object, in which the subject and the object are in a 
permanent flow of re-configurating their own setting. This kind of re-articulation 
stresses the opposition to realistic or idealistic perspectives by pointing to 
transcendentality as a veritable alternative reading of Descartes128. The empiric and the 
intellectual poles corroborate isomorphic abstractions, in which the realistic approach is 
conditioned by a partial and preformed pre-understanding of objective thoughts and in 
opposition, the idealistic understanding tries to understand objective thoughts through 
mere subjective operations. The decisive figure for reading a transcendental line within 
Descartes’ reflection is to understand the systematic principle of an a priori unity of 
subject and object, of res cogitans and res extensa, which outlines the methodological 
principle of ego cogito, ergo sum129. The interconnection of in and out is the pivotal 
point for a transcendental reading that acknowledges the superseding epistemological 
transformation of the sensual experience into gnosiological contents. In other words, the 
translational task is not the motion from A as A’ to B by offering a methodological 
framework, in which any principle of reality could be translated. We rather should 
                                                            
127 For this trap, Bernhard Williams introduces the expression the masked man fallacy by referring to an 
analogia: (1) I do not know who this masked man is, (2) I do know my father, therefore (3) this masked 
man is not my father (Williams 1978; especially chapter IV).  
128 Cf. Paul Natorp (1882). 
129 In this understanding Descartes is neither an extension of Parmenides’ aletheia and doxa rhetoric nor a 
conception of Plotin’s truth thought; cf. Wolfgang Röd (1969) and Franz Bader (1979) support the 
reading of transcendental evidence.  
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expect that it is a possibility to read Descartes not simply as the ontological ergo sum by 
considering therefore the presence of reflection but as the imminence of an a priori 
unity; if the a priori will be still A as A’ to B might be questionable at this point. It is 
questionable, since the means of the consciousness consequence of cogito / sum is a pre-
figure of the internal translation of consciousness. Thereafter, the consciousness 
subsidence cannot be outlined as a function of (subjective) reasoning – this is Descartes’ 
pre-caution and the above outlined disbelief. The a priori of a universal epistemological 
justification principle can be grasped by the fact that the object, the body, the mind, etc. 
are never only ontological entities, but are consciousness-beings. This is how we might 
read Descartes’ subject-object-craftsmanship, not as fissure but as an a priori unity, 
since the translation of objects has to be part of any translating process130. This 
translation-process supersedes the immanent aporia of a pure intellectual or pure 
empiric world and offers the breeding ground for transcendental methods. The 
understanding of transcendental reading is within the realm of Husserl’s dynamised 
transcendental approach but does however take another curve. So far, we have seen that 
Husserl’s A as A’ and his motion of as fixes the transcendental task as the offspring of 
pure ideas and is therefore a transcendental setting of the supremacy of ideas131; the 
epoché does not challenge the presence of the empiric implication. The reduction is the 
trail to reduce appearance to its (idealistic) pure essence. In Descartes’ framework we 
might stress the relationship and inter-connection of subject and object and of the 
signifié and signifiant by re-considering that the transcendentality is not a draft of 
idealistic realms but an epistemological setting that translates in knowledge. Merleau-
Ponty presents very similar characteristics while re-considering the savage ontology as 
the chiastic experience, in which life is curled up, knowledge is produced in its genesis 
and translation is the process in language.  
 
In reference to Kant and in extension to Husserl we are able to grasp that the 
transcendental method is based on its mediation by questioning the a priori conditions 
of its possible knowledge (KrV B XVI, XVII); it is about revealing metaphysical 
stances by questioning the a priori conditions of how we know and how we achieve 
knowledge (KrV B 9, 10), alias A as A’. In this vein Husserl reduces knowledge to the 
transcendental reduction of sensual experiences by explaining with Kant that the limit 
                                                            
130 Cf. Reinhard Lauth (1965). 
131 Husserl’s reading resembles the Marburg-tradition of reading Descartes and is predominantly outlined 
by Ernst Cassirer in his doctoral thesis Descartes’ Kritik der mathematischen und 
naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis (Cassirer 1899). 
 70 
of human knowledge is based on the mixture of seeing, a priori conditions and 
reasoning (KrV B 41ff). Hence, the transcendental apperception of the ego is due to its 
self-regulative ego cogito a circular and regulative figure of its very own. Fichte on his 
side prolongs Kant’s transcendentality by superseding Kant’s mirroring effect. Fichte 
considers not only the sensual experience but also knowing knowledge (FICH II 3 329). 
Fichte’s nova methodo (FICH I 4 217) consists of drafting the realm, in which knowing 
finds its own considerations. Therefore, the capability to translate the signifié by its 
signifiant is the extended understanding of transcendentality. In other words, the self-
consciousness is the reversible operation of reflecting subject and object. This is what 
we outline above as its mediation-process and not as its translational act, while self-
consciousness reflection is not only identical but will also be perceived as identical 
(FICH I 4 276). The transcendental reflection is in its realm a form of self-translating 
self-consciousness. The mediated B is this double-featured identic entity: the 
simultaneity of ontological and phenomenal knowing. The genetivus subjectivus and its 
mediated genetivus objectivus are therefore reversible reflections. Hence, we have to 
consider an ego that is its own reference without separating the slash between the ego 
and its sum, since subjective organisation is an intrinsic part of the epistemology of 
objects. I am not a simple expression, but rather the expression is itself full of life, while 
the determination is nothing more than the expression of related translations. No content 
is un-mixed with other identical certainty, since the linguistic expression, is the 
permanent general confluence of impressions. This is precisely what Merleau-Ponty 
outlines in his inner-ontological relationship132 – Descartes might outline this inner-
ontological relationship by genetising the relata out of the relation (Bader 1983: 
109)133. The transcendental answer to the signifié in its signifiant is probably the 
parousia to understand the paradoxon of linguistic expression. In other words, the 
transcendental self-consciousness is the ambiguity of doubting and therefore the factual 
and immediate evidence of expression. It is this positive disjunction of empiric and 
intellectual entities, in which the mediated B is never a transcendental identity (A as A’) 
but it is indeed an apodictic evidence. In other words, the transcendental framework is 
                                                            
132 Cf. Part II of this chapter: Language and translation: a lateral affair. 
133 Cf. also Cassirer: “Das ‘Ding’ erscheint demgemäss nicht nur den verschiedenen Sinnen selbst als ein 
Verschiedenes, sondern es ist auch für das gleiche Organ, je nach dem Zeitpunkt und den wechselnden 
Bedingungen der Wahrnehmung, ein grenzenloses Veränderliches. Denn all seine Bestimmtheit hängt 
völlig von den Verhältnissen ab, unter denen es sich uns darstellt. Kein Inhalt ist uns in der Erfahrung 
unvermischt mit anderen in identischer Bestimmtheit gegeben, sondern was sich uns darbietet, ist immer 
nur der allgemeine Zusammenfluss der Eindrücke. Nicht das eine oder andere, das ‘Dies’ oder ‘Jenes’ 
einer bestimmten Qualität, sondern nur die wechselseitige Beziehung des einen auf das andere, des 
anderen auf das eine, ist hier das allein Bekannte, ja das allein Kennbare” (Cassirer 1977: 43f).  
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the permanent option of differentiation of the appeared without substantialising it. The 
absoluteness of transcendental conditions is the material facticity of the inner-
ontological dis-reality. The transcendental evidence is not apagogic – evidence enacts in 
immanence without valid counter-parts. The objective world will be mediated as inner-
ontological forms of my own: it is about a subjective objectivity or an objective 
subjectivity. It is closer to you than you might think. The act of A as A’ to B is non-
translated, the motion is un-conditional (WL 196ff). In other words, the motion of A as 
A’ to B has its very own crack; this is what Merleau-Ponty understands as the 
reversibility of expression. Descartes might stress it as the evidence of a factual genesis. 
The expression is a consequence of the leap out of the factual moment and is in its 
facticity the un-translatable evidence of genesis. The absolute evidence of 
transcendental reflection-structure is the appearance of the eidos-eidolon unity of a 
relative disjunction. This is the evidence of appearance, which is present by its absolute 
evidence-foundation and likewise the reflection-structure interferes qualitatively with 
the ego cogito. This is how the factual will be genetic and the genetic factual: A as A’ to 
B is the pre-deliberative appeal for B in A as A’. The synthesis of A as A’ to B cannot be 
executed or in other words, the synthesis of the formal and material will be suspended 
by the fact that B conditions A as A’ and vice versa. This kind of essential relatedness is, 
in its inseparable condition, the impossibility of differentiating A as A’ from B. The 
impossibility is the theoretical framework, in which the disjunction finds its original 
unity. As a logical consequence, if we do not have the disjunction index within the unity 
the function of differentiation would be simply an aporein. The linguistic expression is 
keeping its own absoluteness; the word appears insofar as the appearance of the word 
can happen134. This absolute non-relatedness is however a qualitative relatedness insofar 
as the validity of facticity is given by realising its validity and not simply by mediating 
it: language as such can neither be outlined by intellectual-subjectivity nor by the 
empiric-objectivity, we have to admit a new unity as condition of language and 
expression-capability: it is a vivid language, since its framework is outlined by the a 
priori identity of subjectivity and objectivity. As consequence, a grammatical corpus 
loses its independent status and the possibility of objectivity; the sense-capability and 
sense-objectivity is uploaded by the a priori commitment of linguistic-relationship. And 
                                                            
134 However, there is an important restriction that is completely different to Merleau-Ponty’s stance: there 
is no how function within the different scales of appearance and within the non-relation of the absolute. 
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this is how we articulate the transcendental framework as the foundation of metaxy as 
the transcendental condition of language135. 
 
The grammatical body is in consequence for Descartes a reality of the non-knowable, 
since veritas and the operation of misbelief is the linguistic expression of its total 
identity in immanence. The total correspondence presumes two different realities but 
however, it offers in its A as A’ to B distinction a withdrawal and uncontrollable rest of 
translation. This withdrawal of language has to be seen as the impossibility of objects 
and as consequence of the transcendental condition, in which res objectiva and res 
acutalis finds its genesis. This linguistic setting is the transcendental explanation that is 
not the output of subjective knowledge, but also the identity of the subjective 
knowledge opposed grammatical matrix by stressing its difference in unity. This is 
lately Descartes’ formula of ego cogito, ergo sum or more precisely the cogito in esse. 
Merleau-Ponty outlines that Descartes and the possibility of cogito is the possibility to 
be thrown into the act of thinking. Therefore, I can pass out from the psychological 
cogito without locating me as universal entity. I am not simply a constitutive event or a 
product of nature but I am embraced by a form of thinking that is within the flow of 
ideality, which can never deliver the causality-reasons. It is about thinking that affects 
clarity without having it. This is what Merleau-Ponty outlines as the very third sense of 
cogito.     
     
From this stance, we can easily draw a constitutive line from Descartes’ transcendental 
understanding to Husserl, by considering that Descartes’ monad will be transformed 
into a dynamited being. The idea of translatio in its mediating character can be founded 
in Descartes’ writings. Outlining Descartes’ transcendental analysis gives us the 
opportunity to follow the genesis of his cogito in sum relationship by assuming that the 
transcendental framework is not purely the methodological act of capturing objects but 
the act in which the subject correlates with its objects. Merleau-Ponty will not start with 
Descartes’ premises but he will end up within a framework that resembles Descartes’ 
vision. Merleau-Ponty states that Descartes was espousing his theory of body-mind 
separation but thereby he showed the paradox of unity in the very daily life. Descartes’ 
mind setting is not surrounded with borders, its state digresses in an area of vagueness, 
in which objects are infirmly articulated but nonetheless featuring a kind of presence 
                                                            
135 Descartes writes that God reveals nature in the same way as God creates nature (DES AT XI, 36/37). 
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(Prosa 130). Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body language can be read as an emanation 
of Descartes’ epistemology of presence: we are capable of writing a theory of 
translation, which is beyond naïve realism and does not reveal the expression of its 
being, where another embodied self emerges, where our perspectives meld, cross or 
intertwine. Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of translation will be subsumed 
under the premises of transcendentality – transcendental categories are not the effect of 
a lined up harmonic transcendental setting; we need to read Descartes under the 
premises of losing the very external form and offering thereby a notch that invites us to 
frame a landscape of pluripotentiality (Prosa 112)136.  
 
 
C Merleau-Ponty’s Post-Cartesianism: another grammar 
 
Merleau-Ponty can be considered as a phenomenologist who has re-thought Husserl’s 
phenomenological lines by superseding the transcendental reduction of linguistic 
grammar and by corroborating on the other side the aporein of an ontology that tries to 
yield the dualism of aletheia / doxa and grammar / expression. This reading will trap 
within the paradoxon of expression and language and remains within epistemological 
repetitions. My understanding, and especially by studying the linguistic considerations 
in Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre, is to read his savage ontology as a synopsis of 
transcendentality; in other words, the transcendental package offers revealing moments 
for morphological structures, in which the aporia of radical ontology is described as 
linguistic excess that rejects the separation of immanence and transcendence. This kind 
of excess breaks up the postponement of the signifié and the signifiant by offering a 
lateral enactment of the expression while lacking its intelligible grammar. This hyper-
phenomenon is not the explosion of words and significations but it tries to break up with 
the line-up of aletheia and highlights in opposition the immanent matrix of multiple 
references, in which the excess might be tracked. Understanding translation as a process 
of tracking can be seen as a policy of transcendental taxonomy. It is the activity of the 
reversal body that outlines a transcendental setting by dealing with linguistic 
expressions in a similar way as Descartes has done it with his cogito / sum architecture. 
The key to Descartes and in extrapolation to Merleau-Ponty is to consider the 
simultaneity of transcendentality and ontology, without their being corresponding 
                                                            
136 We can say that Descartes and Merleau-Ponty face a relationship that is not intellectually hostile but it 
is a subtle battle, in which both are patricides and child killers by using the same weapons (Prosa 132ff).  
 74 
partners. Transcendental considerations and ontology are the linguistic matrix in which 
translation and understanding finds their topography of khôra in such a way that 
Merleau-Ponty has difficulty accepting language but in the same moment he has to 
separate it from its expression to bring it to its signification. His momentum of 
simultaneity might offer a vivid aporia, in which the chiastic experience of separation 
and alliance can be possible. In the following I am attempting to outline that 
transcendentality could be the missing link for Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the 
translational motion of A’ to B / C as well as the visible and the invisible by evoking the 
possibility to reorganise the chiastic experience: the heuristic neutralisation by the act of 
polymorphology re-figures the facultas aliud linguam. Nevertheless, it would be 
absolutely misleading to accept that transcendentality will be the clarification of 
grammar and language in general. Transcendentality might be extra logica. By having 
Descartes in our luggage we can evoke another reading of Merleau-Ponty and 
phenomenology that does not evade the transcendental realm but offers a topography to 
stress another transcendentality, in which language and expression are not the objects of 
words, grammatical structures and personal feelings.   
 
Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to rely on the relationship of materiality and foundation, 
since the phenomenological life-world is not constituted by a pure being but rather by a 
realm of sense(s) (PhP XV) that outlines the foundation and access of grammar and 
truth137.  Merleau-Ponty does not speak of transcendental categories while formulating 
grammar and knowledge; he outlines in his earlier stage the importance of relying on 
Gestalten138 and on ontological spheres. By referring to gestalt-psychological methods, 
Merleau-Ponty discovers the body as a place, which is anchored in a sensual-sense-
related world, which was always its homeland or a milieu écologique (VNV 262). A 
phenomenology of phenomenology leads to the discovery of a silent consciousness; the 
expression as a silent expression leads towards the effect to understand disparate 
moments from a reading that ultimately could lead to his ontological project 
accompanying world- and subject-becoming and understands thereby flesh as an 
element of its process. By referring to Merleau-Ponty we should imagine a labyrinth of 
spontaneous steps, which finds its way through a clutter of disorder. The behaviour of 
phenomenological Gestalten yields a doxographic separation of res extensa and res 
cogitation, insofar as the res is not capable of being separated partes extra partes and 
                                                            
137 Truth seeing is in Waldenfels’ reading Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of seeing (cf. Waldenfels 1992: 62). 
138 Cf. Aron Gurwitsch (1929). 
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likewise it supersedes cogitation as it does not signify the revealing of the entire being. 
However, my reading of Descartes offers the possibility to go along with Merleau-
Ponty’s cogitation understood as a specific way to understand life-world and its 
corresponding lexemes. Along these lines, transcendental reduction does not lead out of 
the world and into an idealistic inflection, since it includes its transcendental actor / 
reducer / orator / translator; the idea of reduction reproduces per se a new setting of 
holism that underpins on another level the status of the transcendental actor. The effect 
will not be a deliberated consciousness, rather another mode of a pre-configured mind 
setting. The problem of reduction is therefore not simply an epistemological foreplay 
but it concerns the integrity of a linguistic grammar, while searching its being in a 
permanent mode of commencement139. Language and in addition translation do no 
longer require causes but rather gradually emerge as genesis and phenomenon of 
expression and life-world. The entanglement of language-translation-action-
perception-disruption are the ontological stakeholders and they do not appear as 
determined and isolated tasks that have not yet outlined their definite characteristics. 
Merleau-Ponty does neither propose to reconsider the linguistic realm in which form is 
reduced to content, nor content subsumed in form. In this line, Husserl’s universal 
transcendental relationship of form and content or the mediation of A as A’ to B is a 
passive synthesis of identification as association 140  (HUA I 142). Merleau-Ponty 
understands that performing transcendental reduction makes it difficult to know the 
assumptions of objective thoughts, since nothing is more difficult than to know 
precisely what we see. Hence the usage of linguistic tools such as phonemes, 
morphemes and syntax has to be rewritten by the chorus of chiasm (Signes 294) and 
busts therefore the classical notion of a proper language. Nevertheless, the structure of 
reversibility offers a transcendental reading beyond classical hermeneutics. The 
hermeneutical trap is outlined by the fact that the signifé is always out of the signifiant, 
since B / C is exterior to the unity of knowledge; A’ to B / C is formulating another 
reality of knowledge beyond the realm of A’; it claims an absolute abyss and 
                                                            
139 This interpretation reunites Merleau-Ponty with Husserl: reduction has to be taken under the wings of 
idealistic interpretations. The typoscript of Cartesian Meditation VI highlights the world-entanglement of 
phenomenological thinking. We have to be aware that reduction does not lead univocally from natural 
mind setting to transcendental thinking. It is rather a succession, based on transcendental given meanings, 
which arises from natural meanings; natural attitudes are not alone the where-of-from, but rather the 
wherefore (cf. Fink 1988: 109).    
140 In other words, “(…) after performing the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, experience is 
considered in isolation from its worldly objects. The experiencing subject is conceived as a transcendental 
ego that is not part of the world, and whose doings / states are uncaused. Husserl’s (...) conception of 
phenomenology thus presupposes the Cartesian view of experience as inner representations whose 
qualities remain the same whether or not they present the world correctly” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011: 13).  
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contradiction by neglecting any form of unification. An orthodox reading of Merleau-
Ponty might lead us to a similar understanding: the reversibility is the eternal trap of 
unity. The unity-aporia, however, is the hidden taxonomy of transcendentality and 
keeps the chiastic experience together: the exteriority, the translated or with Descartes 
the res extensa is not exterior but a disjunction in unity or a chiasm in unity. In other 
words, the absolute disjunction of A’ to B / C is not the eternal disjunction of knowledge 
and being, since the difference of A in B / C is in principle like any other difference, 
only understandable by a transcendental unity that destroys the original difference and 
the possibility of making something different. The chiastic experience of 
transcendentality is inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s Le visible et l’invisible and can be read 
as a radicalisation of Descartes’ transcendental cogito / sum, since the original 
difference conditions in its radicalism a linguistic index. This is how Merleau-Ponty’s 
reversibility is kept by the principles of transcendentality. Hitherto, the transcendental 
modification of the sum by its cogito will be modified by Merleau-Ponty. He transforms 
the radical expression by its vivid excess, which is operated by tracing it without index 
and monopolisation: the original action and its expression are signified by 
transcendental realms and are likewise signified through a transcendental enforcement. 
Any other form is a trial of objectivities from the exterior and therefore a non-objective 
cause. Hence, the chiastic experience is probably the (new) structural-logical of 
transcendentality that writes A in B / C – translation is the lateral in-vasion of 
implosions, in which the lexeme is not a contingent appearance. The chiasm is the 
excess in its body expression by enhancing simultaneously several semantic 
relationships that works commensurably in non-coincidence. The notion of associations 
will be therefore the movens of the translational force in its transcendental gown. This 
commensurability of words in its non-coincidental form formulates the transcendental 
lining in its expression. Therefore, the very idea of chiasm takes Descartes’ 
transcendental melange to a radical extreme, it can be grasped within the horizon of 
Husserl’s Urdoxa and Merleau-Ponty’s shifting towards savage ontology. In opposition 
to Husserl and his transcendental reduction, Merleau-Ponty starts in Le visible et 
l’invisible with the initial pretence (feinte) of any thinker: to find the expression of 
things within the silence of the world, the actor, the orator and the spectator does 
pretend to know any phenomenological reduction and does pretend to see any possible 
entities in the world (VNV 18f). Au contraire, the aim for Merleau-Ponty is to reveal 
the semantics of life-world by formulating sceptical arguments independently from 
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ontological prejudices: the world is no longer explored as a closed system of relations 
but rather as an open totality, in which translation and synthesis remain unfinished (PhP 
253), and therefore language is likewise an open and non-deliberative setting, since I 
always perceive the world from my own fluid perspective. Merleau-Ponty’s ontological 
twist does no longer denominate neither the subject nor the object but tries to sketch the 
origio and the genesis of subjectivity and objectivity, regrouping Descartes’ 
transcendental reading 141 . Merleau-Ponty’s a priori is not knowledge beyond 
experience but an a priori repositum based on contingency and language (PhP 255). 
This new form of a priori is the enactment of the silent logic of facticity (PhP 255). His 
onto-phenomenological draft is within a movement that presupposes in a circular 
manner already the toto of the movement reading it through its oblique gesture. In other 
words, it is the concrete momentum of an extensive configuration of life-world (PhP 
256) that suppresses the container of esse. This framework visualises the aporia, which 
seems to be anchored in the concrete world. Hence, the epistemological fragility 
reconsiders language as a silent enactment of the uncertain: the linguistic expression is 
therefore not somewhere else, but an a-language 142  that is curled up by bodily 
expressions that will be enacted in pluripotentiality and by the execution that is beyond 
causal reflections and commands.  
 
By analysing the mode of reflection, Merleau-Ponty wants to reveal consciousness and 
its forgotten history – before consciousness could be an intrinsic part of ego and life-
world, he affirms and stresses the necessity of backgrounds, in which consciousness and 
the very idea of subject can appear as Gestalt. The personal existence of consciousness 
follows the – in life-world anchored – body; not much different is the case for linguistic 
usage. Consciousness is not at all the universal mean incorporating the decision-making 
body of what is semantically relevant and what not. Semantic features and grammar 
exist even before consciousness can interfere; by corresponding to life-world, we are 
condemned to semantics in life-world and nothing can be expressed that is already 
expressed in history (PhP XIV). Nevertheless, linguistic consciousness is not a simple 
                                                            
141 Kant outlines that not consciousness on the one side and pure being on the other side are theoretically 
lined up, but rather knowledge is referred to the experience of the subject in the world and the being of 
entities. On this very point Kant and Merleau-Ponty do agree – hence, Kant however introduces the 
element of transcendental categories, which conditions the a priori and leads to a transcendental apeiron, 
since transcendental aesthesis and transcendental logic evoke discrepancy. The insertion of a 
transcendental ego levels this apeiron off. This system of an integral ego denies any mundane anchoring 
and therefore Merleau-Ponty rejects transcendental settings by considering that the foundation and origins 
of transcendental conditions are not reflected from our historical experience (PhP 255).    
142  Please note: a-linguistic expressions are not founded by a non-linguistic grammar. 
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field of pre-consciousness or magical expression (PhP 419). As we have seen, Merleau-
Ponty tries to offer a transcendental justification for his phenomenological description, 
but this kind of reflection does neither discover an absolute transcendental sphere nor 
the real forgottenness of rhetoric. The event of être-au-monde and the transcendental 
foundation do not claim an additional and second field of semantic investigation, which 
lies beyond previous descriptions. Transcendental foundation is in itself a momentum of 
phenomenological description. My reading of Merleau-Ponty is to radicalise this very 
point: descriptions have to be the grounding work for an understanding that is more 
radical than objective knowledge could be; the cogito has to be re-grasped in order to 
shape a more fundamental logos than objective knowledge might offer (PhP 419). By 
highlighting the element of time, Merleau-Ponty is able to stress the ambiguity of body, 
world and language within cogito – not in a Cartesian sense but rather in the sense of a 
silent cogito. His ambitions revealing the genesis happening and the conditioning 
possibilities of ambiguity are the result of a deferred cogito. Therefore, his reflections 
do not only rely on Husserl’s simple reference to its own phenomenological stance but 
rather he refers to a phenomenology of phenomenology 143  (Signes 224). In 
Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) the transcendental stance can be outlined in its 
consciousness-conception as the being based on the entity through the means of body 
(PhP 160) and as an experience-being of mediating the world with the body and the 
Other (PhP 113). Consciousness can no longer be dissolved by a cogito, an object of 
linguistic knowledge, but rather it is experienceable as je peux (PhP 160) that cannot 
translate Je in an absolute sense (PhP 241). A fundamental logos can only be sure if the 
own language is a cognitive perception that funds its own grammar. Consciousness is 
not at all a stance for itself, it is rather a constant and active transcendence: it is the 
original movement of the transcendental that is my own-being – it is the equi-primordial 
touch with my linguistic being and with the linguistic being of the world. In other 
words: seeing is not seeing-thinking-expressing, it has rather to be described as an 
exceeded happening of the seen objects, in which the event of seeing can be captured – 
although it will never be transparent (PhP 432)144.  
                                                            
143 By highlighting the event of a phenomenology of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty refers to Eugen 
Fink’s remark that phenomenological foundation of thinking has to be examined via a very unique 
transcendental analytical feature by highlighting its transcendental self-understanding, which can be only 
executed of the existence of and in relation to the être au monde (Fink 1988: 8f). 
144  In accordance to Descartes’ ego cogito, ergo sum, Merleau-Ponty does not stress the causal 
determination of the ego. Ego cogito and ego sum are two equivalent statements of the same 
phenomenon. Equivalence does not mean to be a synonym rather consciousness is integrated into the 
transcendence of my being (PhP 438f).  
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Hence, the movens of Merleau-Ponty is to show that life, life-world and language are 
beyond idealistic and empirical transparency and the spectacle of the secret knowledge 
of the artist spurs him / her to re-settle. His remedy is the repeatedly mentioned idea of 
the Gestalt – it is about a form of existentialism, which escapes permanently and cannot 
fit within operative thinking. Words, pictures, signs and symbols do not stand for 
themselves – their immanence is an intellectual construction of an un-constructible 
world. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology tries to invade into morphemes, describes them 
and does not construct their semantic characteristics: translation is therefore the process 
of A’ in-vading B / C. His descriptions are not idealistic regressions to a pretext and the 
condition of possibilities – Merleau-Ponty outlines that experience can neither be 
understood in isolation from its worldly objects nor does it reconstruct it, far more 
phenomenological operations are delivering a chiastic description of it. Descartes’ 
transcendental reading offers the subject-object unity, which Merleau-Ponty radicalises 
as the enacted world experience: life-world is synonymous with embedded 
transcendentality, it is where the unity is getting enacted. The un-reflected can be 
grasped by the description of perception that considers the original contact by 
facilitating the creation of acts and likewise presuming it and therefore, world is neither 
an object of knowledge nor an issue of consciousness (PhP V). Husserl’s reduction from 
natural expression into transcendental consciousness squeezes directly to a sense world 
and loses the secrets of the world while melting to a unique horizon. In opposition, it is 
this radical relatedness to genealogy and facticity that breaks with Husserl’s 
transcendentality and offers another reading of transcendentality that is enacted by its 
sheer expression. In other words, the expressed is within a non-linguistic grammar of 
the paradox, in which the expressed is not expressed and writes therefore the 
entanglement of expression and grammar within a non-outlined lateral oriented 
transcendental life-world. Hence, phenomenology considers the appearance of being in 
relation to its consciousness setting as une opération créatrice (PhP 74) and it can be 
therefore outlined as the reflection of the un-spoken C or to put with Rimbaud: being 
directed to life-world by having consciousness (PhP 68f). Thus, by following 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty uses the label être-au-monde in separation to any 
transcendental setting and outlines in his later stage that his ontological considerations 
cannot be read in relation to Husserl’s phenomenology (PhP 61 and VNV 224). This 
ontological shift is probably the most significant shift away from Husserl by offering an 
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ontological interpretation of phenomenological reading – however, Merleau-Ponty is 
not aware that his ontological setting introduces transcendental categories through its 
very own backdoors. The ontological shifting will be important to understand the 
systematic shifting where words are the enacted experience of life-world and perverts 
the very idea of translation. 
 
 
D Ontological seismograph 
 
In Le philosophe et son abri (1959) Merleau-Ponty outlines that the natural being 
cannot be an exterior event within the realm of phenomenological thinking, but rather it 
has to find a place in its own realm145 (Signes 194f). Merleau-Ponty wants to establish 
an ontological set up that is not based on a figure of non-related ideas and which 
inductive explications are not tasks of linguistic empiricism. And he neither wants to 
prove the existence of the world (OE 60f) nor highlights classification schemes of 
subjects and objects, which could figure as a generic subject- and / or object-being 
(VNV 41). His procedure rather follows the aim to trace a Sein im Seienden. This line 
up can be seen as an ontological difference but not in a fundamental-ontological 
Heideggerian way: it enhances a being that invokes the depth and layered value of 
expressions. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty remains trusty to phenomenological working – he 
tries to elaborate a being, which is neither hidden beyond facticity nor the almighty 
translator who engineers the coordinates of life-world. He develops an ontological 
concept that takes its starting point from Husserl’s life-worldly perception by grasping 
the experiences of a natural and pre-theoretical life(s)146. Hence, Merleau-Ponty refers 
to a being that is not strange to the so-called natural life but is still hidden, since it is 
itself a medium of natural life. He looks for an ontological field that is different to the 
per se and cannot be derived from a constituted order (Signes 206). He shifts the 
perspective of ontological work practices by referring to il y a (OE 12) and from there 
on capturing, on the basis of the perceiving-perceived world, the pure sense that will not 
be accepted by produced institutions such as language. The descending movement 
                                                            
145  Admittedly, phenomenology critiques the natural attitude but nevertheless it has simultaneously tried 
to rehabilitate natural settings; we have to consider that Merleau-Ponty tries to explore a totally new kind 
of ontological thinking.  
146 Merleau-Ponty’s concern corresponds to Heidegger’s reflection of his sense of being / life. Indeed, 
Merleau-Ponty starts by Husserl but he does not end up by Heidegger. The differentiation of Sein and the 
Seiende are always an expression of the fundamental – even when Heidegger tries to show its 
impossibility and negates all kind of Scheinbilder (RC 156).  
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towards a Sein of the Seiende is not at all to find its solution on a common ground. The 
foundational question leads Merleau-Ponty to a field of foundation that is not down or 
up, here or there but rather in the middle of its linguistic circumstances. It is a direction 
towards a life-sense within the Seiende and a Sein in semantics147. Merleau-Ponty treats 
the opening towards the world as a silent relationship of life-world, which shows that 
there is translation (VNV 57); it is a change and a trans-substitution of visibility from 
where seeing by the middle of its entities will be entangled and will have happened148 
(OE 16). This stance shows clearly the change in Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical 
perspective and he criticises his 1945 published monograph Phénoménologie de la 
Perception (PhP), especially by the fact that the idea of a phenomenology of 
phenomenology is shaped by a certain design of phenomenological foundation while 
Phénoménologie de la Perception reveals actually its ontological necessity (VNV 234): 
he is doubting the difference of consciousness and object (VNV 250) and therefore he 
tries to retain a philosophy of consciousness; the outlined silent cogito is consequently 
impossible due to the fact that there is no correlation between silence and the event of 
speaking (VNV 227f): there are neither as nor to clutches. Thereto, Merleau-Ponty is 
not able to reveal how, in the following of Husserl, the silent experience can be outlined 
as pure utterance of its own sense  (VNV 169). Consequently, he tries to draft the being-
sense of an ontological medium by extrapolating it from its natural life-worldly 
understanding. Therefore, his reflections are re-shaped and transformed in his latest 
thoughts and stand clear in opposition to bare reflections and constructions; he analyses 
a certain degree of artificiality in science, which could never be the foundation of its 
construction, its natural believing of life-world and its obscurity (OE 10 and VNV 32) – 
science experiments with entities without participating in and with it149 (OE 9). His 
starting point consists of there is being, there is life-world or more generally qu’il y a 
                                                            
147 Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the middle, of a medium or a dimension and his expression of an intra-
ontology (VNV 275) could be misleading. The middle, the medium is unlikely the transmitter of A and B, 
rather he speaks in a metaphoric language by attempting to capture the ontological atmosphere, the 
ontological medium, which is owned by its natural life while it is in the world and therefore knowable 
and likewise aware of its distance.  
148 Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology can be read in accordance to Eugen Fink’s intentions. In 
Sein, Wahrheit, Welt (Fink 1958), Fink outlines the idea of a philosophical questioning thinking that has 
to question itself (Fink 1958: 9) and that the absolute medium of appearance has to be different from its 
being. As long as the movement of appearance is anchored in the envisaging human being, truth and life-
world are consequences and results of the appearance. The importance consists in its turnaround by 
highlighting the appearance of the Seiende and its truth as a consequence of a space- and time happening 
in the world.    
149 Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty is not opposing science in its practice, his concerns are related to a 
forgotten interpretation of itself, which ends up attributing a being-monopoly to the object of knowledge.    
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quelque chose 150 (VNV 119). An ontology, which is based on literally nothing, is based 
on a shaky fundament, while the nothing and the pure being / Gebilde is always 
somewhere else (VNV 246ff). Merleau-Ponty’s principle follows the idea that there is a 
being and a life-world as consequence of an impossibility of non-sense or ontological 
emptiness (VNV 154). A direct oriented ontology, a philosophy of negativity and naïve 
forms of reflections are not able to mediate Merleau-Ponty’s aim of presenting the 
ontological medium as a being-sense within life-world. He approaches this fragile idea 
by introducing the concept of simultaneity. The natural attitude is characterised by 
comporting une vérité supérieure (Signes 206). In opposition to Husserl’s Ideen (HUA 
III 52 and Signes 206) he interprets the natural attitude as a pre-reflexive stage in which 
the human being is in opposition to entities and things and oppositional to sheer 
differences of the I and life-world and consequently, any as-compositions will fail. 
Merleau-Ponty fosters the natural human being as an actor, who acts simultaneously: he 
thinks that his perception penetrates the objects but at the same time the actions are 
happening in their bodies: nevertheless, these convictions are able to survive in 
everyday life, although they dissolve and create entrelacs as soon as they are formulated 
as thesis or as statement (VNV 24). Merleau-Ponty constitutes ontology by highlighting 
the event of revealing and interpretation and by stressing the element of questions that 
will find its reply from life-worldly features and their entities. But these kinds of replies 
are not at all outlined to find a confirmation of a transparent knowledge; they are more 
focused on the fact and the certainty that there are answers – answers, which are 
emerging from life-world. The status of being is therefore in a doubled status of visual 
and non-visual happenings or in other words, it is being in a mode of speak-ability and 
non-speak-ability in life-world. These kinds of dispositions fund the act of seeing and 
speaking. By having this possibility, the act emerges from the bodily (flesh) Gestalt of 
life-world – its body foundation is based on material, from which the world materials 
are wrapped up. Merleau-Ponty radicalises Husserl’s understanding that any original 
given perception is a source of knowledge and that our bodily intuition has to be taken 
for granted, insofar as the perceived entity is perceived bodily – this dictum has to be 
taken literally due to the fact that the flesh151 of sensuality represents my own 
                                                            
150 This stance stays in clear opposition to classical interpretations of the being-status and especially it is 
in opposition to Parmenides’ ontological design and his concept of being and non-being. 
151  Merleau-Ponty’s stressing of chair could be misleading. The chair of life-world is not an 
anthropologic constant of world-descriptions; chair does not denominate the spirit or the substance as 
being-atoms. It is not chaos and has no name; the chair of life-world is a forming milieu for subjects and 
objects and therefore an element of being (VNV 181ff and 191).   
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incarnation and simultaneously its counter-part (Signes 211). There are no such things 
as abstract morphemes in phenomenological working and in the same line 
phenomenology is only able to problematise the Seiende on the basis that 
phenomenological thinking shares its being-constitution. Therefore the possibility of 
representation and translation is conditioned by the body-constitution of the world and 
the human being (VNV 175). In the intervening spaces, the flesh, as element of being, 
renders the presence of life-worldly possible – meaning that my body is made by the 
same flesh as the world and this flesh of my body is further on shared by the world by 
reflète152 its status (VNV 297). While body is in relation to perception, it is indeed in 
relation to life-world, in such a way as its reflecting status of overtaking and grasping is 
translated by its fleshy moment. Hence, the carnal body is open towards the world, 
while the body is made by the same material as life-world is created153. And this is also 
the reason why touching and touched flesh is my only instrument to enter into the 
chiasmus of entities: while I perceive the realm of language and words, there will be 
flesh. Nevertheless, the reversibility of touching and touched is however une identité 
toujours manquée (VNV 320). It is nonetheless a simultaneity that I tried to show with 
Descartes’ commensurability of cogito / sum and which Merleau-Ponty outlines as a 
double agency of language154 or a sous-entendu (Prosa 42).  
 
By outlining this reading we can follow that Merleau-Ponty breaks with his precedent 
by neglecting the difference of subject / object and of signifié / signifiant and above all 
of translating A to B. Husserl’s transcendental framework and its corresponding 
transcendental ego is therefore definitely perverted: reflection is not a setup without 
referring to experience and history. The signifiant and signifié are not only operators but 
far more they find their consciousness through the enactment itself (cf. un défait et 
refait (PhP 254)). Hence, what does that mean for language and its enactment? So far, 
language and translation find their enactment in their immanent movens by neutralising 
their circumstances and by referring to the pointing force of the resuming actor. 
Merleau-Ponty stresses in opposition a matrix that allows multi- and divers-entries 
without fixing-points. Language is the amalgam and performs its translation by 
                                                            
152 Merleau-Ponty insists on the fact that my body is – as like the world – the emanation of the same 
chair: “(...) et que de plus cette chair de mon corps est participée par le monde, il la reflète (...)” (VNV 
297). 
153 Cf. “(…) chair répondant à la chair” (VNV 259). 
154 It is about our own happening in linguistics settings and likewise we cause moments of happening by 
our socius (Prosa 29). 
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highlighting a ruling body that slips constantly. Nonetheless, the task of language and 
thinking in general is so to speak the duty to establish lexemes, which subsequently 
enact sens(es); consequently one might assume that the principle of anything goes 
guides us to Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts. This is far away from Merleau-Ponty’s aim, his 
epistemological project is to point to the drawer, speaker and actor behind and beyond 
texts, symbols, pictures and stories – this is the price for a life-infected language (Prosa 
126f). Therefore, the historic response to life-world is materially restricted to producing 
and affixing lacuna and fissures in the ampleness of life-world. We have to include the 
most foreign issues to the realm of life-world by enacting its intrinsic sense as the most 
remote issue (Prosa 84f). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty’s telos is a diverted telos or t’: the 
task of radical reflection – a reflection which would like to understand itself – is 
paradoxical to (re-) discover the un-reflected experience of life-world and to transfer 
back the verification and reflexive operations by attempting to highlight reflection as a 
possibility of my being. Hence, radical reflections have to (re-) consider its un-reflected 
origins: the observation of world facticity evokes a possible denomination of subjects 
and objects155. From this point on, Merleau-Ponty reveals his very theoretical horizon: 
the translation of genealogical words, languages, stories and phantasms are historical 
without having had an enacted presence. This tension offers Merleau-Ponty a whole 
new arsenal of criticism: the constant explosion in its implosion will be the chiastic 
movens of Merleau-Ponty’s discovery of language and translation. 
 
 
E Body language 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility of linguistic morphology will be more accessible and 
comprehensible through his conception of the carnal-body 156 : two theoretical 
extremities intellectualism – the intellectual capability (subject) to reduce the world into 
categories – and empiricism (object) – the positive comprehension of facticity – are 
mediated and synthesised by the bodily engaged existence. Body is for Merleau-Ponty 
another way to provoke the ontological foundation of reading the transcendental line of 
                                                            
155 In these circumstances Kant would refer to the ability of synthetic apperceptions. This categorisation 
might have been as well the movens in Merleau-Ponty’s head and it seems compelling that he would have 
introduced the ability of synthetic apperceptions through the back door without referring to it explicitly. 
The synthetic apperception summarises and categories a posteriori subjects-objects and Merleau-Ponty to 
focus on, to communicate and to translate on a very tiny spot, the dramatic scene in life-world. Hence the 
pre-reflexive phase does not enable us to synthesise since we can only synthesise where diversity exists.    
156 Merleau-Ponty introduces in Le visible et l’invisible the idea of chair.  
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linguistic practices, especially by having the possibility to follow literally the footprints 
of bodily traces in life-worldly promises in which paradeisos is so keen of. The 
embodiment declares that the vivid, the sad, the pathic, the suppressed, the laughter, joy 
squeeze life-world but simultaneously it is also the squeezing of the paradeisos in lack 
and excess. This formulation will keep on following us and will erase the body as an 
essence while impelling the embodiment of the body; the paradigm body will shift the 
epistemologie appliqué into non-application. Hence, the enacted language is non-
essentially embodied and therefore performs a certain way of merged combinations by 
outlining its in motion developed scheme (since life-world exists before any form of 
analysis and therefore, any derivation from principles remains definitely artificial (PhP 
IVf))157. This is what Merleau-Ponty understands as the résumé of our body-experience 
(PhP 114) and the constant performing constellation that leads to Merleau-Ponty’s 
setting of Gestalt (PhP 116). The very idea of Gestalt is a non-fixed variation of 
appearance and develops through its genesis its cybernetic body-language: body 
language speaks through its positioning (PhP 116f) and in addition, it is the spontaneous 
organisation of sensory fields that the so called elements of wholeness are dependent, 
which are in a larger sense again integrated into new modulations. This kind of 
bodyness is not a form that imposes on its heterogeneous materiality – there is certainly 
no materiality without form. However, there is only more or less stability or more or 
less articulated organisation (PhP XV).  The translation of the Gestalt will be a being 
for C, but far from the idea of agility in negativity – it is rather the inscription into an 
open register (VNV 236). The meaning of Gestalt evokes a facticity that yields the 
pathos of entity by opting for structures beyond causal circularities; it is a hierarchy of 
comportments that follow a genesis of embodied structures. Language as structure is 
therefore neither an object nor content of knowledge, it is neither exclusions nor 
inclusions and it is certainly not an idea. Hence, the positioning of body and language is 
not simply within a positive grammatical reference-system and in addition to that, 
positioning is de iure not an operator for objective settings but a system for intersections 
(VNV 114). Body language is rather the very first pointing in confrontation with its task 
and its translation. To understand body in contrast to subjectivity, we need to reject the 
understanding of body as a mere object and likewise deny the capability to be grasped 
as an object. It is Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental re-interpretation of the Cartesian 
                                                            
157 Leonardo’s interpretation of the world is given by his bodily and vital situatedness. He has performed 
his artwork by shifting the dimension of happening to expressing. This shift does not mark a change – it 
is still the same life-world (Prosa 105f) but mingled to another meaningful system.   
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dualism-framework158 / 159 or Husserl’s difference of noesis and noema – the concept of 
the engaged body as nucleus and operator for language refers likewise to withdraw itself 
and remain language as a mute transcendental facticity. The idea of Gestalt is therefore 
not an objective entity of different parts and not the result of subsuming the universal 
law (PhP 74); it is not a mechanism of identity but rather a figure of accidental touches 
in my very own cubic corporality (VNV 252f). The morphological structure of the 
Gestalt-fluidum assembled through its activity, in which they might express a common 
style, is about to write a participating commensurability. Hence, the Gestalt is neither a 
grammatical body for linguistic features nor the content of consciousness. In other 
words, the morphological Gestalt of language is already its own translation by 
encountering life and world: the signifié and the signifiant are therefore non-separable 
and revealing likewise there translation C without losing the time-space-relationship of 
A and B: A and B are an entanglement of consciousness as a flow of individual events 
and as consciousness-tissue of intrinsic meanings (SC 232). The linguistic Gestalt is 
therefore not constructed by a subject but is constituted, transformed and re-organised 
like a scene (SC 241). Hence, the common style is framed on the background of 
entangled collective circumstances. In other words, the presence of style in its 
miniatures are never elements of resemblance but look for causal strands in history or of 
a pontiff-translator, who spurs on the very happening of translating. If we draw on 
principles of resemblance, we approach the problem wrongly; the resembling moments 
are minimal to the differences and diversity of cultures (Signes 84). Hitherto, there is on 
the threshold of schematising the shade of an own grammar, in which the expression of 
the Gestalt may follow its Gestaltung. We might restate, that linguistic expressions are 
modifications of the grammatical result, since possible linguistic deviations are built on 
the grammatical framework of being; the upholding of the entangled situation is the 
grammatical and historical variability of linguistic range as it is again not 
homogenously defined. Hence, the function of slash between the signifié and signifiant 
does not mean a carte blanche for synthesis but rather the signifiant is the side effect of 
the signifié without offering an immediate picture of being here (PhP 117). The Gestalt 
undertakes the position of an amalgam that represents the integration-force of sick / 
healthy, signifié / signifiant or the understanding / non-understanding by outlining that 
                                                            
158 The classical understanding of Descartes admits that his experience does not present him as being in 
his body like a captain is dwelling in a ship (Descartes 1993: 53). However, Descartes presumes that the 
body is divided from the res intensa.  
159 This kind of rejection is the reason why Descartes and Merleau-Ponty are quite close; it is about a new 
relationship of entities in its cybernetic story telling.   
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no reference can be made absolutely and independently160. As we can follow, the 
Gestalt might be the structural predecessor of Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body and the link 
to outline his phenomenological system within the realm of transcendental lining. This 
is an important reference to grasp Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of life and language: 
translatio in its vivid enactment remains silent; the realm of no and silence will be 
transported into an area of doxa and non-being in which words, figures and entities will 
be the carnal body; the uncanny movement of this kind of infraction is to offer an exit 
of mute cultural settings (Prosa 170f). This kind of positivity of the negative highlights 
the plasticity of language, insofar as translation exists in correspondence to its task and 
to its very own reversibility – it is this être-au-monde161 (PhP 452) in which the 
linguistic ontology slumbers. In opposition to Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-Sein 162 , 
understood as a relative movement of a pre-theorised relationship and synthesis of the 
world, Merleau-Ponty characterises being relationship as a body and perspective 
experiences. Therefore, body and life-world are a peculiar entanglement of language, 
object, subject, etc. (VNV 197). In addition and as a specification, the body is a form of 
consciousness and likewise embedded in the objective world of language, life-world 
and history, but it is only understandable by the enacted translation motion. Therefore, 
the foundation for translational enactment within knowledge-categories will be yielded: 
transcendental knowledge-production will be re-interpreted by the mere fact of being in 
a mode of vivid body-language experiences without falling into a naïve reading of 
realism. The event of shifting A as A’ to B will be exceeded by having a body that offers 
a scenery of non-located spots: knowledge will be produced by multiple ways via body 
action and therefore, the concept of A to B or A as A’ is re-articulated by highlighting 
elements, which deprive epistemological settings. The unthinkable of phenomenology 
finds its corresponding partner by describing the body as the primordial function of 
being-in-the-world. From this point on, Merleau-Ponty turns the transcendental subject 
and its idealistic entities back to the world by declaring the serving body as the topos of 
                                                            
160 Merleau-Ponty’s early study of aphasia and pathology offers him the structural insights for his late 
manuscript of Le visible et l’invisible (VNV). 
161 By criticising Husserl’s phenomenology of transcendental consciousness, Heidegger refigures the 
phenomenological setting by prioritising the ontological framework. Nevertheless Being and 
Phenomenology are complementary insofar as philosophy should be seen as universal phenomenological 
ontology: “Phänomenologische Wahrheit (Erschlossenheit von Sein) ist veritas transcendentalis” (SZ 38). 
Merleau-Ponty refers to Heidegger’s stance and modifies his In-der-Welt-Seins to Merleau-Ponty’s inner 
ontology. Nevertheless Merleau-Ponty marks a difference by translating être au monde instead of être 
dans le monde.   
162 Heidegger’s relationship to Sein and Da-Sein is marked by its temporal situatedness. Sein means 
Anwesenheit in the sense of being in the mode of presence (cf. VNV 230ff).  
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practise163 (PhP 119). In other words, not the universality of language is the point of 
reference but the serving language practice as peculiar existence will translate its 
content and at the same time it will be translated; the orientation from A to a possible 
translation B / C cannot be fixed: the carnal body is a junction of lively meanings and 
not the law of a particular number of variables related to coefficients (PhP 177). The 
situated body translates and orientates a linguistic content within life-world since the 
fleshy being is constantly deprived of causal-logics and the topological relationship 
objects – background164. In this line, translation breaks again with the powerful 
hermeneutical circle by pointing to C on the very scene of A to B165: translation is the 
action of vivid richness by referring to A, B and C, which is not permitted to understand 
it as separated and to rip apart its actuality by its linguistic enforcement. This kind of 
mixture and curious practice, in which enactment and omission create language, offers a 
dispositive for a weak linguistic and translational theory, since so-called clear and 
transparent ideas are not important, but the confused enactment in its motional existence 
matters most. Hence, language as embodied activity and as a matrix of history, 
psychology and speculation cannot be captured by the extension of causality clauses. 
Language and translation are slippery moments or, in reference to Merleau-Ponty, the 
carnal body of language and translation are elements à l’état naissant (PhP 140). The 
embodied strand however does not only engineer the post Cartesian entanglement of 
subjects and objects but also drafts new forms of transcendentality by referring from 
afar to my reading of Descartes: the enlarged subject-object-matrix outlines the 
transcendental category. The embodied transcendentality refreshes the linguistic starting 
point without pointing to its carnal language. Therefore, the transcendental deduction 
cannot be followed since the Demiurge cannot produce anything but, however he 
evokes, a being in an embodied life-worldly association. The categorised system cannot 
be the foundation, rather Merleau-Ponty yields the transcendental premises, in which 
the a priori of time and space is suspended and will be replaced by the genealogy of our 
                                                            
163 The combination of Gestalt und être-au-monde includes to some extent the universal formation – 
nevertheless and this is the striking moment language and body are not at all depending components.  
164 To understand the importance of foundation, Merleau-Ponty refers to the analysis of the proper motion 
of the body by the famous case Schneider (Gelb and Goldstein 1928). Merleau-Ponty interests the 
examination of Schneider, who was injured cortically by a shell splitter. He outlines the effect and 
penetration of the disturbed structures into the so-called normal function. In other words, his movens was 
a trial to understand the separation and reference-relationship of the pathological and the normal by 
stressing the fact of deeper penetration of outer- and inner-perspectives. The case Schneider shows him 
clearly that the dis-function is not related to the representational function of perception but rather by the 
intentionality (PhP 158), in which we are situated. 
165 Body language is to some extent an operator which outlines the figure as a restriction to a determined 
perspective by making the relationship one of the residuum and its vanishing background. 
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worldly entangled experiences in which the emergence of linguistic expression is 
starting underneath and within its very registrar of the space-time continuum. In this 
context, transcendentality is a derivate and disfigurement of the translational act insofar 
as neither form is reduced to content or its content subsumed in form. Language and 
translational practice grasp their very own legitimation through the genesis of their 
underpinning-relationship as their new a priori feature (PhP 255). The transcendental 
body setting is the breeding ground in which intellectual a posteriori practices integrate 
and hyper-form the entanglement of nature-history-language-body. This kind of a 
posteriori sublimation offers in its radical contingency the possibility to enter the being-
zone or the être-au-monde166 as a new form of an a priori setting167. The carnal body 
signifies the locus amoenus in which the body-phenomenology offers transcendental 
possibilities and material realities – the embodiment of the intellectual realm reveals 
language and its being in life-world. In Le visible et l’invisible Merleau-Ponty 
radicalises the pivotal character of body by stressing its carnal character as the much 
more fundamental operational setting of being than the function of body would do it in 
relation to language and to the world (VNV 308). This radicalism is the embedded 
constitution of flesh as chiasm. The fleshy translation of reversibility (VNV 264 and 
311) underpins the matrix character (VNV 270) of linguistic usage. The translation A’ 
to B / C is that which Merleau-Ponty outlines as the momentum of silence. Therefore, 
the carnal modifies the very principle of being in the world: the carnal-body is perverted 
insofar as I am not in the world, but the world is embedded into the carnal condition of 
extended and porous reality possibilities. In other words, his approach of an inner-
ontology is conditioned by the inherence of carnal translation and its design of a savage 
and raw being. The idea of an inner-ontology is shaped by the surrounding-surrounded 
being of vertical and dimensional territories (VNV 276). It is about an inner-ontology 
that leads to a realm of in-betweeness that provokes an indirect reading of an indirect 
ontology. Therefore, the primal intention is not related to consciousness or thinking but 
to the displaced carnal body itself. In reference to Merleau-Ponty, I would describe the 
activity of the enacted morphology of language through its translation as going 
pregnant168 (PhP 178). It is a lateral and oblique entering of the translational motion, by 
                                                            
166 Hence, this relationship is not a causal relationship of mutual exchange but rather a function of mutual 
enrichment. Merleau-Ponty does not refer to Hegel’s synthesis; his synthesis is rather a compression of 
description, in which facticity and contingency are so to speak a vivid apeiron of mutual existence (PhP 
148). 
167 The a priori is the understandable and explained factum of its silent logic (PhP 255f). 
168 Cf. the French original: “(...) qui est déjà ‘pregnant’ (...)” (PhP 178). 
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being there while having multi-varied entry-possibilities. Hence, the carnal body and 
language are located within a local and grammatical setting but they do not act as 
objects of the space-time-continuum. This non-grammatical fixation, within an 
embodied morphology, outlines language as a linguistic existence within space and time 
(PhP 164). It is a porous system of infinite equal positioning in other orientations (PhP 
166). In other words, an embodied carnal language is translation per se, since it is a 
system of equivalences (PhP 166), which is not embedded in an objective grid of 
coordination points but in a grammatical context where the sense-connection is 
permanently snatched by carrying the origin, its excess and the lack of a linguistic 
grammar (VNV 266f). This experience is outlined by the corporality of the carnal body, 
since it does not offer predicative possibilities but rather marks the new 
transcendentality of extending its possibility. The non-identical equivalence of A’ to B / 
C is an experienced correspondence of lack and excess169. The hermeneutical horizon is 
only given by the immersion of an experienced consciousness within the density of 
world and the syntactical setting of language170. Therefore, words and their linguistic 
meaning are given by the parts of my flesh and not by a natural logical setting of pre 
determined categories.    
  
We are aware that the Leibkörper as the Gestalt of phenomenological argumentation 
expresses its ambiguity-form. Human beings are on the basis of their bodies an entity of 
entities and the lexeme is only an inflection while being situated in the world. This body 
is nevertheless not simply a body – life-world is for the body simultaneously sensual 
and meaningful. Hitherto, the body cannot be taken as the hub of life-worldly 
understanding and it does not simply swap from ratio and facticity to carnal facticity. 
Instead, he succeeds Husserl by highlighting the question of how consciousness 
develops an understanding of entity, space and time; it is about how the body engages in 
this process of qualifications; in Husserl’s reading the carnal body is on the one side a 
physical entity and on the other side it is a body that carries its I (HUA XVI 161f). This 
kind of duality, or let us say the carnal I, is the aporia that translates the subject-object 
means into another reading of transcendentality. In other words, this kind of duality 
outlines the synthetic power that within the unified body subject and object are 
differentiated and, at the same time, the serving organon mutates to an object (HUA I 
                                                            
169 Antje Kapust outlines this event as the paradox of translation (Kapust 1999: 293). 
170 Hence, this framework rejects the postulate of the immanence of entities and the a priori meaning of 
objects. The transcendental stance as such will be in Merleau-Ponty’s case re-articulated and might be 
characterised as ontological transcendentality.    
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128f). Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl’s view but he does not read it in connection with 
Husserl’s transcendental arguments; Merleau-Ponty emphasises to outline the 
transcendental motive of the body by interpreting and describing it – it is far from being 
described by a higher authority and therefore, Merleau-Ponty fears that the fleshiness of 
the I will be erased. The movens of Merleau-Ponty is the demonstration of an 
anonymously executed and bodily-mediated life-world, which strips off analytic 
reflections171. This kind of settlement remains ambiguous due to its tension line of 
reconstitution of the already constituted. The ambivalence of inner and outer 
perspectives, in which world with its subjects and objects are articulated and re-
articulated, endows the aporein of excess and lack. The body-comportment in its 
diverse shades can show and explain the hyperbole and doubled aporetic feature: the 
carnal body as objective body constitutes itself as consciousness on the basis of 
capability of an already existing body: one hand touches the other and through this act 
will be touched (VNV 183ff). The translation of the body ends up by the non-
conclusive event of the overwhelming fleshy event in its life-worldly transgression: the 
elucidation of the primordial function helps to intensify the articulation of space, objects 
and time as a consequence of body-language. A body-epistemology can be recognised 
primarily as the issue of être-en-monde and on a second track as a paradigmatic 
ambiguity-case of sense and sensuality. Finally, Merleau-Ponty drafts ambiguity as an 
original-experience since it simply supersedes to think in alternatives such as subjects 
and objects – he discovers the place of origin at the heart of our fleshy experiences, to 
describe the appearance of being and learn to understand the paradoxon how something 
can exist as such for us (PhP 86) without being able to write the carnal juiciness of the I. 
Meaning in this context is meaning in motion (PhP 166) or knowledge, which is en 
main (PhP 167f) looking for the enactment of the intended possible language172.  
Linguistic meaning expresses the deepness of carnal body expressions: I am grasping a 
word as my hand touches my painful wound (PhP 210). 
 
The carnal body as such is insofar important as Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
symbolises the negation of hasty objectivation-temptations and discovers positively, 
how the body-perception outlines the phenomenon of subject-object-ambiguity. 
Therefore, the act of expressing is not a process of selection and option rather the 
                                                            
171 Husserl’s constitutional event outlines the effect that constitution is in service for the consciousness, in 
which the body has no more than just a privileged position. 
172 The body-language is the translatio and the realization of life-world. 
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rhythm of wrath offers an imaginary body as an equivalent setting of his on setting 
(Prosa 124f). In relation to that, subjectivity meets its historical duty, insofar as 
sensuality and thinking enact an unintentional communion – a commensurability of 
non-existence and existence, of per se and pro se in which subjectivity is removed from 
any kind of body empowerment. In other words, Merleau-Ponty explains that the 
density shared between me and the surrounding intentions of an original acquaintance 
does not offer the transparency of experience. The surrounding perceptions are 
modalities of a general existence that are exposed to a world while penetrating me 
without being myself the source of its forces (PhP 115) – this is dirty translation or it is 
about translating the odeur (Prosa II).  
 
In this stance, phenomenological descriptions precede rational, scientific purposes and 
on the other side the idea of fleshy incorporated ambiguity questions any kind of 
dualism such as subject and object, form and content, ratio and nature, etc. By the 
regression to the one’s own, the carnal body shows that it is an incorporated pivotal 
point in its perspective of perception; but nevertheless perspective-knowledge is not 
about a subjective deformation of entities (SC 201) and does not lead towards a 
perception of subject-factors. To the contrary, it leads to the certainty to communicate 
with a world, which is richer than our presupposed knowledge of it (SC 201). 
Nevertheless, perspectives cannot explain the body from its stance; it bounds our 
knowledge and therefore it develops and perceives the world as such; therefore it 
declares that any entity cannot be ever completely constituted (PhP 108). And 
especially, the body as such is difficult to be caught up rationally, while the meaningful 
body in its action disappears and the body-mediation is not present in relation to it. In 
the case of consciousness-knowledge, Merleau-Ponty refers to the event that 
consciousness has the tendency to posit the objects as they are. This kind of setting is 
already the ossification of consciousness, since it freezes experience to objects (PhP 
86). The firm achievement of body was such that it has to be focused on its genesis, its 
starting perception. The event of being in statu nascendi is literally spoken the melting-
effect of the freezing consciousness moment: language, consciousness or body do not 
exist as such – it is more about the fleshy happening of perception, the experience of 
speaking and mediating or the effect of becoming consciousness173; the progressum of 
                                                            
173 This kind of reflections lead towards the shifting from atomistic theories in psychology towards 
Gestalt-psychology (SC 100ff.) representing the stress of the gestaltpsychological perception; in 
opposition, Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) does no longer highlight the idea of an alien 
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consciousness is not because we have a fleshy body but because we are in carnal 
corporality: again, it is about A’ to B / C. As consequence, the outer-perspective, 
mistakenly understood as an objective perspective, does not offer an understanding of 
phenomenon, but rather it is the entanglement of phenomenological perspectives, which 
is not in opposition to inner- and outer-perspectives. It is an eternal shifting of in and 
out by describing the function and comportment of its genesis (cf. être-au-monde). The 
phenomenological body is in its outlook the opposition of objective psychology and 
physiological bodies. The phenomenological body has a peculiar-structure and an 
immanent meaning; it stands for a pivotal-point of lively-meanings (PhP 177) and 
functions as the anchorage in life-world. The body as the subject of perception (PhP 
260) has therefore an unspecific form of understanding. This kind of understanding and 
knowledge is not an understanding of knowledge, not a logical subjugation of ideas or 
classification of rules, which has to be explained: the body has as such an undeniable 
grasping moment and has in accordance to it an anonymous sense-founder174.   
 
The outlining effect of the carnal body as natural ego, which is prior to any kind of 
personal and transcendental ego, drafts structures of senses by enhancing further 
repertoires; the phenomenological body contains two layers within itself: explaining the 
habitual and the actual body (PhP 98). Merleau-Ponty is persuaded that the categories of 
the habitual and actual body compose the whole entity, since the habitual body 
incorporates the entities, which are the basis for maniable entities (PhP 98). The 
habitual body embodies the antecedent capability of être-en-monde and in opposition 
the actual body is no longer capable of managing the entities of the world; it is rather a 
zone of silence (PhP 97). Within this tension-field, the meaning of the phenomenon as 
an expression of être-au-monde corresponds along its phenomenon by understanding it 
as the consisted engagement in the world. But simultaneously, it manifests a 
contradiction, which Merleau-Ponty classifies as the paradox of être-au-monde. It is 
about the insolvable contradiction of sense-foundation and sense: on the one side the 
perceptive and practical intentions of the world, which are prior, are from another 
perspective just existing insofar as they are connected throughout the power of thinking 
                                                                                                                                                                              
spectator but rather the position of the perceiving person; it is not about the status nascendi but rather 
Merleau-Ponty develops the structures of perception directly from the view of the starting perception.  
174 In addition, cf. Heidegger explores the lumen naturale in Sein und Zeit (SZ 133). 
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and willing (PhP 98). This paradoxon can be detected but not dissolved175. As we have 
seen, Merleau-Ponty does not at all outline the idea of être-au-monde as thetic, object 
based thinking quasi as mode of res extensa. Etre-au-monde signifies a realm in-
between simple objectivity and subjectivity and therefore, a description of the world 
from where on the thetic act of consciousness will be executed by the body laterally. 
 
Hence, the notion être-au-monde makes in statu nascendi terms such as body, 
consciousness or language intelligible understandable and insofar it is a notion that 
describes certain phenomenological phenomenon in-adequate. Indeed, this notion 
indicates the possibility to describe the phenomenon as phenomenon. Nevertheless, the 
ambiguity persists as figuration: it is a tool of phenomenological description, insofar as 
the body or the I is in the world and simultaneously is the perspective, which rend the 
realm of description accessible insofar as être-au-monde is the third figure of psychic 
and physiological setting that Merleau-Ponty discusses as existence. The subject-object 
relationship is no longer the condition of knowledge, but rather a paradoxical being-
vividness, in which the subject exchanges with its life-world (SNS 89). The serving and 
acting body exists in such a way that it designs in correspondence être-au-monde and 
incorporates its structures. In this context, Merleau-Ponty uses the signification of être-
au-monde in a broader sense. The existence and the être-au-monde through the body 
can be interpreted as the subject of perception. The body expresses the existence, while 
it creates first of all the actual reality of the existence and it is in the same line the actual 
reality of the existence itself. By following these lines we can highlight that the very 
phenomenon of existence incarnates itself and hence the separation of inner-and-outer 
perspectives, signs and meanings can no longer be theorised by different entities, but are 
abstract moments of l’être soi (PhP 193). The actual and serving body is outlined on 
sediments of knowledge, which simultaneously has been deposited in-adequately. The 
permanent shifting is the characteristics of the existence, which can lead towards a 
certain kind of pathology of nascendi. This kind of knowledge is never a cognitive 
knowing that that can be attached to a cognisant I but rather a knowing how176, whose 
explications remain incomplete. The sedimentation of knowledge remains anonymous 
and remains in the mode of the anonymous one. Language is therefore an apperception 
(VL 175) that is not self-being but a kind of relationship of flesh and body that evokes a 
                                                            
175 If we attempt to analyse this paradoxon, it might be resolved. Its clarity and transparency have to be 
the price to pay for contradicting the original experience. The ambiguous reality of body inspired reality 
would disappear in favour of the idea body and the idea of the world. 
176 The notions knowing how and knowing that are explained by Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 1986: 26ff).  
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linguistic form of spontaneous apperception within a kind of being that is not self-
being: it is much about to figure out how a self-being can modulate a savage being of 
expression. 
 
  
F Yes to savage being                       
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s later work and especially in Le visible et l’invisible (VNV) he 
reshapes his phenomenological considerations by favouring an ontological approach 
(VNV 219f) reformulating and radicalising perceptual considerations and work 
practises. Nevertheless, he does not abandon the reflections of his earlier thoughts; it is 
rather a new cocktail in which the entanglement of visible perceptions and expressions 
are related somehow to the invisibility of thoughts 177 . Due to Merleau-Ponty’s 
unfinished work, the unfolding of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is quite difficult and 
polyvalent. His being experience is primarily a carnal experience, offering a pre-
conditioned reality and is in opposition to Heidegger’s pre-predicative availability. 
Outlining its vivid dimensionality and openness in correspondence to being will 
reverberate carnal achievements. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of an ontology-within-
the-world offers an intra-ontology that relies on the mediation of the carnal consertus. 
Hence, I attempt to line up glimpses of ontological framing by relying on his rejection 
of causality – his ontology is not at all the source for the casus accusativus. In this 
sense, the silent cogito, the non-axiomatic consciousness will be rejected by the mere 
fact that the intrinsic power of consciousness is a theoretical evidence that needs words, 
expressions, inflections and practices178. In this reading, the tiny line of perception and 
expression remains un-resolved; the enactment of translating phenomenological 
perceptions into morphological entities and henceforth linguistic structures remain a 
lively existing apeiron. In other words, the order of perception does not create defined 
and determined objects and therefore linguistic signs are non-corresponding derivations. 
The act of expression yields its given grammar into a pre-condition in which we are 
already embodying the metamorphosis, which we are going to undertake (Prosa 97ff). 
Hitherto, the problem of Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning is that he considered language as a 
                                                            
177 Merleau-Ponty follows Heidegger’s approach by considering the ontological project as a mixture of 
phenomenology and ontology; it is a way to understand the world by questioning its origin and it is 
likewise the setting, in which it reacts (SZ: 38 and PhP V). 
178 Even though words are in their enactment as well a pluri-potential fragmentation. 
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positive setting179 and therefore he aims for strands or for polyphonies of translation. It 
seems that in his very last period of thinking, he corroborates dual structures of 
perception and realisation. He tries to overcome this thetic failure by enforcing 
phenomenological stances and at the same time ontological embodiments. Parallelism 
enforces body expression, crystallises and fractures happening and therefore, he 
enforces the ontological project as a savage ontology or indirect ontology. This 
radicalisation is linked with final trails of denominations: Merleau-Ponty wants to know 
what is beyond the possibility of perception (VNV 20f). Nevertheless, his ontological 
reconsideration does not enforce causal strands: no intrinsic being, no representational 
being, no being for human beings, etc. The sceptic argument beyond ontological 
findings enforces its conjunctivus (VNV 21); language as such is therefore the 
conjunctivus objectivus and conjunctivus subjectivus without aiming for synthesising 
forces. The mere dialectic evidence is embedded within multifactorial diffractions by 
highlighting the hyperbolic experience of translating A’ to B / C. Merleau-Ponty tries to 
underpin this pending ontological stance by a radical withdrawal of consciences and 
perception entities, since they separate language into clear realms of A and B or image 
and perception. As we can understand now, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of ontology 
is non-foundational and does not consider the ontological power of separation. His 
ontology is a radical description of an amalgam and is articulated within this slippery 
framework: the concepts of idea, cogito, and representation should be replaced by 
framing bodies such as dimensions, articulation, level, charnières or configurations. In 
other words, Merleau-Ponty wants to show that ontological characters, such as 
experience, sensations or judgments are in reality theoretical separations within the 
vivid ontological reality that is incarnated in the corps de l’esprit. Merleau-Ponty’s 
opting to a life-world that can neither be perceived as a positive entity nor as negative 
lively passage, is formulated as heavy fleshy-body-being. Henceforth, translation from 
A’ to B is the multiple repeated reality of the deviation of C. This C is not a C but – let’s 
say – fleshy C in life-worldly practice. In that sense, the existence of C cannot be 
explained by transcendental characteristics but by the enactment of phenomenological 
experiences of C as a kind of transcendental character180: C is not an expression of an 
isolated real, but the serving expression of its fleshiness. C corroborates the fact that the 
translation of A is a derivation of its expressional relatedness in life-world. The structure 
of A’ to B / C cannot be understood as an entity-structure of expressions but rather as a 
                                                            
179 At least, Merleau-Ponty considers language as positive instrument in Le visible et l’invisible (VNV). 
180 Cf. Alphonse de Waelhens (Waelhens 1951: 391). 
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style of being existent to(wards) life-world: style writes the outlining of meaning. 
Before the signifié will be common sense, there is a fruitful moment, where the 
enactment of the translated expression will be given through déformation cohérente 
(Prosa 85). The style of translating is therefore a kind of story telling and yet it is not 
history; the translator does not know anything about the difference of a difference 
between human beings and world, between the meaningful and the absurd, since the 
translated is only able to draft the translated by its mode of action and on the backslash 
of the world. In other words, the translation-style is not a positive figuration, a mode of 
representation or an object, rather it is a result of points of contact, in which the 
demands of the expressed translation looks for; the act of translation is therefore a 
system of resonance that is a possible deviational element of my body and my 
expression – the meaning of C is the genesis, in which the given life-world is 
undergoing a coherent deformation and the expressed regroups a bundle of elements. 
This kind of translation would be beyond and in opposition to structural and systemic 
settings. It is a latent translation that can never be re-grouped by positive figures or a 
linguistic framework in which sense and reality is seeping in and is shimmering like a 
flavour (Prosa 87). The new setting is the existence of the successful expression, in 
which the particular-entity will be refused181. Yes, translatio is an embodied expression 
of flesh, since the fleshy experience is the chiastic event of body and mind, body and 
world, you and me, life and world – it is yes to squeezing, while Husserl in opposition 
would analyse the process of squeezing in epoché. The difference between yes and 
analysing is the fundamental difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. Hence, 
translatio is not stressed by any objective entity of wholeness but rather by a generality 
of visibility (VNV 171). Merleau-Ponty’s fleshy standpoint is the Urpräsentierbarkeit, 
openness (VNV 171) and reversibility (VNV 187) of the phatic situation of the 
translational-act: the transgression of A’ to B / C is not a matter of texts but of its 
texture. The generality of flesh evokes the concrete-general, its reversibility and it offers 
a platform to enact the translation of the Urpräsentierbare in its un-presented stage. The 
translated C is the emergence of the concrete, in which the general mode of being 
sensuality has to be taken seriously and is therefore the outburst of Merleau-Ponty’s 
outburst of savage ontology. As a consequence, language is not a setting of conventions 
                                                            
181 Merleau-Ponty refers to an anecdote of the landlord of Cassis and Renoir by André Malraux: Renoir’s 
view was not a certain way to consider the sea but rather he was attracted by a hidden elaborated world 
that rises to the immeasurable (Prosa 87f). This immeasurable raising is where the fleshiness trickles 
down in the juiciness of life-world. Translatio is therefore the hidden act of living chiastically in the 
world. 
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or a well formed and organised grammar but rather an expression-happening in its 
sensuality of aporetic descriptions: the transcendental ego does not enter into a deeper a 
priori stage of sensuality. Hence, we have discovered that Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of ontology has to be read in the polyphony of flesh. It is a kind of in-
direct language–ontology that corroborates the force of expression as a form of 
differentiation-activity in its materiality and meaning-creations. Indeed, we do not have 
to value the meaning of C, rather it is about the expression-happening of C in its 
juiciness. C is not a synthesising force, it is about the approach to C in its metaphoric 
appearance. In that sense, Merleau-Ponty formulates the idea of reversibility as the 
impossibility to consider Parmenides’ being. He formulates that being can only be 
grasped by the Seiende describing its Sein. Indeed, between C and my flesh there is a 
special relationship of approaching the realm C but also by saying metaphors: 
translation is in that sense an ambiguous enactment, since the access to C is at the same 
time its withdrawal of C. The hermeneutical approximation of C is in each 
pronunciation a differentiation in non-differentiation182. The experience of the translated 
C can be fetched by the fleshy-body and its state of surrounding juicy perception. 
Translational truth is the production of very fleshy experiences in its savage ontological 
appearance. The importance of this line is that the very evidence of ontological 
compossibilité (VNV 29) is in its enactment and stylistic figuration written in 
incompossibilité. Therefore, notions like equation, transparency, truth or representation 
are positively perceived by a mind setting that requires a transcendental ego that is able 
to enforce ideas – ideas, which are symbols that we never can grasp by their 
transcendental sense but by their presence (PhP 18f). This might be the reason why 
Merleau-Ponty’s reflection is much more radical than any analytical observation could 
ever be: we can only translate the perspective, which we have read into it. In Merleau-
Ponty’s setting, there is no vertical translation of C; any structure of cogitationes has to 
be withdrawn from its reflection of life by highlighting the silence of phatic openness of 
être-au-monde. Language is therefore less an operational skill than a thematic realm in 
which the enactment of sense-potentiality can be formulated. The task of the translator 
will be to use a grammar that is not given by norms and frameworks but will be the 
articulation of a motivation and hence, style is not a figuration of recognition but a 
practice of distortion: it is about finding the path that opens to the caveman without 
having tradition in my hand-luggage and this will be again the momentum where we are 
                                                            
182 This is where the juiciness of the fleshy body comes into account. 
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able to express the world. Merleau-Ponty formulates that the savage seeing is at the core 
of each translation since translation as such lacks and exceeds its very operationability: 
it lacks since C is not given per se and at the same time it exceeds since translatio 
evokes that we are able to read C. Within this, aporein language and its translation has 
to be articulated in its malfunctional originality – language has to be withdrawn to 
understand its hidden grammar. Language is in Merleau-Ponty’s context not a 
denomination-toolbox but rather it tries to catch the richness and fracture of life-world 
by considering that meanings do only exist in a non-differential difference. 
Nevertheless, language is not an unnecessary and useless trope, its grammatical lining 
has to consider that in each expression there is an unexpressed part – language as a 
diacritic knowledge-production183 of style and type is within a non-located field of life-
worldly experiences. Within this framework, fields and world are for Merleau-Ponty not 
positioning in time-and-space but rather a flexible band, in which we are never able to 
say C but able to say it is not B; the invisible C is fixed by the visible B that is in its 
enacted translation of A’ to B / C an extension of C. Hence; the un-translatable is not the 
negation and not positioning – it is rather a negativity that is not a negation (VNV 273 
ff). By this turn, Merleau-Ponty tries to overcome the dialectic setting by introducing a 
linguistic grammar of ambiguity and aporia: the sense of translation of A to B is 
invisible, but the invisible is not the opposite of the visible; the visible has itself a 
structure of invisibility – C is the non-ur-presentation of the translated text B or in other 
words, C is the virtual texture of the visible text B (cf. Weltlichkeit VNV 265). This 
structured non-structure is Merleau-Ponty’s essay of transcendental framing. This leads 
to a new kind of generality, if we have understood that the invisible is part of its 
(linguistic) reality. The translated B will not be qualified by a C since we understand 
that B can be a particularity and likewise its universality. In other words, the Gestalt of 
language erodes the morphology without that I am at the source of the erosion184. This 
kind of chiastic experience of facticity and entity exceeds and lacks dual patterns and 
has to be grasped by the very idea of flesh – flesh as the Sichtigkeit and generality 
(VNV 171). Hence, the signifié and the significant are the entrelacs of l’envers. This 
architecture captures the picture that any operationalization of language contains in its 
silence the possibility of language. It is about using a language of another world but this 
does not mean that we are no longer in the life-world we pretend to be normally; it is a 
                                                            
183 Merleau-Ponty uses diacritic in reference to Ferdinand de Saussure. 
184 In other words, facts and entities cannot be separated, since it emerges from the essence brute (VNV 
153f). 
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life-world that is exempt from the burden of fixation. The linguistic act translates the 
prose of the world into the fiery conditions of poetry. Hence, savage ontology is the 
system of compression and de-compression in which the diacritic-momentum enacts its 
lateral conception. This passive structure is the silent shouting of savage ontology and 
on the other hand it outlines the conditionality of transcendentality185. Translation fulfils 
in this constellation the deviation and the avenue for being pregnant. Therefore, the 
access to the essence of language will be important since the chiastic life of immanence 
and transcendence will not be solved but encompassed186. So far we have sorted out that 
linguistic schemes, their modulation and translation are the silent enactment of life-
world. In Coda, I am attempting to outline Merleau-Ponty’s linguistic constellations in 
its pregnant life. 
 
 
2. Coda: Language and translation: a lateral affair 
 
In extension to the above mentioned, we might consider that sensual word-pictures and 
in general linguistic signs cannot be intellectually grasped by their intrinsic validity. 
Reasoning the ontological breeding ground is not answerable by the means of 
formation. The institution language is far from revealing the secrets of the world – 
though language exposes a linguistic world and by outlining a second power of life-
world (VNV 129f), it does not exhibit emptiness but it outlines the perversion of life-
world insofar as the second potency reveals the effect of doublets; questioning life-
world is not about re-flexio but the repetition and doubling force of immanence. In its 
initial and original perception and as a first theoretical approach – way ahead of 
linguistic absorption and denomination – sensual signs and their meanings are ideally 
not separable; the intellectual reflection is not able to introduce the spinney of life-world 
(PhP 48). The sensual sign can only be a sensual sign due to its inhabited sense and the 
initial perception fulfils it by the fact that it only perceives meaningful signs and entities 
due to its a-logical hyperbolic fertilisation. Neither can we rely on grammatical 
analyses, which indexes general linguistic elements, nor does language pose the 
necessary equivalence of expressions in other linguistic forms. Grammatical meaning 
                                                            
185 However our motion for transcendentality is not based on the facticity of transcendental narcissism 
(Waldenfels 1976 V). 
186 In my reading the relationship of immanence and transcendence is not lined up as Michael Henry 
would put it: the immanence is the entity of its transcendence (Henry 1963). 
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and inflection are finally nothing else than a self-fulfilling approximation of the 
linguistic actor (Prosa 38ff). Hence, linguistic signs as such do not denominate and do 
not create the causality of sign and signification; in other words, signs are in a certain 
way lacking and exceeding their own meaning, since meaning-intentions are nothing 
else than a determined vide détérminé, which has to be filled with words (Signes 112). 
In another reading it seems to be plausible that sensual word-pictures cause a certain 
(psychic or physiologic) action that cannot conceive a specific meaning of signs, a 
perspective of life-worldly being (VNV 131) or a theory that constructs words by the 
acts of consciousness. Both theoretical approaches lack the fact that words might have 
sense: the first theory represents the mundane-effect of word-signification by having an 
active position of cogito (PhP 206) and the second concept yields it by referring to a 
speaker / user. Merleau-Ponty tries to extricate language from its theoretical burden and 
its instrumentalisation for positivity without considering its starting and aiming points – 
language is functional and likewise a diverse happening (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 7). In 
reference to Merleau-Ponty, the genesis of language is more than referring to an 
existing language, not only that it has an extra-linguistic backing, but it is subsisted by 
the already said and the unsaid through the modulation of life-world. In his vision, not 
language but rather the primal act of speaking as speaking behaviour matters most (PhP 
208f). From this perspective, he is not able to identify a motive to separate the sensual 
sign from meaning and to relate it to an object. Au contraire, Merleau-Ponty discusses 
the possibilities of origin, genesis and the crystallisation of the linguistic phenomenon 
and he is not at all interested in determining the truth of expressions. In other words, the 
intelligible world is an imposition insofar as any attempt of reconstruction is primarily 
the imperialism of my own referentiality – truth is une idée-limite (PhP 222), which has 
forgotten its contingent linguistic elements in its utterance. Merleau-Ponty bases truth 
on the reality realm of speaking, in the sense that its foundation is layered in linguistic 
signs, which are developed by language in statu nascendi and concretised by the 
expression of original silence (PhP 214) – this is a practical shift in language but its 
force is only indicated by the act and its immediate fleshy coverage; we have to expel 
the idea of an original text, its translation is not our language – the concept of a 
complete expression is pointless, since its coverage is oblique or even silent (Signes 
54). The wondrous silence follows the line that the linguistic act is not able to separate 
and categorise meaning due to its diacritic meaning but likewise it seems that language 
offers the possibility to pertain and foster meaning (Signes 109).  
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Language as a constituted, syntactic and vocabulary-based system as well as means of 
expression are sediments of its written utterance, in which the unformulated sense finds 
a way for outward expressions, since lively language has its vivid task underneath and 
beyond its expressions and likewise in its overwhelming noise. Lively language is 
living a mutual life like big creatures, unifying and separating just as its lateral and 
indirect meaning features long for (Prosa 123f) – language is silent in its lack and 
excess motion.  
 
Hence, this sub-chapter is dedicated to understand the hyper-phenomenon of linguistic 
practices and the relevance of operationalising translation as toolkit for trespassing the 
diacritic relationship of perception and expression187 and as matrix in which linguistic 
signs are neither translation of idealistic prepositions nor representation of imaginary 
dreams: it is about positive ambiguity or positive dialectics (VNV 127). The translation 
of morphological elements is in Merleau-Ponty’s framework an accurate study of the 
phenomenon and its visibility by evoking that denominations are neither constituted by 
positivity and negativity nor the synthesis of it. There is not a third movement in 
linguistic usage, positive dialectic is not a matter of thought and behaviour that keeps an 
intimate relationship of its ontological breeding ground but it opens fields, in which acts 
can be inscribed, registered and enacted by the motion of linguistic polyvalence in 
historicity. For this reason linguistic intentions will be exhausted with its completion, 
since the expression will be expressed but never in its full range (Prosa 52). It is about 
self-mediation, in which ambiguity suspends the capability of denomination to be I by 
annihilating its very identity188. Hence, the difficulty of this examination is within the 
realm of accuracy – is it accurate in relation to what and to whom? Since positivity such 
as accuracy are derivations, the chiastic moment of entering reality without denying its 
very own orientation and perception offers a brave new world; the identity of life-world 
and language has to be identical but not in an unifying sense, since the lack of 
                                                            
187 It is about the dialectic happening in which the expression can require the presence of mind in nature 
or nature in mind (RC 21).  
188 Valéry’s linguistic richness can only be understood by considering his absence of writing – it is about 
this misbelief in language: “On voit par les cahiers de 1900 à 1910 (qui devaient plus tard constituer les 
deux recueils Tel Quel, I et II) que sa [Valéry] défiance envers le langage n'était qu'un cas particulier de 
sa défiance envers une vie qui ne se soutient que par des prodiges incompréhensibles. Le langage est clair 
quand on passe assez vite sur les mots, mais cette ‘solidité fondamentale’ s'effondre devant une 
conscience rigoureuse. Aussi la littérature vit-elle d'impostures : l'écrivain dit ce que veut son langage, et 
passe pour profond, chaque manque en lui, une fois mis en paroles, fait figure de pouvoir, et la somme 
des hasards qui collaborent à un livre passe pour intention d'auteur” (RC 24f). 
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difference, the element of motion and trespassing would therefore not exist. In other 
words, I attempt to draft the landscape behind the drawing by considering the 
paradoxon of the expressed language that is always underneath and above linguistic 
signs: how is it possible to draft a non-coherent grammar by using intended linguistic 
signs and how can the silent word double and translate the expressed language by 
evoking the absent present? It is about outlining, how we are able to translate without 
relying on nature, which is set previously and lies literally in front of our senses and it is 
about how we are able to communicate prior to communication and how meaning can 
be created before meaning (Prosa 79). I follow Merleau-Ponty’s strand that the evidence 
of the concrete perceived things is related to the texture of quality that its sensuality 
should be capable of drawing its odour (Prosa II). Drawing odeur is the tension between 
relying on already given expressions and using these expressions as figures to stand out 
from them and creates curiosity or sensation. It highlights a linguistic framework that is 
not a system of entities but tendencies, which distracts language from its lively 
presence. Accuracy is lively accuracy and it is the silent meaning that is inherent in life-
world. 
 
 
A The accuracy of language 
 
In Le fantôme d’un langage pur (Prosa 7-15) Merleau-Ponty outlines that we are driven 
by the desire to have a language-machine that connects given codes and translates given 
evidence into well established and causal syntaxes (Prosa 8f). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty 
evokes structural premises of linguistic signs: language disposes a certain number of 
basic signs, which can be constantly regrouped into distinct expressions and translates 
its pre-determined meaning. This distinction leads towards a system of grammatical 
original equivalence of signs and meaning in its full transparency. In this case, language 
outlines the possibility of almighty-hood and intelligibility, since no thoughts are in 
words and no words remain in thoughts.  Language will be transferred to a level, in 
which tension will be resolved (Prosa 69). In this circularity we will not be able to 
formulate alternative linguistic signs; life-world and its modus vivendi enact and 
supervise linguistic-combinations. The structure of signifié and signifiant does not 
consider or include (remote) possibilities. The other will be – as long as the space-time-
continuum permits it – the other and the sun will be always the sun. And if the grammar 
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has to explain for a particular situation a new and unknown form, it does not dispose an 
equivalent setting; grammar introduces new definitions and symbols, which can be 
thereafter be translated within its very own setting. Even new forms do not distract the 
language machine and order the new elements in its linear syntax. Language guides us 
to meaning, even before it is meaning – as long as we attribute a minor function to 
language we bind language to a form of truth-consciousness, whose supporter it should 
be (Prosa 38): it is the hermeneutical encounter of two identic horizons. From that point 
of view, the remotest and non-located expressions will simply be replaced by 
expressions, which resettles our linguistic setting. We seek to synchronise perception 
and expression and provoking by translating that life-world is nothing less than a 
synchronised reality. The expression would be bound to unequivocal relations, in which 
thought finds out what actually already has been imported. The ego or more precisely 
the transcendental ego, in its ens rationes, is the nucleus of all possible meanings, since 
experience is already pre-registered in the a priori trope. This hermeneutical circle is 
that which we have outlined above: the translation from A as A’ to B. Husserl has not 
formed per se a theory of language but rather in his transcendental a priori he reduces 
linguistic signs and tropes to servants of the very coniunctio of eidos and eidolon. In 
addition, Merleau-Ponty describes that even pre-historic language settings are 
subscribed in the very time-continuum189 and reproduces life-world, even though it 
might be a pre and therefore invisible language190 that is not fixed to defined objects. 
The momentum of pre191 supersedes the element of cuniuncto and likewise it outlines a 
language of silence that evokes a porous and fluid ontological setting, but nevertheless 
pre does not mean a second order beyond time: it is the atmosphere of time itself192. 
Merleau-Ponty breaks with the immanence of language and replaces it with chiastic 
experiences of grammatical inflections that slip away as soon as we attempt to fix it – it 
is an invisible language in its visibility. Pure and universal language is simply the 
counter-project to the chiastic experience of linguistic being and a simple doubling or 
neutralisation effect of its essence: translating is in these circumstances not the line up 
                                                            
189 Cf. Merleau-Ponty Prosa 12 ff. 
190 Merleau-Ponty explains in Le visible et l’invisible that the new ontological setting is the expression 
ante expression (VNV 219ff). 
191 The translator is before language as well as before external realities, cf. trouver le langage (VL 172f). 
192 Even language is not able to outline this blind spot due to the fact that in the expression the prior 
expression, which has to be executed, does not get expressed. The expressed cogito encounters a deferred 
silent cogito. This cogito is not at all a constructing cogito in the highest potency; it is the experience of 
my own through me that has got only a gliding indication in the world (PhP 462): the silent cogito is its 
pure existence if it gets expressed and simultaneously is reflected to the indeclinable event of the silent 
cogito. The silent cogito will be manifest if it has to deal – in its existence – its existence. 
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in which we translate the odour but rather we translate the ordure in life-world. 
Translating in is finally a cynic and blasphemous happening since the idea of a 
complete expression is a chimaera (Prosa 41). Hence, my movens is to follow the strand 
of sensations to find out how a non-thetic language can be expressed that does not end 
up in chaos. The ad libitum movens of chaotic settings are in its negativity already a 
rational concept and does not fulfil the non-thetic dispositive, since chaos is never chaos 
in its negative sense. And so is expression, never expression in its absolute sense and 
language never a grammatical composition that can be grasped conceptually. Perception 
and expression are a matrix of another past and another future. Language is therefore an 
a-transcend enactment of perception and thoughts, while my seeking for its semantic 
expression is always apart. Merleau-Ponty explains that the transcendental capability of 
language and perception results from its very own organisation. Therefore, the act of 
translating language and perception into meaning does not leap to an intellectual 
framework but into a meaningful setting in silence that enacts a transcendental 
framework, which is never ens rationes but is present in its a-part constitution – this 
other reading of transcendentality is the very silent moment of language and framework. 
 
 
B Silentium 
 
The silent enactment of language is the underpinning event of language: silence guides 
us to language insofar as it withdraws itself from ourselves through its activity. It 
gropes around meaning intentions, which are not guided by texts but which are about to 
be written; we have to be aware about the silence around the presence (Signes 58). 
Activated language is speaking to us and makes us blind for its enactment – in other 
words, language will be through us a non-identified vivid language of speaking and 
echoing (Prosa 16f). In opposition to any form of linguistic unifying stages, we should 
be attentive to the silence of language by discovering the pathic moment of life in its 
silent force of expressing. Merleau-Ponty recapitulates this double entrance of language 
and silence, by separating a langage parlé as the linguistic dispositive of spoken 
language and a langage parlant as the enacted language. This separation offers the 
possibility to operationalise a langage avant le langage or in other words language is 
meaning before it has meaning: the translation of A’ to B / C is in its enactment a 
permanent derivate of A and B or in other words C is always carved in A and B. The 
power of expression in its operation – langage operant – and enactment offers the 
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possibility to understand the above described double entrance of expression. The 
creativity and genesis of language is a palimpsest in silence and rewrites language, 
history and its expression possibility. The codification of possibility is its silence: we 
are not looking for positivity and facticity of an emergent linguistic expression but we 
are keeping our phatic openness as the dispositive for expressivity and morphemes: 
texts are no longer important we should highlight the texture as form of 
responsiveness193 but however I am reading a text, I am literally transforming the 
written text into speaking words in believing to have created the text by myself. Hence, 
I am already the translation of myself. This might be the ultimate form of translation in 
which the pathic responsiveness opens the possibility for A’ in B / C. The pathic setting 
responds to sign possibilities, in which C emanates from its very hints; the character of 
C has its own style-possibilities, which penetrate the common realm of langage parlé. 
This movement of penetration is not simply the act of invasion and capturing but rather 
the event of translatio. The langage parlé will be trans-ported into a latio of langage 
parlant. The translation is not a new text but the text is re-written. It is body 
engagement in which the translated text is the sedimentation of a texture and of body-
enactments. This kind of body language is never new but accentuates aspects of its 
sedimentation. A translation is therefore never a new product or a copy of an original 
(con)text, it is rather a special relationship of text-body-texture, in which expression 
reverses the texture-body-text language: translation is a trope in which A’ to B / C is the 
chiastic experience of C / B to A’194. The carnal body is the very special style and 
transcendental condition to capture the lineage of text-language-texture. In a certain 
way the transcendental offspring demands a double entrance of the body: it fosters and 
likewise limits its body enactment; the body operator reduces therefore visibility. 
However, if the operator body is the transcendental condition possibility of viewing, 
then it might mean that the reduction is itself the transcendental condition of its one 
possibility. The very condition of reduction is not a restriction but rather it outlines 
temporal body perspectives (PdW Vf). However, this transcendental setting is not 
positivity in the Kantian sense but rather the a-morph life-worldly possibility, in which 
body incorporates its double function of being its vivid expression and likewise its 
abstract foundation. This body ambiguity is therefore the very silent spur of translation: 
being already a translation is the silent shouter at the border of life-world and it is 
                                                            
193 Cf. Waldenfels (2007). 
194 Cf. the moment of expression is the happening in which the relationship will be reversed: indeed, the 
book possesses its reader. 
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therefore the amalgam of translational practice, which is never body, hybridity, text B / 
C or entanglement. It is not facticity, fatality but the phatic enactment of style-
possibilities, in which being will be rough, savage and diffracted. The fragment of life-
world offers an infinite amount of figures in which being can be unfolded by 
questioning the momentum of the chiastic tangency. Translation is therefore a ground 
operation that yields its own conditions of perception, expression (Prosa 83) and silence 
in life-world. 
 
 
C Silent … immanence 
 
Therefore, we can trace that in Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) Merleau-Ponty 
explains that body is able to translate a certain motoric entity into words, expounds the 
articulation-style of a lexeme into its vivid possibility and translates a possible 
movement-intention into real movements, since it is the sine qua non of natural 
expressions in time and space (PhP 211); yes, translatio is the silent polyphony in life-
world – life-world has a disposition that probably enhances the spurs of elements, 
renders the relationship with being possibilities (Prosa 85). Its meaning-intention is not 
a mental transformation but rather a synchronic modulation of my own existence and 
therefore an articulation of my very être-au-monde. Nevertheless our daily 
communication does no longer cause problems and is not perceived as synchronic 
modulation of my own. Language is reflected and performed in its given world-reality 
without distortions and dilatations. In that sense, the institutionalised language as such 
presumes the chiastic experience of langage parlé and langage parlant as presumed. 
The experience of our body will be superficial as long as we do not re-schedule the 
linguistic phenomenon as the original silence of the word and its body expressivity that 
breaks with its silence. If the thetic reality of an original text is missing, the ability for 
an entire expression will be useless, since words would be allusive and finally silent 
(Signes 54). The gesture of language is the hidden facticity that refers to the ultimatum 
that meaning has language. Bodily experienced language has in Merleau-Ponty’s 
system nevertheless veins leading to the realm of immanent conditions: language and 
words have a certain inner and immediate meaning-sense that is however never given 
by its term but as style, affective value, modulator and as gesture. It is an immanent 
enactment that is existential in its organism insofar as the expression of the reader and 
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recipient calls for a new sense- and experience-formation. The immanent structure of 
language is not an intelligible structure (VNV 28); the expression of language is a 
signature of an unsettled and continued spur in its environment. In this case, linguistic 
structural elements can only be related to their network of impartial inflections. The 
internal logic creates hybrid constructions, which nevertheless affirms its grammaire 
impérieuse (VNV 143). According to Merleau-Ponty, linguistic signs are able to 
express their sedimentation on an inter-subjective basis by referring to its field of 
experience, in which material things become apparent and in which its appearance is 
measured by our capability to diversify (VNV 147); language founds therefore in us the 
idea of truth that re-groups pre-summative idealisation of notions and forgets its very 
contingency of facts – an ontology that is not a positive being but an in-variance that 
articulates an alternation in the ontological difference or absence (VNV 147). This is the 
immanent birth of what we have denominated as the silent language. Consequently, 
there is this eternal dream to stabilise the linguistic constitution by repeating the act of 
linguistic expressions. Nevertheless, the act of stabilising is not formalising, the 
aesthetic experience is rather existential and re-shapes its very natural attitude: 
expression is not simply translation but rather the realisation of meaning itself (PhP 
209) 195 . We do not have the consciousness ability that constitutes words and 
inflections196. However, words and inflection are also not pre-ordered figurations197 (as 
realism could outline it) – phenomenological working does not inter-connect entities 
and mind and it is therefore on a very special mission while shaping transcendentality 
into another direction. At this very point we can witness the hyper-reality of formalism 
– formalism exceeds and lacks the act of translation – but simultaneously the 
transcendental corpus steps into the breach by reading a total other form of 
transcendentality. Therefore, the immanent structure does not resemble Husserl’s 
transcendental A as A’ formation but it underpins my transcendental considerations on 
Merleau-Ponty’s perception framework. In its mode of expression, the question of 
equivocation and translation might be re-shaped by articulating that equivalency is the 
enactment of sense-dilatation and –transformation. In that sense, the preposition of body 
is not the specificity of having body: our senses, our views and our odours are 
                                                            
195 In correspondence, Merleau-Ponty uses in this context a very immanent and positive meaning of 
translation and does not correspond to his thoughts about experiencing language by its chiastic 
happening: “Personne ne contestera qu’ici l’opération expressive réalise ou effectue la signification et ne 
se borne pas à la traduire” (PhP 213). 
196 We do not have the categories of idealism which would predict this kind of understanding. 
197 We do not have the categories of realism which would predict this kind of understanding. 
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references, which overlay us by offering hints to grasp the criterion of being. The 
theorem of habitude198 is connected with the lexeme trans-latio and re-latio: it reflects 
the matrix of body, its inscriptions in(to) the signifié-box and its texture. In other words, 
we are all possessor of language and grammar, even though habitude is not the 
immanent offspring of pure facticity, our linguistic ability refers to a stock of a 
linguistic matrix that supersedes the individual lines of word-pictures. Hence, the body 
is not a unity but rather it is consistency with different layers and different empathic 
connotations. As we can see, there is a subtle tension between acknowledging the 
diffracted being of carnal language and at the same time accepting the carnal body as 
inner-ontological structure. In Le visible et l’invisible Merleau-Ponty favours the 
ontological being as its habitude, since this setup enables us to play with grammar and 
to vary with lexemes. Hence, there is a double reality beyond A and B: on the one hand 
A and B is a tool of action and on the other A and B is a disinterested, not habitude 
oriented, denomination-form. The unattached manner of speaking is an entity and inner-
ontologically a process of reflection. The eidos A cannot be defined and translated in 
one category A. Therefore labelling something as A signifies to translate its particularity 
and individuality into the entity of A’199; the ill person might have A, but he / she is no 
longer capable of fulfilling the translation from the concrete towards the categorical 
setting200 (PhP 205). Consequently, causality of being ill formulates that language is 
conditioned by causal links and finally by its transcendental ego.  
 
 
D The story of analogia entis 
 
This very paragraph invites us to close-read Merleau-Ponty’s theory of life-world in 
lining up another transcendentality. He is aware about the ambiguity of its intellectual 
stance and is therefore the movens to reformulate his phenomenology of perception in 
Le visible et l’invisible into a form of analogia entis. Nonetheless, it is an analogia entis 
that is never stricto sensu an analogia entis: the intelligibility of the world is not a 
cosmos noetos of compossibilité that bridges the perspectives in a sense that A is B and 
                                                            
198 Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between being and having and outlines it as counter-project to 
Gabriel Marcel’s l’être and avoir (cf. PhP 203).  
199 This is Husserl’s transcendental project.  
200  Merleau-Ponty refers to the example of colour-amnesia by outlining Gelb and Goldstein’s 
observations. He outlines an immanent distinction between the sick and healthy human being. Body 
entities are therefore probably no longer read in their fragility; cf. Gelb and Goldstein (1924).  
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B is A. The progress of adequation is not recurrent to an adequate thinking but a totality 
that is present before we are even able to grasp it (VNV 64). It is again the very idea of 
pre that seeps in the work of linguistic frameworks: it is a happening in which the artist 
exudes his style to invisible elements (Prosa 109). It is indeed a pursuit in which the 
translator has no clue about it and reminds us that the aporetic analogia ends with 
analogia: the aporetic is never the case of the transcendental and vice versa. Translation 
offers access to realm B, to which I was not able to grasp and to capture it; its process 
gives me the feeling that I am following strands which I was not aware of and which 
highlights via its movens the act of translation. The analogia will never be the scholastic 
entis – the social mechanism of ontogenesis drafting a common linguistic grammar will 
be deflowered by cracks of a contingent life-world. The antinomies of analogia will be 
another analogia; we have to reformulate the sceptic arguments above all ontological 
pre-justice, just to be capable of understanding l’être-monde, l’être-chose, l’être 
imaginaire and l’être conscient (VNV 21) as another l’être-monde, l’être-chose, l’être 
imaginiare in its topology of compossibilité (VNV 29). The big object (VNV 31) is not 
the enactment of A to B / C, since the relation of pre-predicates and objects are the new 
predicatives that stress the amalgam of world legibility: the street is in its distance and 
proximity identic, nevertheless the transgression of the appearance to its reality is 
incommensurable; proximity and distance are in their contrast a system of relationships 
provoking the reality of perspectives. The phenomenological perception has in its 
enforcement a proximité absolue and likewise a distance irrémédiable that ironises its 
ontological stance. This ironic moment is perhaps the key issue that keeps Merleau-
Ponty’s chiastic phenomenology together and can therefore be outlined as a 
transposition of Husserl’s phenomenological transcendentality 201 . Merleau-Ponty 
criticises Husserl that he minimises by his transcendental / eidetic reduction friction and 
tension within life-world. The willingness to understand the drama of the world by its 
internal logic demands the abstention of perception (VNV 64). This order castrates the 
vitalising moment of expression and does not allow us to capture the collision of my 
body in life-world and in language. The ambiguity in life and language evokes 
transcendental settings that can be outlined as a counter-reality to systemic knowledge; 
the enacted translation of a lexeme is neither a variable of psychology nor of an idea, 
                                                            
201 It is clear that the understanding of transcendentality has not to be confused with its classical meaning. 
Transcendentality is not a system of true statements. The existence cannot be explained by pure ideas and 
entities, but any phenomenological understanding has a transcendental character. The sexuality of our 
body is the very transcendental condition; it is a condition insofar as it is not an isolated fact but rather it 
is the expression and style of its entire existence towards life-world. 
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since its intro-spection would mean self-knowledge and evokes a metaphysical belief of 
knowledge through analogia. Hitherto, by following Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental-
understanding we might understand transcendentality as a latente transcendentalitité 
that can never be understood by denominations. It shifts the understanding of 
transcendentality: I cannot be the translator, since the act of translating is enacted 
without my stringent competence and knowledge of the drama; the pré-possession of 
transcendentality is on the scene before I am able to figurate it: the act of translating is 
inscribed in its translation. In a radical sense, this might underpin the thin line of the 
tension between form and content202 which accompanies Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical 
setting; in other words that was probably his hidden movens while writing Le visible et 
l’invisible.  
 
It is worthwhile to look closer to his inner-ontological breeding ground and its 
transcendental condition as its formulation of combinations – it is a micro-analysis of 
Merleau-Ponty’s hidden ingredients of his ontological-project, it is about deconstructing 
the meaning of gestures, which are the intrinsic part of language (PhP 209). The 
presence of language conveys to us how language itself moves laterally by entering a 
realm, which can be opened by its internal organisation (Signes 51). Nevertheless, the 
deconstruction does not lead to a brighter world and to its intrinsic value, since the 
cumbrous analysis of internal truth clings to its critical venture evoking the 
deconstruction. Searching for the immanence of language is not simply in opposition to 
truth and coincidence that could be part of language; language is coincidence insofar as 
it is a manner to bring things into language. It is about a linguistic framework that is not 
organised, words are not composed and arranged – they are inter-connected by its silent 
entanglement and through the secret use of pictures they are forging alliances203. 
Manifest senses and relationships are countless, lateral relationships and associations 
which are hidden present in their inflection and exchanges are the habitual reading in 
which the alien infraction opens up the possibility for consciousness settings (VNV 
159f). The articulating-possibility of immanency transforms as well the strict separation 
of intellectual and empiric worlds and in extension re-shaped our translation-formula A 
                                                            
202 In Phénoménologie de la Perception Merleau-Ponty outlines this inner-ontological tension in various 
ways: the word is not per se the translation of given thoughts but evokes lexemes in its evolving thought 
(PhP 207) in which words are finally given by the words solely (PhP 208f).  
203 It is about this incarnated logic, which evokes a new sense of linguistic being within the logic of 
contingency: Merleau-Ponty refers to it by attempting to work up random issues into a meaningful totality 
or simply incarnated logic (Signes 110). 
 112 
as A’ in B / C by favouring a dualistic understanding of langage parlé and langage 
parlant: how is it possible to formulate a new inflection without referring to its existing 
inflection? The so-called new-ness or originality is the derivation of an institutionalised 
linguistic framework. In Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) Merleau-Ponty 
develops explicitly the conception that language is an emergent issue: words are not 
given in their pure remembrance or in an attenuated mode of perception: “(…) le 
langage (…) ne dit rien que lui-même” (PhP 219). Therewith, we inaugurate the 
ambiguous order of perceived ontology, in which functional dependencies are staring 
into space. The ambiguous status of language overruns the psychological status of 
order204. A learnt word or un mot parlé is a Freudian imago, which is less perception 
and less an empiric setting but more a sublimation of an emotional constellation and 
likewise the process of concentration. The appearance of language has to be captured by 
its emotional gesture and its phantasmatic possibilities, in which human beings slip over 
a second monstrous-world; the second world becomes a narrative of a second and 
vulnerable nature by speaking monstrously. A denominator cannot fix the monstrous 
figure; it is a wandering picture that evokes modulation-effects within twilight and 
shades. Nevertheless, it is not an artificial expression of natural entities; its mode of 
remembrance is given by the presence of lexemes. They emphasise their own setting by 
the intangible presence of the denominator and by its contingent articulation- and 
sound-style. A monstrous body as such drowns out and overrules its biological entity, 
since it produces narratives of blind spots, which do not emphasise grammar and life-
world. The hesitation of translation is the first condition of phantasmatic readings205. 
The simple psycho-physic existence offers a difference in a given life-world; it offers 
nutrition for its physic reality. It is this kind of life, in which the diacritic moment of 
inner-ontological reality does not fulfil its own purposes but actually is an act of 
                                                            
204 Hence, it is no longer this epistemological play of internal versus external means which conditions the 
ontological status of knowledge: “Le ‘psychisme’ n’est pas objet; mais – notons-le bien – il ne s’agit pas 
ici de montrer, selon la tradition ‘spiritualiste’ que certaines réalités ‘échappent’ à la détermination 
scientifique: ce genre de démonstration n’aboutit qu’à circonscrire un domaine de l’antiscience qui, 
d’ordinaire, reste conçu, dans les termes de l’ontologie qui précisément est en question, comme un autre 
‘ordre de réalités’. Notre but n’est pas d’opposer aux faits que coordonne la science objective un groupe 
de faits, – qu’on les appelle ‘psychisme’ ou ‘faits subjectifs’ ou ‘faits intérieurs’ – qui ‘lui échappent’, 
mais de montrer que l’être-objet, et aussi bien l’être-sujet, conçu par opposition lui et relativement à lui, 
ne font pas alternative, que le monde perçu est en deçà ou au-delà de l’antinomie, que l’échec de la 
psychologie ‘objective’ est à comprendre, – conjointment avec l’échec de la psysique ‘objectiviste’ – non 
pas comme une victoire de ‘l’intérieur’ sur ‘l’extérieur’, et du ‘mental’ sur le ‘matériel’, mais comme un 
appel à la revision de notre ontologie, au réexamen des notions de ‘sujet’ et ‘d’objet’” (VNV 40f).   
205 Todorov explains that the transfer of the natural to the supernatural is not simply a facticity of 
translation: “D’abord il faut que le texte oblige le lecteur à considérer le monde des personnages comme 
un monde de personnes vivantes et à hésiter entre une explication naturelle et une explication surnaturelle 
des événements évoqués” (Todorov 1970: 36). 
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translation of diffused experiences (Prosa 81). We might draft that translation 
transforms the biological body but without denying its very corporal drame qui le 
traverse (PhP 231). This ambiguity, which cannot be resolved by dialectic synthesis, is 
the difficulty to grasp the concept of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and to read his 
understanding of transcendentality, since the resemblance of nature-culture does not 
synthesise its existence: it is over and over again the grid of the visible and invisible 
feature. Hitherto, style and manner are the offspring and development of genetic 
readings of lexemes. The existence of my body is the enactment of stylistic expressions 
and the depth of the carnal body enables us to ally the tissue of words, its texture of 
experience and its style in silence. The mot parlé is not a system of equivalences but 
rather the happening of a vivid body-presence that articulates the complexity of a non-
present density of being (VNV 157). Expression is the equivalence of bodily presence. 
The very existence of body is in its time-space-continuum the ontological setting to 
articulate lexemes (PhP 210) and therefore an a-translatable happening of carnal 
juiciness. Nevertheless, the time-lapse-life-world-time-space oriented framework does 
not warn its approaching enactment. Hence, words do not have per se an internal 
materiality, the carnal body as modus vivendi operates as its transcendental necessity206. 
This kind of transcendental reality is bound in its very materiality of life-world as a 
phatic experience of my être-au-monde. Communication is not an activity of 
hermeneutical politics but rather through my body I am able to receive love (PhP 216). 
Hence, the inner-ontological debate is not a diacritic deviation of the Seiende to its Sein, 
it is rather the material friction with history and the enactment of the modality in its 
space-time-continuum. In other words, Merleau-Ponty fulfils the Marxist turn-over 
from the Ideenhimmel to materiality or in other words, from Husserl’s transcendental 
ego to Merleau-Ponty’s fleshy ego. Hence, grammar, linguistic inflection and 
morphemes do not exist – however, language is the pathic backup of the body; body 
expression is the projection of its future historicity. In a hermeneutic sense, translation 
does not exist in any entity related sense and therefore, the sense of language can never 
be translated into another language (PhP 218). It is this very translatio of body in its 
slippery modulation of langage parlant: the empiric setting of grammar and syntax is 
not simply a facticity of expression, grammar and syntax are sedimentation of langage 
parlé, in which the unformulated sense does not subtly evoke the purity of langange 
parlant but aims its very Dasein in the sense of être-au-monde (PhP 229). The porosity 
                                                            
206 In reference to Sartre: if I am imagining the absent Peter, I do not have a numeric different picture of 
Peter. My imagination is bound within my very existence in the world (Sartre 1940: 148 and PhP 210). 
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of our carnal body enables us to the lateral enactment of expressions: in a radical sense, 
content is on a primary setting not existing; it is a synchronic modulation of my own 
existence in history (PhP 214). The morphology of expression is a matter of hyle. 
However, hyle is a (transcendental) condition possibility to draw a tiny line to the 
expression of content in its positive ambiguity. In this very status of articulating, 
weighting, wearing hyle and content we can setup Merleau-Ponty’s entire 
phenomenological project: seeing –language activity – creaturness intertwines the 
theatrical setting of life-world in a very odd and obscure manner. Seeing –language 
activity – creatureness are the new relational experience and the breeding ground for a 
new transcendental understanding.  It is no longer about the horizontality or verticality 
but about the lateral insert of the body experience. Hence, body is not the very nucleus, 
but rather that what stands literally (VNV 43f) beside the body. The effectiveness of this 
totality is its non-physic reality. Body enactments are the very stumble moment of 
proliferation – a suspended form of chôra. Since the problem and articulation of my 
body last in me, we may consider in variation to Balzac that my usage of language is 
my death. Hence, the inner-ontological grid offers essentialism in its chiastic basso 
continuo of chôra. Indeed, it is a non-captivity of the eidos but nevertheless it still 
remains eidos: that means that the transcendental act of language is per essentium A’ 
and not a feature of A as A’. In other words, the sublime is able to articulate the 
incompatible on the very screen of presence. This is what Merleau-Ponty understands, 
in the vein of de Saussure, as the diacritic moment or in my tautological expression 
essentialism of structures (cf. structures are products of doubling: they are not only the 
execution of being but are likewise its very own setting of being)207.  
 
This exegesis shows us that the phenomenological tradition has an affinity to 
ontological solutions by attempting to overcome the gridlock of ontological separatism. 
This ontological cipher is probably the theological desire to read and translate its very 
own foundation: it is much about the presence of life-world. In the succession of 
Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty tries to characterise the 
phenomenological project as ontological reality: ontology is therefore the language and 
the corpus to offer intelligibility, transparency and translatability. However, Merleau-
Ponty’s non-thetic essentialism is beyond Heidegger and Sartre’s In-der-Welt-Sein and 
is notably discussed in Le visible et l’invisible (VNV). Sartre’s translation-force of 
                                                            
207 Heidegger refers to an ontological difference in this respect. However, this difference is not the 
featured nucleus of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. 
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separating the I negativity and the positivity of the world (Sartre 1943: 51) cannot be 
resumed and synthesised by Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm; the chiastic experience is not a 
reciprocal fact of positivity and negativity but a massive life-world (VNV 77). In 
Sartre’s setting the transcendental ontologia mediates literally its very own analogia 
entis. As we already know, this option does not exist for Merleau-Ponty. The functional 
dependency of relationality is off project, since appearance and reality, the metabasis 
eis allo genos, are incommensurable (VNV 39f) and the partial, the marginal are not the 
absence of its totality and not only an inner-adequation (VNV 64) of Sein und Seiende. 
As evoked, Merleau-Ponty’s inner-ontological debate is a process of pré-possession of 
life-world, which is present before we are even able to think and categorise it. Hence, 
outlining the inner-ontological reality (eidos) does never incorporate our image 
(eidolon). Since we believe it, its literal Ent-sagung is actually its chiastic anticipation. 
The inner-ontological fracture of Sein and Seiende can never redeem Sartre’s analogia 
entis of the other, since the otherness is always the negativity of its very being (Sartre 
1940: 298ff). The immanence of language is therefore a quasi-totality that highlights the 
appearance of Pour-soi as its absolute happening but also something that happens to 
En-soi as its very adventure: Pour-Soi, langage parlant and the translated are 
constituted by their consciousness of A while its immanence escapes and slips off the 
law of the Pour-soi and the langage parlé in which the signifié is covered by the 
signifiant. The absence of Pour-soi will be executed as the meaning of En-soi. In other 
words, A finds its meaning in the very slippery momentum in B / C. The translation is 
the reversal of its inner-ontological negation208. The quasi-totality is happening to the 
evidence of En-soi. The event of En-soi is the adventure of being signifié and being 
translated. The En-soi, which has not the force to denominate or the ontological power 
of execution, has been enacted by the Pour-soi without having destroyed itself (VNV 
80). Hence, the inner-ontological reality is a passive ecstasy of the very own En-soi that 
is not transformed but nevertheless enacted on its basis; it is the lateral way as it goes 
along the way with the analysing appearing of objects (VNV 43). Translatio is the very 
moment of moving A’ in B / C and not A’ to B / C. This basic fact and facticity are not 
                                                            
208 This is the very momentum of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental translatio: “Puisque le néant est ce qui 
n’est pas, (…) la connaissance se résorbe dans l’être: elle n’est ni un attribut, ni une fonction, ni un 
accident de l’être, mais il n’y a que de l’être (…); nous pourrons même, à la fin de ce livre, considérer 
cette articulation du Pour-soi par rapport à l’En-soi comme l’esquisse perpétuellement mouvante d’une 
quasi-totalité, le surgissement du Pour-soi n’est pas seulement l’événement absolu pour le Pour-soi, c’est 
aussi quelque chose qui arrive à l’En-soi, la seule aventure possible de l’En-soi: tout se passe en effet 
comme si le Pour-soi, par sa néantisation même, se constituait en ‘conscience de …’, c’est-à-dire par sa 
transcendance même échappait à cette loi de l’En-soi en qui l’affirmation est empâtée par l’affirmé” 
(VNV 80).  
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reality but emanate within the mixture of positivities and negativities, which are never 
positivities and negativities209. The ontological realm is the shimmer of the nothingness 
on its very surface210. Hence, this is the lateral project of translation, in which notion, 
life, experience and aspirations are enacted in its savagery and situatedness. It is the 
ontological turn towards a savage ontology stressing that we can never faire de 
l’ontologie directe (VNV 231), since the rawness of the ontological tissue covers 
emergent associations of meanings (VNV 57). The consciousness of translation is 
therefore an expression of immanence, since it is invalid, empty, transparent and 
likewise open for immanency. This topos ontos is the chiastic summa plus one awaking 
multiple compossibilités. This theorem is nothing else than creating a momentum of 
possibilities; this reversibility is the ontological translatability of A’ in B / C, since it 
keeps my very actuality and openness vivid. And this is only possible as long as I do not 
want to develop it in a reflexive way; reflection reduces meaning, life, truth, belief, etc. 
to realm entities of transparency and ens intellectualis. The richness of possibilities will 
be reduced to an immanency of an ideal-world by subsuming the realm of possibilities 
into the framework of the cogito. In other words, the cogito force is predominantly 
conditioned by the teleological hope to pursue a relationship of ego and its revealed 
world in harmony. This relationship is enforced by the belief of being able to create, 
craft and produce the world. In other words, the ingeniosus is perfectly able to translate 
its very own map. These kinds of life-worlds, maps and realities are not translation of 
possibilities, which Merleau-Ponty bears in mind: translatio is a form of relatedness of 
different strands and possibilities that are virulent but not coinciding with its actor. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of thinking is not withdrawn from Merleau-Ponty’s 
cosmos but has to be re-shaped and re-articulated: reflection as such is an aporia; by 
attempting to reveal the dense possibilities of life-world, life-world is literally re-
flecting its very own setting into curvy reflections. The cogitatum translates so to speak 
its cogito and shows therefore the silent reality of our original attention of être-au-
monde. The enactment of the inner-ontological evidence shows us that translation is in 
its very fundamentum nothing211 and that there is no force that could separate realms. 
Cogito is not the cave in which it shows can be shown, since there is no entrance of the 
                                                            
209 This reading might be a radical continuity of my transcendental re-unification of Descartes’ subject-
object line by Merleau-Ponty. Descartes’ transcendental interdependence is obviously continued in a very 
different direction.  
210 Merleau-Ponty follows so far Sartre’s understanding of L’être et le Néant (Sartre 1943: 248 ff). 
However, he rejects Sartre’s transcendental radicalisation.  
211 Obviously, nothing has not the denomination formula of facticity; it is not the negativity of something. 
Nothing is the porosity of life-world. 
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very concrete scene of life-world in cogito. The translation is the ecstatic expression of 
being A’ in B / C or the transgression to a latio to another possibility in its very 
condition of confining impossibilities (VNV 55). As we can follow, reflection as such 
destroys the experience of confused totality. The confusion will be replaced by parallel-
consciousness with its very own causality. This is the reason why a translator and 
hermeneutist is able to dream of translation as an act of pureness and humanity212. This 
teleology is the movens to declare freedom and neutralise the tohuwabohu in life-world.  
 
 
E Pregnancy: philologia in phenomenology  
 
Hence, this archaeological digging shows that the capability of immanence is present 
but however it is silent and remote: the translator might find the reference to this very 
original presence in which the inward-turn and the outward-turn are simultaneously 
alive (VNV 92). What are the consequences? So far, we have discovered that language 
and its translation are the product of expressions and not simply the output of reasoning 
and the effect of something. Though expressions are bodily given, they are given as 
propagation in my very corporality and therefore a slippery presence of the savage 
ontology. Merleau-Ponty shifts the body into the realm of chair / flesh; flesh as 
ontology has a porous pulse and opens its tissues for creux and entrelacs. It is the 
possibility for Sichtigkeit and généralité (VNV 181) and therefore, the fleshy body is 
the attempt to outline a general setting which is beyond dualism and it is certainly not a 
category of mental idealism. Flesh is not the materiality of being-entities, substance, 
mind or facticity. It is a pregnancy of general things in the halfway of the individual 
space-time-continuum; it is the incarnation of style, introducing the character of being 
which is à part of its present. Again we can discover that the inter-ontological debate 
provokes chiasm and evokes reality. Merleau-Ponty evokes that the character of being is 
present; it is not possible to outline it in purity since it is habillé in its flesh (VNV 171). 
Hence, the grammar is habillé into a tissue of possibilities, which is the intertwining act 
of creating and meaning the presence of habillé; the inflection forms are an on-going 
derivation of the inauguration of possibilities while longing for facticity. This is literally 
the C in my formula A in B / C. The sediment C is snuggling the translated into its 
translation. We might say that the fleshy body is the through route where the mimetic 
                                                            
212 The synchronism of consciousness is given by its ontological logic; its code is however not known to 
anybody, but its law is enforced by everybody (cf. VNV 90ff). 
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longing is diverted, since being is the very event of poly-morphology of 
dimensionalities and multiple entries. To paraphrase it, la chair is the very 
Urpräsentierbarkeit213; it is in fact a phantasma and a withdrawal of any form of 
denomination (VNV 181f), it is not a thing, it is not substance, no material and it is 
definitely not a mind-setting. The fleshy expression is the very withdrawal of any 
expression; it is the hotspot and concrete-generality for the chiastic experience of the 
langage parlé and the langage parlant. Flesh is the approach and latent modality of 
approaching ontology in its reversibility. The tactility of fleshiness is the sublimation of 
thoughts and therefore the generality of being pregnant. Hence, the fleshy body is 
however not a neutral zone of transfer, rather it is a polymorph element in which the 
chiastic moment is enjambé – fleshy translation is therefore not a dialectic imprint but 
an enactment of it.  Language is the enactment of the sensual and tactile event of the 
flesh in the world 214 ; again it is this very Kafkaesque momentum of chiastic 
exemplifications, which outlines the parallelism and synchronism of moments without 
relying on each other. Within this chiastic impossibility the translated B / C is preserved 
as B / C and is likewise literally enrolled in A. The fleshy condition is the revocation of 
alternative mediations, which I have outlined as translatio: A to B is not drafted by 
ontological instruments, but by enacting the excess of the polymorphic line in its fleshy 
moment of C. The future is therefore enrolled in its presence. We cannot simply 
question the phenomenon – the fleshy body is literally an ontological non-place by 
enabling language and expression without being itself present; flesh is a stylistic draft 
within and beyond our life-world and outlines expressions, which are silent and apart. 
The genesis of the linguistic Gestalt in the fleshy body formulates dimensions of the 
deep life by being open to the undertones of the un-structured life-word: the linguistic 
grammar bursts the common ground of onto-theology215. Hence, the fleshy body is the 
                                                            
213 Cf. Merleau-Ponty outlines: “Le corps interposé n’est pas lui-même chose, matière interstitielle, tissu 
conjonctif, mais sensible pour soi, ce qui veut dire, non pas cette absurdité: couleur qui se voit, surface 
qui se touche – mais ce paradoxe [?]: un ensemble de couleurs et de surfaces habitées par un toucher, une 
vision, donc sensible exemplaire, qui offre à celui qui l’habite et le sent de quoi sentir tout ce qui au-
dehors lui ressemble, de sorte que, pris dans le tissu des choses, il le tire tout à lui, l’incorpore, et, du 
même mouvement, communique aux choses sur lesquelles il se ferme cette identité sans superposition, 
cette différence sans contradiction, cet écart du dedans et du dehors, qui constituent sont secret natal” 
(VNV 176f). 
214 Merleau-Ponty questions if there is a separation between body and world, since the seen world is 
actually not in my body: “Où mettre la limite du corps et du monde, puisque le monde est chair?” (VNV 
180). This very question suspends the actually in life-world since the conjunction is the cantus firmus of 
translatio in life-world. 
215 Merleau-Ponty differs between a minor rationalism of the 19 th century and major rationalism of the 
17 th century. The 17th century seems to be open for different regions of senses and is therefore not limited 
to consider merely an external level. In opposition, the 19th century seeks to complete rationality by 
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movement in which translation is registered as the fleshed expression216. Language 
winds its way through life-world as a latent matrix in its chiastic evidence. This is the 
fleshy expression: a double-entrance, which is never a double-entrance. The expression 
is not an imprint but the genesis of a gestalthafte polymorphic language-body. The 
inner-ontological body is therefore a relief of the nameless and consequently the fleshy 
body offers the hideout for its status of non-pronounceability. In other words, the inner-
ontological reality is a catastrophic happening in its radical questioning. Nevertheless, 
the (ontological) existence of the nameless is and will be touched by the very moment 
of fleshy porosity as a concrete element of being. Translation is an element of a general 
being-disposition of the in-betweens of the general and the special in which the 
momentum of translation is the enactment of multiple relations without determinacy; 
the langage parlé is left with its excess in C and opens therefore a relationship, which is 
not relational217. Inner-ontological linguistics is therefore the fleshy possibility to speak 
from another enactment of its being – the immanence is another fleshy element of 
immanence. The transcendental being and the being of expressions are for each other 
back- and front-page insofar as the bias C is the visibility for B by outlining that the 
lexeme is not the adequate cause for all that which is in our life-world. Life-world is not 
the private ontogenesis of A but it is the amalgam that carries the translation in such a 
way as we participate through our translation – the transgression from A’ in B / C is the 
genesis of my flesh in a life-worldly experience. The renunciation offers the option to 
speak between lines and figures without referring to any fixed linguistic realms. Life-
world will be discovered by its lateral pregnant setup as its source, and therefore its very 
deviation and raw dimensionality by highlighting the spreading of simultaneous re-
actions. The imaginary does not last, the phantasmatic experience of words is not 
observable, it vanishes as soon as we would like to use it as a lexeme. In other words, 
the event of lateral happening is the birth and genesis of transcendence and immanence, 
it is the very inauguration of the where and the when of facticity (VNV 182). The 
                                                                                                                                                                              
reducing causality to facts (Signes 186f); cf. also Christian Bermes’ preface of the German translation of 
Signes (Merleau-Ponty 2007: VII-XXII). 
216 The fleshed expression is another reading of the Christian theology of incarnation and the carnal 
epistemology of theologia crucis. The co-reading of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh and the ascesis and 
mortification of the Christian body could lead to very interesting synoptic interpretation-lines; 
unfortunately this would go beyond the constraints of this thesis, cf. John Robinson (1977). 
217 The relationship of the non-relational in C can be read synoptically to Walter Benjamin’s Die Aufgabe 
des Übersetzers (Benjamin IV: 9-22) but also to Die Lehre vom Ähnlichen; cf. “Die Wahrnehmung [der 
Ähnlichkeit] ist in jedem Fall an ein Aufblitzen gebunden. Sie huscht vorbei, ist vielleicht 
wiederzugewinnen, aber kann nicht eigentlich wie andere Wahrnehmungen festgehalten werden. Sie 
bietet sich dem Auge ebenso flüchtig, vorübergehend wie eine Gestirnskonstellation” (Benjamin II: 204-
210).  
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explanation of translation is embedded in the simultaneity of the fleshy body and its 
very fleshy-selfness (VNV 298). Through the world-flesh, which is always embodied, I 
will be able to understand my body (VNV 299). The ontological stance of langage 
parlant might be the very enactment of langage parlé in which the density of my body 
and the density of the world is not mutually exclusive but rather the only possible 
feature to enter into language by enabling the genesis of flesh and world (VNV 176f). 
The translated is the act of translation and at the same time it is its very reversibility in 
presence. Hence, the un-conditional and the uncertainty translate being in its fluid 
momentum. The fleshy reading offers an ontological volatilisation of characters and 
words without referring to a vanishing point, in which the ontological shimmers and 
flashes. Merleau-Ponty brings the element of reversibility into the realm of changing the 
mirror, which is necessarily the prolongement of any entity to its pregnant body: to see 
something and to touch him / herself means to be an extract effect of him / herself. 
There is a fissure in the very process of touching (VNV 304) and this kind of 
essentialism is not able to outline any forms of hermeneutic equations. This ontological 
equation of signifé and signifiant is rather the permanent missed identity. It is the very 
moment of starting the happening, the pregnancy that suspends the upcoming meaning. 
This process of excess and lack outlines the ontological structure of a differential 
structure that emphasises its reversibility and not simply the exchange of eidos and 
eidolon. In this sense, the process of translation is the coincidence in its realm of 
possibilities and fleshy lateral dynamis. The pregnancy of language is enacted by the 
fact that a linguistic realm of A is meaningful, since its lacune and its écart are never 
located where B / C is actually based (VNV 239). It is the highly perverted diacritical 
structure, in which modulation and articulation happens. This structural element may 
offer a further perspective on translational matters by highlighting hyper-moments. The 
chiastic moment is not a concept or a theory, it is rather the sensual expression of a 
savage ontology that makes language speechless and likewise fruitful; it is an 
unconditional unity of incompossibilités (VNV 264) or a being that is dimensional 
(VNV 272f). In this very cluster flesh perverts the classical mechanism of translation by 
removing the possibility of denomination and localisation. As far as we can see, the 
setting of paradoxes is no longer within life-word features but fleshiness is the very 
specificity of life. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty starts in the middle of the slippery-moment; it 
is not a paradox but rather an emergence that starts to pick my pregnancy. Translations 
are an emergence of settings, which are underneath and above the fleshy-corpus by 
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corroding the tissue of the pregnant body218. Language and translation are therefore 
passive exemplifications and cannot be subsumed within traditions, narrations and 
within the desire of classification. This very order is probably an inter-ontological 
momentum, where intensity and flesh intervene. Hence, this kind of intensification 
allows us to have flesh and simultaneously permits us to be a resistor; the fleshy grid 
outlines the possibility to always have an alternative, a matrix with multiple entrances 
as its totum simul (VNV 268). This coincidence, which splits the resistance of 
translational strategies and simultaneously the hyper-movement of flesh, is the removal 
and relief of the very inner-ontological status. The imminence is the in-compossibilité of 
its compossibilité and the fracture of any morpheme in its rhetoric.  
 
 
F Re-articulating A’ in B / C 
 
We have discovered that the inner-ontological debate highlighted the Urpräsenz of the 
carnal body as diacritical moment in which its porous structure outlines the very 
reversibility of the ens reale. The linguistic immanence is the pregnant endeavour 
(VNV 177) of a non-fixed cluster, which is within the cultural context of langage parlé 
anchored in a silent life-worldly presence. The mistake of semantics is to understand 
language as a substance that would speak of its own. The dimensionality of language is 
to articulate the Wesen, which doubles our perceptions and our thoughts. Likewise it has 
a doubler-effect by considering the inner-ontological debate in which the Wesen is 
meaningful and meaningful is the Wesen: the translation slips off the denomination 
taxonomy and nests laterally in its very dimensionality. Hence, we might say that the 
immanence of linguistic grammar is the pure phenomenon of excess and lack and has to 
be discovered in an oblique way. The carnal body-language offers therefore not the 
metaphor but the very reality in its transcendental condition: the act of translation is 
embodied in its (con)texture. The freshness ploughs therefore the furrows of the 
langage parlant. It outlines the hotspot of happening and the very moment of 
expressing. What could therefore be the consequences for expression and its 
relationship to perception and taxonomy? What might be the genealogy of 
understanding language as process of expressing, since we know that the expression of 
                                                            
218 The very incorporation of the pregnant body as life-style of being in life-world reflects the parable in 
which the words of the Archangel Gabriel will impregnate the Virgin Mary (Luke 1:26-38, KJV). This is 
where the philos of légein starts to write the translatio embodied.   
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that which exists is an eternal task? It is quasi the essay to make the transformation from 
a phenomenological understanding towards an ontological line-up; it is about 
understanding Merleau-Ponty in the vein of a savage ontology that corroborates the 
phenomenological task as such and the linguistic event as new edition of the silent 
realm of expressis verbis. But however the transcendental codification is not simply the 
Kantian possibilities of conditions but rather the extension to the realm in which style 
and variations are possible life-worldly features. In that sense, Merleau-Ponty’s 
reference to the carnal-element is neither an idealistic-condition possibility nor the 
fulfilling of the silent existence in its crystallised life-world. The transcendental setting 
is not the pivotal point but rather the hiding place of a pregnant taxonomy, in which the 
a-grammatical structure performs its linguistic happening. The momentum of reclining 
on savage ontology, in which the visible and invisible is inscribed, refers to the 
epiphenomenon of transcendentality: language, in its sur-realistic happening, is 
language.    
 
Language is about the curious entanglement of carnal and linguistic expressing in a 
visible and invisible continuum of time and space; the quasi-eternity of language will be 
mingled with the quasi-eternity of the incarnated body-existence and therefore, the 
carnal translation has a pre-experience of the impalpable body in history (Prosa 117). 
Therefore, the carnal perverts the setup of intellectual representation patterns and 
likewise silences the subject of language. The ontological background of Sein und 
Seiend will be re-articulated in a framework of savage ontology in which the fracture of 
Sein and Seiend is a very slippery momentum of being – it is a slippery moment that 
happens and is not pre-conditioned by a cogito-framework. The cogito is the secondary 
effect of expression and is identical in relationship to the outlined langage parlé. In 
opposition to that, the langage parlant is the primary sense of an expression and is the 
ontological stance of the Urpräsentierbare. This Urpräsentierte is however, so far we 
have seen it, not the classical project of ontology, it stresses the possibilities of 
enactment: the force of language lies in the very presence insofar as it is able to arrange 
the so called keywords that they can say more than they ever have said (Prosa 58f). 
Hence, the expression of a morpheme is in Merleau-Ponty’s (con)texture given by 
another agent and evokes simultaneously the matrix of other entrance possibilities – 
translations are therefore implosions of a life-worldly rhetoric. In a free rendition we 
might say that translation is the very agency for the reverse net of expressions. 
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However, agency is not an active form and it cannot be read as a synonymous of 
translator, hermeneutist or explainer since language is not simply the hyle of thinking: 
as we have seen, langage parlé exposes in opposition hyle as positive entity of 
translation and cultural setting. Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to subvert this form of 
culturalism. The agency is not the ego, the cogito or the actor, the translation agent is a 
carrier of the Urpräsentierte in its very agency. Hitherto: A’ in B / C. And if you want to 
declare so, the act of thinking is the contemporaneous moment of the Nachleben of 
expressions: thoughts are embedded in the amalgam of the contingent expression and 
the sediment of life-world. Consequently, expressions are not separated from perception 
and perception is not simply a side effect; expression and thoughts are simultaneously 
and differently articulated in the carnal life-world. This is why Dadaistic expressions are 
not random expressions, but are meaningful scenes in life-worldly performances. 
Therefore, thoughts are not in the realm of immanency but the shape / form of the 
expressing gesture. The meaning of the morpheme is given therefore by its articulated 
style by modulating the carnal body (PhP 210). Hence, we might have differences of 
thoughts: there are not different thought degrees but different modulation and textures 
of thoughts; the diacritic element tears thoughts into the presence of life-world. In the 
context of langage parlé, Saussure’s coniunctivus of signifié and signifiant does not fit 
in Merleau-Ponty’s diacritical movement. The denomination of signifié and signifiant is 
the positivity in thinking and speaking. The diacritic event is nurtured by the 
arrangement of thoughts in its Gestaltwerdung of the carnal body. Hence, the 
expression has this element of presence, which pronounces silently its passive hyper-
phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty outlines therefore the irrational capability of meaning-
creation and meaning-communication (PhP 221). This chiastic momentum outlines the 
capability of carnal expressing not as form of schizophrenia but rather as hyper-
schizophrenia219. My intention is to read Merleau-Ponty’s mode of expression and 
usage of language in life-worldly practices as a hyper-schizophrenic act. It is a 
psychotic understanding of phantasmatic supercharge in phenomenological translation. 
The trope schizophrenia is a map in which regions of semantic intentions are differed 
and laterally commingled220. To understand the pathogenesis of Merleau-Ponty’s savage 
ontology we have to examine the lineage of the output of the inner-ontological 
                                                            
219 Merleau-Ponty theorises the enactment of expressions in reference to the illness of Aphasia. This 
dysfunction is not simply the dys in its function, dys is rather the uncompromised lack and excess in 
linguistic practices.    
220 Cf. Freud’s analysis of the uncanny (Freud IV 241-274): He refers to Ernst Jentsch’s concept of 
ensoulment: the uncanny as a matter of ensoulment of dead body, cf. Ernst Jentsch (1906).  
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discussion with the genealogy and processing of the trans – so far we have seen that 
ontology has a footnote by referring to transcendentality. This footnote causes in turn a 
cluster of schizophrenic happenings, which formulates a wholeness that is beyond and 
beneath vivid breathing and shocks the paradoxon of grammar and expression. The 
genesis of language shows us that the expression is not just the bodily expression; the 
enactment is rather the entanglement of linguistic expressions and therefore the very 
translation possibility to express and to mean. In the very carnal moment, we are able to 
enact meaning, although struggling with a semantic overcharged rhetoric while 
suffering from the very lack of life-worldly contingency. This is the very theological 
move of Merleau-Ponty and outlines his teleological aim of the carnal element, in which 
the ornament of linguistic happening is inscribed: expression is not a schizophrenic 
happening, it is the figuration of hyper-schizophrenia insofar as it enacts the 
transgression of semantics. The formula hyper distributes lines in which trans drafts the 
semantic excess and grammatical lack.  
 
 
G The hyperbolic difference in transgression 
 
Indeed, linguistic necessity of expressing has to be modulated by the option of being 
interrupted and shocked221. This option outlines that realms such as A, A’, B, C, etc. do 
not deliver designed entities but rather questioning labyrinths by offering the draft for 
ontological savagery as its initial dimensions in which differences may appear. These 
possibilities are not explained and filled with rational designs and hermeneutical forces 
and do not receive transcendental signals for their very status of immanence. This inner-
ontological moment is the clearing of distinction of denomination and the indescribable 
and cannot be captured by any trial of synchronisation – it is more about a suspended 
sense, a déception or a déprise du sens (Barthes 1964). This kind of procedure offers the 
possibility for chiasm where translation of another saying might be possible. Hence, the 
hyperbole of difference is the catharsis of grammatical lineage and it is a translation of a 
double insubordination, in which the ambivalence of openness and closure are 
simultaneous. This insubordination of the translational moment is the analectic moment 
of language and outlines the pathology of hyper-schizophrenia, which outlines 
morphemes in the sense of chiastic creations and expressions beyond expressions – it is 
                                                            
221 Cf. Marcel Détienne’s shock of the incomparable (Détienne 2000: 48).  
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an expression that does not mediate but keep it in its translatio as phantasmatic 
supercharge. The figuration of excess is the modulate tear in the dialectic structure of its 
chiastic topos and is executed by the ambiguity of articulating the punctum caecum 
(VNV 295); this might be the reason why Merleau-Ponty is able to consider the very 
short chiastic moment of unification in which the inflection of the lexeme is open 
towards the indescribable. It is this very lateral moment, in which Merleau-Ponty 
stresses the silent impossibility of dichotomy. The pre-conditional forecourt of reflexive 
dualism is the break up and hyperbola of language. The enactment of translation is 
therefore the process of being beyond methodological considerations, which are lacking 
words and getting involved in labyrinths: it is a withdrawal of being and denomination. 
This grammatical openness marks simultaneously the immanence of that which I 
outlined as inner-ontology and outlines the reality of pre-conditional forecourt. The 
immanence of the inner-ontological setting is exactly the idea that its transmission in 
superabundance provokes the immanence of the lexeme is given by its hyper-being and 
its non-being. The internal movement of the immanence is the apeiron of Merleau-
Ponty’s telos: its revelation is the trans-mission and not the mediation of positive 
correlations. Hence, the force of inner-ontological immanence is not outlined by its 
opposition but by its pre-original difference of immanence. The linguistic immanence is 
not per se but rather in trans-latio – it is the immanent contact for a possible otherness 
(Goldstein 1933: 496 and PhP 229). The re-interpretation of immanence cannot be 
grasped by being and non-being, by in and out or by aletheia and doxa; linguistic 
immanence is therefore beyond the dualism of ontology. Merleau-Ponty’s savage 
ontology is the articulation of the one in the other and the other in one’s own. The 
savage ontology is therefore not the negativity and the anarchy, but it is a being in the 
amalgam of the signifié and signifiant that slips away from totality and denomination. 
Translation is literally the translation of experiences, which will be evoked as text 
through its wording. This invisible wording is literally the perversion of the movens of 
mimesis and installs a stinging response in its translation – the immanence of translation 
is the carnal sting of being in life-world and the a-aesthetic presence of language. In 
other words, the carnal chiasm modifies the possibility of inner-ontological identity and 
diversity by its diacritic hyperbolism, which does not simply mean a non-word and an 
antithesis of language but it does create another relationship. This other relationship is 
pre-conditional, pre-causal and cannot be synthesised by its very momentum of 
relationship – the relationship is the pull in of the expression in the carnal happening 
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and can therefore never execute it as operation. Thus, the carnal reversibility is the 
option to reverse a double meaning. 
 
Translation is therefore not simply a determined act of expression but rather the style of 
translation is the modulation of sense-possibilities and therefore the possibility to 
overcome grammar by its figuration: a linguistic sentence cannot be understood as 
perceived but has to be seen as a gesture that touches the above outlined being of 
culture. The enactment of figuration is the immediate expression and pull in of the 
carnal body. We may understand now that the setting of expression is a tâche infinite 
and will be nurtured by life-world, understood as scenery of a pregnant organism. 
Merleau-Ponty declares that the expression cannot be an act of hermeneutical 
translation: there are no clear facts before expression happenings – it is rather that 
something is around us: the expressed is always the doubt of the carnal moment of 
expressing in hyper-schizophrenia. The carnal possibility of the savage ontology is the 
output of such a strand of translating the expression. In other words, the chiastic 
possibility of the carnal body is the effect of a double motion: the body is 
simultaneously the seeing and likewise the visible moment: it is the chiastic momentum 
of the evoked touching and touched. This double expressivity of the carnal body is the 
psychological (self-)referentiality of inner-ontological readings that highlights a self-
carnal-body of confusion and perversion in inference. The phenomenological re-
articulation of ontology highlights Merleau-Ponty to stress the very possibility to see 
from things by simultaneously enacting the momentum of seeing its pregnant body. 
This analectic happening outlines the necessity of the inner-ontological stinging. Its 
invisible parts of reality will write the texture of the text. We might say that the 
immanence of expressing is the texture of being, which is the vividness of the carnal 
body and likewise the fascinosum of expressing the inspiration and expiration (OE 31f) 
– hence, the immanence is the nameless presentation of the universal being (OE 71). 
This non-determinate being is more than thinking and obeying to a grammatical canon, 
it is the absence of my own and a fission of my being. The perverted grammar offers an 
approach to a universal ontological lisibility; the doubler-effect is the riddle of being 
able to sketch the lineage of the absent in its silent being. The silent event of enactment 
is the evidence of expression happenings within the being-net; it is a being that is never 
fully a framework of is. Hence, the line up is not about the transgression from one 
realm to another; the transgression is within life-world and therefore a movement 
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without telos. The motion is pluri-phony and cannot be captured by its life-world, since 
its Nachleben offers the audition for a linguistic drip down that annihilates the first 
person or the first language. The translation of linguistic expression is the other side of 
the contingent visible and invisible that withdraws itself in its enactment. The double 
feature of expression is probably the aliquid of the force of the elements and the 
irrational capability of meaning-creation and meaning-communication in its very 
enacted sedimentation. The corroboration of the chiastic happening is the a-temporal 
event of the wound that cannot be healed; the translational happening is never the 
closing openness of the wounded lexeme. As consequence, translation is the enactment 
of the wounded in by highlighting the excess, the anticipation, the repetition and the 
modulation of its very existence (PhP 176).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
My reading of Merleau-Ponty considers that the immanent linguistic expression is not a 
determined entity, a part of a grammatical discourse or the linguistic sublimation 
inscribed into the flesh of body language. The capability for expression is rather based 
on the possibility of expressing the lexeme in the pull in of the porosity of the carnal 
body. However, the pivotal point of linguistic expression is not reduced to the 
maximum of the carnal body; the carnal body is rather a loophole, in which linguistic 
expressions are pulled in and likewise diverted. This momentum of lack and excess 
creates a spark of another possibility, which is beside and probably more than the 
translation of A’ to B / C. Its translation is the pull in of A’ in B / C. With Husserl we 
have seen that translation is primarily the mediation of the conjunctivum as. With 
Merleau-Ponty we might be capable of considering that translation is the motion (trans-
) to another topos, which is never the positivity of another topos (cf. latio). In other 
words our model A’ in B / C is already the perversion of translation, since realms such 
as A, A’, B or C do not exist but rather outlines schizophrenically transcendentality as 
the condition possibility of materiality and the carnal cut in. In other words, Merleau-
Ponty shifts the transcendental setting from mind setting towards a material enactment 
within a twisting life-world: Husserl’s transcendental as will be the latio within its 
motion.   
 
It is therefore interesting to consider that the idea of trans is a reliable partner to capture 
the latio in its inner-ontological breeding ground: the motion of trans offers latio its 
stumble logic (KV 98); the process of translating is never a process per se, it includes 
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rather the possibility of omission222. Language is a spur that outlines a specific type of 
pre-language (VNV 166) in action. In other words, language is this mysterious layout 
that is neither simple essence nor a simple thing; aphasia is no longer able to keep the 
morpheme expressive (KV 25f). Hence, the expression of translation struggles while 
attempting to communicate with its alter ego and searching for its matching point. As 
for Merleau-Ponty, it is about a communication possibility that yields un sujet parlant.  
Hence, the motion of trans might be the key, which formulates a language that offers a 
sustained grammar, in which the diacritic moment is beyond its linguistic fabric; it is a 
diacritic act in open references. The consequences emanating out of such amorphic 
fabrics reformulate articulation modes which in turn evoke to trace the psychogenesis of 
its very own amorphic topos; it is about articulating by reorganising the transgression 
not simply as addition or as superimposition but as reorganisation223. The chiastic 
reorganisation outlines a pathology of cenestopathic schizophrenia that measures 
language as a déformation cohérente in which old and new sedimentations are 
inscribed; latio is the embodied field or embodied communio in which the trans from A’ 
in B / C outlines its via eminentiae and via negationis. The translatio of cultural realms 
follows cenesthesis in its sense as it describes distorted bodily sensations, in which the 
level of consciousness are not able to translate its descriptions. The pathology of 
cenesthesis is the association of being unified by koinon aistheterion224; translation is 
not only the unification but also drafts a sensorium commune in which sensations yield 
the perception of the five senses. The cenesthetic sense is the translation of the external 
sensory apparatus and the internal sensorium understood as the topos of Meinhaftigkeit 
(Fuchs 1995: 103-112) that overwrites the status of grammar. This topos asserts as the 
internal body is outlined by disturbances of bodily enactments and generates a 
psychosis of linguistic translation. In other words coenesthesia is a topos for communio 
in which the hyperbolic difference in the scope of grammar is a displacement and not a 
fixation of latio. The trans of linguistic communio is the radical transgression which 
deprives your linguistic order; this level of radicalness overrules and lacks the 
coenesthesic mode of schizophrenia. The transgression will surprise me by being in a 
certain way in life-world. Or to speak in a pathological narration, the motion of 
linguistic practice refers in its schizophrenic feeling a variety of deviations in their 
                                                            
222 Merleau-Ponty resumes in his study on children, that a child lives in the future but an adult may 
regress: indeed, childhood is never fully completed (KV 324). 
223 Cf. Kurt Koffka’s theory of psychological formation (Koffka 1924: 102-111).  
224 koinon aistheterion is Aristotle’s nucleus to explain the coordination of the senses to an unified image 
in its correlative soul. 
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embodied language-practice. It appears that the event of trans is not simply the 
disturbance of a canon but a linguistic phenomenon of passivity. In other words 
language is not about explication but about implication while referring to its lateral 
movement of being imposed. Hence, the act of translation is never between realms but it 
is the place where we meet everything; the framework of intentionality will burst openly 
by exploring a sense in non-sense and by displacing it to a phantasmatic here. Per-
capere is the linguistic transgression from A’ in B / C by being alert of being surprised 
by its pathological appearing. Referring to Maldiney, the permanent deviation in 
language is primarily pathological nature (Maldiney 1973: 49). The schizophrenic 
transforms lexemes into bodily entities by outlining life-world in a counter-life-world-
project and by referring the alert to the very existing body. The schizophrenic 
expression is within a very linear framework of neither internal nor external emptiness 
(Maldiney 1973: 79). The communio of schizophrenia is nonsense (Maldiney 1973: 56) 
and non-thematic (Maldiney 1973: 82f). The open categories of coenesthesia evokes the 
direction of motion through its style and its rhythm. The pathic responsiveness is 
actually the trans of translational practice by highlighting that the identification is a 
success where it is unsuccessful and a failure where it succeeds (Maldiney 1973: 74). In 
other words the trans in linguistic practice is not only the marginal and un-thematised 
but it is its very abyss; the subject of expression will be superseded by a schizophrenic 
happening of expressions in which perceptual intentions of expression and the act of 
expressing transgress into a happening of expressions which are thoroughly formed. 
The linguistic happening is therefore formed by something / somebody that possesses us 
and not vice versa. Hence the motion of trans is a passive or more a pathic event in 
linguistic practice and cannot be a leading force while translating. However, there is 
indeed a possibility to read my emphasis of passive actions as structural happening; the 
pathology of schizophrenia can be noted as an inscription into a field that is 
characterised by its transformation, the substitutional act and likewise shaped by its self-
regulation that happens laterally. The act of translatio is no longer bound to objects but 
is literally the transgression to another structure that is beyond the setting of a second 
nature or a second structure. Structure as such is in Merleau-Ponty’s case not a 
positivity, it remains in a ambiguous status in which any dual forms are deprived and in 
which language is a configuration in practice. Transgression is the fold in the linguistic 
texture and will be enacted by its lateral movement. In this sense, the transcendental 
condition is not the entanglement of chiastic ontological acts and its carnal conditions 
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but transcendentality is to bear the ambiguity of immanence and transcendentality: 
grammar is a fleeting appearance in life-world and in translatio; the radical expression 
seeps into life-world. In other words, the trans is the wrapped in in the materiality of 
latio; translation is in Merleau-Ponty’s understanding the procedure of contexts and 
sense will be nothing else than the non-comparable comparative225. 
                                                            
225 Paul Ricoeur pays also attention to this aporetic setting, while referring to Marcel Détienne’s 
Comparer l’incomparable (Ricoeur 2006: 36). 
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III. PERPLEX COENESTHESIA  
 
In the process of outlining chapter I (Husserl and transcendentality) and chapter II 
(Merleau-Ponty and savagery) we discovered how phenomenology could be close read 
in relation to shape translational realities as practice of interfering and engaged power 
within the realms of life, world, language, pathology and practices. Therefore, the trias 
language – life-world – knowledge enacts multiple stories of an untold world by 
dynamising the latio in correspondence to its stabilising trans: there is neither a 
continuum of space nor of time for any self-regarding life-worldly references. We are 
aware that grasping life-world in its translational practice has been outlined by Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty as the katabasis of transcendentality – the openness or the 
dynamenon of life, its latio and its therefore used language is the phenomenological 
overcoming of the teleological movement in life – world – language. The chiastic 
experience overwrites, in the dynamenon of gazing, metaphysical aims while 
considering life-worldly practices: the chiastic experience of livelihood in life-world 
suspends the movens of metaphysics by considering its impossibility of tagging. But 
this very impossibility is simultaneously the very condition possibility of being within 
metaphysics. Translating A in B is therefore the transcendental proteron of a shared 
life-world A as A’ to B. Hitherto as long as we speak in transcendental realms, the 
experience, le vécu, the practice, etc. is another story of the same world and of the same 
syntax. This other story or the pretended openness of life-world and its enactment is the 
spelling out of a dynamised egoity226 – Husserl outlines an egoity that is beyond the 
empirical, material subject and its contingent life-world. The translation of A as A’ to B 
is meant to be the transcendental fasces in which life-worldly probabilities are tested, 
moved, assembled and finally spelled out as life-world egoity. Newness is therefore 
namely just another expression of the on-going genesis of thinking and expressing A as 
A’. New is in reference to A, an epoché label of channelling forces that has always been 
the egoity of the monde vécu. In addition, the exterior facticity of egoity is just another 
form of the interior reality: metaphysics will be converted into linguistic pragma which 
in situ reports from another world – the other world is however the report from and of 
egoity that triggers the dynamised upside down effect of the schizophrenic usage of 
                                                            
226 I use egoity not in an anthropological sense where I am able to write I and world. Egoity is rather an 
abstract entity that outlines the very Kantian condition of possibilities incorporating the past, the present 
and the future as well as the a-temporal normativity of facticity. In a pointed manner, we can say that 
egoity refers to a Kantian dynamised transcendental subject that writes the difference of I and world. 
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language: the possessive ability of in linguistic usage is secured by the life-worldly 
motion from. The circumventing of schizophrenic linguistics is the stimulus of enacting 
the materialised idealism of life-worldly topography as another reading of hermeneutics. 
Hence, the hermeneutical use of language is on the one side the intrinsic part of the 
transcendental ego but on the other side it is much more than a coincidental exterior, it 
is part of the egoity itself that is blind for the appositional schizo while writing of and 
from: transcendentality is the very institution of making things evident and keeps it 
evident (HUA I 92); it is the exegesis of the empirical subject in which the realm of 
language can be executed and where words are not emerging apart from a theoretical 
subject but are simply transcendental lexemes. Language and lexemes are generated 
through their actors and by enacting the transcendental unity of the subject-object 
(in)difference227 – it is where we direct towards them in action (HUA XVII 366f). 
Nevertheless, this happening is not a copy of a pretended world, language is not 
bounded to an actuality, a necessity and it is far more the possibility trespassing the 
instant actuality. It is the possibility, in which any kind of modality can be expressed. 
The neutrality of language invites us to use language as possibility in which the 
organisation of life-world can be satisfied by its dynamenon. Hence, this stimulus 
considers the role of translation as a tool of enacting language and overviewing its 
dynamic status. Life-world, a world full of expressions and dynamics is however in its 
constitutional effect hidden due to its coding of egoity. In correspondence to this line, 
the egoity offers, deciphered by language, the decisive wherein for any kind of theory, 
the a priori, the trespass and its wrap-around. Hence, the dynamised transcendental ego 
is the ambiguous fabric of reducing life-world and likewise enabling life-world. This 
machinery is blind for differences, cleavages and overrides the crystallisation lines that 
schizophrenia causes while reporting from another world. The impossible double task of 
the appositions of and from in its dynamenon is why the Narcissist cries: she / he / it 
feels a dynamic experience within life-world but she / he / it is not able to express it, 
since A is constantly A’ and therefore the tearing body of the hyper in which the 
schizophrenic movimento causes non-existing shivering moments. The causes of non-
existence however enact a residuum of dynamis that enables us to distract the 
metaphysical note by the cipher of non-existence, since the transcendentality of egoity 
longs however to the chiastic slip away by perverting its very Gestaltwerdung. Reading 
the hyper-schizophrenic act of Gestaltwerdung is similar to that which Merleau-Ponty 
                                                            
227 The subject-object formula has been outlined in chapter II as a transcendental necessity of co-reading. 
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has recognised by prospecting the anomalia of double gestures while writing the 
experience of chiasmus in life-world.      
 
We have recognised that Merleau-Ponty tries to discover life-world within the realms of 
meaningless diffractions in which translation is the offspring towards B, B’, B’’, C, D, 
E, Z or even ∞ and in which syntax and grammar have still to become. Linguistic 
practice is wording in nascendi in which there is no mediator anymore; the translator as 
slippery agent evinces the circular reality of mediating signs by drafting the very code C 
as a chiastic experience. But nevertheless, the processing and transformations are 
happenings that have been worked out and revealed in their daily practice and are in situ 
not telos oriented. Consequently, the carnal body is less the condition of possibilities 
than the articulation of expressions in a crystallised way of non-coherent associations. 
The body is no longer an object and denies the capability to be grasped as concept. The 
thin line between natural and cultural realms is therefore the last remembering line by 
transgressing from Husserl’s transcendentality to Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology: the 
transcendental ego has been transformed into a carnal ego and outlines subsequently the 
doubling effect of life-worldly immanence in which A in B has as well its relevance 
while writing B in A. This thin line evokes the possibility that we can no longer refer to 
culture and nature as transcendental positivity; grammar and syntax are deformed 
characteristics in coherence, in which the visible and the invisible outline the shift of 
inner-material materiality towards body as modus vivendi. This approach denies the 
stipulation of the transcendental colonialised seeing and evokes the gesture of being 
surprised by its carnal enactment – it is a way of living with secrets in life-world by 
doubling the questioning of life-world228. The carnal enactment of doubling has to be 
read in reference to diacritic happenings: it is about the essentialism of structures. This 
turn re-invites transcendental affiliations while considering the double movement of 
nature-culture: transcendentality will be re-interpreted as an un-definable mixture of 
carnal body – (world) – language. Hence, it is about transcendentality which is never 
ens rationes but is present in its a-part constitution; it is about a shifting that outlines the 
pre-possession of transcendentality that is on the scene before I am even able to grasp it. 
This double structure of nature-culture makes it difficult to turn the transcendental fact 
into – a phenomenological approach of – mere seeing but nevertheless, what is at stake 
is the mode in which the transcendental setting is not the pivotal point but rather the 
                                                            
228 The doubling effect of from and of is the secret questioning of life-world and will be a liminal line of 
writing schizophrenia.  
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hiding place of a pregnant grammar. Hence, the transcendental motivation completes 
another feature that can be formulated with the ambiguity of carnal readings: Merleau-
Ponty’s thoughts and especially the outlining of Le visible and l’invisible (VNV) rips up 
and longs for enabling the alienation of transcendental readings. The status of hesitance 
is outlined by hyper-schizophrenia: the pathogenesis of Merleau-Ponty’s savage 
ontology examines the lineage of the output of inner-ontological discussions while 
following the genealogy of trans – the anchorage of trans is Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
that writes a footnote in referring to transcendentality. This footnote causes in turn a 
cluster of schizophrenic happenings, which formulates a wholeness that is beyond and 
beneath vivid breathing and shakes the paradoxon of a grammatical reference in life-
world. This radical awaking enacts the go away from (transcendental) grounds by 
stipulating simultaneously the very reality of going away as an ontological reality. As 
Merleau-Ponty draws attention and as we tend to point the drawer, speaker and actor 
beyond texts, pictures and stories, we have this picturesque reality of life-world that 
longs for an infected language. The longing for ambiguity is therefore a diverted telos of 
going along with the visible and the invisible as it does not exist as the synthesis of its 
very existence. The doubling of life-world is the inflection in which we have the strong 
feeling of leaving language, reality and world but at the same time we are keen on using 
language, reality and again language: it is the visible and the invisible that enacts in its 
very double nature transcendental questions (language) and life (enactment). This is 
what I outlined as the very Kafkaesque momentum of chiastic explications, which 
outlines parallelism and synchronism of moments without relying on each other. A 
negative theological reading of ambiguity is a phenomenological understanding that 
tries to supersede metaphysics, transcendentality and ontology by formulating layers for 
the hyper in the doubling of schizophrenic purposes. The hyper has in its utterance the 
non-ability of the ego and definitely it has not the transcendental ability to transfer the 
sounding effects of its very own utterance in relationship to the realm of A and B. 
Therefore, the story of the transcendental ego should rather be continued with the hubris 
of the Narcissist in which the egoity fixes the relationship Narcissist and Mirror. The 
practical line of this epic constellation (cf. Narcissist and Mirror) fosters the occidental 
hypocrisies of linguistic usage while creating the very schizophrenic momentum: the 
Narcissist is literally able to collect her / his / its rolling down teardrop from the 
mirror229. Hitherto, the lust to jump between or over the hyphen of the signifié–
                                                            
229 This is the arrogant momentum of the Narcissist where he / she / it is able to fix history. But 
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signifiant was so far the lustful play of the Narcissist but now – questioning the hyphen 
of signifié-signifiant – the teardrop of the Narcissist is the tearing lust where the 
relationship of the Narcissist and the Mirror is heavily hit by the hyper in le monde 
vécu. However, the introduction of the hyper-schizophrenic reading of latio enables us 
to say that there is no hypocrisies as such: by considering the utterance of the Narcissist 
there is no mirroring effect, no hypocrisies and thus the silent mirror is the very reason 
why teardrops roll down the face of the Narcissist into the dark of the night230 – the 
translation of the tearing sameness silences the Narcissist and makes him cry, since his / 
her / its copy is a grotesque face looking back to her / him / its with shady eyes. The 
attraction of gloominess captivates the Narcissist to the mirror of his / her / its grotesque 
figuration by bearing up against the tearing drops in the silence of the dark night. The 
break up with the Narcissist is on the one side a radical break with reading the epos, but 
it marks also the continuity of hyper-schizophrenia as the survival of dramatis 
personae. The weeping of the Narcissist is NarcissistgrotesqueFace: the deferring 
practice of writing practice. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is fertilised by the roll down of 
the tearing drop while listing to the liquid scream in the dark of the night – 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the reality of a mirror which outlines the contours by 
freezing for a very moment space and time: the liquid scream is literally the No to any 
kind of fixations. Hence, the typographic writing of life-world can no longer rely on the 
index of grammatical frameworks, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is rather an anaphoric 
catachresis enacting multiple entries of linguistic and translational practices by 
deferring another story in another style. On that account, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not 
the well designed, the formal reading or the shaping of life-world, 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the syllabic sedimentation of the erratic. This modus vivendi 
evokes diabolic 231  lust for translation: to be directed is the genesis of the 
psychopathology of (grotesque) lust that leads to a suspended, mixed up, diverted and 
deferred eschaton; libido evokes an Urkraft of simultaneous complementary Urkräfte232 
redeeming the pathological character of making the phenomenon transparent. Therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                              
simultaneously the Narcissist can also erase the archive by dashing away the very teardrop from the 
mirror. This ultimate hybrid turns the Narcissist into a very helpless being, since his / her / its 
transcendental emanation undermines the hiatus in life-world. 
230 In terms of teardrops, we talk about the fall down by referring to the non-possibility of the teardrop to 
identify with nature.  
231 In reference to diabolic, note the Greek verb diaballein, diaballo: throw or carry over or across (Lidell 
/ Scott 1977: 389).  
232 This might be the very sense of Derrida’s deconstruction; it is about the deconstruction of the phallus 
in our western society. And if I talk about translation, it might be the deconstruction of white male 
supremacy and its very reaffirmation.  In other words, the Ur-Kräfte confirms the phallus in its disastrous 
situation: it is and it is not, the masturbating auto-confirmation (cf. VP 86ff).  
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practicing translation is a suspended libidinal movement; A and B are a matrix in which 
the detachment of A and B are deferred: the act of translating is an absurdity, it is all 
about translation233: trans(lating) A to B is the genesis of pathology, in which something 
heads forward and simultaneously, it is the pathological abandonment – it is the 
tautological aspect of lust bearing silently the echo of NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s tearing 
drops to its extremity by going under with their lingering sounds – as we have seen with 
Merleau-Ponty, translation is about pathic experiences of the grotesque figure of the 
Narcissist, in which translation is more than taxonomy. Remember, translational 
practice is within labile frameworks of carnal chiastic experiences or more precisely, 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is non corpora bearing up labile translatio: executing life-
time-syntax kills the psyche of the Narcissist since it is at the very practice of formula 
where she / he / it decays into a grotesque scenery in which the Narcissist directs 
directly the murderous knife to the grotesqueFace. This revolting gestus is the dramatic 
act in which a broken mirror is nothing else than the translatio of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace: linguistic practice is in its schizophrenic mode never able to 
point to the Narcissist and to the grotesqueFace differently; by pointing to the 
Narcissist my utterance slips away and pronounces instead grotesqueFace. Hence, the 
practice of translation is rather a modus vivendi of becoming a translator-agent who is 
deprived of her / his / its agency – the institution will recognise the translator as an 
outlaw, a betrayer of agency and definitely as the schizophrenic figure of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace. But – and this is the very point – NarcissistgrotesqueFace 
cannot bear the schizophrenic figure rather it is the hyper-schizophrenic act of linguistic 
practices: there is no vanishing point of anchorage where the translator is shaped as 
translator; the transfer of A to B is not a form of mimicry but the very articulation of 
deferring practices in which non-differentiation are the necessary going astray to display 
translatio within prefixed entities. With Husserl we have seen the pathological structure 
of how the AS – while highlighting the movement in time – enables us to expose the 
arché of life-world. With Merleau-Ponty we have discovered how linguistic practices 
enrol IN – while highlighting space – life-world by embedding savage ontological 
practices in transcendentality.  
 
We are more than aware that neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty have left 
transcendentality behind them, since phenomenological gazing is faith and expression 
                                                            
233 This is the very principle of deferring practices. It is about the daily life, in which time and space are 
deferred and in which the difference slips away as soon as we want to capture it. 
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of worshipping life-world – the alliance of faith and expression is the transcendental 
reading of Descartes’ subject-object life-worldly project and will be written as 
phenomenological translatio. Nevertheless, the phenomenological translatio in its 
double realms of of and from refers to the different reception strategies of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty. Recapitulating the weeping of the Narcissist does not redeem 
metaphysics but rather pushes the transcendental categories to the abyss of of and from. 
This double structure initiates the transcendental aporia, in which the outer reality 
presents itself as the con-stitutive part of inner reality. Therefore the apart is also a 
structural into one other in which the aporetic survives in tension en vécu: the linguistic 
cohesions of As and In deploys a referentiality of double realities without having a clear 
grammar, but, and this might be the life-worldly trick, it creates nevertheless the 
tautology of fact and reasoning by synthesising it in the very momentum of the chiastic 
vécu. This deferring trigger causes psychological pressure up in relationship to this 
schizophrenic longing of writing of and from. The enactment of schizo monde vécu is 
complemented by the decisive urge of having to be in the world; it is this relentless 
catalyst of a transcendental ruse that persuades me to recognise that I am in the world 
just to secure the survival of the logos of being anthropos. Foucault, Derrida and later 
on Deleuze are outlining in their respective critique on phenomenology the auto-
affective reality of empiric and transcendental facticity (Foucault) without 
acknowledging that the mixture of urdoxa and doxa (Deleuze) in the presence of le 
monde véçu (Derrida) will be able to outline a phenomenological prospectus that writes 
an ambiguous and fragile layering underpinning the syncretic forces of life-world 
spelling234. Foucault points out that the finitude of the human being is conditioned by 
the outer reality of being an object of knowledge but simultaneously a subject that 
                                                            
234 Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze enable us to re-phrase the very idea of time and space or even though 
time in space and space as time, since their critique on phenomenological linings are regrouped around le 
véçu and its overwhelming physical presence: the living presence (Derrida VP 5f) writes an écart intime, 
mais invisible where the empiric and the analytic are mixed up (MC 388) and in where the décalage is 
mixing up the urdoxa and the doxa (or the foundation can never resemble the founded (Deleuze 1969: 
120)). Hitherto, my transcendental reading of phenomenology emphasises as well the phenomenological 
imprudence of the life-worldly hiatus between the of and the from in its linguistic utterance but I will not 
deploy a dialectic strategy within the analysis of proceeding with phenomenological diglossia that 
materialises the potentiality of depicturing the hiatus. We can therefore refer to a certain indexicality 
while reading Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze; especially the index repertoire strikes back if we ask: what 
kind of time are we talking about?  
This chapter will be subliminally an attempt to read with Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and against them 
the transfer from space and time, since the hiatus is a phenomenological reality in space and time but it is 
also an attempt to decipher that the little hiatus has a certain phenomenological tradition. The reception of 
phenomenological traditions by Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze are a guiding line for a kind of 
questioning that is important to my analysis but the parallel readings are tacit, since they would burst the 
framework of this thesis.      
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knows (MC 323). The telos of the double feature describes a phenomenological 
discourse in which the presentence of empirical facts and the past-tense of 
transcendental possibilities are mediated by life-world itself 235– the reflexive pronoun 
itself is the hidden third figure of affirming ambiguity of the fetter in phenomenological 
work practices (MC 332) in which form and content can be restored and structured as 
unity (PhP 451). Therefore being in life-world is the formal condition of translating the 
out there. This mixture is the cocktail in which connaissance is simultaneously savoir 
(MC 261) by enabling a nature of ambiguity (MC 332).  Thus, the chiastic experience of 
ambiguity in deference pronounces Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology but it does not 
ultimately rub connaissance against savoir. This non-frictional task, that should be 
frictional, is in Derrida’s perspective, and in addition to Foucault, the repetition or 
differing momentum of being-before the object and simultaneously against the object 
(VP 84); it highlights that the auto-referentiality of phenomenological grammar mixes 
up form and content at the same time. Temporality of the tautological fetter claims an 
auto-reference that neglects the hiatus between transcendentality and empiricism (VP 
5). Therefore, Foucault and Derrida criticise that phenomenology does not give 
attention to the hiatus of an empiric and transcendental repositum; in other words, this 
hiatus is finally bridged by the egoity which is ultimately in its double constitution self-
referential236. Hence, this is the translator’s auto-reference who betrays the modus 
vivendi of tearing analogia by emphasising the auto of the I. The critique of non-
differentiating is thus a limited: the formality of auto-reference is not just an entity or a 
realm as Foucault and Derrida tend to outline it; the I, the we, the translator, etc. is the 
hyper-schizophrenic enactment of a multiplied hiatus. The multiplicity of formality 
overrides Foucault and Derrida’s conception of vécu237 though it confounds strangely 
the empirical and transcendental task: the I, the we, the translator, etc. the formal 
outwardness by Foucault and Derrida is likewise the formal outwardness of language 
that fixes the double reference in which life-world and in extentio linguistic practices 
break under238, since transcendentality does not have the sense for the side by side or 
the lateral acts in its linguistic practice; phenomenology is a kind of saying 
transcendentality while moving on ontological consequences: Merleau-Ponty’s savage 
                                                            
235 The discourse of the itself in life-worldly correspondence to my Cartesian reading of transcendentality: 
the empirical is in reference to the transcendental and the transcendental is in reference to the empirical.   
236 This self-reference is primarily possible through the acceptance of an acknowledged I. Foucault’s and 
Derrida’s critique is therefore primarily directed to Husserl and not to Merleau-Ponty.   
237 It is interesting to see that especially Derrida does not refer to the monde vécu since the monde vécu is 
per se differance and an issue of differanciation (Marges 12).  
238 Cf. my explanation of hyper-schizophrenia in chapter II. 
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ontology and its chiastic experience have shown the non-fixation of causa materialis, 
but the immanence of Merleau-Pony’s savage ontology contains nevertheless a rest 
momentum of epiphany. The epiphany is consequently in Merleau-Ponty’s writings re-
interpreted through the hidden lenses of transcendentality: the Janus-face of 
differentiation is hooked up by the transcendental vanishing point. And therefore, 
Foucault and Derrida’s attempt of differencing the difference via battle and time echoes 
my transcendental reading, elaborated in chapter I and chapter II. However, Foucault’s 
fighting with the act of differentiating and Derrida’s concern of time are rather sneaking 
attempts to fix the deferring differences by subverting my reading of the transcendental 
dynamiké fetter in which Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental dynamism is in- and 
simultaneously excluding the conditional hiatus of savoir and connaissance. 
Questioning the status of the hiatus is finally nothing else but peeling the value of 
notions239 and therefore the positive calibration of coordinate axes is mis en péril. In 
consequence, my exegesis of phenomenology proposes a life-worldly cartography that 
outlines a potency of non-positivities enabling another story of time and space that 
cannot mingle spots, dots or realms into a new reading of (transcendental) relational 
space-time stories: the positive acceptance of space-time is not the calm anchor for 
reading synthesis. I would even go so far to say that the transcendental reduction is a 
phenomenological shouting for reaching far, beyond the necessity of special and 
temporal necessity and therefore, the ontologie sauvage of Merleau-Ponty discovers the 
phenomenological explosiveness of a life-worldly vacuum but hesitates to enact the 
knits of materiality. Henceforth, my fettle is a lax or even though a very radical fettle of 
phenomenology in which the dynamiké is a parapraxis of the broken transcendental 
almighty hood. It is worthwhile to close-read the phenomenological critique of 
schizophrenia by following the very concepts of difference, time and space as the 
practice of longing for enacting the dynamiké of language and translation as hyper-
schizophrenia in deferral.          
 
We have seen so far, that the manifestation of deferring openings and deprivations write 
schizophrenic possibilities, in which the linguistic practice within the transcendental 
bracket is in its libidinal moment suspended: the schizo event is the very practice of 
straying in which the hiatus of inner realities and outer possibilities suspend language; 
in other words, to jar is simply another psychopathological way of producing life-
                                                            
239 It is strange that Derrida embarks on the game of denomination formulas, since his deconstruction is 
the perversion of positivity and fixed terms.   
 140 
world-matrixes in which the physiognomy of grammar is another form of materiality. 
Hence, the vehemence of lust while striding through the linguistic appearance in life-
world imposes a linguistic grammar referring to its most remote reality in which the 
humus of hyper-schizophrenic moments perverts the necessity of differance. The 
remoteness is remote since NarcissistgrotesqueFace cannot be read in space and time 
realms240 in which the linguistic appearance in life-world can only be unravelled 
through the transcendental hyphen between the dramatic linguistic utterance and the 
stabilising grammatical code: the Narcissist (cf. linguistic utterance) in (cf. 
transcendental transmitter) life-world (cf. grammar) remembers the chiastic happening 
in which the schizophrenic reality fixes the grotesque masque of the Narcissist in her / 
her / its freezing mirror. Thus, NarcissistgrotesqueFace has rather to be read as the 
anaphoric reality, and this is close-reading the hyper-momentum, in which the differed 
Gestaltwerdung of the screaming teardrop or NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not simply the 
act of the scenery – the differed Gestalt is the metalepsis of on-going deferring acts of 
hyper affiliations with schizophrenic practices of A and B.  
 
Hence, the extended engagement of differing difference A and B241 in its hyper-
schizophrenic practice is still a pending issue. It is still a pending issue insofar as life-
world – language – translation are embraced by transcendental brackets, in which the 
mundane world and the world of ideas, the subject and object are simultaneously 
present, respectively mutually conditioned through the bastion of the conjuncta AS and 
IN that outlined a phenomenological prospectus of a syncretic life-worldly topography. 
Language as a schizophrenic experience can only be schizophrenic while subliminally 
there is a transcendental acceptance of a spatial and temporal relationship in which the 
very moment of dia turns into the utterance of the lexeme: A as A’ to B and A in B can 
only be schizophrenic in relationship to something else and this matters, since the 
relatio in natura is simultaneously the relatio in rationis. Therefore, the ur-syncretic 
formula ti esti is the redemption of translational schizophrenia since it creates the 
configuration of who (nature, culture, actress, etc.) and what (translation) and hence, 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s who and what cannot be analysed or associated with 
categories. In other words, the incomprehensible is only incomprehensible in 
                                                            
240 And therefore remoteness as well as closeness are not notions of indexicality.  
241 Cf. also Gayatri Spivak’s preface of Grammatology (Derrida 1976: xxix). We will see that differing 
difference is no longer applicable to categories (such as space and time), it is rather an exposition of 
possibilities in materiality that suspends the translation of A in B, but rather emphasises A with B. And 
therefore the differing enactments are not a dialectic experimentum.    
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relationship to a linguistic grammar and sign language is only sign language in 
relationship to a symbolic tradition242 – the mute resistance is not an anarchic refusal, 
since the clinical authority would range it simply as the refusal of linguistic utterance. 
Hence, the redemption of the double structure of utterance claims heuristic practices, in 
which the reality of language was realistically there but not as an effected practice. This 
double structure creates the heuristic powerful rhetoric of positivities in such a way that 
the reality was on the scene but not effected and therefore not a positive factum; the 
negativity of language is therefore on another level just the circular No to its 
corresponding Yes such as the grotesque face is always stuck with mirror. 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace however slips from schizophrenic writings Yes and No while 
bearing the hyper in its reading. This is where Husserl neglects or overlooks the 
underlying and silent operational hyper in the very schizophrenic243 setting within the 
very loud rally of promoting As as an option of episteme: while reconsidering potestas 
as another expression of episteme, any proliferation and doublings of translational 
practice are told as a story of transcendental linearity. Additionally to Husserl, Merleau-
Ponty reconfirms the circle by highlighting the ontological ambiguity as another way of 
expressing Heidegger’s ontological difference of Sein and Seiende. For Merleau-Ponty, 
there is an internal bond between the chiastic movement of Sein and Seiende, since 
essence is correlated intrinsically with potesta and will translate this relational power to 
layer the textures of A and B – the potesta incorporates again the taming of dia into the 
realm of life-worldly Prägnanz 244 . This is why life-world as phenomenological 
principle is predominantly a lack of translation by Husserl and a lack from translation by 
                                                            
242 In reference to Ernst Cassirer’s Symbolische Prägnanz and its procedural exposition of the immanent 
disposition of perception and representation (Cassirer 1982: 235ff): “Unter ‘symbolischer Prägnanz’ soll 
also die Art verstanden werden, in der ein Wahrnehmungserlebnis, als sinnliches Erlebnis, zugleich einen 
bestimmten nichtanschaulichen ‘Sinn’ in sich fasst und ihn zur unmittelbaren konkreten Darstellung 
bringt” (Cassirer 2010c: 250). 
243 We might even say that Husserl outlines unwittingly schizophrenic practices while writing stumme 
Erfahrung and simultaneously reine Erfahrung (HUA X 75) and cf. also Giorgio Agamben’s Infanzia e 
storia. Distruzione dell’esperienza e origine della storia (Agamben 2001: 56). 
244 As a Neo-Kantian, Cassirer was not hiding the implication of the transcendental exegesis on life-
worldly effects: “(...) so wendet die Philosophie der symbolischen Formen ihre Frage auf die Gesamtheit 
der geistigen Ausdrucksfunktionen. Auch in ihnen sieht sie nicht Abdrücke oder Kopien des Seins, 
sondern Richtungen und Weisen der Gestaltung; ‘Organe’ nicht sowohl der Beherrschung als vielmehr 
der ‘Sinngebung’. Und auch hier vollzieht sich die Leistung dieser Organe zunächst in durchaus 
unbewusster Form. Die Sprache, der Mythos, die Kunst: sie stellen je eine eigene Welt von Gebilden aus 
sich heraus, die nicht anders denn als Ausdrücke der Selbsttätigkeit, der Spontaneität des Geistes 
verstanden werden können. Aber diese Selbsttätigkeit vollzieht sich nicht in der Form der freien 
Reflexion und bleibt somit sich selbst verborgen. Der Geist erzeugt die Reihe der sprachlichen, der 
mythischen, der künstlerischen Gestalten, ohne dass er in ihnen sich selbst als schöpferisches Prinzip 
wiedererkennt. Hier gilt nicht sowohl, dass das Ich sich in den Dingen, dass der Mikro- sich im 
Makrokosmos spiegelt, sondern hier schafft das Ich sich in seinen eigenen Produkten eine Art von 
‘Gegenüber’, das ihm als durchaus objektiv, als rein gegenständlich erscheint. Nur in dieser Art der 
‘Projektion’ vermag es sich selbst anzuschauen”. (Cassirer 2010b: 255).   
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Merleau-Ponty. Both prepositions confirm that the language of translation is the 
language of legislation.  
 
Henceforth, the legislation of conditioning life-world does not question the hiatus, the 
hyper or NarcissistgrotesqueFace – the symptoms of writing life-world remain in the 
courtroom and they will be classified and finally disclosed. Unfortunately the judge aka 
the grammatical code does not question the double movement of symptoms and the 
symptoms of the duration or the length of the gap. The hiatus is an unqualified distance 
that interferes tacitly with the translation from A to C as the forma formans of linguistic 
practice; the forma formata, given via transcendentality and ontology, rescues through 
the back-door the trans of trans-latio: the practice of AS as the epoché-answer by 
Husserl or the enactment of an IN language as the katabasis of Merleau-Ponty’s savage 
ontology secures in its deferring difference the Ur by accepting tacitly the possession of 
Urdoxa as Urdoxa. Therefore the transcendental economy of explication and 
comprehension has still the answer of producing realities as language in a given life-
world. The aporia of stories as untold stories is therefore, hidden, captured by the 
transcendental sponsor. The A’ bias generates on the one hand deferring realities beyond 
the Aristotelian shelves while on the other hand, linguistic practices (re-)introduce the 
Platonic idea of wholeness as constitutive part of the enacted grammatical code of life-
worldly sensuality. The taxonomy is dynamised but this dynamon is simultaneously the 
simple extension of the linguistic grammar in which the transcendental line fulfils its 
duty. We have seen that the translational activism is in the very case of Husserl 
maximised to the minimum while dwelling within the tension of synthesis and analysis: 
the transgression is actually nothing else than A as A’. There is nothing more to do than 
to suppose the nature of agency as potestas of another world. From that angle the 
translational task is the organon of holiness. The translator is the high priest, the 
sacrificed figure of three who takes responsibility for the emerging transfer within life-
world. She / he / it does not only take responsibility in the sense of responding to 
emerging constellations of A to B within life-world, she / he / it are rather the sainted 
third figure of being the denominator, dictator, master, who conditions and fosters, from 
a very hidden position, the transfer from A to B, the interaction of subject and object or 
the interference of life and world as its double consistency. Or to put it in other words, 
life-world is the very political fulfilment of the bourgeois’ telos: the lawyer interprets 
law by responding (by taking responsibility) to the juridical canon as a learned person, 
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the engineer offers operations by defining the framework of the Euclidian geometry and 
the medical doctor predicates symptoms on the very basis of his medical training. This 
is the ugly antic of the bourgeois entelechy: translating life-world is the execution of an 
original body and his corresponding mind through the possession of transcendental 
wisdom as its political hidden reference. The master, written in capital letters, overruns, 
bleaches out and ignores NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The original knows just the original 
and it is a matter of originality of the master, who executes differences within a life-
worldly setting as its venue of execution:  Husserl uses therefore the notion of 
transcendental epoché and Merleau-Ponty refers to a carnal body as ontological 
savagery to compensate Crisis (Husserl) and Ambiguity (Merleau-Ponty) within life-
world. In other words, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty refer in their phenomenological 
reading to a theological system in which the blessed and the sinners refer to a common 
code of conduct: the syntax of translation is the blessed instruction of a better life-world 
by adding the transcendental task as their inevitable metaphysical steering body of its 
very principle. It is finally the desire to transform the disorder into order: the savage and 
the dirt will be tamed by the force of translation and by the positivity of having a non-
grammatical corpus. This act testifies the theological movens from the impure to the 
pure. The mythological containment from the violent to the sacred order is the theology 
of language: the movement towards the hallow is its phenomenological feature and at 
the same time its referral. In other words, the double-name Husserl-Merleau-Ponty has 
fit into the mould of transcendentality, which in turn dynamises the life-worldly project 
by highlighting secretly its positivity. This hidden track keeps Husserl’s tamed 
dynamism and Merleau-Ponty’s savage dynamism in strict discipline by 
operationalising phenomenology as an inflection of linguistic practices. The 
encompassing figure of reading the inflection in linguistic practice neglects, in its 
sublime ways, the authority of forms – although it is sublime and hidden present in the 
cloak of transcendentality – the neglecting of authority is the linguistic fulfilment of 
carrying out possibility forms and formation possibilities and therefore we can say that 
the genesis of forming possibilities is the discontinuity of transcendental symmetry and 
will be re-engineered via phenomenological readings by translating the continuity as 
and in life-world while re-considering its transcendental addendum. The comparative 
As and the preposition In referring to a grammar in which the chiastic deviation of 
positivities is caught up within the modification of taxonomy frames consistency of 
linguistic authority through the back door. Therefore phenomenological reading remains 
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– despite my previous adventurous readings of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty – in the 
aftermath of transcendental taxonomy hermeneutically without holes for escaping.  
 
Stripping of transcendental categories from a hermetic phenomenological framework 
and therefore emphasising the battle of other means (Foucault 1973) or the spacing of 
time (Derrida 1976: 154) means to read articulation patterns and the gamble with 
dilatation possibilities of the signifié and signifiant in a deferred bundle. 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is therefore the lateral attempt245 to break with the familiar 
feeling of hermeneutic intimacy of pre a priori conditions and of representational 
constellations. My exegesis of phenomenology is an attempt to get rid of the 
transcendental epos by attempting to outline how a non-hermetic phenomenological 
exegesis can be drafted without visibility, language without grammar and knowledge 
without history – it is an attempt to read phenomenology laterally without objects and 
therefore also without subjects; it is a prospectus with NarcissistgrotesqueFace, the 
pausing moment in which the appearance of the hyper-schizophrenic move on the stage 
is not a mise-en-scène but the mise-en-scène of the rolling teardrop into the dark of the 
night. It is the silent shouting of the nocturnal membrane that reverberates the flow of 
the non-existing shivering moment in translatio – the assembling translational bricolage 
speaks out symtoms of another inflection: the endeavour is to coble another metonymy 
in which the non-linearity of sym and hypo enacts an assemblage of translatio and in 
which the diastase of hyper-schizophrenia is life-worldly deixis.    
 
The movens of sym with hypo is the experience of how translatio displays practices that 
intrinsically do not have language (no I, no us, no auto-reference) and subsequently no 
grammatical reference-point of distinguishing time and space from its content246. It will 
be a trial to surprise the slumbering Merleau-Ponty, to shake him heavily and hoping 
therefore that he loses his transcendental fettle – by loosing the superficiality of 
denomination formulas and historical facticity, we might reach much more widely than 
the echo is even able to return to life-world and might tremble therefore not only the 
bedrock of Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic foundation but also Husserl’s transcendental 
                                                            
245 The lateral trial is insofar NarcissistgrotesqueFace, since it is not the trigger and the pivotal point of 
reading life-worldly practices. All of a sudden the lateral presence rattles heavily the coniunctum with 
while reading A with B. 
246 Note: content cannot be read in correspondence to form. Content is neither within the realms of reality 
nor an issue of positivity and therefore the formation of form via differencing realities in time and space 
is definitely an obsolete procedure. 
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womb. Rocking Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is touching hyper-schizophrenia while 
being written by its symptoms and while being played by the enactment of the un-
intended gnosis. Experiencing gnosis reconsiders linguistic usages in diacritic fabrics; it 
is about a carnal coenesthesia as topos noetos for communio that understands latio not 
as fixation but with Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic momentum as deferring trembling. The 
communio of language and grammar might be thus the transgression of a radical 
expression that deprives you of the very sense of communio – it is again about the 
cantus firmus in which symptoms graft onto the sheer abyss in hyper-schizophrenia. It 
is about an endeavour of subscription in which we are delivered to translatio and in 
which translatio of life-world can never catch up but will be continued. This 
unqualified continuum, the choreography of dancing with247  – with is the far-reaching 
that enacts translatio – is however neither simply the bridge from A to B nor a parallel 
structure of A and B and it is definitely not the relational co-reference. With is literally 
the a-poria, the alpha privativum of the very pace of existence in which the sym writes 
the ephemerid of diastase. This ephemeral sym is the continuation of contiguus. The 
trope contiguus will be the echoing presence while dismantling transcendentality while 
bearing sym with hypo248. The contiguus praxis of sym with hypo is not only the 
correlation of the lexemes A with B, but it also writes the continuation of A with B while 
drawing mouth with vagina. It is all of a sudden the lateral presence of mouth and of 
vagina that rattles heavily the coniunctum with while exploring A with B249. The 
collocation of with defers the perplex co-presence that shivers while reading the 
liquidity of the Narcissist’s teardrop. Unfortunately, neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty 
pushed the edges of As respectively In to the ephemerid abyss of vagina with mouth by 
neglecting en passant the very existence of sym with hypo. The neglecting of A and B 
by Husserl via A as A’ to B and by Merleau-Ponty via A in B, C, D, etc. is the heavy 
denial of the tearing sym with hypo. The ponderousness of the denial is,	   on the 
                                                            
247 Dancing with has been used in reference to Natasha Myers (2008) and Donna Haraway (2008). We 
will discover that the preposition with of dancing will be slightly different in my reading.  
248 Hypo is in my reading and within the context of sym with hypo the ephemeral phenomenon of co-
presence. 
249 The focus on with can also be read as an exegesis of Theologia Crucis in which the body creates the 
telos of being. In correspondence to my life-world with theological studies explore the corporal unity of 
Christ in its axiomatic reading that oscillates between the potentialis of unity and diversity. Thereby the 
debate between being in Christ and being with Christ writes, especially within the Pauline tradition, 
categories of enactments: “To use the idea of being with Christ conveys something more external than 
that of being in Him. But almost certainly it did not to Paul. In Gal. 2.20 he combines it with what is 
perhaps the closest of all his expressions of identification with Christ: I have been crucified with Christ; 
and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me and that life which I now live in the flesh I live in 
faith, which is in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself up for me” (Robinson 1977: 63f). In 
addition, we can read the preposition with as Merleau-Ponty’s theological in life-world.     
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opposition, the heavy acceptance of a transcendental framework; their criticism has 
been fired off, since Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s life-world fulfilled the extravagance 
of language by replaying linguistic usage with a proper grammar and with an 
appropriated syntax within a proper world of the Narcissist; translation is therefore the 
very écart of the replayed game, saying: A and B. We will see that phenomenological 
translation shivers the écart to its lingering rolling of writing sym with hypo while the 
contiguus is the utmost practice of reading the coniunctum with: the juxtaposition of 
contiguus and coniunctum balances life-worldly stories over a debris of wording that 
impends suddenly to fall, since A and B is enacted via the contiguus rhetoric of the 
venereal engagement: A with B. Hence, the venereal juxtaposition writes stories of co-
presence that heats up cataphoric stories that cannot be written in a plot. The 
impossibility of following a script will show us that the dissolution of A and B will 
research its utmost reality by calling A with B. However, the positum of with bundles in 
its radicalism the bearing with as the exegesis of phenomenological translation that 
spells out a remote residuum of situated story telling that cannot be transferred into 
history. The amorphic practice of A and B enters the very slippery entanglement of Sein 
und Seiende in which the morpheme of other – delirious – entrance possibilities mark 
the modulation of texture. Therefore, the story of the interference of the prefixes hypo in 
sym will circumnavigate the bedrock of the history that is written between Sein and 
Seiende; the simultaneous multiplicity of the hiatus will be at work while the lack and 
excess of psyche turns the clinical picture of the schizoid obsolete, since it writes 
apertures, constellations and shifts which are normally closed and formalised by the 
clinical corpus. The ethos of the clinic is therefore always the process of becoming fixed 
but processing in a non-clinical mode is rather writing paronyms. In other words, life-
world is no longer readily understood through linguistic practices and grammatical 
moves – there is no locus amoenus of linguistic holiness, A and B of life-worldly 
experience and of an insoluble shift in which rivers, mega cities, the homosexual or the 
daily survival of the Cullies in South India have fulfilled their duties; Atlas is no longer 
suffering the severity of Zeus’s punishment, his practice has sophisticated another 
burden of another story, in which you and I are lovers and in which the latio of the trans 
is ironised and deprived of time and space. The practical utterances of paronoyms are 
the very suspension of historical readings of materiality in my very situated historical 
play. The very moment of differing morphemes creates a tension that offers in their 
explosiveness a vacuum – a freezing moment in which the explosiveness of world 
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outbursts an implosion of grammars, theories, systems, images, ideologies, politics and 
histories through the raw surface of the Narcissist’s mirror: it is there where liquid 
screaming overrides grammar and telos. It is an a-historic momentum in which the 
paradise is, for a very second, possible – it is possible in its very disturbance of situated 
perversity and blasphemy in which our situatedness is lacking and excessing the mirror: 
the vacuum writes lack and simultaneously it is exceeding Natureculture and 
natureCulture. This very moment at the very same momentum is nevertheless the 
impossibility of the paradise: the trace has in its directness lost its direction. The 
impossibility of possible writings of history, grammar and knowledge is my very 
reading of phenomenological translation A with B: the chiastic experience is never a 
passing happening, its trace touches and will never be touched250. The trace, which is its 
very ironised reality of implosion, is a worldly glimpse with words and worlds. This 
incommensurability of translational practice, the deferring impossibility of its practice is 
the untold possibility of phenomenological work practice that does not care about 
entities and transcendental containment but about how they interfere with: there might 
be even grammar, systems or symbols but these entities are no longer at stake; it is how 
these entities are bearing with. In this vein, hyper-schizophrenia enables us to trans as 
movement in multiple chiastic directions, in which the act of distinguishing is simply 
trickling down; the hyper enables us to the attendance of slowing down, in which life-
world is the symptom that never can be captured. In that very sense translatio is never 
able to catch up differences, it is diacritical in open relatedness and therefore beyond 
schizophrenic practices. The trans cobbles a linguistic hyper-pathology in which latio is 
a coherent deformation in communio. Translation of life-world cannot be pulled in but 
is able to be continued as the radical expression of seeping with life and world: with is 
not production, it is not positivity, it is not facticity, it is not formality, it is not…!    	  
 
This no is not simply – as above outlined – the negation and the opposition of yes – it is 
a radical disengagement with the function No: my No is simply a void disillusion and 
therefore, it is a deeper No that is a silent shouting (or liquid shouting) at the materiality 
of this very mundane life-world – it is NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Thus, the dispersion of 
materiality of NarcissistgrotesqueFace in form and content will be twisted, twisted and 
again twisted as far as materiality is not simply the consequence of chiastic happenings 
but the montage of with that unlocks the non-relational of metonyms. It is about a 
                                                            
250 This is the difference in relation to Merleau-Ponty; indeed, there is no (ontological) revelation. 
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disturbing sensitivity of with in its historical affiliation with linguistic practices: 
materiality is bearing with and therefore the instrument for a differing translation of 
tearing materiality. Form and content will not be newly negotiated, there is no 
discourse; form and content are a juxtapositioning that rattles its translatio and therefore 
it is primarily No. Therefore the anticipation of the key function – which is always 
unintelligible, if not, it will not be a key function – of with is the ecstasies in Chi as 
hyper that writes the suspended translatio in venereal phantasma. We will see that the 
chiastic experience is a trial to shift from a transcendental subject (aka: non-translation, 
embedded in tautology despite the possibility to think variations) towards a carnal body 
(cf. translation, enacted in the hyper-schizophrenic reality of chiastic experience in 
symptoms); the lively feature of the carnal body is not simply the lively tune, it is in its 
lively practice a hyper-schizophrenic reality that opens up a differing hiatus and 
therefore again Derrida’s critique of le vécu as the fundament of phenomenology as 
metaphysics is literally a pending issue (VP 133). But le vécu is also not strictu sensu 
para-physic, since the para conditions physics and therefore Derrida’s je vécu is not the 
third figure (the phenomenological figure) that combines empiric and transcendental 
modalities. Phenomenological exegesis can be much more radical than Derrida’s critical 
sum up of transcendental and empirical constellations. The semantic horizon will be 
trespassed via Derrida’s enacting dissemination possibilities since its communication 
cannot be reduced to polysemy (Derrida 2001: 44). The trespassing is in my 
phenomenological layout already trespassed before we are able to recognise communio 
of trespassing communication251. The malapropism of the material condition is a radical 
fraction with the transcendental condition of time and space; the power structure veiled 
by the generosity of (transcendental) possibilities will be unmasked by the futility of the 
time and space grammar: the inflection is the absurdity of life-world since there is no 
container labelled time or space. The hyper materialised through the carnal body might 
be worked off along the line of ambiguity of pathology, irresponsibility, pathos, 
ecstasies, montage, morphology, etc. in the aim of translating the carnal body not as 
entity but as flesh. Therefore, hyper-schizophrenia embodies an ontological friction 
with the formatting mixture of time and space and of content and form. Hyper-
schizophrenia is therefore rather a read-out of cultural hyper-formation that cannot write 
the carnal body in its very juiciness. The assemblage of lack and excess is the alienation 
                                                            
251 This reference shows us that Derrida has however still a referential (cf. horizon) space-time exegesis. 
The possibility to trespass one world into another is enacted within the realms of space and time. 
Trespassing even before we are able to consider to trespass is in a certain time-line but we will see that 
the space-time continuum does neither bother nor constitute anything.    
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in which flesh is able to take position in its pathic narration. The pathic enrolment 
however, does not write a sensitive slope-shifting as there is no with between A and B – 
the hyper-phenomenon of A with B is the differing difference without time and space 
but with time and space: it is about the enactment of sensitivity as vulnerable language – 
it is about the enactment of the sensitivity of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. 
Phenomenological translation will be therefore a narration beyond phenomenological 
dualities while enabling a with that is and has a risky emptiness: it is about a risky 
translation that writes a lady, a cleaning lady, a black cleaning lady who is more or 
completely somebody else than the (imposed) attributes of her body are telling us. 
Story-telling bears the radicalisation of the tension of possibility and alienation in which 
the co-presence of a black cleaning lady and black loving mother is not a possibility but 
a queering position, in which the story with translates A and B as queering positum: it is 
literally the display between the position of the black cleaning lady / black loving 
mother against the potentialis of the black cleaning lady / black loving mother that 
perverts or queers the positum. Story telling of translatio is literally the trickle of life-
world; it is an art of afterlife that slows down the telling of le monde véçu.  
 
In the following telling will be the very notion of bearing with that writes another 
translation that is actually the bearing with of No. Writing No is however as exercise not 
marked by the exemplum classicum of decline life-world: A and B are not the reference 
of drawing the map of the landscape – No is not nunc aeternitatis et temporalis in 
shifting gravitas while the surveyor paces the mundane garden. We will see that the 
dispersion of metathesis of le monde vécu in time and space are écarts of language in its 
very fundamental self-understanding or in other words, the dispersion of metathesis 
writes No. Therefore, I will address – in a second line – the hiatus of doubling life-
world, language and practice as the écart of hyper-schizophrenia in which the sensitive 
usage of a vulnerable language shivers translatio. Shivering life-world considers carnal 
bodies as queer seeing in which NarcissistgrotesqueFace replays to the mirroring effect 
of the Narcissist. We will see that the very beam of the reflecting mirror does not 
emanate from the face of the Narcissist but it emanates from the very juiciness of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace while writing a choreography, in which A is dancing with B. It 
is a plea for a phenomenological practice that is oriented by a frictional surface of 
materiality – a materiality that defers as soon as we want to write A or B. Therefore we 
have to say that it is about promoting phenomenology that will go far way to show that 
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time and space are suspended within hypo-schizophrenic practices. This draft is a re-
appreciation of Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body; it is a phenomenological reading with and 
far beyond Merleau-Ponty’s reading. The hyper-schizophrenic act deferring within a 
carnal body is an attempt to dig within the veins of writing without grammar. Within 
hypo there is a possibility for narrations but it is a narration that stands permanently 
apart. However, being apart does not correspond to the grid of space and time – this 
figuration provokes phenomenological readings to go far away: the hyper-culture of 
translatio is about this deferring without time and space but within time and space. It is 
about phenomenological story telling in its material enactment. The queer carnal body is 
the incitement to dance – in return, the queering invitation to dance is story telling that 
goes under the skin while displaying NarcissistgrotesqueFace – 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace will be hereafter declined to display the graphos of trans in its 
life-worldly practice. Et voilà, the topos of the tearing teardrop will disturb the 
transcendental reality of yes and no whilst coenesthesia reads the formula A with B 
perplex. The trigger of perplex reading is the redundant use of … again and again. The 
instruction da capo al NarcissistgrotesqueFace has the enactment of chronos and topos 
that cannot compose the coda of life-world. Therefore, the continuation of this chapter 
is the ornamental circumstances of da capo al NarcissistgrotesqueFace blowing A with 
B while writing A with B in similitudo: you will smell it – bearing A with B is the dirty 
smell of disformation.   
 
 
1. Materialising the spelling out of the carnal body or the total refusal of life-world 
 
A No Language is more than an Idiolect  
 
The trope far-reaching (of phenomenological tautology) is a cry for help252 leaving 
notions, denomination formulas and the always-reassuring mother tongue behind their 
transcendental contact-zones. These contacts have so far produced chiastic moments 
through their capability to theorise by striving inwards for the possibility of utterance 
and for fixing the lineage of signifié and its signifiant while touching outwards the knot 
A and B. This line-up outlines schizophrenic constellations by accepting simultaneously 
– in time and space – the connection of signifié and signifiant; this double feature 
                                                            
252 The Narcissist cries for help since she / he / it is at somebody’s mercy. 
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regroups the theoretical subjects I and we under the umbrella of egoity. Combing the 
theoretical subject with practical reality is the schizophrenic act for what the directive of 
infolding253 calls for. It is the very other possibility to grasp the hidden transcendental 
line, since the in of folding is the act of holing ex linguistic practices by me, the judge, 
the translator, the scholar, the blue collar worker and me the black cleaning lady. 
Therefore, the trope far-reaching calls materiality of carnal linguistic practices into 
question254, since dissolutive linguistic realities disform carnal enactments: in its 
disruptive practice of trashing similitudo, hyper-schizophrenic enactments express the 
experience of deferring in its schizophrenic hiatus255. The excess of materiality as 
disformation is consequently not tamed by mediating the signifiant to the signifié since 
the tie between language and logos is not simply repealed but rather differed through its 
practise of translatio. And consequently, materiality is as well dissolute as entity; there 
is no lineage outlining the relationship of pathos and logos, of materiality and text, of 
body and texture, of space and time, etc. Linguistic practices cannot be conceptualised 
as topos noetos and therefore they cannot be used to be read as localisation of the locus 
classicus; far more the carnal body is no longer the textual cipher for telling stories. The 
tension between the institution language and the difference in its deferring practice of 
writing fleshy A and B refuses to be conceptualised and therefore, it refuses to locate the 
material of the carnal body in the realm of life-worldly practices256.  
 
By following closely materia obstat, it is clear that the rejection of material linguistics 
is in its practice the deferral tension of the compositional figure institution with 
difference. This reading shifts the track of aesthetic sobriety towards the mask of 
                                                            
253 The in of infolding is the condition in which the folding can be processed and elaborated. As we have 
seen in Merleau-Ponty’s chapter the preposition in is not simply the condition of its very life-world 
possibility, it is rather the transcendental condition of its possibilities. Donna Haraway uses in references 
to Don Ihde Merleau-Ponty’s link that the practice of infolding suggests the dance of world-making 
encounters: what happens in the folds matters and she continues that infolding of the flesh is worldly 
embodiment and therefore the on-going formation of the infold writing dynamic, situated and historic 
realities (Haraway 2008: 249). In this last chapter I will develop tacitly how Haraway’s dance-figure and 
the process of embodiment layer the martyrium of practice. This martyrium can be read in Haraway’s 
commitment of natureculture (Haraway 2008: 16); I attempt to go with Haraway but also simultaneously 
beyond Donna.  
254 The questioning of pathogenesis in reading hyper-schizophrenia is the political line of this chapter.  
255 George Bataille reels the hiatus in by expressing the dynamis in agony (Bataille 1944: 296).  
256 Obviously, life-world can no longer act as a unity of analysis. It will be a deferred figure of practice in 
which the life-worldly pattern cannot be repeated. So far we have seen that the ephemerid of 
hyperschizophrenic happening is written on the template of life-world that allows paradigmatic 
repetitions. From now on, the distortive reality of life-world will be utterly at the hyperschizophrenic 
disposition. This enactment will be the movens for understanding section III of this chapter. 
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NarcissistgrotesqueFace257: the symmetry of the aesthetic totality is in other words the 
shifting from progress and the re-assurance of becoming literally the body that I want to 
be towards digress, disforming practice that reads NarcissistgrotesqueFace all in one 
breath – a stretto in extremis that is before any architectural groundwork and therefore 
beyond the ontological index of time and space. Or to put it in other words, the 
hypothesis of a philological body writing an aesthetic grammatical residue that 
indoctrinates the relationship and the reading of my very own life-worldly upsets the 
pathological body, upsets the aesthetic grammatical residue, upsets relationships, upsets 
the architecture of life-world and finally upsets NarcissistgrotesqueFace – and again the 
upset is not the reversal of a pathological body, of an aesthetic grammatical residue, of 
composition, etc. … it is258 NarcissistgrotesqueFace. To write is up side down is not 
violating the graph but indicates rather the distortion of reality by following the non-
presence of its presence259: A and B as life-worldly extensions and as pivotal extension 
of is, is bearing A and B which cannot be synthesised in presence. In other words, I am 
able to write is up side down since the presence of non-presence is written in time and 
space. A and B are not positing the typeface ex negativo, they write an experimental font 
that still has to be designed. Translatio of A and B learns to bear physically with A and 
B; however, the categories time and space are not simply categories, they are present 
without being there260. And therefore, translatio distorts my authorship and suspends 
my ability to write the scenery in which the verbum being can be choreographed as 
trans-positional force: the copula is, the delegate of the verbum being cannot be the 
pivotal point from where sense, practice and life can be shaped in time and space, since 
the present tense of is is not the pre-condition of life-worldly agency; the fungous 
contours of the agent stumbles in her / his very practice and simultaneously she / he 
                                                            
257 The shift towards (...) is never towards NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The assumption that a shift has a 
direction towards NarcissistgrotesqueFace is overwritten by the very deferring need.  
258 Please note: I intended to turn the crossed out words up side down but unfortunately my software 
programme does not have any graphic tools to rearrange it. Keep in mind, all crossed out words are meant 
to be up side down! 
259 Derrida indicates the impossibility of arché by crossing out essential references. Derrida is only able 
to commit the act of crossing out due to the tacit acceptance of time and space. To turn the copula being 
upside down is the act of bearing with that acknowledges time and space. This is the very difference to 
Derrida’s position of différance; I agree that arché and différance are not features of a negative 
theological reading but nevertheless Derrida’s enactments cross out the copula due to temporisation and 
temporalisation and while turning the copula up side down we have to bear with being while neglecting 
time and space. The act of cutting is therefore the production of the letter a in differance. In opposition, 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the product of differing difference.  
260 My considerations can be again read in the line with Derrida’s La différance (Derrida Marges) but also 
with Signature, événement, contexte (Derrida Marges). In these texts Derrida stresses temporisation and 
spatialsation as the requirement of practicing différance. Hence, Derrida orients himself too much on the 
firmament of time and space. In my reading, I attempt to keep the framework time and space lateral apart 
without denying its existence. They are simply no longer important to translate life-world.  
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loses the grid of linguistic actions261 by following a strategy without tactics. As we can 
read again and again, the spatial tactics of time is not the salient point, since bearing 
life-world is not conditioned by a pivotal point (called being) in time and space – time 
and space are present on and in translatio of life-world but they do not formulate 
positive linings. The linguistic effect of A and B is not conditioned; its practise is a 
reversed parasitos by nurturing the host without weakening the parasite. In 
continuation, the verbum is has no stimulating natural devices but is stimulans in its 
distortion by resisting the protocol of dichotomies. Consequently, the copula is is rather 
a symptom for reading efflorescence that crosses out the realms of time and space while 
changing its very own notions. Therefore … NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the suspension 
of syntax and grammatical knowledge but nevertheless, NarcissistgrotesqueFace 
involves simultaneously the enactment of lexemes that are non-sense – 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is literally the linguistic exhaustion that never had historical 
time to breathe (cf. the above written dot, dot, dot). The dramaturgical force of 
trembling linguistic behaviour considers linguistic aesthetics as pathogenesis of an 
unfilled plethora that will be re-dressed by the outburst of irony, showing the absence 
of pathological mimesis: the bureaucratic affirmation of form and content will be 
perverted by a travesty that is convulsed with laughter, with correlations, with logical set 
ups and with architectural dispositions262. Therefore, we have to make ourselves 
comfortable with a language of an infamous grammar that definitely does not transport 
its construction – it rather refers to its fissured differences. Its practice breaches 
radically, in its deferring reality, with the humanistic acclamation of pathos and logos or 
the semiotic necessity of body and text. The produced hiatus is by its scaring abyss no 
longer discernable, since the positivity of words is at it ends suspended or it writes on 
the skin a lingering sound of simulacrum: the flying around cuticles of Lucretius are the 
imprints on the scattered skin of the carnal body263 and therefore it is its permanent 
deprivation of any giving sense in reference to the scattered skin. Flying realities are 
looping their perspectives without being chased by the premises of a cat-and-mouse 
game, since there is no premise A (cat) and no premise B (mouse). The figuration of 
simulacrum is the non-possibility of the psychological wish of having voice and being 
heard. The stumbling of our voices that are, in their material utterance loud but in their 
linguistic utterance senseless, twisting the pathological reduction into a loop of 
                                                            
261 The non-ability of handling the copula as agent of practice will be discussed further down.   
262 The travesty ironises the psychopathological affirmation of time and space and it ironises the re-
aestheticisation of aesthetics while documenting itself. 
263 Cf. Lucretius, De rerum natura, Book 4, V 30-53. 
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difference by forming a silent shouting at the practice of forming words; it is as the 
silent shouting derives from the psychotic error in which the shouting might be 
translated into life-worldly senses. Hence, (having) no language is about a vestigium264 
in which, fleshy words trespass the form of linguistic inflection and therefore betrays its 
transcendental loyalty265: there are no possibilities to form the condition of linguistic 
recognition possibilities – words are literally epiphenomena and refuse to be 
conceptualised through NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The vestigium commences where we 
stop to spell out the Narcissist and where we say No to categories and systems of the 
Narcissist. The vestigium is convulsing with laughter that makes almost literally 
everything convivial266. Thus, life-world seems to be a deprived zone of improvisation, 
in which the vestigium flashes en passant and in which translatio is the vestigium 
clothed in a velvet texture; velvet is the code for looking closer to the fabric of linguistic 
impossibility, since it needs the softness of its feel: the in-articulation of A’, B, C, D, 
etc. is not the dramatic denouement that will be followed by an apocalyptical doom of 
life-world. The tugging hold of life-worldly deflections are synonymous with translatio 
and materiality and therefore, the twist of the trope far-reaching is the con-lecture of 
translatio and materiality in which we turn the modern condition of possibilities into the 
condition of impossibilities up side down. The radical refusal of the graph of life-world 
is finally, at this very point, an attempt to go beyond the writing of the theologian 
Merleau-Ponty by dismantling the infolding placidity of the martyrium of 
phenomenological constructions through NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Therefore 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace re-arranges morphemes in such a manner that up and down, 
right and left, reality and fiction as well as visibility and audibility float ironically 
around: non-linearity, anti-logical and fictional principles are from now on the 
inflection of grammatical impossibility. Therefore, the non measurement is the heretic 
position in which translatio is underneath neurotic obsession and above canonical 
coercion; translation without language is the organon of deferring practice that deprives 
                                                            
264 Vestigium is an index for neither space nor time; it is rather a sonderbares Gespinst according to 
Benjamin (Benjamin II, 1, 378) that drafts the formation of le monde as accidental competence in the 
invariance of le vécu. The enactment of the vestigium is not the discourse of forming representation it is 
rather a gestus of proliferation. And especially the scholastic debate on the relational imago and 
similitudo of God and the mundane creature (Bonaventura, Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi q. 4, 
c (24a) formulates the vestigium as life-worldly necessity. In this praxis Derrida talks of trace (Marges 
12), Benjamin aura (Benjamin Briefe II 349) and in this tradition I will refer to vestigium as a 
continuation of spur and aura but also as its acting contrast.          
265  The loyalty of life-world is the presence in which the non-existence of spatialisation and 
temporalisation is overwritten by the non-presence of the gramme (Marges 69) as its vestigium.  
266 In reference to Michel Leiris’ Exposition Hans Arp (Leiris 1929: 340-32). Leiris describes how Hans 
Arp is transforming the universal understanding of material into ridiculous co-reading of particular 
materiality (cf. also Didi-Huberman 2010: 157).   
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its very own grammar and the focalisation of the hypnotic reality of taxonomy – hence, 
practice is deferring since reality grapples, stirs up and paralyses materiality but it 
definitely does not foster the very (bourgeois’) ideology of becoming, processing, and 
changing materiality. The reasonable language of the bourgeois occupies the historical 
scene without past life and with damped capacity for experiences. Becoming language 
is therefore the momentum where the transparent and the productive newness should be 
enabled. Hence, we have to consider from now on that translation and linguistic practice 
are kat exochen not (aesthetically) sense oriented but are rather the performance of 
materiality that has no script, no metteur en scène and no best time: the cynical certainty 
of tautological gazing will be overridden in presto accelerando through the enactment 
of the paradoxon language267. The decomposition of the carnal body that so far – and 
especially with Merleau-Ponty – elaborated a minimal infolding of life-worldly 
practices will be from now on our dance floor or in other words, the decomposition of 
the minimal resemblance of materiality retains the montage of confusing words as the 
choreography of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The decomposition-montage performance 
indicates not progression but digression that will not be able to give sense but will be 
taken out of its circumstances by arraying an ornament of symptoms: the material of the 
grotesque carnal body is no longer in the container life-world but the distorting material 
epigraph is with life-world. The synoptic exegesis of the material and life-world is far 
away from what we would commonly understand as com-munication, inter-relation, 
inter-embodiement or dia-log; it is rather the schism in language, in materiality and in 
life-worldly practice that includes in its incommensurability a with that does not strive 
for the prefix sym but for the explosive co-reading of the seismographic contingency of 
hypo: the alien will never be the one who provokes the discord of the dia in its logos – 
the stretto of the NarcissistgrotesqueFace will not be resolved by an andante maestoso, 
where we might be able to redirect the hidden facticity of time and space, it will be 
rather continued by a più stretto. We can say: A with B while co-reading mouth with 
vagina. The opening of the mouth is the initiation to life-world where stumbling with 
grammar ritualises the anthropos whereas the meatus of the vagina utters clearly the 
inflection of life-worldly legislation. The grotesque shift of meatus is actually 
convulsive (with laughing) that provokes us to make everything far too similar but also 
far too different. Hence, the NarcissistgrotesqueFace plays constantly on the 
juxtaposition of mouth with vagina by wishing to climb the vertical hierarchy of 
                                                            
267 Once more again, there is NarcissistgrotesqueFace! 
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practice. We might say that the vertical hierarchy ladder is rather the composition of a 
Fugue, in which the cantus firmus is followed by a second and third canto firmo that 
starts before the first cantus firmus has finished and rushes a densification by leading to 
fallacy: NarcissistgrotesqueFace is a Fugue without counterpoint; the baroque principle 
of punctus contra punctum has no punctum saliens, since the saliens has no punctum, it 
is the dancing of punctus cum puncto. The passing happening of the contingent onset is 
the impossibility to mount on the ladder and it is probably the intense scenery in which 
the theology of phenomenology can be twisted towards phenomenography268. Writing 
with phenomena is the stage where the psychological process is the differed 
juxtaposition of life-world while telling NarcissistgrotesqueFace tout court.  
 
As consequence, the refusal of the fleshy body as semeiotikon meros breaches a taboo 
by caricaturing the ontological certainty of a bourgeois society that puts its value, 
norms, historical writings and its juridical practice into the syntax of socially accepted 
codes: the bourgeois’ linguistic index is literally the graphos of porneia, since its 
illusionary show of being here is the bracket that holds the narration of a civic life-
world together. Social practice is canonised through the imaginative reality of life-
worldly penetration and therefore it is in this very glimpse of a momentum in which the 
linguistic practice of materiality follows its enactment that having sex with Teresa of 
Avila’s is the piety of experiencing trinity. Henceforth, the dirt of trinity is the story of 
hyper-schizophrenia in which the mucus of split glossa is about a with in its 
pornographic materiality: it is reality with imagination or in other words, it is literally a 
para-doxon – out of meaning, out of punctus contra punctum – it is about a paradoxon 
which is not an aesthetic, a rhetoric, psychological or metaphysical one, but about a 
punctus cum punctum, a parad-oxon with para-doxon where the lust of fornication 
translates Teresa of Avila with life-world. The phenomenon with is about holiness that 
messes up! Therefore, linguistic practices as graphos of transcendental hypostasis are 
an apocope by omitting the trans in the deadly abyss of deferring: it is about 
phenomenography experiencing the carnal body through procedures of dilacerations. 
The trans-valuation of Teresa of Avila wrests the organon of mediatio by taking the 
splendour of grammar, claiming the sobriety of life-world and suspends translatio in its 
fragility. This fragility of the body is actually the tiny gap in which history might be 
                                                            
268 Phenomenography is a trial to read the phenomenon through the performance and the enactment of 
graphein. The act includes a certain reading of cybernetic entropy that is eliminated while referring to the 
logos of the phenomenon. Phenomenography has no references to the pedagogical paradigm developed 
by Ference Marton (1986) (cf. also Svensson (1997) and Bowden (2005)).       
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read – the history of NarcissistgrotesqueFace; indeed, it might be a trial to fill up the 
gap to claim the lost or to run after evidence and producing therefore the archives of 
Teresa of Avila’s afterlife. But the double bottom of historical evidence lives a tension 
filled life in which the (catholic) bourgeois possibility overrides the collection of the 
archives; but as we know now, the gap is not a gap in its customary sense (between the 
canonization of the Vatican and the fornication of Teresa): space and time of fornication 
are not in the gap. Hence, we have to learn to write the material in the echoing practice 
of non-recognition, since the archives are No to life-world!  
 
 
B Somagraphies 
 
The discarded language strikes materiality in its very suspension by going beyond the 
semiotic coercion in which the body has so far been the locus of semiosis of the subject-
object construction269. The non-sign, the non-semiosis and the non-materiality are the 
consequences of revealing the perversion of schizo-doublings by being deprived of 
neurotic fixations. At this very point we might understand (again) that the double 
charge is actually the mutual abolition of linguistic practices and cannot be bridged via 
translation: neither A’ nor B, C, D, etc. can hold the double reading or the multiplied 
sign together. Linguistic practice does not simply pervert the doubling by imaging a 
translated linguistic ritual but it is rather a neurotic practice in which the imitation of 
perversion covers up the reality of the Narcissist. The act of capturing knowledge via 
materiality and its translated meaning is suddenly interrupted. The psychopathological 
construction of the Narcissist is the semiotic lie that makes us believe that the 
architecture of the symbolic reference has found its materiality but actually it makes 
rather the position of the material impossible. The differed reading of translatio enacts 
the debris of the porous carnal body by suspending linguistic practices of neurotic 
fixations in ambivalence. Consequently, translatio provokes rather an apraxia of 
enactments and materiality: the openness of being read is the phenomenography / 
praxeography270 of materialising body in such a way that the hyperbole of materiality 
provokes us to enacted vulnerable readings and therefore, if the body is openly read, we 
                                                            
269 Cf. in reference to Jane Gallop’s seminal Thinking through the body (Gallop 1988): she reconsiders 
body beyond the object of thoughts. My somagraphic writings follow as well the idea of non-materiality 
and the impossibility to think body as an object of knowledge. 
270 I use praxeography in reference to Annemarie Mol’s concept of investigating contingent and complex 
objects in life-world by exploring our continued enactments of life-worldly possibilities (Mol 2002: 55).   
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have to consider ways of different enactments for reading bodies in both specific and 
determinate double ways271. Hence, the discharged language has subliminally not only 
schizophrenic double structures but the doubling of the doubling; the fourfold potency 
says schizo but it says also bathos and meiosis to apraxia of materiality. But to avoid 
misunderstandings: the hint for the fourfold composition is not the positive response to 
the fatigue of language but rather the quadruple framework mocks the stultification of 
translating the Narcissist’s mirror; the necessity for semiotic or linguistic openness272 
and double metaphors is therefore suspended or rather replaced by the soil, dirt and foul 
of schizo, bathos and meiosis in which vulnerability provokes the suspension of any sort 
of mediation and in which combinations and entanglements of lively situations are not 
the guarantor of utterance – they are rather guarantor for literally diglossia. The dirt 
scrapes at the linguistic reality by imposing hyper readings queering literally the com-
positum of the dirt. The No to relation and structure is the schism of my tongue and the 
enactment in which time and space are neither temporality nor spatiality. Therefore, the 
slippery withdrawal of the act of producing and mediating can no longer refer to the 
development of producing A and B, since it is in its extension a preference for 
something and indicates a relation in which the preposition for has to aim for A and not 
B, since A is of my position. Henceforth, the preference for producing something 
neglects the friction and tugging by producing dead273 bodies or blunt materiality. The 
phenomenon is no longer the discourse (of argumentation and transparency274) and it is 
definitely far from being the pattern of analysis; therefore, bas matérialisme275 of 
vaginal utterance has neither a defined history of form nor a process of the genesis of its 
very verbalisation: no philo-genesis nor onto-genesis either. The formation of the dead 
body is the apraxia of neither interpretative systems nor sterilised lab practices. The 
Gestaltwerdung (of lexemes) is therefore not the simulated incarnation of materiality, it 
is rather a retarded second or embarrassed reading of materiality alongside bathos and 
meiosis; it is this kind of material enactment that has been compressed in the expression 
                                                            
271 Sara Ahmed and Jackie Stacey outline that “(…) If the skin is open to being read (and being read 
differently), we can also consider the ways in which these various techniques for reading produce skins in 
specific and determinate ways” (Ahmed and Stacey 2001: 1). 
272 This contrasts fundamentally with the idea of being-with outlined by Sara Ahmed and Jackie Stacey. 
The body is not always open to be read (Ahmed and Stacey 2001: 1), since the loss of syntax allows to 
outline the reading feature as a simple facticity – that simple facticity is the line up synthesis and 
linguistic nucleus.  
273 Dead in this sense is a tautological reality by stripping oxygen of the fire. 
274 In transparency we are able to die! Or in other words, transparency outlines the condition in which we 
are able to die. 
275 In reference to George Bataille’s tropes figure humaine, informe and le bas matérialisme (Georges 
Bataille, Le Bas matérialisme et la gnose, In: Documents (1930), Nr. 1, 1-8). 
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of materiality. The Gestalt participates in the lie of everyday life of linguistic practices 
by accepting life-world as readable endeavour that is always deferred in its reality. In 
other words, the Gestalt is the product and it is the – well-reflected – answer to the 
oscillating nature of charging the schizophrenic practice of language. Consequently, the 
action of the suspended sign and the suspended language has to be read before discourse 
and before the becoming of life-world. It might be depicted in the scene where your 
mother catches you out before you use again a lie to allegedly save your own life: the 
surprise of being hit throws you out of the circularity of processing in words. The 
practice of ante (cf. from and of) is life-worldly reality in which I am caught up before 
the process of nature-semiotics-culture-language starts circulating: A and B is not a 
possibility for interaction of historical events and far more it is not a name for a thing 
itself. Linguistic practices are no longer the result and output of a system of hierarchy 
and distribution, efficiency and productivity, semiosis and translation as well as 
transparency and reality: no mother, no dictator and definitely no translator. Language 
is No to you and me but it has simultaneously you and me276. This is where No is the 
vestigium of bearing with NarcissistgrotesqueFace; it is the non-articulation of using 
language and its correlated practices. Translatio or NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the 
refusal of writing the carnal body before language by emphasising materiality as the 
narration of travesty: narration is again no, no to life, no to politics and above all no to 
language; this No is underneath the opposition of being yes and no and it is also above 
its practical proliferation but nevertheless No is not a philippic condemning of 
materialised hermeneutic incapability. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the inexhaustible 
narrative of permanently juxtapositioning the travesty of the material beyond 
psychological debris and semiotic empowerment.       
 
However, the non-syntax and the non-grammar of the carnal body is hitherto not the 
equation for death277 – having no linguistic ability and having no syntax productivity is 
not the erasure of body materiality, it is rather the somagraphic writing of life-worldly 
dirt. Dirty hands are poisoned and cause not per se death, since writing dirt is the lateral 
co-presence that is deprived of relationships while writing non featured ontological 
                                                            
276 The aspect of being in ‘Language is (...)’ and the element of having in ‘Language has (...)’ is 
subliminally my attempt to go underneath and above of problematising the separation of ontology and 
epistemology as a theoretical discourse.  
277 The non-ability of linguistic grammar is highly perverse, since my writing pre requires a positive 
acceptance of an English grammar. The acceptance of this hermeneutical relationship outlines the 
(forced) commitment to write a dissertation. As consequence we have to read this tract literally as a 
performative act.   
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evolutionary processes278: the vamp Teresa of Avila has not become the vamp Teresa 
nor is she liberated from her sins either, the story is rather Teresa of Avila with Teresa 
the Vamp. Or to put it in other words, dirt has no progressum of being and therefore it 
cannot mark the liberation279 of the carnal body from life-worldly necessity280. If we 
follow the rhetoric of being-progressum, we will be aware that progress does not only 
mean liberation but also the possibility to die, since the path of genesis is linked with 
the agonistic momentum where the evolution enters a zone of coercion; the coercive 
force of tautological movements are being overshadowed by the fuss of becoming but as 
soon as the corresponding life-worldly reality (and even in its negativity) is no longer 
semiosis, language and its translational practices are death: death is the nihilistic re-
distribution of life-worldly practices in which the carnal body is buried281. In other 
words, becoming with is in its evolutionary stage the deprivation of (fixed) objectivity, 
but on the flip side this deprivation is however in another time-space continuum the 
becoming of objectivity, since it exists on the formulation of (deadly) relations282 – the 
progress of time and life is the evolution of variations and the generation of the 
unpredictable, hence the difference is the concession to negation and absence. However, 
evolution is the bio-political affiliation where the mucus is able to formulate the body’s 
immersion in life-worldly fixations and narratives283. This formulation is championed 
by Haraway when she uplifts the contact zone of bio-political strategy of becoming with 
as world-making entanglements (Haraway 2008: 4) and declares consequently that 
figures are not representations but material-semiotic nodes in which different material 
nodes co-shape one another through lived reality (2008: 4). In her seminal essay Cyborg 
                                                            
278 My references to dirt and dirtiness are not made on the premises of differentiating, but in respect of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace. 
279 Elisabeth Grosz outlines in reference to Nietzsche and Bergson that the idea of evolution highlights a 
theory of time in which becoming marks the present but it also refers to futuristic features (Grosz: 2004: 
157). The inclination of marking the present in the very idea of becoming in its futuristic aim is my 
understanding that you can only be death in relation to something; death is the anticipation of our present 
and therefore liberation is also the antedate of death.  
280 The necessity of liberation can however also be read as the figuration and phantasma of ecstasy that 
destroys its production as soon as dead is anthropomorphised. “Toute oeuvre douée d’une valeur humaine 
en tant qu’essai d’affranchissement, isole et détruit le réel, toute forme étant équivalente à distinction, 
séparation, négation inquiète. Par ce moyen, l’artiste arrive, non pas au vide et à la généralité de Hegel, 
mais à la création de visions concrètes et autonomes” (Carl Einstein, Picasso. In: Documents, 1930, Nr. 3, 
156). 
281 This reference outlines the transcendental line of Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body in such a manner that 
we can follow now how the chiastic momentum in the carnal body is conditioned by its silencing.  
282 Franz Hinkelammert’s understanding of Realutopie reflects the spirit of an essence that cannot be 
physically. This premise is the movens of liberation within the discourse of liberation theology; liberation 
is an un-conditional goal that can never be achieved kat exochen (cf. Hinkelammert 1994). 
283 It seems to be that the body immersion has an inner truth which is given to our actual lives; a very 
privileged line to knowledge in western culture according to Haraway (cf. Haraway 1989: 3). However, 
“Nature’s biographical unit, the reproduction group had the moral and epistemological status of truth-
tellers” (Haraway 1989: 41). 
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Manifesto (2004) she draws attention to the fact that co-shaping is highly motivated by 
communication means284, where communication sciences and modern biology are 
constructed by the translation of the world into a problem of coding that the 
heterogeneity of life-world summarises to disassembly and exchange (Haraway 2004: 
23). The translation of the material-semiotic node, which is based on the 
naturalcultural285 legacy, is the acceptance of drawing life-world of potentiality / 
cybernetic moves286 that override the position of the subject by referring to the ability of 
writing internal difference(s) – these internal differences are however not dia but rather 
inflections. This potential is the intra-action of relational pattern (Haraway 2008: 17) in 
which we become who we are by the sometimes-joined sometimes-separated history 
(Haraway 2008: 25). This ontological choreography287 of becoming with depends on the 
interaction of natureculture and its situated in-the-making of that joins texts and bodies 
referring to the material semiosis and semiotic materiality (Haraway 2008: 163). 
Situated knowledge is therefore a proposition to read the life-worldly knot as the 
activity of entangling performative process of generative bodies. The acceptance of the 
kinship natureculture and the semiotic charges are the condition to create figures288 and 
to play with them by highlighting the shoving of concretisation that locates and 
substantialises (Haraway 2000: 94). Although the position is never a bio-political or a 
cultural entity289, it has to be seen as the outcome of a complex of historical and 
political constructions in which the material-semiotic entanglement outlines life-worldly 
                                                            
284 In Reconfiguring Kinship in Technoscience, Haraway concludes, “(…) networks of co-constitution, 
co-evolution, communication, collaboration abound to help us rethink issues of communication and 
control at the heart oft he cyborg figure” (Haraway 2004: 315). 
285 Cf. Haraway’s A Manifesto for Cyborgs (Haraway 2004: 7-45). 
286 “In communication sciences, the translation of the world into a problem in coding can be illustrated by 
looking at cybernetic (feedback controlled) systems theories applied to telephone technology, computer 
design, weapons deployment, or data base construction and maintenance” (Haraway 2004: 23). 
287 In particularly I refer to Charis Thompson’s monograph Making Parents (2005). Haraway says also in 
her text that “(…) the simple and obvious point is that nothing is self-made, autochthonous, or self-
sufficient. Origin stories have to be about fraught histories of consequential relationships. The point is to 
engage ‘ontological choreography’ in the yearning for more liveable and lively relationships across kinds, 
human and non-human” (Haraway 2004: 317). 
288 The companionship of creating figures is always at least twofold: “There cannot be just one 
companion species; there have to be at least two to make one. It is in the syntax; it is in the flesh. Dogs 
are about the inescapable, contradictory story of relationships – co-constitutive relationships in which 
none of the partners pre-exist the relating, and the relating is never done once and for all. Historical 
specificity and contingent mutability rule all the way down, into nature and culture, into naturecultures” 
(Haraway 2004: 300). 
289 Haraway has understood how the reproduction of taxonomy and grammar has shaped western linings 
of cultural knowledge production: “Simian orientalism means that western primatology has been about 
the construction of the self from the raw material of the other, the appropriation of nature in the 
production of culture, the ripening of the human from the soil of the animal, the clarity of white from the 
obscurity of color, the issue of man from the body of woman, (...) the emergence of mind by the 
activation of body” (Haraway 1989: 11). 
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engagement beyond established social customs and embodied modes of life (Haraway 
1995: 23). Haraway’s perspective of partial or relational objectivity conditions the 
embodied reality as the sine qua non of life-worldly responsibility in which translation 
is the irreducible and local zone of enacting practises as power relations beyond 
discourses (Haraway 1995: 25 and 1989: 82). Nevertheless, the power of the un-closed 
practise is the contingent and vulnerable possibility to read the embodied knot of 
semiosis without relying on the activity of discursive power play. However, this 
perspectival reading is definitely the implosion of the very process of becoming partial 
objects by referring to the possibility of having the option of harmonising via the topos 
of semiotic-nature. We have to admit that, following my lines of the psycho-
pathological lie of diglossia, Haraway’s reading overrides the hyphen between nature 
and culture too fast, since the condensation of our material and semiotic picture 
codifying the possibility of historic transformation (Haraway 2004: 8) stumbles. 
Conditioned by the embodiment of nature-culture, Haraway’s infolding of life-world is 
not the accelerated reading, before nature-semiotics-culture-language could happen. 
The bridging force of the hyphen remembers the Gestaltwerdung as its situated 
genealogy with nature and with semiosis. In contrast to Haraway but also with 
Haraway290, I attempt to champion a reading of a hyphen in a silent pausing of gapping 
nature and culture by questioning not only the length of the pause between semiotics 
and nature but also the facticity of nature and cultures as semiosis. In other words, my 
material has no semiotic knots with nature, which offers the sym-biotic multiplicity of 
the singular 291 . NarcissistgrotesqueFace is consequently neither the bio-political 
construction of death nor its translation, since constructing and translating are based on 
the natureculture topos in which different forms of practice are conditioned and 
challenged by the form of its very own system. As we know now, the prolongation of 
condition is in its multiplied construction-destruction framework literally death. The 
story of the carnal body and life-world is not simply a single story definite in its 
formation (its becoming) but it is rather a single story crafted and assembled as 
aitiologia of intervened narrations. Therefore, the practice of becoming narration and 
stories is the relational effect of shifting is as a statement towards being an element of 
conjunction. The copula is is not only the very fundament of Parmenides’ project to 
discover the western intellectual sphere but being is also the agent, angle point and 
simultaneously a time mark in which praxis is related and in which the relationships are 
                                                            
290 For further readings: Haraway (2000) and Haraway (2008). 
291 Cf. Foucault (DE II 136). 
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continuously related to each other292: the carnal body is henceforth the response to the 
material organisation of grounding life-worldly practices on a dynamised space-time 
discourse. This is the reason why Haraway understands translation as another possibility 
to read relations (Haraway 2000: 125) and can therefore claim to be engaged in kinship 
with her dog Cayenne on different communicational layers (Haraway 2008: 215-231). 
Consequently, the relatum is the response to a life-world that is not single-fixed and 
cannot be spelled out by one sentence. However the force of time is the selection of the 
process in which being is the producing product. This occupying difference is the 
redemption of Heidegger’s Being in its Time293. In other words, the non-linearity of 
evolutionary explanations is from a narrative practice again the force of linearity. This 
setup allows us to investigate the uncertain and the ephemera within a non-closed and 
non-classified life-world: the translation of its layers guides us to an object that is 
multiple in its singularity. This multiplicity is the driving force of any kind of relations 
by enacting different places simultaneously and therefore considering multiplicity not as 
synonym of plurality but as a complex practice that implies that different realities 
overlap and interfere with one another: genesis might be therefore outlined as being 
made that differs from itself in similitudo. This complex practice neglects time and 
space but it does not deny it. This is the very point in which my death body is not death 
per se but mingled up in a partial co-presence of complex and messy somagraphes. The 
disregard or the change of scales in time and space allows me to talk about materiality 
that is not directly involved in a discourse of (hierarchical) difference294. Ephemeral and 
frictional realities are therefore not only enacted by cutting the carnal body into pieces – 
no, fractional objects in a never ending story of life-worldly practices are the resistance 
of bearing the dirt of my forked tongue. A complex narration of the carnal body does 
not need the combining forces of translation: complex narration of bodies is trans-latio 
                                                            
292 Gadamer writes about the meaning of the beginning and its reference to copula in his Naples-lectures 
at the Instituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici: “Es ist das Vorhandensein der Kopula, der Gebrauch des 
Verbes ‘sein’ zur Verknüpfung von Subjekt und Prädikat, welche die Struktur des Satzes ausmacht. Auch 
dies ist ein entscheidender Punkt, wobei allerdings zu bedenken ist, dass es sich noch nicht um Ontologie 
handelt, noch nicht um die Begriffsanalyse von Sein, (…) und in der abendländischen Tradition der 
Metaphysik nie zum endgültigen Abschluss kommt” (Gadamer 2000: 16). 
293 The redemption is actually my response to Heidegger’s attempt to understand the relationship of being 
and time by introducing a new language and therefore to grasp the discourse of being. In addition to 
Heidegger, we can read by George Steiner that the reale Gegenwart is spatial-temporal limited: “(…) die 
Summe der Zeit, die das Sein erfährt ist endlich” (Steiner 1990: 77). We will see that my movens is led by 
the premise not to dismiss the space-temporal condition, but however to read other articulations which 
disregard space-temporal affiliations. 
294 Derrida and Foucault criticise that phenomenological considerations have not given attention to the 
difference in time and space. By neglecting for a very passing moment the time-space continuum we are 
able to approach materiality from a complete other spectre.  
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– again, the is, the denial of the conjunctium being: the complex narration of carnal 
bodies … NarcissistgrotesqueFace and … therefore the radical programme of partial 
connections. The omissions give us a hint in which the form of in-here processes and 
out-there contexts are enacted (Law 2004: 67) and show clearly how 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not a fetish of a non-linguistic language: 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is beyond the discursive debate of fixed non-productive reality 
versus free floating material production. Nevertheless we have so far outlined that the 
trope becoming enables us to break out structural pre-fixations but the euphoria of the 
breakthrough will be narrowed down by the fact that words last gestaltet and are an 
idolect of becoming body.     
 
Hence, we have to go further, by saying that No to language is a complete refusal of the 
material, the carnal body, the death body, the knowledge, the aesthetic, the Gestaltete, 
etc. but this refusal and its mindedness narrating and writing exercise – without having 
inflection and grammar – is the disformation of materiality295: although we have a body 
our writings are not the writing of our bodies – the graphos of the soma is having 
disformations. Having disformation is a kind of conducting experimental narratives by 
hatching a crack in the process of having disformation and therefore, we are martyred 
and paralysed following and telling the story of the crack to its very reverse of the 
carnal body: the disformed materiality is the labile and provocative enactment of 
tearing, jarring and crying – the material is not formless, it is not simply the change of 
scales but it is disformed. In other words, if we are talking about the carnal body as the 
ephemera of translatio, we are composing a rhythm in which the materiality of the 
carnal body is about to be the repetitive poly-rhythmic co-presence of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace and deus ex machine. Though the frictional co-presence is not 
about symbio-genesis of coding natureculture296, it is about schizophrenia that enacts in 
anger the experience of translatio, by writing phenomenological deformation as 
paragraphos. Liminal writing is the scenery in which the close shot of Teresa of Avila 
                                                            
295 The Latin prefix dis refers to negative or reversing forces. I will deny this relational momentum in the 
following while attempting to outline a non-linear and a non-systematic formation of the material. It is 
about an anagram which permutation will be the palindrome of life-worldly practice: indeed, the 
palindrome is the change of scales without having scales and resemblances, cf. Bataille’s bas 
matérialisme (Georges Bataille, Le Bas matérialisme et la gnose, In: Documents (1930), Nr. 1, 1-8).      
296 The friction of natureculture is not about the harmonising tendencies of the companion that find some 
potent transactions between nature and culture, as Donna Haraway suggests (Haraway 2008: 15).   
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as a vamp offers the translation of ellipsis in life-world297: materiality on the edge is 
disformed and evokes translation in extremis, this is when the écart is suddenly the 
centre – the centre of fragility. Disformation is the brachial No that decapitates the 
psycho-pathological lie of the anthropos. Hence, instead of talking with subjects there is 
the appearing of a self whose ability to act is not based on identity and barrier but on the 
matrix of embodiment and companionship beyond the human-machine and the human-
animal cluster.  With Haraway, we have seen that the fragile centre is the Cyborg, the 
Oncomouse or the kinship with the companion Cayenne that translates material nodes in 
actua – the fragile centre is the formulation where the psychopathology of creating 
material possibilities meets the vulnerability of alienating the essence of materiality. 
Therefore, the non-discourse of NarcissistgrotesqueFace creates blind positions that are 
not inherent in form and materiality but rattle form with materiality: this is literally the 
somagraphes with language before it gets mingled and mixed up in the categories of 
semiosis: somagraphes are before corporal chronicles, i.e. somagraphes are before 
sense-data, customs, pain and the inamorata. In other words, my No to carnal bodies 
and materiality explores the dirt and I attempt to aufheben298 the grit and dirt of word 
coining, which we normally are not able to experience. I am attempting to go really, 
really close to see the rottenness of what we drop (e.g. the story line in which Teresa of 
Avila is a vamp and where the black prostitute is also a carrying mom); these close-
shots are however not a change of scales, close-shots are more radical than just shifting 
from macro to micro scales or something similar to that. Halt! This something is an 
assemblage of tearing bodies to whose mercy we are exposed. The close-shots or close-
sho(i)ts are the phenomenographic something writing the montage of something. In 
correspondence to this feature, language bears the bas matérialisme299 and the grotesque 
figure that narrates a story of A with B, but rendering A with B that does not follow the 
rhythm of natureculture. As we have seen, the formula becoming with subsumes the 
whole rhetoric of production, newness, autogenesis, etc. and in contrast we may say 
now that the trope bearing with subsumes a poetic without producer, director and 
creator. However, this compression of A and B is not simply the antithesis to A and B, 
                                                            
297 Marcel Schwob outlines that art does not claim for general ideas, it simply describes individuality by 
declassing and not classifying (Leperlier 1992: 85). The non-possibility of classification is the parerga of 
breaching a taboo.  
298 The German verb aufheben refers to the prefix auf and the verb heben. The paradox of heben 
(keeping) something while conducting the dialectic operation of auf (from) reflects the somagraphics 
writings of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. 
299 In this respect, my reading of Bataille’s bas matérialisme has been inspired by Georges Didi-
Huberman’s dialectic re-considerations (Didi-Huberman 1995). 
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rather it champions a bas matérialisme that tells us a story of A with B. As its 
consequence, the cartography of the carnal body takes another direction of translational 
practice: carnal bas matérialisme is not text, not texture, not sign, not figure, not 
metaphor, not symbol, not allegory, not transfer, not zone, not comfort zone, not 
transfer-zone, not death, not life-world, etc. … it is finally not and a no to the fact to 
find an agent who takes the position of somebody who possesses language and 
somebody who will be betrayed to play the master of translation for our very own 
purposes300. Bas matérialisme is a vertiginous matter beyond the taxon of salvation-
historical exercises! 
 
 
2. Oikesis  
 
A Addendum sans cesse  
 
Suspending and even though refusing the syntax of material utterance is rather hurling 
materiality to materiality which has and is no language; having and being are actually 
the perfect operation of tautological readings: writing translation which is A or B or 
which has A or B is therefore per se tautological. In consequence, if 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is targeted and run by the articulation of being, (then) we have 
to point out that the copula is is the up side down effect and cannot be crossed out as 
such but needs to bear with301 – we have to read that bearing with is the lateral act that 
does not admit the phenomenological play of parenthesising being and having and, it is 
not the calculation of relationships that writes sui generis realms in which A and B are 
appearing as the combination of the modulated signifié of being and having language. 
Modulation rends the possessum in its striking rhythm of capturing the verbs being and 
having in the very practice of writing the geography of life-world – No to grammar and 
corpus is however not the metabolic disease of life-worldly practices leading directly to 
the fall of clinical lethargy. Rending materiality questions rather its very behaviour and 
shifts the text of A with B to textural experiences, while the mangling texture – its fabric 
longing of smelling life-worldly words – is not simply given, it is rather addendum sans 
cesse. In other words, the attitude of No towards the bureaucracy of language is 
                                                            
300 And again my No cannot be the superessence of a negative theological line up.   
301 In the preface of Grammatology Spivak does not refer to the crossing-out politics put to the crossing 
through of being (in reference to Heidegger): “Language is indeed straining here” (Grammatology: XV). 
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definitely not able to draw a line from cause to effect, from the scent trail to the spur, 
from life to the clinic and from being to having, it is rather the task of sans cesse 
formulating translational and linguistic issues turning in nuce just to an additional / 
lateral outburst of writing the decadence of bas matérialisme. 
 
The outburst of linguistic practices do not claim kat exochen nihilistic premises and can 
therefore not be the amor fati of its very retarded yes: No does not strive for 
compensation and it is not the dissolution of materiality, it is rather a disforming 
practice of writing – in its suspended materiality – not a formless material realm but the 
oxymoron mounted Sculpture. The merger of assembling bizarre non-relational 
materials is the curved out reality of sculptures – the mounted Sculpture can neither be 
materiality nor the composition of contradictory activities by shaping and mounting A 
and B. The mounted Sculpture is a juxtaposition of materiality that is deprived of any 
kind of activities related to material practices and in addendum it is deprived of its 
consequences: no production, no newness, no realism and no signifying telos. Hence, 
the material fabric of the mounted Sculpture while (juxta)positioning (itself) is not 
simply relying on the fatality of materialism but on NarcissistgrotesqueFace. This 
picturesque mounted Sculpture is practically a willenloses Beiwerk302 conferring a 
juxtaposition that does not formulate A as B or A in B but A with B. Hence, the operator 
with is the material connexion of materiality writing a willenloses Beiwerk and in 
addition, the conjunction with is the subversive ekphrasis of hyper-schizophrenia that 
can no longer formulate a transcendental figuration in which Husserl’s epoché and 
Merleau-Ponty’s immanentism would be possible transcriptions into grammar. Neither 
Deleuze’s becoming-zone (Deleuze 2000: 11) nor Haraway’s becoming with (Haraway 
2008: 3) can be contacted or evolved into realms of singularity or into positions303 while 
referring to the means of mediation and translation; the prevented biographein of 
writing becoming-woman, becoming-animal is the rhizome which 
                                                            
302 Aby Warburg pays high attention to the readings of iconographic descriptions by outlining the 
transfer-stages from the libidinal agitation to cultural manifestation in Sandro Botticellis ‚Geburt der 
Venus’ und ‚Frühling’ (Warburg 2010: 39-124). Warburg follows the expression of everyday gestures 
and how they are transferred into the scope of things. He is a master of tracing the smallest and most 
useless out of descriptions that in turn trigger synoptic readings of realms that do not belongs together; cf. 
the transition of the bewegte Beiwerke Haar und Gewand (Warburg 2010: 45f). Translatio is therefore 
the trans of realms that can never write cum. The prefix cum is Warburg’s willenlose Beiwerk (Warburg 
2010: 48) and my NarcissitgrotesqueFace.    
303 Singularity and position are a consequence of materiality where the all-nothing composition would 
apply to (the all-nothing design has the transfer from no to yes and from material to form and therefore 
they have the performative ability of translation). The juxtaposition of NarcissitgrotesqueFace is 
deprived – as shown above – from material reality and therefore we have to say indeed no translation 
zone.   
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NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not able to write304. Therefore, the act of translation and 
basically any form of trans is the deprivation of active figurations between the so-called 
deferred poles A and B while the material non-dissolution of No is literally writing the 
juxtaposition of disjecta membra. To put it in other words, the juxtaposition of disjecta 
membra overrides silently the premises of translation, while silently screaming at the 
borders of translational zones. This is the narrative auspicium of hyper-schizophrenia 
that concerts NarcissistgrotesqueFace as the membra of mounted Sculpture while 
writing voluptuous corporal aspects of skinny carnality. The mounted Sculpture is the 
enactment of A with B that cannot be read as chiastic corporal ontology that Merleau-
Ponty has put up to reconcile the excess of grammar. The mounted Sculpture is rather 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology while being read non-ontologically: the mounted Sculpture is 
the dramatisation of the dissimilar with the similar. With as stakeholder of the mounted 
Sculpture is the mapping within deferring practices; it pierces glass fragments of 
disjecta membra of NarcissistgrotesqueFace.                
 
Hence, the pathological lie of linguistic usage is the capability of tearing the ego, the 
idea and especially the clinic of language305, but it is not however an institutional tear, 
it is rather the scribbling of the material heaviness of psychology and grammar that 
forms the crack of translatio in which the juxtaposition of with enacts the deferral trans 
of reading addendum sans cesse. The tearing of I and latio is therefore layering the 
overwriting praxis of hypomnemata in which the mnemonic device is not simply a 
material corrective for reading the contingent content of future movens, it is rather the 
spoken and written practice of lexemes306 that will never be ad manum and therefore 
never be spoken or written in situ. Thereby, the historical charge of the spoken and 
written echo is neither the utter singularity of psychological possibilities enabling the 
ego transpono307 nor its relative anachorese. Consequently, any forms of writing logos 
bioethikos308 can create relational knots of forming the fragments of the logoi by 
demanding to form the tranquilltiate animi309 that in turn forms the humanistic telos 
                                                            
304 In reference to Deleuze (Deleuze 1993: 11). 
305 This is the very possibility to read Kafka’s Tagebücher. Maurice Blanchot reads Kafka’s Tagebücher 
beyond the lines of the normativity of (linguistic) facticity and anecdotic descriptions. In La solitude 
essentielle the topos beyond marks the movens of writing itself (Blanchot 1988: 20) thereby figuring that 
the author writes about something that he never can and will write.      
306 Cf. Foucault’s Débat sur la poésie (Foucault 2001: 418-434).  
307 The writing of the impersonal singularity is not simply the deprivation of the I as Deleuze outlines it in 
Critique et clinique (Deleuze 1993: 12-13). 
308 Foucault uses logos bioethikos to formulate the practice of self-writing (Foucault 2003: 356).  
309 In reference to, Plutarch (1939) De tranquillitate 464e. 
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sans cesse. The linguistic practice is the material I that does not know that I am I. 
Therefore the psychosis of the homonymic I is accompanied by dem willenlosen 
Beiwerk that admits NarcissistgrotesqueFace writing about my body without having 
(body)language. Suspending the biological practice of re-assuring my very ego can be 
read with Carl Einstein’s breaching of linguistic purity as the expansion of the lexeme 
to its biological proliferation: the description of A and B is the quarrel of falling out of 
the fetishists (Einstein 2013: 13) and therefore the carnal happening has to be read as 
the rest that is beyond the autotelic necessity of ego transpono and the framing of 
descriptions by rating its vivid and magic means (Einstein 2013: 16f). Henceforth, he 
was questioning if we do not have to subordinate language to the vivid force of (life-
world) experiences (Fleckner 2006: 285). However, Einstein’s commitment to the vivid 
rest is the surrealistic telos of formulating an alternative style, another wording or of 
creating another language. Nevertheless, Einstein’s biographein is not the pathology of 
rebounding or jolting possibilities. In other words, the possibility of biographein will be 
linguistically enacted as the act of placement (graphein) through practice (gymazein) 
and ends up finally as grammar (legein) or even though grammatical rest. The mounted 
Sculpture of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the new rest, which has been created out of 
vital working grammars, the new rest is ad manum … sans cesse.  Einstein’s 
biographical rest cannot say No to language, since No to language is literally bearing 
language while writing addendum sans cesse and therefore, we have to say that, the 
mounted Sculpture of A with B is not the daily atrocity that disables linguistic sceneries: 
there is No to such things as like the structure of style and aesthetics and therefore it is 
also No to the logic of biology and to the places of geo while enacting graphein. 
Language is radical; it is hyper-schizophrenic and therefore beyond aesthetics and it is 
definitely also behind the open outcry of Yes. As effect, you have to tell to your 
neighbour that NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not a neologism nor a metaplasm either.  
 
As we can read or rather see now, the juxtaposition of A with B is not able to outline 
grammar and syntax as the intrinsic movement from pathos to logos, it is rather the 
practice of language that displays; NarcissitgrotesqueFace is a kind of display and 
description that is more than Einstein’s grammar of displaying and describing the 
biography of Gaia: the mounted Sculpture is that radical No and that radical shift in 
which there is No language of NarcissistgrotesqueFace but narcissistgrotesqueFace-
istic language. This radical turnover is the drizzling rhythm of translatio that falls out of 
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rhythmic progressum and shows that non-mimesis does not simply mean disregarded 
access: by displaying A with B we will see that the description of A with B will be 
radicalised up to Eisenstein’s design of a biological rest that is per se not subjected to 
the structural addendum that finally releases the rest as the rest of nature – this is the 
orthodox practice of the humanistic project that aims for a rest that is effectively part of 
nature. My rest, my NarcissitgrotesqueFace, my mounted Sculpture is rather the 
garbled radicalism of graphein. Thus, the garbled language is the translatio that 
displays and that stumbles while displaying. This ever stumbling over Eisenstein’s rest 
is the biological connexion of the carnal body that chafes by writing A and B. The 
chafing is however not the indicator for reference but displays the co-presence of the 
rhythm that is constantly stumbling. The stumbling co-presence of seeing is 
consequently a No to Eisenstein’s attempt to create another possibility of formulating 
language. The morphology of forming pathetic possibilities is the echo and the 
resonance of verrichten310 the syntagma with that renders the ego transpono obsolete.  
 
Hence, A as A’ to B and A in B are conditioned by the realm of transcendentality 
allowing us to interweave between A and B in such a way that we stick to reference 
realms by enabling A as A’ to B and A in B. In opposition, the Verrichtung of with has 
no direction; there is no directive that leads towards realms in which A with B is an 
outburst of meaning. Bearing with is complex seeing that turns the realms of A or B 
obsolete while encountering A with B in another surrogate that reads the hyphen 
between the human-animal, human-nature, humature, humanimal, huma…, hum…, 
…annature, …ananimal  in such a fast way that the biography sees perplexity and 
writes animalistic NarcissistgrotesqueFace. This perplex enactment provokes 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace to see with legs. Consequently, the biographein of the carnal 
body is the phenomenographical praxis that is not simply a mounted dispositive but 
perplexity that overrides the binary codes of space and time and the amor fati of nature: 
we have to learn to see with legs without shifting the anthropos-scale. The perplexity of 
bearing with by writing its Verrichtung is the – above mentioned dancing – of punctus 
cum puncto, that shakes the bearing of hyper-schizophrenia feeling how its pathetic No 
ensnares the texture of materiality: the NarcissistgrotesqueFace is therefore the 
                                                            
310 The German expression verrichten is composed by the verb richten and the prefix ver that intends to 
outline the transfer of one realm into the state of the stem. This semantic choice has to be read in my 
option as the addendeum that differs sans cesse and can also be read as die Aufhebung of translatio sans 
cesse. 
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forbidden witness who unfolds by seeing choreography the stumbling rhythm of the 
mounted Sculpture while writing A with B.                                            
 
 
B Revisiting Ammonitore 
 
Displaying the mounted Sculpture is actually the feigned compression writing the 
unstable conjunction of with that subverts the difference between narration and 
materialisation in such a way that the thick description of NarcissistgrotesqueFace 
could rather be the storyline of the on-going taste of the forbidden fruit. The thickness 
of writing the forbidden fruit is with NarcissistgrotesqueFace the denouement of 
morphology in which we have to get the deep description out of it; perplexity is 
underneath and before morphology, where the thick description of space and time is no 
longer possible and therefore we can say reading perplexity is stumbling, stuttering, it is 
velocity, shorting or simply hyper beyond the space-time concentration. Thick 
description is with that does not conjoin precisely in such a way as the interpretatio 
patris would map our life-world. Writing mouth with vagina is not the disposition in 
which we have thought of in our life; it is not reality, it writes translatio 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The practice of NarcissistgrotesqueFace writes in turn 
biographein as its Verrichtung; this line corroborates the echoing bitterness of history 
and writes the tearing drops of the Narcissist in the dark of the night. Hence, displaying 
and following the Narcissist’s tearing drops is not the total construction of her / his / its 
biography but it is the total disallowance with her / his / its psychological spill over that 
will be dissected by the difference of reading time and space in life-world. Or to put it 
in other words, bearing with is Derrida’s différance of time-space in extremis: the 
bitterness of the forbidden fruit is the ungrounded juxtaposition of bearing with in 
which the positioning of iuxta is not the fetish of narcissistic satisfaction by leaping the 
gap of time and space in life-world but bearing with is time and space; this tautological 
tautology is in a perverted perversion, a circular movement that runs after its very own 
tail by creating simultaneously something that is labelled as tail. By running after reality 
(respectively running after the stylised tail) we are behaving actually like fools – 
basically, by forgetting our very own position, we are acting like children who have 
forgotten while playing their very (own) persona. Following mother’s wagging finger is 
the metaphoric stumbling of our in situ and has the innocence that does not have the 
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aftertaste of hiding my very positioning by tautological means. Thereafter, iuxta does 
not only itch me but hears the fruity bitterness of the mounted Sculpture through the 
perplexity of A with B. The performativity of having No language and No materiality 
tries to theorise what is actually practical: translatio will be the act (the weird spectre of 
space and time) that cannot be fixed. This act is never the alienation of time and space 
since the horizon of alienation creates in transcendental utopia dialectical relations that 
lead consequently to the – structural – grotesque figure. In contrast, the enactment of the 
mounted Sculpture is not the narrative of a grotesque figure, it is rather the hyper-
schizophrenic bearing with that tears up Leon Battista Alberti’s ammonitore311: this is 
the very humanistic momentum of seeing in which the Narcissist is used by the 
chiselling of the plain of the marble (Alberti 2002: 111), while ammonitore’s medial 
gesture formulates the short cut of commentator and histor. Ammonitore’s gesture of 
looking is the testimonial short cut to historia while writing the kairotic code of the 
sevenfold psychic (hidden) peregrination from soul to body (by alienating the corporal 
figure to form its very own psychological abundance) (Alberti 2002: 135 ff). Hence, 
ammonitore’s quote of the grotesque-structural peregrination of the hidden nature is 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s deprivation of quoting. NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s seeing 
practice is not Alberti’s figure of the spectator, who follows hidden the dissemination of 
histor’s punctum.             
 
Hence, my No to language and materiality is the radical aversion to any kind of 
commitment312, it might be even so heavily radical that it is deprived of theory or it 
might be literally theorein. That means that any fixation will hang itself by its hyper-
schizophrenic capitalisation since seeing with my legs is the (visual) presence of 
bearing with. Therefore, we have to accept that NarcissistgrotesqueFace cannot be the 
Messiah who liberates linguistic practices from its psychotic lie of forming its very own 
double structure313 – at this very point we do not have to draw the rolling tears of the 
                                                            
311 Ammonitore theorises the alienation effect representing the retracted viewer in Renaissance paintings. 
As a guide line for any painter, Leon Battista Alberti formulates how the antrophormised nature (cf. “(…) 
maravigliosa artefice delle cose (…)” (Alberti 2002: 122)) of the viewer is hidden present: “E piacemi sia 
nella storia chi ammonisca e insegni a noi quello che ivi si facci, o chiami con la mano a vedere, o con 
viso cruccioso e con gli occhi turbati minacci che niuno verso loro vada, o dimostri qualche pericolo o 
cosa ivi maravigliosa, o te inviti a piagnere con loro insieme o a ridere” (Alberti 2002: 132).  
312 Victor Sklovskij outlines that words are not available for being used to express thoughts. We use 
words without sense (Hansen 1996: 111).  
313 Franz Hinkelammert outlines that the trans from liberation to utopia has a transcendental movens and 
cannot be fulfilled within the line of conditio humana. Nevertheless, the trans is for the historic project 
necessary. Hinkelammert separates therefore two forms of captivity which negate the double structure of 
trans: we are captured in transcendental illusion, one the one side, and, on the other side, we are 
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Narcissist but we have to follow the wobbling tears into the darkness of the screaming 
night. The conducted night search is however not wresting the tears from the black 
night, its wresting leaves the glossy white dotted sketch of the tear as its locus delicti in 
the middle of the night. The liberating act of teardrops is in my reading nothing else 
than drawing on to the Narcissist’s mirror, since liberation is referring to relieving time 
from its chronological burden and unchaining space from its duty of hosting. Therefore, 
the structural duty of any liberator is limited to the very incident of cracking the chain 
of construction and unleashes it from causality. Nevertheless, there is a stronger reality 
that will question the accepted customs and overplays the overused whore called 
causality (Carl Einstein, Expositions de Collages (Galerie Goemans). In: Documents, 
1930, Nr. 4). By realising the teardrop from its metaphorised hostage of dark 
melancholia, the liberator establishes another storyline of relationships; this other 
regime is the – above-mentioned – lust of the Narcissist for overused whores. Hence, 
the mounted Sculpture is not a palimpsest on which description / space in history / time 
are multiple layered and is not the divestiture of language within the context of the 
Narcissist’s construction. The liberating heroes are none other than the new commander 
in chain and will betray us by establishing in the name of politics of montage another 
grammar and syntax. Therefore, changes in language policy are basically re-visiting 
language and drafting life-world in its commonly accepted contingent mode. The 
hyphen between social contingency and grammatical collage writes the production of 
picturesque linings that in turn outlines grotesque possibilities without formulating 
another story.  
 
Recalling the same story is the very prosopopeia of life-world; its connection agendum 
is therefore the revolutionary credendum that was outlined by the surrealistic movement 
at Rue de Grenelle 15, Paris 314  and by the formalistic OPOJAZ-group in St. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
following transcendental mysticism. Hence, the transcendental illusion outlines that the eternal 
transformation is not only approaching asymptotic the utopian horizon but rather aims for its captivation. 
In opposition, the transcendental mystification is the operation capturing the utopian horizon with specific 
measurements (Hinkelammert 1994: 300). Hinkelammert has formulated these lines in an attempt of how 
liberation and materiality can be close-read. His liberation theological approach has very interesting hints 
to my schizophrenic / hyper-schizophrenic reading of language and power. Unfortunately a further 
analysis would exceed the framework of this thesis.            
314 “(...) ce bureau s'emploie à recueillir par tous les moyens appropriés les communications relatives aux 
diverses formes qu'est susceptible de prendre l'activité inconsciente de l'esprit” (Breton 1987-99 I: 481). 
The Rue de Grenelle is my pars pro toto for Surrealism.   
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Petersburg315/316. The guiding line of both movements is to disturb (social) self-
sufficiency of linguistic practices by alienating the construction of grimaces against the 
purposeful usage of bourgeois’ every day practices317. By loosing the daily grind of 
linguistic usage, both movements are not attempting to replace language with a new 
system of linguistic work practice but rather reading life-world as its metaplasm: it is 
about conceiving la matière première (au sens alchemic) of linguistic everyday practice 
(Breton 1962: 357) and to understand it as priem ostranenija318 / 319. The acceptance in 
its modus vivendi is a special overriding of nihilistic reading320 that draws on the one 
side closer to my No. On the other side however, the alienating effects are primarily to 
point to the immediate origin of the surrealistic signifié 321 and its psychological urging 
to write life-worldly possibilities; the surrealistic signifié is complemented by the 
formalistic ostranenija of stressing the signifié in its tension of form and materiality322 
(Erlich 1973: 214). Thus, the alienation-act claims for difference-quality that in turn 
evokes Derrida’s le monde vécu in extremis. In contrast, the act of displaying No is the 
epipheton since translatio of A with B constructs neither life-world nor its pathological 
fixation. No is the deferral epipheton that cannot write addendum which actually foster 
the surrealistic credo of writing possibilities (Breton 1962: 48) – addendum is the cipher 
for possibility and construction. This option does not apply to No, since the structural 
vibration of addendum cannot be fixed on the map of NarcissistgrotesqueFace, 
mapping is rather sans sense while writing addendum. At this point we can say that the 
mounted Sculpture is effectively the tearing experimentum of a willenlosen Beiwerk 
                                                            
315  The young stream of Russian Formalists and Cubo-futurists analyse the phonetic-acoustic 
phenomenon (in linguistic practice) and its suppression by creating new forms of linguistic practice 
(Hansen 1996: 111f).  OPOJAZ is my pars pro toto for the Russian Formalism.  
316 Surrealistic and formalistic considerations contribute to our language analysis, since both movements 
have close links to the linguistic phenomenon. 
317 André Bréton writes in the Premier manifeste du surréalisme (Breton 1962: 13-63) that human beings 
are reduced – in the impossibility to grasp the complexity of the world – to indifference and therefore 
they are a product of une impérieuse nécessité pratique (Breton 1962: 15ff).  
Jurij Striedter writes in the preface of Russischer Formalismus that some of the Formalists follow the 
principle of épater le bourgeois (Striedter 1994: XV, cf. also: Erlich 1973: 196). 
318 Russian: procedure of the unfamiliar.  
319 Cf. Striedter: “An die Stelle ‘empirischer Gleichförmigkeiten’, aus deren experimenteller Beobachtung 
‘Gesetzeshypothesen’ gewonnen und geprüft werden sollen, treten bestimmte, am literarischen Material 
immer wieder zu beobachtende ‘Verfahren’, aus denen sich Schlüsse über Strukturen und 
Wirkungsweisen der Literatur gewinnen lassen, die es dann in erneuter Konfrontation mit dem 
historischen Material zu überprüfen gilt” (Striedter 1994: XXII). Erlich savours Sklovskij’s trope of 
alienation by outlining the semantic deferral as the raison d’être of narration (Erlich 1973: 195 and 
Striedter 1994: XXII). 
320 Pavel Medvedev remembers that linguistic Formalism uses predominantly the negation of the essential 
momentum as its basis (Medvedev 1976: 112).  
321 “Il n’est rien sur quoi il devrait se refuser à parler, à écrir d’abondance. S’écouter se lire n’ont d’autre 
effet que de suspendre l’occulte, l’admirable secours” (Breton 1962: 48). 
322 Cf. Victor Sklovskij’s Art as technique (Sklovskij 1965: 3-24). 
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beyond pathology and procedure, exactly: addendum sans cesse. The difference of 
writing surrealistic-formalistic metalepsis in translational practice and displaying A with 
B as willenloses Beiwerk that neglects any form of space-time presumptions, tells: 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not crypsis of writing with. Writing language as with is 
something else than having an emanating language of matière première (Breton 1962: 
357) or a linguistic product of free creation that follows its very own conditions 
(Hansen 1996: 111). A with B will never be the constitutio of framing life-world in 
which displaying with is the pivotal point while words die and the world remains 
eternally young (Hansen 1996: 112) – in this life-worldly words do not dance with 
articulated organs (Sklovskij 1994: 38); translatio is not punctus contra punctum where 
the dying punctus is contrasted by the punctum of eternal youth and where élan vital323 
might be the movens of differentiating linguistic practice as reinforcement of 
translational realities. Phenomenography writes rather A with B beyond the spatial and 
temporal dance (Sklovskij 1994: 38) and henceforth, the phenomenon cannot be 
confirmed as the historic a priori of alienating semantics324: time is neither intensified 
and contracted nor densified and contracted as the movement of time325 that facilitates 
the haptic seeing of linguistics. Time-space relationality – outlined by Bachtin as 
chronotopos – is not the cultural semantics326 framing the genre (Bachtin 2008: 8) and 
is not usurped to write unity by highlighting a metaphorised path (Bachtin 2008: 180) as 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s silver bullet would do it, while following the contracted time 
of the firing line. The scattered path is the historic charged space abrading life-worldly 
practices since telling the infolding chapter of filling the flesh with blood of the silver 
bullet leaves the echo of the written behind the reverberating membrane of life-world: 
the deathly blood leaves the untold over to the echo. Hence, Bachtin’s chronotopos 
collects the contraction of time and space while writing the infolding of the silver bullet 
by finally spelling out the internal form of the lexeme (Bachtin 2008: 188) where the 
untold over the echo is tamed by the infold of the form. Thus, the movimento of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace can only be the vivid consequence of entangling in life-world 
                                                            
323 Cf. The critique of Hansen-Löve on the zaum-poetics of Cubo-futurists (Hansen 1996: 112). 
324 Jean Cocteau explains that Sklovskij’s priem ostranenija is very similar to the surrealistic movement. 
The criterion of the unfamiliar is that what the surrealistic outlined as Wiedergeburt des Wunders (Erlich 
1973: 198). By quoting Cocteau we can see how Russian Formalism and French Surrealism can be close-
read.   
325 In reference to Kant’s understanding of time in Critique of Pure Reason (KrV B 33-73).  
326 That does not depend on Kant’s space and Heidegger’s time construction. 
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the signifié and the signifiant to multiple possibilities327. The ostranenija of possibilities 
contracting chronotopos twists the Thomistic principle of multiplex est similitudo 
(Summa Ia, 4, 3) and has therefore to be read in the narrative of a deferred 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace: the similitudo of multiplex reading re-deploys time in such 
ways that multiple linguistic locations where possible while the successively progress of 
the scenery A and B crystallises a flashback of stumbling chronicles alienating A and B 
from its motive. In formalistic turns, Boris Ejchenbaum replaces the structural realm of 
A and B through an evolutionary process of an immanent functional procedure; this 
procedure does not refer to any kind of real time and cannot be divided into 
chronological sections. By interrupting the very process of historicising the very nature 
of time, Ejchenbaum creates a kind of historic analysis of the persistent, steady, 
immutable and immovable in its shift and modification, whose objects are the rules of 
the dynamic of the occurrences, that is not simply its very facticity. The aporetic 
immovable in its movement is Ejchenbaum’s understanding of creating newness. 
Alexander Potebnjas’s notion of concreteness is, in addition to Ejchenbaum, the 
enlivenment of words since it liberates the lexeme from its bureaucratic knot and 
highlights allusively the connotative innerness of its very formation (Hansen 1996: 49). 
And Aleksej Krucenychs’ quotation words are dying, the world remains eternally 
young (Hansen 1996: 112) is therefore the capitulation in front of life-world, since death 
is actually the sine qua non for life in the world. That leads Roman Jakobson to say that 
the formalistic point is to stress that the form has overcome its material in such a way 
that the material is utterly covered up by its very form (Hansen 1996: 112)328. In other 
words, the formalistic breakup with the automation of language is the alienation for 
material on another potency and it is simultaneously the syntagmatic composition in 
which the ambiguity is interpretation (Hansen 1996: 228); it is this relationship formula 
of many with interpretation. Max Ernst underpins from a surrealistic perspective the 
formalistic many with interpretation by highlighting the poetic firing of random 
approaches as its vital liberation by scraping up the interior and outer life-world (Ernst 
1934: 5). This kind of newness has the exciting news to have a liberator who is not a 
liberator in its structural sense, but nevertheless the immovable in its movement is the 
structural definition of historical analysis by accepting implicitly chronotopos that 
                                                            
327 Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson (1990) try to read Bachtin’s chronotopos as a multiplicity of 
definite terms of social spatiality.  
328 The formalistic position reverses and dissolves the scholastic distinction of matter and form but 
nevertheless it still upholds Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic in. The cipher in turns the task of explaining to 
comprehension.    
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covers up the transcendental framework of recognition and reconciliation. Ejchenbaum 
is in this regard just another Merleau-Ponty who hides the transcendental precondition 
by the chiasm of the immovable in its movement: A in B. In contrast, Ernst was 
exploring as well by psychologising liberation as its exit formula. Subliminally, we can 
read that decomposing liberation is predominantly the decomposition of time and space 
and therefore we might segue from condition to reification and therefore from fixage to 
the mounted Sculpture. This from to trope is the competence of writing relationships 
while creating grotesque figures of stumbling seeing as its deferral of with. 
Nevertheless, the stumbling seeing is a qualified relation insofar as it runs the hidden 
nature of ammonitore’s seeing hand and the possibility of writing the grotesque figures 
in the time-compression machine of chronotopos: the difference between A with B will 
be the stratagem of confounding the structures of the horizon A and horizon B in with. 
Ammonitore’s translational act is within the aftermath of the scholastic premises matter 
cannot contact form – the consequentialism of matter and form enables us to explain 
life-word, since the meaningless matter is the conjunction of causality; matter with form 
is in opposition the conjunction where stories can be told without having the reciprocal 
necessity. Telling No is the juxtaposition of the willenlosen Beiwerk that has no strategy 
of structures and therefore the bitterness of the forbidden fruit has never been cultivated 
in the historical momentum of the paradise. The co-presence of A with B is the mounted 
Sculpture of NarcissistgrotesqueFace; seeing with legs is re-visiting Alberti’s cum 
while emphasising that ammonitore’s seeing with hands is not the compound of seeing 
with legs.  
 
 
C The mounted Sculpture  
 
The mounted Sculpture of bearing A with B has therefore not a disguised ontological 
foundation nor an immanentism of regional structures either; the disembodiment of art / 
téchne from its ur-syncretism was hitherto leading to producing the very ontological 
foundation; producing promotes an aesthetic of evolution in which the intransitive 
function (of self-value) towards transitive form (of alienation) has fixed chronotopos as 
reality producing relationship-machine. Bearing the mounted Sculpture is rather the 
vestigium of translational practice that passes by as we attempt to fix the relationship A 
with B. Bearing vestigium is the mounted Sculpture NarcissistgrotesqueFace where A 
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with B cannot be aestheticised and materialised, respectively where the re-translation of 
the disformed towards outer-aesthetic phenomena is not possible or simply the 
grotesque distortion of life-world. Translatio of A with B has no vector-matrix that re-
temporalises and re-fixes space. Hence, the formula becoming with in time and space, 
respectively the becoming of the topos, is present when I talk about 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace and do not value it as life-worldly reference; or to put it in 
other words, the prefix re disables to write the movement of the material necessity, 
since A and B is put upside down. Hence, the Kantian a posteriori geography is the a 
priori of space over time and Heidegger’s stressing of timing life-world will be replied 
in my study by consigning time and space without appreciating these two poles: the 
translatio of life-world as objective is relationally impossible and therefore, bearing A 
with B is its willenlose Beiwerk that stumbles with NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s silver 
bullet in Bachtin’s chronotopos. In reading perplexity, I read time neither as its timeless 
fiction of talking space nor its chronological facticity of shaping life-worldly stages329. 
Its fragmentary character and its permanent feel of historical insufficiency cannot write 
narratives over time and space and in consequence, the transfer from A to B and its 
commutative property of re-translating the aesthetic disformed outer-aesthetic 
phenomena will be permanently in need of explanations (Hansen 1996: 423). We have 
to understand that bearing with and in consequence the willenlose Beiwerk are not an 
abstract and life-world-enraptured figuration but very much in time and space without 
its time-space-continuum. This is radicalism and this radicalism is neither able to have 
nor to be language, but translatio is in life-world – in is however lined up as with that is, 
literally in its remotest material niche, barbarian. Translatio lacking time and space is 
the barbaric dirt since the euphoria of metaplasm can only be written by an author, 
whose reference is fixed in time and space and therefore be translated into history and 
into the archives of life-worldly materiality. Bearing with in return has no fixed 
authorship and is not the outburst of immanentism but bearing with is vestigium that 
deprives itself of becoming history. The genesis of becoming with is not the figuration 
of translating its genesis; the force of ramification while writing the becoming of A with 
B is not bearing translatio – the upcoming relations of ramifying realities are 
schizophrenic options of pretending the synergy of pluripotentiality; the disformed 
materiality of A with B is not capable of writing the synergy as its translation. 
                                                            
329 Georges Didi-Huberman refers to Brecht’s Kleines Organon für das Theater in which neither timeless 
fiction nor chronological facticity can be found in real facts: experimental conditions are only able to play 
with the impure character of real facts to show the fragmentary conditions of the historical transformation 
of grammar (cf. (Didi-Huberman 2009: 76) and (Bertoldt Brecht 1967: 686)).    
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Henceforth, the epic telling of becoming is slightly shifted by small stories reading its 
bearing with that is written on the palm leaves of history but without locating translatio 
of A with B in the lining of time and space. The curved plastic NarcissistgrotesqueFace 
is therefore bearing stormy conditions while disforming A with B – the very prefix re – 
indicating the act of repetition – curves out the redundant bulk of the sculpture and 
simultaneously mounting the left over for crafting; this heroic resistence is the 
beginning of the story of NarcissistgrotesqueFace.     
 
Hence, displaying NarcissistgrotesqueFace story is a stumbling seeing, it is stumbling 
not because there is a spatial hurdle in the dilatation of time but because seeing with 
legs is the immovable moving. The No to becoming with is a topos of vestigium that 
displays the non-reliance of structures and formation. Hitherto, the relying force of 
montage is the connection of the grotesque figure to its ornamental assemblage while 
the distraction of the grotesque face A with B is a mounted Sculpture. The tugging 
compositum of following the mise en abyme of the montage is in my reading no longer 
the urging density of life-worldly sculptures. Reading mounted Sculpture is cobbling the 
collapsed coherence while still stumbling A with B. The repetition of the scratch is the 
utterance of the oxymoron mounted Sculpture: mounting is the praxis in which the 
material of the sculpture is not simply taken and scattered by the assembler but is 
undergoing the assemblage of carving the material of a material monolith. Tearing the 
removal material by assembling its carvings and modellings and therefore undermining 
the attraction-lines of montages will divert the signature sculpsit. A disformed centre of 
sub-textures cuts off the line enacting the sculptural attraction, while the re-figuration of 
the ambivalent exhaustion is not the dissolution that leads to canonical realities. The 
enthumema assumes the re-vocation of language by its principals while referring to the 
stumbling reality that the mounted Sculpture is therefore disabling any forms of 
automatism in life-world. The deadly point of describing330 and translating life-worldly 
realities is overtaken by the vivid reception of word-seeds cracking the reality in which 
we used to be at home. If we turn once more to the framework of formalistic writing, we 
can read the homeland of enthumema as a synthesis of practice. Potebnjas was 
attempting to semantically differ (sdvig) the obvious while overriding the signifié-
signifiant liaison by joining up inner and outer forms. The merging of the inner 
semantic composition and the outer phonetic reality writes the outlined schizophrenic 
                                                            
330 Vladimir Majokovskij outlines that we can find in Cechov’s writing conclusions which are maximised 
in their reductions in order to create lexemes (Hansen 1996: 112). 
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reality in which the formulations of the pathological parallels are for Potebnjas not 
causal relationships but anthropocentric life-worldly associations of the very well 
known (Hansen 1996: 45f). The syntactic sdvig rehearses the psychological parallelism 
that does not stumble like the syncope of the mounted Sculpture, since overriding the 
syncretism of the very nucleus via psychological double belongings leads to the 
phenomenon of becoming with that writes a quadruple pathology. The montage of the 
grotesque figure is the outburst of the economy of producing, formulating a chronology 
of becoming with that is from a relational point of view nothing else than the evolution 
of self-sufficiency towards the transitive grotesque / utilitarian functionalism of 
language331 – hence, it is again the ramification power of fieri that cannot read the co-
presence of bearing A with B. The functionalism of dynamic totality (Hansen 1996: 
369) is the disempowerment of the scholastic affinity towards restitutio ad integrum, in 
which the possessum of translation shows the teleology of the vestigium. The integrum 
is rather an oscillating practise of a syn-aesthetic stimulus (Hansen 1996: 59f) that 
overturns the epic telling of life-world as totality while opting for perplex co-presence. 
This non-mediated confrontation with life-worldly situations – in which the reality of 
the surface exposure is the valence of things – is very similar to my reading of No. The 
act of mincing the canon is positively formulated, the formalistic reading in which the 
montage is articulated out of its material contrast and not as its summa (Hansen 1996: 
95). The Russian formalistic tradition creates extracts that are formulated by an active 
subject; the fractura of the montage is the hepatic self-presentation between matter and 
material. This double reading ends up in a syntagmatic close up view that formulates 
with while writing side lines: A and B as diverted pictures of life-worldly drawings. A 
with B enacting side lines are very close to the synecdoche mounted Sculpture while 
radicalising the montage to its very detail. Nevertheless, the syn of Sklovskij’s 
syntagma proposes the activity of new creations and subverts my reading A with B; the 
mounted Sculpture is the sheer insanity that collides with the syntagmatic readings of 
Sklovskij and his fellows. The psychological doublexity of the syntagmatic acting will 
be imploded in my hyper-readings of carving out co-presence that yields the internal 
narration by filling out the void of the transition (Hansen 1996: 347).             
 
                                                            
331  Aleksandr Veselovskijs’ framework of becoming with is driven by differentiating noetic and 
psychological modes. The movens for conceptualising aesthetics does not underpin its very quality. The 
automation of aesthetics leads not simply to the unity of tradition but to the unity of psychological 
procedure in the kind of ars renovata forma dicendi (Hansen 1996: 48). 
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One more once, the dissolution of time and space disables phenomenographic longing 
for discernment, the reading of NarcissistgrotesqueFace while bearing A with B swirls, 
runs high and goes down, it is dirty, pulverised and stretches in the chemical compound 
of H2O not a contact but an explosion of practice. Hence, the translation of A with B is 
more than a theorem, more than theory, more than aesthetics and even more than an 
optical phenomenon. The perplexity of bearing with enacts an elusiveness of display 
that is dramatic and heavily present, since it is in time and space unhinged from time 
and space. This is the point, where the mounted Sculpture is not simply an oxymoron 
but the latio in trans – yes, it is the point, where the mounted Sculpture is the heavy 
displaying coherence formulating disjecta membra. The radical longing of with is 
neither explaining nor comprehending, it displays; it displays the urging value of the 
impossible in such a way that the No to materialism is the raw appearance that is 
bearing with and is not the interpretation of excluding systemic settings that are 
founded on their fragments. The dissected elements are neither the historic remaining 
ambiguity of a surrealistic montage anticipating the future nor the hepatic motor of 
alienating totality: with is not fragmented, it is not a crypsis, it is neither teratological 
nor is it an epitheton. The authority of the fragment will be suspended since the 
synecdoche with is the pending fragment that turns its diffracted mode into almost 
complete similarities: the translatio of A with B is getting pretty close without knowing 
what is closure – no space, no time in space and time – it might be AwihtB, AthiwB, A w 
I t  h B or it might be as well A     with                   B: we laugh, but we do not know 
what we laugh about; with is not a topos noetos – the Narcissist’s teardrops might be the 
outburst of laugh and not the aphansis of life-lust. Or to put in other words, the sign, the 
lexeme, A and B are the epiphasis that is literally the aphanisis of slipping from 
translatio’s grid. The mounted Sculpture is exactly that above mentioned holy mess of 
A with B smiting the simultaneous, the urging, the inconsistent, the fu(n)ck(y), the 
messy, the Pope and the capitalist lesbian kiss of Madonna and Britney Spears. 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the sheer insanity where language is the palimpsest of a 
fleshy non-design aka non-ramification: writing like a pussycat or even though stronger, 
not only writing but also being the curing sound of pussycat332. Michel Leiris feels sorry 
for those people who are not able to feel the need to metamorphose themselves into 
table, chair, animal, paper, etc. (Wörterbuch 39): the transformation of the body into the 
possibility of a pussycat or an oyster-card is the pathology that was the pathological 
                                                            
332 The sheer insanity is the metamorphosis-project of Bataille by virtually depicting animaux savages 
(Georges Bataille, Chronique Dictionnaire, Animaux Sauvages. In: Documents, 1929, Nr. 6, 333).   
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virulence of the surrealistic eidos. The sheer insanity is therefore literally not the 
descent of sketching pussycatRemo or Remopussycat but the very fraction of the 
willenlose Beiwerk. NarcissistgrotesqueFace writes subsequently the detail that has 
been curved out of pussycatRem…..o. It is the perplex interruption of bearing that has 
no trim margins – bearing with of this trimmed margins are calling Bataille’s fissure, 
Brecht’s detail and can be read as Reginold’s mounted Sculpture. Hence, the 
dramatisation of differed margins is the ephitheton, writing an aesthetic theatre of 
surrealistic potential and formalistic polysemy. And therefore, the fringes are rather the 
details which are interrupting the slip away of the signifiant flottant: Haraway’s fringing 
creature OncoMouse no longer relies on Trickster God, it is Mouse …….Onco; yes, 
dilatation twirled around. The antithesis of the holy and the impure is written by A with 
B, while the fissure is not possible without contact; the act of fissure starts with 
touching by materialising the touching surface as its fissure. With is the transgression 
from A and B while transgressing into the taboo of touching. This close up view is 
Brecht’s detail endangering the scream of the montage since the close view might 
reveal the secret of relations while writing the grotesque figure. The close reading of the 
montage overrides the perception of A and B and can therefore neither interfere with 
sub-texture nor its deferred praxis. Bataille’s depiction of fissure is bas matérialisme 
undermining the paraphrased body of materiality; his matérialisme déclassé is to some 
extent my No to language and materialism. The sheer insanity is the bounce of being 
touched by my eyes – voilà: the constellation of the bounce is actually the reading of 
constellating perplexity in which the historical exposé cannot follow the formal pattern 
of displaying alienation. The reading of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the experimentum 
that queers the schizophrenic double-structure by the hyper that reads the non-archived 
character of history – the impurity of bas matérialisme – in its perforated shape, but on 
the other hand, the hyper as its gap subverts the metalepsis of A with B while displaying, 
not the documented organon of the historical vestigium, but snatching the vestigium that 
does not frame the extract A with B. The inconsistency of the symmetry within with is 
actually the mounted Sculpture that enacts the symmetry of a non-discourse that will be 
singularised in curiosity. Seeing singularity means displaying bearing with beyond the 
singularity of writing with as a historical necessity, which has been overlapped by the 
lacunae of Blitzkriege. This (revolutionary) potential of flipping over historic necessity 
mounts a historical setting that writes the combination of A with B as the disobedience 
of the exposed footage. The montage however exposes its footage by considering 
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exposing by exposing that we are exposing, and subsequently exposing, exposing, 
exposing and again exposing; the montage splits off to manifest the visual and temporal 
difference by exposing the juxtapositioning of with as its conjunctive imperative. The 
imperator of with transgresses in history with the very conjunctum dwelling, the 
psycho-pathological lie of doubling the progress in history to fill the gap of writing with 
by the vestigium. The prolonging of bearing with is not the practice in which the 
doublings of A with B is encoded by the art of differentiating but it is the historical 
abstrusity of bearing the decadence of doubling that can do something – can trigger 
something – can extinguish something. The hypo of this very schizophrenic reality is 
able to write a bearing with that implodes the perplex palimpsest of writing and re-
writing the storyline of the fairy tail that can never pull the trigger, since its story-line 
redeems the oedipal dream of pulling with of A with B into it. This psychoanalytic 
measure is the feature of having the reliability of with, that is subordinated by the in, 
that in turn is able to bear the lie of doubling the movens for A with B while creating an 
extract of practice. The juxtaposition of bearing with beyond the scope of re-tracing 
life-worldly lines is the willenlose Beiwerk that I have been calling so far as mounted 
Sculpture. The co-presence of A with B longing for identity is neither a supplement nor 
complement. The desertion of the scholastic vestigium exposes legally the same 
material but speaks virulent from NarcissitgrotesqueFace. Bearing A with B is reading 
its farwell while fooling around with the montage. The earnest of depicting the 
excerption is the evidence of referring to the analytic positioning of the observer who 
points to the excerption while writing its compositium of life-worldly practices. The 
configuration of life-worldly perception will be the decrescendo of the screaming body 
that falls into the abyss of realities; the attention of the eye to capture the continuity of 
fading down the screaming body is the very epistemic topos in which A with B is the 
narrative pattern that includes the reading of the abyss as its historical momentum 
enabling the translation of life-world. The alimentation of topos noetos enables us to 
read A with B as a combination that allows to differentiate A and B due to the sensitivity 
of being able to listen to the screaming body, writing the darkness of the abyss as its 
legal potential of positioning A with B – the legality can be heard while the screaming 
body falls into the abyss, where history and the spotlight are suddenly virile. 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the lengthiness of practicing its legal status while 
gaining the competence to read the screaming fall. Hence, the chronotopos, the 
supremacies of Kant’s space and Heidegger’s time are not able to read the synecdoche 
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NarcissistgrotesqueFace as the mapping force of bearing A with B. The mounted 
Sculpture is indeed radicalism that does not follow clichés and denies the authority, 
which is producing the montage as picture or yet as the excerpt of a falling picture. The 
authority of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is tomorrow or was yesterday but never today – 
there is neither the option to rely on the institution language nor legislation either. The 
non-reliance of with writes translatio but it is never the saviour of life-world 
physicality. The hyper-schizophrenic act overrides the call for liberation while bearing 
A with B; our mounted Sculpture is disforming, yet not playing the grotesque card of 
being signed by the surrealistic authority of possibility, while writing the authority of 
formalistic compositions333; with is not a precarious ambiguity since there is no change 
of A and B. The taxon of A and B is telling while telling A with B. The pedagogical aim 
of how presenting the montage, which is lacking a raison d’être, has been overplayed 
by the disformation in which the contrast is the contact: aufheben is the co-presence of 
translatio.  
 
 
D Co-presence  
 
The co-presence of A with B formulates a paroxysmal semblance that can neither write a 
supplement nor a complement of relational practices in actua – the semblance is the 
disformation of A with B that transfers vital dilatations of the hyper-schizophrenic act in 
linguistic practices. Whether the supplement or the complement de-layers the semblance 
of A with B from its locus classicus, they rather enable us to see an essential 
dissimilarity baffling both the supplement and the complement of its semblance334. 
Hence, the baffling act can be read synoptically with – the above mentioned – affront of 
perplexity by understanding the imaginative reality of its locus classicus 335 . In 
operation, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is literally taking the baffling imago to its very own 
                                                            
333 The discussion of formalistic, surrealistic and phenomenological traditions can outline interesting 
connections, which can unfortunately not been dealt with within this thesis. The texts of Bréton, 
Mallarmé, Ernst, Sklovskij, Ejchenbaum, etc. referring to a material reading of ostranenija and to a 
psychological formation of possibilities showing how Formalism and Surrealism incorporate the element 
of progress within the formation of montages. This progress is the parallel-lecture of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace. 
334 Jacques Lacan outlines the correlation of the fragmentation of the intersubjective relationship that 
evokes and transgresses imaginative boundaries (Lacan 1978: 208ff).   
335 According to Merleau-Ponty, we might understand that the transformation of the locus classicus re-
phrases the essentialism of his carnal body. The unformed body cannot be read in its chiastic move. The 
non-reliance of the supplement and complement in semblance gets very close to reading 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace in an illuminative way of chiastic essentialism.     
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limits while expelling the perplexity of imaginative efficiency by yielding the authority 
of the locus classicus and its affiliated limits; in other words, reading metaplasm is not 
only a highly creative way to enter life-worldly scenes via oral expressions, they also 
reconfirm the locus classicus by suppressing orchestral attempts of vaginal barbaric 
writings 336 . The performance of imaginative efficiency neglects to consider the 
translation of oral and vaginal utterance, since the correlative dictum of imaginative 
efficiency implodes while transgressing the linguistic picture of neologisms and its 
simultaneous condemnation of re-writing the potesta of metaplasm. Therefore, the co-
presence of mouth with vagina outlines radically the paroxysmal semblance that 
features the fragrance of shining shit: the co-presence of A with B does neither 
decompose the formation of shit nor does it follow the odour of the shitty glance on the 
surface of life-worldly scenes – the supplement and the complement are hors categorie 
– A with B will be written with smelly fingers which were constantly fingering in the 
theoretical depth of (vaginal) excrements. Hence, the ordinary process of its very 
structural reality will be disturbed by the hyper of writing the abysmal of imaginative 
efficiency: fingering the grotesque outburst as grotesque masque of metaplasm is the 
smelly ornament of writing history true the dilatation of reciting with – it is the very 
reverse augmentation of linguistic legacy. The historic progress streams constantly 
through my eyes while overriding the vestigium of the very told story. The dilatation of 
the story line writing with as co-presence sketches no comments about the violence of 
forming life-world while the hidden file of A with B concerts a compulsive anamnesis of 
latency. The trial for explaining the mounted Sculpture is now perplexity tout court that 
overrides the density of A with B while writing A with B. Hence, co-presence does not 
need its aesthetic counterpart to operate within life-world; the sun has been depicted as 
human being who transects his / her throat her / himself337 and attacks the bearing of A 
with B as a society of mounted Sculptures. Therefore, we have to look very close to see 
the smell and grasp that the indefinite article a (of a mounted Sculpture) is precisely a 
No that is never Not – the act of an a-stage on which A with B are starring, bears the 
indefinite (article) to the perplexity of A with B when writing to its narcissistic lover No. 
The (love)story is therefore the very No of a gestalthafte anachoresis that turns with 
once more up side down. Thus, the co-presence does not need the presence and reality 
of materiality nor a montage that watches itself dialectically. The Narcissist has been 
                                                            
336 The oral and vaginal relationality is inspired by Freud’s vision of Irmas Injektion and is re-negotiated 
by Lacan (Lacan 1978: 186).  
337 Cf. Batailles’ aesthetic of Acéphale (Bataille 1995). 
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banned to the deathly desert in which she / he oscillates in delirium of diastole and 
systole and formulates hyper-schizophrenic activities that bear a kind of co-presence 
that does not simply bear the grotesque translation of bearing with as its contractual 
contradiction. Bearing with is not the rhetoric figure reading itself as the antithesis or 
the exclamation mark of prudery: sorry, the petting between A and B has already 
happened before you even had the chance to write A with B – the exclamation mark 
after A with B – A with B! – is the co-presence with NarcissistgrotesqueFace that is 
always translatio and never the hygienic need for language that considers life-worldly 
relationships and the consequences of its activities as translation. Therefore with does 
not long for the other by bridging A and B – the epitheton is the vistigium that implies 
the impossible subversion of a summarised taxonomy. This leads to a momentum to say 
that the willenlose Beiwerk tries to bring something to an equilibrium where actually no 
weights are – it writes a perfidious metric system that has the structure from the logical 
to a figurative point of view as its linguistic life to keep life-world even much more 
lively. Hence, the heresy of structural readings cannot write the grotesque figure of 
heterodox references; the co-presence or the mounted Sculpture is not the facilitating 
movens of reading polysemy, it is rather silence beyond polysemy. The schizophrenic 
sense of A with B is the silent shouting of the hyper where double entries of the 
linguistic-complex are literally bearing with of catachresis: co-presence-bearing with-
translatio are rocking phenomenographic exclamation marks which are documenting 
historical legacy without having the chronos as its metric feet338. Therefore, the syn of 
synecheia chronou cannot be the with that is in charge of Hades: the historical gathering 
of A and B is unavailable since the experience of historicity is practically the obsession 
of co-presence and literally the salient point writing the latent perplexity as its hyper-
schizophrenic outburst. Experiencing hyper-trop(y)e writes the vestigium as its close up 
view of the smelly detail that never existed.   
 
Hence, vestigium draws a line that never has been drawn by the coercion of writing with 
at the end of the bottom line of A with B – it is the story where the efficiency overruns 
the economic ideology of the best cause by the presence of the authority of grotesque 
form(ation) and the convenience of possibilities in which the exclamation mark of hyper 
is not the spur of writing the logos. It is not simply the tension between two poles – 
                                                            
338 By correlating bearing with with metric feet, we can see similarities Bataille attaches to Le gros orteil 
(Georges Bataille, Le gros orteil. In: Documents, 1929, Nr. 6, 298). His idea is to write about a close up 
picture of a toe and not as a detailed view. The correlative friction between close up and detailed view is 
the possible screening of a non-chronological historiography.     
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identified by the condition of programming – but a with that triggers a morpho-pathetic 
echo of the exclamation mark339 that will not have the sensitivity for its spur nor the 
severity and abstraction of its morpho-phatetic practice either. Bataille would have used 
the vestigium of the hyper as an essay to read the universe as the hazy prospect of spit. 
This virulent change of perspectives leads Bataille to a credo while writing bas 
matérialisme, the non-alternative alternative to materiality  – the deferral of materialism 
is the co-presence where the vagina and the mouth have been translated by the utterance 
of my nose and is therefore readily not the dense formation of formless encounters as 
Rosalinda Krauss and Yves-Alain Bois expound Bataille’s informe (Bois and Krauss 
1996 and 1997). Displaying A with B is subsequently not the trace of grotesque urging 
of a formless spit, it is rather a reading of bas matérialisme that re-writes translatio of A 
with B as co-presence that cannot counteract by an informe reading but a disformed 
vestigium that stresses the form of the mouth while writing vagina. The emphasis on the 
form is however the vestigium that is not stranded on the shores of the translational 
realm but as the hyper writing NarcissistgrotesqueFace and therefore, I read Bataille’s 
informe as the disformation of perplexity bearing the material of A with B, not the 
summarised necessity of anatomy but as the bearing of physiognomy: translatio of A 
with B is the utterance of apophatic stories. 
 
The line telling apophatic stories of NarcissistgrotesqueFace reverberates the synecheia 
chronou that cannot purge the remembrance into historical narratives – the impossibility 
of synecheia chronou is the edging force of reading with in the deferring practice of No. 
Translatio of life-world is more likely a verrichten than a disposition of the echo. That 
means that the formalistic formation and the surrealistic possibilities are definitely not 
the dis-position of translatio, since they are dispositions. The difference of A with B is 
not written by the disposition of the typographic difference of A and B – the vestigium 
of A with B is enacted via the act of bearing its co-presence; in other words, the 
figuration of bearing A with B is the fermentation of hyper-schizophrenic linguistic 
practices in which the act of stumbling is the uncompromising perplexity of bearing A 
with B. The apophatic line writing the juxtapositioning of A with B while verrichten its 
fall is the fall out of favour that hitherto coerced dialectic labelling340, but nevertheless 
falling is not falling. The falling act has lost its velocity and it has lost its reference of 
                                                            
339 Walter Benjamin would re-phrase the exclamation mark by the notion of Aura.  
340 This is the ultimate infringement with Kant; the Kantian telos of transcendentality is led by the telos of 
certainty. The certainty is the ethic notes on liberty, equality and codetermination. 
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displaying A with B, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is definitely not the monstrous spell out 
of A with B. The story A with B, is not the echoing line on which we might depicture the 
sym and cum of mouth with vagina; the non-portrayal NacissistgrotesqueFace is 
therefore the denial of having NarcissitgrotesqueFace as totality. In reference to with 
Bataille, we have to read le bas matérialisme as the forsakenness of bas and 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace as the forsakenness of with. Hence, the juxtaposition of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace and with is the experimentum of story telling that offends just 
to goad without dispelling NarcissistgrotesqueFace. It is much about Bataille’s ripping 
of materiality without cutting it into pieces (Bataille 1943); ripping materiality is the 
semblance of A with B while exposing the taboo: seeing the physiognomy of mouth 
while writing vagina. The exposure overrides the stigma of ground-realities by sapping 
the taboo of displaying its echo. The echoing seeing writes the epigraph of historic 
realities without knowing its capitalis monumentalis – there is no spirit of transition in it 
and no epigraphic depiction. The dialectic of montage is – while continuing – apophatic 
in such a way that the display of bearing A with B is not the structure of the material 
substrate: the ordo naturalis cannot be translated into life-worldly experiences that 
dismantle the ordo from nature. There is no tension of transgressing the montage in 
which dissolution and synthesis form the grotesque outlook of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. 
Dissolution and synthesis are not the material grounding for juxtapositioning A with B, 
dissolutionsynthesis NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the ad manum of translatio in which 
the mounted Sculpture disforms, while writing a juxtapositioning that is not made by 
chance but by its co-presence. The disformed writing is neither simply the negation of 
form nor the absence of it. Bataille’s bas matérialisme is the suspension of material and 
form, since it is neither the absence nor the negation of forming. Bataille outlines while 
writing bas matérialisme that the classic difference between material and form has to be 
rejected. This rejection is founded on the double structure of the abstract God and the 
abstract material (Georges Bataille, Le bas matérialisme et la gnose. In: Document, 
1930, Nr. 1, 1). It exposes not only a dilemma while overwriting constantly the abstract 
God by the abstract material and the abstract material by the abstract God, it also 
oscillates with a structural reality in Bataille’s reading by enabling a new effect of 
progressing; we can summarise Bataille’s position by saying that after all any disturbing 
momentum in Bataille is a hidden germ for dialectics. Yes – for once – this play of 
dialectic supremacy is the hidden ticket for schizophrenia; hyper-schizophrenia is 
however not the answer to the dilemma, it is perplex fall, where the dialectic play drags 
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through the Narcissist-mirror of mire. The grotesque deprivation of the material towards 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the hunching line for possibilities341; the upswing of 
falling materiality is rather the transfer from life-world to No and to redundancy echoing 
the vestigium of bearing life-worldly realities. Therefore, we have to say that bearing the 
upswing of falling subverts the grotesque masque of close-writing A with B. The 
closeness of the echo is No and neither the rejection of bas as such nor the logic of 
scattered structures342. The prefix re of repealing life-worldly realms is the transfer of 
repealing A and B towards A with B while reading the process of transferring the 
juxtapositioning A with B as its pealing materiality that is not scattered. The lingering 
sound of falling is not the living cantus of legacy but the ligature enabling hyper-
schizophrenic readings of with. Bataille’s crunching tactics of material reads 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace as its pull on of informal qualities than constructive realities 
where the time-line of the kings is replaced by the cave of the villain. Consequently, we 
have to draw the line saying that the fetish of verrichten the willenlose Beiwerk is the 
catacresis of vestigium 343  – the fermentation of story telling is translatio when 
translatio reports I am hungry and Hitler has been constituted in 1933. The willenlose 
Beiwerk is the perverse swap in which bearing A with B is the verrichtete 
Aufgehobenheit in which the translation of words can never be part of language.  
 
Hence, the verrichtete Aufgehobenheit writing the willenlose Beiwerk is not the 
excavation of teratology in which life-worldly practices are doomed to contingency 
where language and the directorship of senses are forbidden, the mounted Sculpture and 
the practice of the willenlose Beiwerk are rather story telling without having the spool of 
history. Story telling is neither the ability to describe the line of A with B nor the 
utterance of non-constitutive fleshy words. Bearing A with B is the juxtaposition of No 
which hurts to tease the practice of life-worldly realities without hurting the lexeme – 
this is the paradoxon that nourishes lack and excess of hyper-schizophrenia enabling to 
                                                            
341 The difference to Derrida’s formal law of deferral, Benjamin’s Wahlverwandschaft and Reginold’s 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace are the impossibility of possibility; that means that the sense for possibility can 
only be evoked by the necessity of stressing the structured space-time rhetoric. The tearing body is within 
this framework simply the necessity for progress. 
342 Cf. the conversation between Hal Foster, Benjamin Buchloh, Rosalind Krauss, Yve-Alain Bois, Denis 
Hollier and Helen Molesworth, in: The Politics of the Signifier II: A conversation on the ‚Informe’ and 
the abject (Foster et al 1994: 3-21). 
343 Bataille outlines in reference to Van Gogh that there is no value for transfer by stating that Van Gogh 
does not belong to history of art (Bataille 1970 1: 500). In addition, Bataille criticises the 
commercialising aspect of the Avant-garde by reading that its very production has been negotiated at the 
stock exchange (Georges Batailles, L’esprit moderne et le jeu des transpositions. In: Documents, 1930, 
Nr. 7, 489-492).  
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break with boundaries of aesthetic dialectics. The figural reading of the story is 
therefore not existent and the classification of the paradox not described as the fleshy 
body; we have to consider that No of linguistic materiality is not willing to tell its 
grammar, it is rather the fall of perplex negations that mounts A with B to sequences of 
Sculptures telling NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The experimental dissection and clashes of 
mounting linguistic practices is the vestigium telling us about the chiastic story telling 
of with344. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the notate of a linguistic intrusive happening that 
never had happened in life-worldly realities in concreto. The translatio of linguistic 
hyper-schizophrenia is the minimalistic rapport in which my arms are able to seize 
intimacy345. The copulation of my arm and intimacy or the copulation of mouth and 
vagina are the willenose Beiwerk that distresses the formal possibility of transgressing 
form by doing nothing (Georges Bataille, Le cheval académique. In Documents, 1929, 
Nr. 1, 30). Henceforth, perplex negations tell us the display in which the total view of 
the close shot is the non-portrayal squeeze of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The non-
intimacy of storytelling is the teasing act in which the detail is not the distance to write a 
linguistic-aesthetic synthesis 346 . In concreto, we might say that Bataille’s bas 
matérialisme has lost the virility of reading the baseness of materiality as swapping 
conjuncture of grasping by overlying the non-representable monstrosity of hyper. The 
linguistic pace through the haunted forest of life-world is the totality of a non-
potrayable story of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. In continuation to that we can say with 
Carl Einstein that the biological monotony has been avoided (Hollier 1994: 84) by 
emphasising that the isochromatic tunes are never the picture into another life-world. 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the plunge of the picture that does not highlight another 
crystallography by scratching on the surface of life-worldly stories. The crack of the 
crystalline does not draw another crystalline prism, rather it is the utterance of bearing 
on the surface that trembles every single vein of crystallographic writings: analogia is 
no longer analogia, love is no longer love, historical writings are no longer historical 
writings, language is no longer the practice of grammatical directives and relationships 
are no longer the intimacy of lining up but … (the continuation however cannot be 
                                                            
344 Eisenstein was sure that the chocs are the predominant facilitator of communication since the event of 
art is lead by clashes (Eisenstein 1929: 9). 
345 In reference to Jean Epstein, Pascal Bonitzer writes that the close shot changes the drama through the 
impression of proximity. Hands can grasp pain and in reality there is no air between us; I am literally 
consuming it. It is in me and it is a sacrament (Bonitzer 1971: 19 and 22). 
346 Friedrich Schlegel’s linguistic-aesthetic synthesis or non-synthesis by destroying the form “(…) 
verletzt, um zu reizen – ohne zu zerstören” (Schlegel 1882: 58) ressembles my NarcissistgrotesqueFace 
(cf. Hansen 1996: 37). 
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written with words that referrers obviously to an existing grammatical corpus). The 
mounted Sculpture of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is therefore never the sum347 of its 
scraped out features; we are telling a story – without any hesitation – formulating one 
plus one equals three. The fall of summing up by the figure of three cannot be written 
as grotesque outburst, since the sum is no longer writing relations: one plus one equals 
three is the perplex bearing of telling A with B while acting as NarcissistgrotesqueFace! 
The burst of the crystal prism is the translatio of the mounted Sculpture of telling the 
never-ending story of the plunge of the picture. Or to put it in other words, translatio is 
not the peeling of the onion, it is not the act of coming into the lotus flower and it is 
definitely not the psycho-analytic setting of family dramas in which all of these 
examples deploy different layers of the non-portrayal by exploring oedipal 
relationships: as long as we peel of, as long as we read biological incidents and as long 
as we allow my cat we are accepting relations within a space-time continuum. 
 
The idiosyncrasy of with as a narrative conjunctium can no longer be the continuity of 
life-worldly pictures. The communio of life-worldly progress can be read by Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty while longing for As and In as its respective technical 
transformation. Perplex bearing A with B written by NarcissistgrotesqueFace negates 
the ability to draw liminal lines. The mounted Sculpture is much about the baseness that 
is not oppositional to the rhetoric of highness and therefore not relational but at the most 
the bearing of relations. The bearing of relations A with B is however the hyper-
schizophrenic effect that highlights via the abyss of the hyper addendeum the exposure 
of a from a-bject and the o of o-bject. The a and the o are the dirty elements of relations 
that are never relational in a touching and smelling sense: it is vagina with mouth. The 
undressing abyss of a and o is neither the additive nor subtractive bit of forming 
relations, it is rather the undoing vividness of bearing A with B in bearing the vestigium 
of disformed materiality. The disformation of undressing the abyss packs the gap of A 
with B while literally niedertrachten. The German verb  – a neologism – niedertrachten 
– referring to the verb trachten (to be looking forward to and to aspire to) and added by 
the adjective nieder (base) – confounds A with B by writing the hyper in reading the 
Aufgehobenheit of story-telling. Therefore we can see niedertrachten as the very point 
where we cannot grasp A with B but where we have to grab the perplexity of bearing A 
with B. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the subject of narration and description nor the 
                                                            
347 in reference to Gestaltstheorie. 
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fairy-tale depiction either – the perplex bearing A with B catches the scratching mounted 
Sculpture on bearing, on A, on B and finally on nibble off the rest of with. At this 
moment, grasping A with B is literally aufheben the crumbs of with – the transcendental 
eye of phenomenology is practically the phenomenography of picking and scratching on 
lexemes and therefore being beyond the breathing of A with B: the perplex bearing 
chops the air between me and A with B. In its latio we have to inscribe the graphos in 
which the NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the metaplasm of trans-graphos. The 
transvaluation of values has already happened before we even had been able to see the 
utterance of transgression – A and B are literally swallowed by 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Hence, the organon of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the vivid 
decay cancelling the double standards of linguistic practices while writing the 
Aufgehobenheit of hyper-schizophrenia348.  
 
The tugging vacuum of linguistic self-determinacy and its practical need cannot be kept 
up by translating A with B. The tugging of the hyper-schizophrenic determinacy by 
writing NarcissistgrotesqueFace tells us another story of echoing that peals the 
statement there is / there was. Between the pealed lines there is this hefty bearing of one 
plus one equal three that echoes a symptomatic outcry of NarcissistgrotesqueFace that 
is literally the hefty dementia of the echoing rime. The story of A with B is the 
libidinous violence of the Narcissist while hearing the echo of the rime. The hi-story of 
rime is the inquiry of the membrane of re-membran(c)e where we have to leave the ur-
syncretism of historical utterance. The suffering of libidinous violence is actually the 
accelerated experience of carnal physicality of NarcissistgrotesqueFace and the other 
way round the dynamics of physicality is the singular and dirty lexeme calling the 
symptomatic crises of cutting off representation: bearing A with B is the enactment of 
contradictory identifications that tells us about the smelly micro dirt on the street 
writing a-bjects and o-objects. To put it in other words, we have to commit that the 
form A with B is literally eaten up by NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The act of linguistic 
cannibalism is the insistency of translatio that enables us to be corroded while it is 
                                                            
348 The Aufgehobenheit of perplex seeing is therefore never Derrida’s rapport transgressive which 
articulates the combining forces of the senses of the world with the non-sense of practice. This rapport 
however is the knot of Derrida with life-worlds; the knottiness of rapport and life-worlds is the 
deconstruction of the spur that slips from us as soon as we want to grasp it. The knottiness contrasts 
radically with Benjamin’s Aura and much more with the vestigium of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The 
rapport transgressive has already happened before we have even been able to consider any form of 
connections: space and time are the legality for the scholastic vestigium, now it is still legal but no longer 
bearable. Hence, bearing A with B is translatio and definitely not translation. 
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actually occurring and vanishing. Bataille outlines the figuration of occurring and 
vanishing as the trias of thesis-antithesis-symptom349. His trias however is subverted by 
bearing A with B in such a way that the symptom of excess and lack is snitching off 
stories. The acting overrides the double topos of linguistic practices while drawing level 
with hyper-schizophrenia. The dilemma of syntactical aesthetics of the presence of A / B 
and the form with is deferred while writing the vestigium of the hyper. The symptoms of 
bearing A with B is the association of mouth and vagina and not the anthropological 
trope and therefore we have to admit that the hidden anthropological pivotal point 
disables any life-worldly features, not to mention linguistic projects, since it outsources 
the production of representation: ars renovate forma dicendi! The re-membran(c)e of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is in that relationship the semblance of Bataille’s formless that 
formulates the contingent relationship of concrete forms (cf. the spit) and philosophical 
formula (cf. being). The contingency of bas matérialisme occurs since the accent marks 
the dirty mouth and the dirt of the vagina. The semblance of Bataille’s reading with the 
connection of the rapport transgressive is striking. Therefore we can say that the co-
presence of antinomies does not avoid their pathological schizophrenia but keeps them 
alive by following the crumbs while telling about disformation that writes radically the 
symptoms of a non-humanistic foundation: mounted Sculpture, 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace, translatio bearing A with B are beyond phenomenological 
reach.   
 
Telling stories of perplex bearing A with B is the phenomenographic translatio of bas 
matérialisme writing the co-presence of ambivalent and alternative valuations before 
even engineering the valuating practices of linguistic realms. It is the picturesque play 
of hyper-schizophrenia that does not engineer but bears the static contradictions and 
limitations of life-worldly sceneries. The co-presence of A with B has this chiastic range 
of close-ups that are neither a hybrid nor a mixed up constellation of bearing the burden 
of life-world – the co-presence of bearing A with B tells stories without having the 
story-lines of NarcissistgrotesqueFace and therefore it cannot formulate within the 
linguistic setting any needs, presses, production processes, any feeling for newness and 
becoming story. It is the willenlose Beiwerk that is dirt since it cannot be translated into 
the carousel of categories. Instead, the vestigium of hyper tells us in its vertiginous 
distance that bearing A with B is the hyper clause of having too much of material 
                                                            
349 In reference to Didi-Huberman’s form-antithesis-symptom or form-antiform-symptom (Didi-Huberman 
2010: 326). 
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tautology and too little of forming daydreams. Hence, bearing A with B is the translatio 
or simply NarcissistgrotesqueFace and perplex NarcissistgrotesqueFace are therefore 
the change of emphasising dirty acts by deferring the ability of translatio and not 
primarily A with B as such. The translatio of bearing A with B is the blind plethora of 
capturing the picturesque NarcissistgrotesqueFace where you never would expect it – 
translatio is the inevitability of the emptiness of fleshy words. Hyper-schizophrenic 
writing of translatio is consequently therefore the story of dirty eyes which are in search 
of crumbs. Hence, the phenomenographic story is – without the dirt of 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace while bearing A with B – a close fisted eye of the very 
bourgeois transparent view. The dirt of bearing life-world is the ornament of linguistic 
hyper-schizophrenia that mounts the Sculpture in which the perplex of bearing A with B 
is the niedertracht of the mounted Sculpture. In a no-man’s land the perplex éclat 
allows us to write a sincerity of translatio since the heuristic of type-resemblances350 is 
pointless; co-presence is the buzzing of a lateral life-world in which the subversion and 
bearing of are not just attempting to bear the long shot of life-worldly practices. Hence, 
translation is neither translatio militans nor translatio passive, translatio of co-presence 
is not the oscillating attitude of activa and passiva and therefore it is deprived of 
fatalistic reading of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Or to put it with other words, translatio is 
not an aggregate and therefore we can say A is the translation of B. Hence, we have to 
continue that storytelling A with B is neither synchron nor diachron, but is the co-
presence of the willenlose Beiwerk that never alienates from the time-passing 
momentum. And therefore phenomenography is the noise in my eyes spelling out the 
carnal body while writing NarcissistgrotesqueFace. 
 
                                                            
350 It is about type-semblance of anthropological differences, while writing female and male. 
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EPITHETON   
 
The catharsis of this thesis is to portray how co-presence of NarcissistgrotesqueFace 
translates language without language and how No to language is the iconoclastic 
reading of the phenomenon. Indeed, the juxtapositioning of A with B radicalises the 
transfer-material of linguistic realms in life-world tampering without knowing its 
(relational) consequences: the utterly No is the radical position that makes the act of 
translatio literally perplex and immobile – there is no taxonomy of salvation and no 
token of aesthetic production351. We have seen in chapter III Perplex Coenesthesia that 
grammar, taxonomy and wording are no longer the reference for linguistic practices and 
translation is not the transfer act by producing its corresponding realms in which the 
gaze of the phenomenologist reveals the organic unity of A and B. Translation is thus 
from chapter III on not a theory of gazing relations but rather it is bearing A with B that 
can never write the gaze in which the phenomenon of A and B becomes A with B. Yes, 
the perplex washes out the transcendental epiphany of phenomenological reading and 
leaves us – the reader and writer – to use language and grammar but not understanding / 
accepting their (transformative) power. At this point, we have to learn to bear with since 
referring to language without accepting its consummation is the montage-practice of 
writing the phenomenon. And it is at this very point where my proposed 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace bears up the differing materiality in its Kafkaesque 
momentum: the material will neither be produced, disseminated, gazed at nor seen as 
fallen practice of neither linguistic nor epistemological realms but it has to bear the 
material of A with B in co-presence – the grotesque of co-presence is this melancholic 
appearance of affiliation that cannot be formulated in which I write 
NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Hence, it is about a translational void in its material 
disformation in which the introduction of NarcissistgrotesqueFace, mounted Sculpture, 
vestigium, willenlose Beiwerk, etc. are artificial figures or trickster gods which speak 
                                                            
351 While finalising my thesis I discovered a letter exchange of Adorno and Benjamin in which Adorno 
problematises Benjamin’s correlative reading of base and superstructure. My juxtapositioning of language 
and its differed practice of the phenomenon resembles Benjamin’s position; Adorno to Benjamin: 
“Lassen Sie mich hier so simpel und hegelisch mich ausdrücken wie nur möglich. Täusche ich mich nicht 
sehr, so gebricht es dieser Dialektik an einem: der Vermittlung. Es herrscht durchwegs eine Tendenz, die 
pragmatischen Inhalte Baudelaires unmittelbar auf benachbarte Züge der Sozialgeschichte seiner Zeit und 
zwar möglichst solche ökonomischer Art zu beziehen. (…) daß ich es für methodisch unglücklich halte, 
einzelne sinnfällige Züge aus dem Bereich des Überbaus ‘materialistisch’ zu wenden, indem man sie zu 
entsprechenden Zügen des Unterbaus unvermittelt und wohl gar kausal in Beziehung setzt. Die 
materialistische Determination kultureller Charaktere ist möglich nur vermittelt durch den 
Gesamtprozess” (Benjamin 1978: 784f).  
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out the deficiency of translating the linguistic material into life-worldly realms; the 
multiplied usage of these notions – which are actually in my reading not notions kat 
exochen – are glossary lines352 passing from behold the lexeme to verbosity of the told 
which has in turn nothing to do with an organised spook of juxtapositioning (Moholy-
Nagy 1978: 75). Consequently, translating via the link of with is neither spooky nor 
nihilistic in which anything and everything can make sense out of it, it is rather a 
synoptic reading of Bataille’s bas matérialisme that turns out to be the material of 
bearing the disformed material. It is no longer about reading-understanding but it is 
more about the proliferation of the act: what are artificial figures doing with you – the 
reader – but also with me – the writer –, is therefore the translational bathos of being 
here and there. Thus, chapter III is not a theoretical tract of disformation but the enacted 
engagement with disformation in which the performance has been literally practiced in 
perplexity: it is no longer about the causal efficiency of explaining, understanding and 
gazing at the phenomenon, it is rather the performance in which the reference reginold 
is just another play figure of you that has never been written353. Therefore, chapter III is 
not the total collapse of references, it rather affirms that language and translation is a 
performative practice of the scenery. This invites us to read scholarly exegesis – in our 
case the exegesis of the translational phenomenon – not on the ground of fixed points 
but rather as an oblique practice of the subsidiary in which a sideline is actually the 
actor on the stage.  
 
Hence, reading the trifold architecture of this thesis shows us how phenomenological 
translation has been evolved from a linguistic practice of the ordinary life in which life-
world has been fixed by the reward of the transcendental line (Husserl) and its 
epistemology of the ordinary. The analysis of Husserl will point at the chiastic practice 
of reading language as the carnal fixation of A in B (Merleau-Ponty) and outline on top 
of that, hyper-readings of disseminating practices (Reginold) as the No to episteme-
transcendentality-ontology. We have seen how this intervention transforms the self-
rewarding transcendental line of A as A’ to B to the chiastic shimmering of ontological 
A in B. This chiastic practice of linguistic usage is the lateral position of language which 
                                                            
352  In reference to the special edition of Les Documents: Doctrines, Archéologie, Beaux-Arts, 
Ethnographie (from 1929-31) in which Bataille et al. established an anti-dictionary. Felix Philipp Ingold 
writes in the Neuen Zürcher Zeitung: “Er sieht das Ziel des Unternehmen darin, die Wörter aus ihrer 
konventionellen Begrifflichkeit herauszulösen, sie dem Rausch preiszugeben, ihnen neues Leben 
einzuhauchen” http://www.perlentaucher.de/buch//kritisches-woerterbuch.html (27th May 2014).   
353 Edward Casey refers that “(…) to orient, after all, is to orientate to something other than that which 
does the orientating itself” (Casey 1997: 234). 
 198 
is finally through its fixum somehow tamed by its transcendental conditions in which 
the voiceless possess voice, the homeless translates his homeless being into the night 
shelter for the homeless and in which the gaze finds finally its regard. In total contrast, 
No to translation is NarcissistgrotesqueFace – this life-word reality without taxonomy – 
that bears at the abyss with its repetition in absurdum; there is no essence of the 
phenomenon – no veritas ontologica – that will claim its translation since it follows the 
formula: to have everything as itself (Blumenberg 2001: 52). The transfer zone is 
therefore the capitalistic sold out of life-world: transferring A to B is the trade off of A’ 
as B and A in B. Hence, the translation of A with B or the anastrophe B with A cannot be 
dissected as phenomenon in life-world but has to be read all in one breath, in an 
accelerando that transfers before even the transfer has been gazed at. This is the 
performance of the translation that bears A with B before the epistemological dichotomy 
of life-world rolls out the speculative gesture of eidos and eidolon – the performance 
follows the wobble of Narcissist’s tear drop. This is the reason why the 
phenomenological attempt to translate life-world has been replaced by the graphein of 
the phenomenon – the act of translatio writes NarcissistgrotesqueFace as the wobbling 
of practice. Or to put it with other words, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the untouchable 
figuration of wording the phenomenon. Consequently, the trajectory of this study shows 
us the shift of the perspectives: from doxographic analysis (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) 
to biographical performance (Reginold). Hence, the reception of Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty, in reading the translation of life and world, shows us that Husserl’s A as A’ to B 
is very eager to explain the relationship in life-world354. With Merleau-Ponty, the 
translation machinery of explaining the world has been more and more detached from a 
world full of explanation to a world full of understanding in which the preposition in 
declares the fusion of horizons and in which the empathy of living in this world is the 
movens for understanding the out-there in the world. A world full of story telling 
contrasts with the corrective of linking in which neither explaining nor comprehending 
can grasp the practice of translating; my bearing A with B is the practice of telling 
without telos355. Through the act of telling, we are exploring the scenery of life-world in 
                                                            
354 cf. Hans Blumenberg: “Die Lebenswelttheorie dient, so ruppig sich dies ausnehmen mag, nicht dem 
Verständnis der Lebenswelt. Ihre Definition schliesst das aus: Sie ist es, die sich von selbst versteht. Sie 
bedarf keiner Nachhilfen und gibt keine. Sie ist nichts für eine Avantgarde der Bewusstseinsbildung” 
(Blumenberg 2001: 22). 
355 Sarah Ahmed refers still to phenomenology while writing: “This is how phenomenology offers a queer 
angle – by bringing objects to life in their ‘loss’ of place, in the failure of gathering to keep things in their 
place” (Ahmed 2006: 165). Her theorising practice of bringing is a phenomenological analysis; I 
suggested to turn towards the performance of writing, while loosing the contact zone of being with as 
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highly differing non-differentiating negotiations: not words will be translated but the 
bathos of styles. Story telling in its unpredictable feature will overrun the transcendental 
means of explaining and comprehending. Therefore the triad explaining – 
comprehending – telling tells us a lot about how the body of theory – especially in the 
humanities – has been used over time and under which paradigm the translation of the 
phenomenon has been captured to finally write there is no language. The 19th century 
was guided by Positivism in which Erklären via scientific discoveries was translating 
the objects into life-worldly features. Inspired by the Neo-Kantian Methodenlehre and 
by the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann, Husserl’s attempt was spurred on by the 
description of facts while attempting to analyse its coherences and figurative 
appearance. Under this aegis, notions of fixations were the response to physical 
accuracy: A as A’ to B is the logical formula of how life-world has to be translated. The 
hermeneutical tradition in turn has emphasised the relationship of psychological 
epistemology while addressing the relatum in life-world: this is Merleau-Ponty’s A in B 
that digs deeply into a lateral epistemology of Verstehen. In contrast to these traditions, 
my attempt to read the world via phenomenographical performance is an attempt to 
leave the fettle of phenomenological transcendentality far behind. The narrative 
endeavour of story telling is therefore literally the graphein of my biography in which 
acting is another name for the entanglement and situatedness of being a scholar. The 
Cartesian subject-object trope is the legitimation of academia to study and analyse what 
academia refers to as the intelligible object; referring the sober object to the practice of 
story-telling is in this context radically dismissed or messed up: the material of 
linguistic practice is not a feature of targeting and analysing A and B, it is rather a messy 
task of bearing A with B356. This narrative practice is a critical continuation of science 
study, considered especially in reference to Science, Technology and Society (STS) and 
to scholars like Annemarie Mol (1998 and 2002) and John Law (2002a, 2002b and 
2004) where the assemblage of gazing cannot write a single story but is looking for 
jagged story-lines (Mol & Law 2007: 102); this is where I the scholar is also I the 
percussionist or where my scholarly questioning is the translation of my daily 
drumming practice357.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
feature of a phenomenology of bringing; Ahmed uses bringing objects to life rather in a descriptive sense 
and remains therefore phenomenologist.  
356 It might be now clear that the mounted Sculpture of bearing A with B is in its material deferral practice 
flanked by the assemblage trope of (on the one side) Formalism and (on the other side) Surrealism.  
357 In Beethoven’s 3rd Symphony Eroica, he perverts the role of being a composer: the composer is 
suddenly part of the composition and tries to master his own deficiency. It is a radical turn in which the 
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Thus, translatio in phenomenography is this kind of translationess358 that reads the 
material in jagged story lines in which the differed practice exposes not only the text but 
also the tissue of the text. Terry Eagleton outlines that materialistic readings of Marxism 
narrows the phenomenon of textual tissue to a simple output of generative happenings: 
“Marxism, as an inevitably ‘limited’, ‘text’, thus stands in ironic relation to the 
historical ‘text’ it exits to produce, and whose emergence will finally signify its own 
demise. Historical materialism stands to its object somewhat as a materialist criticism 
stands to its text. Its task is to refuse the phenomenal coherence of that text’s narrative 
presence so as to expose the generative mechanisms that produce its repressed 
heterogeneity” (Eagleton 2009: 69). This citation shows and makes it clear that my plea 
for materiality contrasts with any figurations of generative grammar by writing 
deferring practices, which do not follow the rhetoric of becoming and beginning. 
Translatio is not the generative mechanics liberating A and B through reading with. The 
quintessence of chapter III was subliminally to show that the material phenomenon 
cannot write the relatum mechanics of space and time and consequently, we have seen 
that the differing practice is this absurd immobility of language. Accordingly, the 
acceptance of the space-time continuum is the historicised temporality that outlines the 
generative line in which life-world produces on the one side A and B and on the other 
the difference of A and B – this differentiating practice is the signifiant which is able to 
construct life-world and therefore translating its concerns into grammar. However, my 
proposed bearing A with B practice will stumble over its two-dimensionality (2D) – 
translatio of the differed material is rather the three-dimensional (3D) lining in which 
the endogenic space-time narration (2D) is blasted out by space-time-! (3D). The 
exclamation mark is the jagged positioning in A with B. Or in other words, by 
introducing the 3D optic of space-time-! we have to read that the material framework 
applies the materialistic feature in a complete other way: co-presence of the willenlose 
Beiwerk is not the translated output of the organised world, it is rather the vestigium of a 
historic text that is never a quotation of history. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the 
shortened citation or the sideline that we do not know. Phenomenographic seeing is this 
noise in my eyes that perverts the etiology of describing life with world as the shorted 
citation. Relating the trope shorted citation with practice is indeed Alice Walker’s 
sewing machine that has suffered an ineffable martyrdom: rape, being separated from 
                                                                                                                                                                              
composer Beethoven is the exposed theme of Eroica: he pleases himself into the centre of the 
composition – indeed, it is biographein.  
358 In reference to Terry Eagleton’s difference of literature and literariness (Eagleton 2008: 5). 
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children and sister, forced marriage and humiliation by the husband has not broken the 
sewing machine; Alice Walker, the sewing machine is the iconoclastic material of the 
phenomenon translating NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Thus, we have seen that with is the 
entropy of jagging materiality that writes the anastrophe either way and we can declare 
now that graphein is the credo in which the scenery of life-world is only passable but 
never an object of analysis. It is also a credo in which the mimesis line is the bodily 
sweat of which the figure NarcissistgrotesqueFace is made out of. Hence, translation is 
this praxeographic writing that goes beyond reginold and it is material that will be 
positioned as a shorted sideline of remo. 
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APPENDIX: SOTTO VOCE 
 
The notation sotto voce is used in western vocal music359 to indicate the lowering of 
vocal volumina in order to create a certain atmosphere within the expression of sound 
compositions – sotto voce is an expressive agency to indicate, to emphasise, to redeem, 
to disturb a performance. Therefore affettuoso is notated to create another modulation in 
the expression of a vocal line. This transformative practice of exposing recalls the 
tension of theatrical scenes in which the actor is exposed to create a relatum with the 
audience but also in which the vocalist modulates an inner relatum with her / his very 
own tectonic of expressing. The transformative tension of this double relation pulls of 
an atmospheric necessitas progressing the compositum by integrating the modulated 
voice into the volumina of the soundscape. The scenery of relational necessitas is not 
simply the cantus firmus of the composition, the soundscape of sotto voce speaks out 
the affetto of a dramatic unsolved tension-rest: the affetto is actually the vacuum of the 
double relational line in the volumina of soundscaping. Exactly, it is about the 
volumina-vacuum in which the necessitas of the compound disturbs the rhythm of the 
vocal expression; the act of affetto evokes for a tiny fraction the soutenu of the cantus 
firmus – yes, it is indeed a fermata of the ornamental unknown. The continuum of the 
fermata is the necessitas of breathing out the distorted ornament and on the other hand it 
is likewise the struggle of how the vacuum of continuo and soutenu will enact the 
composition. The emphasis is not only on suspending the pulse of breath but also on the 
ornamental continuum as the nebulous incursion of the Unerhörte360. The emphatic 
streak of the Unerhörte is thus the unerhörte crescendo transforming the compositional 
sotto voce as the unresolved rest of the volumina – it is a mobile vacuum of expressing 
in which sotto is clothed by the intonated pitch of voce or to put it in other words, the 
Unerhörte comes along with the presence of the bel canto voice. Hence, the mobile 
vacuum is the distortion of lingering sound-shreds that cannot be compromised by the 
dia-logoi of the composition; the twine feature is rather the marvellous transfer from the 
theoretical vacuum distortion into literally the Unerhörte silence of the expression. This 
transfer is radical insofar as the Unerhörte will neither guide nor liberate the double 
relation of the volumina-vacuum – the gesture of the Unerhörte is the Poltergeist who 
                                                            
359 Cf. for further readings: Sotto Voce (Honegger / Massenkeil 1982: 393). 
360 Das Unerhörte has a twisting double meaning: 1. (literally) non heard and 2. enormous and 
tremendous. 
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will not consider the vocalist nor the auditor / the audience. In this vacuum volumina the 
Unerhörte is not the dialectic trick of a third figure who / which makes things 
happening. No, the Unerhörte is the very practice of sotto voce that can neither enact the 
telos of denouement nor practice the psychological performance of the vocalist; the 
performance of sotto voce yields definitely the psychological oikonomia of aesthetics – 
it is the unerhörte continuum of the suspension that has no cantus. The very frozen 
breath of the unerhörte is the punctum that neutralises space and time as its reference 
zone in which the audience and the vocalist might be simply a distorted practice of sotto 
voce. Therefore we have to declare that the latency of sotto voce is a perplex figure that 
expresses its non-existence; the tension filled silence, in which the figuration is much 
more imposing than the affetuoso might intend, does not follow aesthetic formations nor 
does it outline the hermeneutical horizon; the diachronic piano within sotto voce is 
never the performance of the synchronic volumina of piano and forte. The Unerhörte of 
sotto voce is the piano that is grotesque in its ornamental expression: it is the incredible 
pouring of the beguiling that stuns the flaneur while ambling along the written score. 
Practically, the punctum of the Unerhörte constrains to write the score and listen to its 
performance. The presence of a stimulus tearing the transfer from the sotto voce act to 
its score is the co-presence of sotto and voce which in turn will write a willenloses 
Beiwerk. And exactly this very constraint of the co-presence writing the willenlose 
Beiwerk, as the spur of the impossibility of the Unerhörte, is the transformation that will 
never happen kat exochen. The transformative act is the violence of the spur at the spur 
– yes, the violence of the spur at the spur is the duplex that writes sotto voce while 
following the scent in the nebula of its very taste. The nebulous longing is the transfer 
of sotto voce that tries to get on to the track with the scent of sotto voce while 
attempting to resound the utterance of its phenomenon. Hence, the transfer of the 
modulation does not happen in the expression of the very vocal part but is an oblique 
happening revealing the very incongruency of the act: the scent of the sound is 
transferring the modulation of sotto voce in a non-relational reality – it is the shatter of 
the unerhörte voice. The subliminal stimulation of sotto voce is in its unerhörte and 
non-fixed utterance fostering the non-mastery of irritation. The diachronic practice of 
non-mastery and irritation cannot be synthesised by a third figure which balances out 
the resistance in time. The non-mastery is the gasping vocalist who cannot capture the 
irritation of the spur at the spur. This aporia strikes sotto voce not by remembering the 
fetters of its intractability but by practising its transfer to modulations that are – for their 
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parts – in turn never the arché of expression and therefore never the topography of 
sounding. Thus, the subliminal line of the very trans that wants to express something 
before we are even aware is the messy situation that keeps us stumbling. But however, 
the sotto voce act is neither a situation nor a performance, it is rather a position that 
keeps its instability since it is at the mercy of disarming its position that actually has no 
positioning; this is why Wolfgang Rihm’s Dis-kontur (1974) is a great piece of music 
but it will never be a composition.  
 
Hence, the emblematic position of the Unerhörte is the position where the vocal-
expression is not the utterance of the written score and therefore never the practice of a 
response; the echoing effect of the mirror misses and therefore the rhetoric of anamnesis 
is fighting a loosing battle. The transfer of sotto voce dooms anamnesis since its 
possibility does not serve as cliché, as footnote nor as catalyst. It is the harsh 
discontinuity of its expression that bears with the scenery that has no voice, no vocalist, 
no composer and no audience. Sotto voce is nebulous present in where the scotoma of 
sotto voce is the sound of tasty seeing. It is this distorted co-presence of act and life that 
bears an instable position on stage although without having a position on stage. The 
juxtaposition of sotto and voce is therefore the unresolved phonographein that does not 
write the phoné of presentability but creates a phenomenological anticipation of the 
informed graphein where the instability of the positioning and the non-positioning are 
simultaneously bearing with… . The anticipation of … has – in a structural sense – no 
tectonic practice and consequently turns any mirroring effects into epiphenomena of the 
Unerhörte. The redemption of the Unerhörte as the other zone streaks next to 
Blumenberg’s Fliegenglas in which he – in reference to Wittgenstein – revises the trap 
of Plato’s cave allegory as the incorporation of the impossible in reality (Blumenberg 
2001: 436). Hence, the trap of the phenomenon forces us to see that the impossibility of 
the Unerhörte is not the incorporation of the impossible but rather the impossible is the 
informed reality of the phenomenon sotto voce. This radical position always follows the 
other zone and it is this very other informed reality, where we are constantly struggling 
with the Unerhörte of the impossible other reality, and therefore we have to declare that 
anamnesis is definitely just another invective. The discontinuity of the invective is the 
appellation of the impossible reality. The movement of the Unerhörte is therefore No; it 
is a no that will not follow the composition, it is a no that does not reconcile the 
audience with the vocalist and it is a no that expresses the urgency of the score. This no 
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is about a translation that cannot follow form and content, it is about this informed 
translation that says no to the composition and no to the performance on the stage. 
Though, the Unerhörte translates the ticking of the watch on the performing stage. Et 
voilà, the phenomenon sotto voce is the immanent compositional pleasure of cum and 
syn that writes an incommensurability where the disturbance, the stage, the clothing of 
the audience, the make-up of the vocalist and the brick stones of the auditorium writes 
the act of sotto voce.   
 
Hence, this diffracted modus vivendi is a plea for lively approaches wherein flexible 
modes of seeing, hearing, smelling and tasting are at the core and offer an arsenal of 
criticism against the substantial material of a composition: by the very act of seeing the 
sound cannot be understood – but it can be tasted! The imposition of the composition 
becomes therefore silent, since it is that which is still pending – and issue of formality; 
the engaged performance of the silenced voice is more readily a play of contradictions 
than a preservation of identities. Just as anamnesis is driven by a mimetic desire, which 
can never be satisfied, the transfer of sotto voce is a struggle, not with the concept of 
identities but with the deferring differences in writing a mobile vacuum of life-world. 
Writing an analysis on sotto voce and attempting almost to enact its taxis gives us a hint 
about the figuration of how translation interferes with the Unerhörte. A phenomenology 
of sotto voce shows us that the phenomenon can no longer be captured with 
denomination formulas, the sotto voce drama is an empty shell: a phenomenon without 
content.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
Benjamin: Benjamin: Gesammelte Schriften.  
 
Benjamin Briefe: Benjamin: Walter Benjamin Briefe Vol. I-II.  
 
DE: Foucault: Dits et écrits 1954-1975.  
 
DES: Descartes: Oeuvres de Descartes.  
 
FICH: Fichte: Gesamtausgabe.  
 
Freud: Freud: Studienausgabe.  
 
HUA: Husserl: Husserliana. 
 
KrV: Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  
 
KV: Merleau-Ponty: Keime der Verunft. 
 
KUK: Kant: Kritik der Urteilskraft. 
 
Marges: Derrida: Marges.  
 
MC: Foucault: Les mots et les choses.  
 
OE: Merlau-Ponty: L’Oeil et l’Esprit. 
 
PhP: Merleau-Ponty: Phénoménologie de la Perception. 
 
PrW: Merleau-Ponty: Primat der Wahrnehmung. 
 
Prosa: Merleau-Ponty: La prose du monde. 
 
RC: Merleau-Ponty: Résumés de Cours. Collège de France 1952-1960.  
 
SC: Merleau-Ponty: La Structure du Comportement. 
  
Signes: Merleau-Ponty: Signes. 
 
SNS: Merleau Ponty: Sens et non-sens.  
 
Summa: Aquinas: Summa Theologiae. 
 
SZ: Heidegger: Sein und Zeit.   
 
VNV: Merleau-Ponty: Le visible et l’invisible.  
 
VL: Merleau-Ponty: Vorlesungen I.  
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VP: Derrida: La Voix et le phénomène.  
 
Wörterbuch: Kiesow / Schmdigen: Kritisches Wörterbuch.  
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